













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
 
 Critical Hermeneutics 
 
Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives in 
Turkey on the Understanding and Interpretation 
of The Qur’an  
AUTHOR: YUSUF ÇELIK 
Doctor of Philosophy 




















Doctor of Philosophy No. of words in 






Critical Hermeneutics: Contemporary Philosophical 
Perspectives in Turkey on the Understanding and 
Interpretation of the Qur’an 
 
From the moment of its revelation, the Qur’an has held a pivotal importance 
for Muslims. However, reverence for the Qur’an did not by default mean an 
indiscriminate application of its message. On the contrary, as old as the Qur’an 
is, there is also an equally old tradition of hermeneutics that ponders upon the 
operations and conditions in which the meanings of the Qur’an become 
intelligible and significant for different contexts. In this dissertation I have 
explored the hermeneutical theories of three Turkish thinkers by asking the 
following question: what is the status of new and variant interpretations of the 
Qur’an in contemporary Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics as exemplified by the 
works of Cündioğlu, Alpyağıl, and Öztürk? Accordingly, I have discovered that 
new and different interpretations of the Qur’an are only meaningful and 
justified if they fulfil the right subjective and objective requirements an 
interpreter must impose on him or herself as a subject. On the objective side 
these requirements include the following of a formal method and 
understanding of the historical use of Arabic. However, on the subjective side, 
other requirements are stipulated, such as faith, conscience, and self-
knowledge. By integrating subjectivity in interpretation, the Turkish authors 
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open a constructive theoretical path to new readings of the Qur’an that are 
informed by the subject’s relative context. However, despite reaching new 
thresholds of interpretation, the Turkish authors have chosen to defer the full 
potential of their hermeneutics to the prudence of future interpreters, rather 
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Critical Hermeneutics: Contemporary Philosophical 
Perspectives in Turkey on the Understanding and 
Interpretation of the Qur’an 
 
For Muslims the Qur’an symbolizes God’s final will unto humankind. 
Accordingly, great attention is devoted to implementing the message of the 
Qur’an to everyday life. However, as reverent as Muslims might be, they are 
not hastily applying themselves to the message of the Qur’an without any 
forethought. As old as revelation itself, Muslims also have a tradition that 
ponders upon the right conditions in which they can understand the message 
of the Qur’an. This tradition is better known as Qur’an hermeneutics.  
 
In this dissertation I have explored three Turkish thinkers that have dedicated 
their works towards a better understanding of the Qur’an. I have explored their 
works in light of the following question: what is the status of new and variant 
interpretations of the Qur’an in contemporary Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics as 
exemplified by the works of Cündioğlu, Alpyağıl, and Öztürk? In other words, I 
have inquired into the particular appreciation that Turkish thinkers have or do 
not have for new ways in which the Qur’an is read.  
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Whilst trying to answer this question, I have discovered that the Turkish 
authors only constructively appreciate new readings when they fulfil certain 
personal and impersonal requirements that an interpreter must oblige by.  All 
three authors require that interpreters, regardless of who they are as a person, 
must interpret the Qur’an in accordance with rules and practical use of Arabic 
during the 6th and 7th century. However, two authors (Alpyağıl and Öztürk), 
have also required the interpreter to personally have faith, humility, and moral 
scruples.  
 
By allowing for interpreters to also consider their personal situations, these 
Turkish authors have paved the way for new readings of the Qur’an that are 
context sensitive. Nevertheless, despite creating a field for new interpretations, 
these Turkish authors do not fully explore the limitations and possibilities of 
this field. They would rather defer judgment on what one can or cannot 








Notes on citations  
 
All principal references to the Qur’an have been made from Yusuf Ali’s English 
translation. Except for cases where a theoretical point is made clearer with other 
English translations of the Qur’an. In such cases other Qur’an translations are 
explicitly cited.  
 
All references to Islamic concepts by the Turkish thinkers have principally been left 
in their native Turkish and Latinised form (e.g. iman and not imān). References to 
Islamic concepts not directly related to the particular word usage of the Turkish 
thinkers, have been transliterated from their original Arabic forms.  
 
Translated references made by Turkish thinkers to English sources, have been 
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The primacy of the Qur’an for the Muslim Weltanschauung is unmistakable. 
Without the Qur’an, there would be no divine message that would incept 
Muhammad’s prophetic mission, and thus, there would be no Islam as we know it. 
This primacy is, at a more technical level, reinforced through the conventional 
theological belief that the Qur’an is itself directly related to God as His speech. As a 
result, the Qur’an’s status is directly connected with the status of God. Since God – 
as the creator and master of the Universe – has the highest authority, it only follows 
that the will of God expressed in His speech enjoys the utmost pre-eminence. 
Moreover, because God is omniscient and wise, it is only expected, as al-Ghazālī (d. 
1111) stated, that the greatest teaching and wisdom is contained in the speech of 
God (aʿzamu al-ḥikmati kalāmullāhi taʿālā)1.   
 
Given Muslim claims about the Qur’an’s origins with God, anyone believing in the 
divine status of the Qur’an should attentively heed its calling. Moreover, the Qur’an 
asserts that to be heard by God one must first listen to God: “I listen to the prayer 
of every suppliant when he calleth on Me: Let them also, with a will, Listen to My 
call, and believe in Me: That they may walk in the right way.”2 As the latter part of 
the prior verse indicates, the telos of listening is to walk in the right way. In other 
words, the Qur’an is not listened to in order to intuit a mere rapport by God, but in 
order to receive “guidance and good tidings”3. This means that the Qur’an has to be 
of consequence in the lives of its believers. Put differently, the Qur’an must be, 
what I would call, “life pertinent”. For as the Qur’an states, it is a book revealed in 
order “that it may give admonition to any (who are) alive”4.  
 
 
1 Al-Ghazālī, The Niche Of Lights, trans. David Buchman (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 
1998), 10a. 
2 Qur’an 2:186 
3 Qur’an 2:97 
4 Qur’an 36:70 
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The fourteen-century old tradition of Islamic jurisprudence lends its very existence 
to this premise that God’s speech does not only contain historical rapports (ikhbār; 
qaṣas) but also a charging address (khiṭāb al-taklīfī) of vital pertinence. 
Understanding (fiqh) itself is reconceptualized as an exercise in prudence 
wherewith one discerns how God’s formal address relates to one’s life. Thus, 
understanding is not a simple reconstructive exercise in which the verbal 
significance of words is made intelligible, but rather, as the grand jurist Abū Ḥanīfa 
(d. 767) defines, it is “the comprehension (maʿrifa) by the soul (nafs) of that which 
benefits it (mā lahā) and which harms it (ma ʿalayhā).”5 The formal address of God 
can ultimately only be understood if one is able to properly relate this address to 
their Lebenswelt in terms of how it helps one to avoid the hazardous and pursue the 
beneficial.  
 
Recently, Shahab Ahmad has further generalized this premise by relating it to the 
very core of what constitutes Islam. As Ahmad recounts:  
 
“The historical phenomenon of Islam is the varied product of that engagement of 
the human with the Divine; it is the apprehension, elaboration and articulation by 
Muslims in their individual and collective lives of the meaning(s) of the Truth of the 
Divine Revelation”6.  
 
Accordingly, rather than coinciding Islam with things such as “religion”, “culture”, 
“symbol system”, or “discursive tradition”7, Ahmad has opted to conceptualize 
Islam as - what he calls - a ‘hermeneutical engagement’. Islam is an “engagement by 
an actor or agent with a source or object of (potential) meaning in a way that 
ultimately produces meaning for the actor by way of the source.”8  
 
 
5 Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ Al-Talwīḥ ʿalā Al-Tawdīḥ Li-Matni Al-Tanqīḥ Fī Uṣūl Al-Fiqh, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1996), 16. 
6 Shahab Ahmad, What Is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2016), 344. 
7 Ahmad, 302. 
8 Ahmad, 345. 
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To reformulate Ahmad’s observations, Muslims have thus surrendered9 their selves 
unto God’s revelation in order to organize their lives according to its truth. As Rumi 
(d. 1273) further ratifies this, “While I live, I will be the servant of the Qur’an.”10 The 
Qur’an is, and always will be for Muslims, as Goethe’s diwan lyrically claimed: “das 
Buch der Bücher” (the book above all books).  However, regardless of the Qur’an’s 
status, the assimilation of the truth of the Qur’an with life, was not an act 
performed without preponderance and discrimination. Rather, at various turns in 
history Muslims have sought to reflect upon the grounds and means upon which 
their understanding of God’s revelation ought to rely and proceed. In other words, 
Muslims have from the very beginning of the Qur’an’s history also engaged in 
Qur’an hermeneutics.  
 
In the following thesis, I will explore a particular context and turn in the history of 
Qur’an hermeneutics that has not received as much attention as it deserves. The 
context of which I speak, is contemporary Turkey. The works of three present-day 
authors (Alpyağıl, Cündioğlu, and Öztürk) will be discussed—each of whom has 
contributed in their unique own ways to the contemporary discourse on Qur’an 
hermeneutics. The central question wherewith my engagement with their work will 
be guided, is as follows: what is the status of new and variant interpretations of the 
Qur’an in contemporary Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics as exemplified by the works of 
Cündioğlu, Alpyağıl, and Öztürk?  
 
Before this question is answered in the subsequent chapters, a variety of prefatory 
topics will be first addressed in this chapter that provide context and direction to 
the present thesis. These prefatory topics are as follows:  the current status of 
Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey according to existing research, the particular 
importance of inquiring into the status of variant interpretations of the Qur’an in 
the Turkish context, and the methodological principles by which this inquiry will be 
 
9 The term Muslim is the active participle of the Arabic aslama: “to surrender”.  
10 My translation from the Persian “ مراد ناج رگا منآرق ٔهدنب نم ”. Jalāl al-Dīn Al-Rūmī, “Dīwan-i Shams,” 
accessed November 14, 2019, https://ganjoor.net/moulavi/shams/robaeesh/sh1330/. 
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answered. It is in this last part, where I will establish the principal methodological 
presumption of this thesis, and argue that there is a strong thematic and dialectical 
connection between the status of new and divergent interpretations of the Qur’an 
and the theoretical discussions on the possibilities and limitations of objectively 
interpreting the Qur’an vis-à-vis subjectively interpreting the Qur’an. Accordingly, 
since there is an innate thematic and dialectical relationship between both aspects, 
the one cannot be discussed without involving the other. Moreover, it means that 
the most productive way into understanding the status of new and divergent 
interpretations of the Qur’an in the works of the Turkish thinkers, is through a 
discussion of their ideas pertaining to the subjective and objective dimensions of 
understanding the Qur’an more broadly. 
 
Status of prior research  
 
A study of Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey is reflexively a study of Islamic intellectual 
discourse in Turkey. Without a doubt, the entire enterprise of Qur’an hermeneutics 
as a philosophical endeavour, to understand the grounds and the means that serve 
as the basis for any understanding of the Qur’an, is predicated on the existence and 
activity of intellectual discourse by Muslims. Qur’an hermeneutics is ultimately just 
one of the problems in the grand scheme of Islamic intellectual discourse.  Hence, 
an inquiry into the current status of research of Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey, 
starts with an evaluation of the research of contemporary Islamic intellectual 
discourse in Turkey.  
 
When it comes to the general study of Muslim intellectual discourse in Turkey, 
there is unanimity among some academics that research is scarce. The late 
sociologist Şerif Mardin (d. 2017) argued a decade ago that “In the contemporary 
literature on Islam and modernity the primary—and in fact overwhelming—voice is 
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that of a concentration on Arab or Salafi Islam.”11 Likewise, Silverstein has argued 
that both the institutions as well as the traditions of Islamic discourse in Turkey 
remain “relatively unfamiliar to those otherwise knowledgeable about the Muslim 
world.”12  
 
The current underrepresentation of Turkish thinking in Islamic studies has been 
explained in a variety of ways. Mardin, argued that studies on Islam in modernity 
failed to take the Turkish context into account, because the study of Islam in the 
Turkish context did not “not fit ready-made categories”13. Silverstein writing around 
the same time period concurs with this assessment by arguing that the “lack of 
interest is based on conceptualizations of the scope nature of Islamic traditions in 
recent centuries and their relationship to modernity that are in need of profound 
reformulation in light of the Ottoman and Turkish experience”14. On the other hand, 
Silverstein also argues that researchers lack the necessary language skills in order to 
attend to Islamic intellectual discourse in Turkey15. 
 
Other researchers, however, have made more moderate assessments by arguing 
that only particular fields have been neglected. Wilkinson has recently argued that 
while there exists ‘much prior’ sociological and political scholarship on religion in 
Turkey, “little work has been done to explicitly examine Turkish theological voices 
for their theological value.”16 Likewise, Dorroll has argued that while there does 
exist studies on Islamic thought in the Turkish Republic, these studies have been 
 
11 Mardin’s statement is further supported by the advanced attention given towards the translation 
of the works of Arab authors in English, French, or German, while I have yet to discover one single 
monograph of a contemporary Turkish Muslim intellectual translated to the previously mentioned 
languages. Şerif Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture 
and Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” Turkish Studies 6, no. 2 (January 1, 2005): 148. 
12 Brian Silverstein, “Islamist Critique in Modern Turkey: Hermeneutics, Tradition, Genealogy,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 47, no. 1 (2005): 134–60. 
13Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and 
Reconstruction in Operational Codes,” 148. 
14 Silverstein, “Islamist Critique in Modern Turkey: Hermeneutics, Tradition, Genealogy,” 137. 
15 Silverstein, 136. 
16 Taraneh Wilkinson, “Dialectics Not Dualities: Contemporary Turkish Muslim Thought in Dialogue” 
(Georgetown University, 2017), 10. 
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prevalently focused on conservative groups, and have therefore, neglected the 
more “liberal” voices17. Finally, without expressing any judgment on the general 
field of research, Körner has simply assessed that Turkey still remains “a great blank 
on the Western maps of Muslim exegesis.”18 Although, this latter claim carries less 
weight now in light of Pink’s recent studies19 on modern Muslim commentaries in 
Turkey and Indonesia.  
 
Recognizing the various lacunae, the prior authors have all sought in their own way 
to contribute to the further research of Islamic discourse in Turkey. However, the 
fact remains that only a few studies have been wholly dedicated to the 
philosophical aspects of Qur’an hermeneutics in the Turkish context. The most well-
known of these studies is Körner’s Revisionist Koran hermeneutics in contemporary 
Turkish University Theology: rethinking Islam. The second monograph that comes 
close to Korner’s work is Wilkinson’s dissertation Dialectics not Dualities: 
Contemporary Turkish Muslim Though in Dialogue. However, this work has a 
peripheral interest in hermeneutics. As Wilkinson states, “Finally, with Körner, I 
signal the importance of engaging and understanding Turkish theological 
discussions—but for a broader purpose than Qur’ān hermeneutics.”20  
 
Despite being one of the seminal contributions to this field, Körner’s work only 
focused on a particular “strain of thought”21 in Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics, 
respectively the thought belonging to ‘the Ankara School’. The Ankara School, 
however, is a movement pre-dominantly comprised of a “small group of avant-
 
17 Philip Dorroll, “‘The Turkish Understanding of Religion’: Rethinking Tradition and Modernity in 
Contemporary Turkish Islamic Thought,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 82 (November 
17, 2014): 1035. 
18 Felix. Körner, “Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology : 
Rethinking Islam” (Ergon, 2005), 21. 
19 Johanna. Pink, Muslim Qurʾānic Interpretation Today (Sheffield: Equinox, 2019). 
20 Wilkinson, “Dialectics Not Dualities: Contemporary Turkish Muslim Thought in Dialogue,” 57. 
21 Dorroll, “‘The Turkish Understanding of Religion’: Rethinking Tradition and Modernity in 
Contemporary Turkish Islamic Thought,” 1039. 
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garde reformist theology professors from Ankara University.”22  Accordingly, by 
virtue of this limitation, the principal narrative on Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey  
that exists in Western literature, is the one rooted in the institutional history and 
thought of the Ankara University. However, there are still vitally important 
unmapped areas left in the contemporary discourse on Qur’an hermeneutics in 
Turkey that are waiting to be uncovered. Hence, as I will demonstrate, a larger 
understanding of Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics involves more than the mere 
comprehension of the history and discussions pertaining to the Ankara School.  
 
The Ankara School: history and hermeneutics 
 
To better understand these uncharted areas of Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics, it is 
pertinent to explore and elaborate a bit more on the particular findings of prior 
research, even if it is predominantly limited to the Ankara School. By having a more 
complete understanding of the discourse on Qur’an hermeneutics produced by the 
Ankara School, we can subsequently better understand which types of discourse 
have been left out of consideration in existing scholarship.  
 
The origins of the Ankara School can be retraced to various reforms of religious 
education in Turkey that took place in the late-Ottoman era and the beginning of 
the Turkish Republic.  As Körner describes it, “The origin of Turkey's higher religious 
education of today is paradoxical in many ways. It is traditional and it is a novelty, it 
continues Ottoman lines and takes up Western structures, it follows a Kemalist 
programme and it may prove to be of worldwide relevance for Islam.”23 However, 
the politics  and ideology that lays at the root of the constitution  of  the Ankara 
 
22 Recep Şentürk, “Islamic Reformist Discourses and Intellectuals in Turkey: Permanent Religion with 
Dynamic Law,” in Reformist Voices of Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity, ed. Shireen T Hunter 
(London: M.E.Sharpe, 2008), 236. 
23 Körner, “Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology : Rethinking 
Islam,” 48. 
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University, inevitably reverberates through the subsequent discourse on Qur’an 
hermeneutics in the Ankara School.  
 
Before the existence of such institutions as the Ankara Faculty of Divinity, religious 
education was historically provided in Turkey by the madrasas (medreseler). 
However, when Western influence expanded to the Ottoman state, new ideas 
concerning education emerged. During the period of Tanzimat24 these ideas were 
put to effect by establishing a second type of educational institutes, the maktabs 
(mektepler). While the madrasas provided traditional and religious education, the 
maktabs were to provide “a Westernized or modern type of education.”25  
 
For decades these institutions co-existed, until the law of unification (Tevhid-i 
Tedrisat) was passed in 1924. With the law of unification in place, both the 
madrasas and maktabs fell under the administrative and financial authority of the 
Ministry of Education. However, since both institutions were now under state 
authority, the Minister of Education Hüseyin Vasıf Çınar (d. 1935) decided to close 
all the traditional madrasas, and open new secondary level religious schools (Imam 
Hatip schools) as well as the first university of religious studies inspired by Western 
standards (the Darulfünun Faculty of Theology)26. 
 
The uprooting of the Turkish educational system was both appreciated by some and 
bitterly criticized by others. The closure of the madrasas was regarded by 
conservative media as a gravely biased attack on old institutions that led to 16,000 
scholars and their families being financially and socially ruined. On the other hand, 
secular media depicted the abolishing of madrasas as a positive change. Journalist 
 
24 “The word tanzimat means “reforms,” “rearrangement,” and “re-organization,” and in Ottoman 
history, the Tanzimat period refers to a time of Westernizing reforms from 1839 until 1876.” Coşkun 
Çakır, “Tanzimat,” in Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters 
(Infobase Publishing, 2009), 553. 
25 Mehmet Pacaci and Yasin Aktay, “75 Years of Higher Religious Education in Modern Turkey,” in 
The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought, ed. I. M. Abu-Rabi’ (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2006), 124. 
26 Pacaci and Aktay, 126. 
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and politician Falih Rıfkı (d. 1971), found the government’s actions brave and cause 
for the overnight eradication of 16,000 dogmatists27. However, the establishment of 
the Darulfünun Faculty of Theology, was neither fully appreciated by conservatives 
nor modernists. The modernists found the curriculum to be too narrow-minded and 
strict, whereas the conservatives - ironically - found the curriculum insufficiently 
religious28.    
 
Both the Imam Hatip schools and the Darulfünun Faculty of Theology would 
ultimately only enjoy a short lifespan. In 1932 the Imam Hatip schools were shut29, 
and in 1933 the Darulfünun Faculty of Theology closed down on account of a lack of 
students. Various policies were in place that restricted the graduates of Imam Hatip 
schools from attending the Darulfünun Faculty of Theology. For starters, Imam 
Hatip schools were not given the status of a lyceum, and were hence, unable to 
qualify students for a further university level of education. In other words, an 
otherwise potential influx of students graduating from the Imam Hatip schools, 
could not further advance their secondary level religious education with a 
subsequent university degree in religious studies30.  
 
The consequent lack of proper religious education was experienced by some to be 
very demoralizing for the future presence of religion in Turkey. Parliamentary 
deputy and journalist Cihat Baban (d. 1984) had observed that in the countryside 
there were no longer clergy men able to bury the dead. Moreover, people were 
starting to fall prey to various superstitions31. Tuncer, another contemporary writer, 
drew an even bleaker prospect by arguing that without proper training, religious 
knowledge would go extinct32.  
 
27 Pacaci and Aktay, 125. 
28 Pacaci and Aktay, 127. 
29 Körner, “Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology : Rethinking 
Islam,” 49. 
30 Pacaci and Aktay, “75 Years of Higher Religious Education in Modern Turkey,” 127. 
31 Körner, “Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology : Rethinking 
Islam,” 50. 
32 Körner, 50. 
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Politicians were highly aware of these sentiments and chose out of electoral 
interests to reinstitute the Imam Hatip schools and pursue the plans for a new 
Islamic theological faculty. Tahsin Banguoğlu (d. 1950), the present Minister of 
Education, had assured the Parliament that the new faculty would be worthy of 
Atatürk’s revolution and would not work in the spirit of the medrese but against 
“regressive trends”33. The Senate of the Ankara University decided to examine this 
project and open a faculty of divinity according to Western standards rather than 
the conventional madrasa model. This decision was pursued “In order to make the 
investigation of religious questions according to the possible scientific principles, 
and also to provide the required conditions for raising men of religion effective in 
their profession and comprehensive in their thinking.”34 In other words, the Ankara 
Faculty of Divinity was instituted  to remedy the problem of waning religious 
expertise and to serve as “the flagship institution for an enlightened and reformist 
understanding of Islam in the Republic of Turkey.”35  
 
This historical emphasis on reform and the concomitant negotiation between 
tradition and modernity, would ultimately also resonate through the subsequent 
way in which the Ankara School was shaped as a particular intellectual movement. 
This is evident from the fact that important members of the Ankara School are not 
only guided in their thinking by traditional thinkers and methodologies but also by 
Western non-Muslim authors and methodologies. Accordingly, there is an 
eclecticism to be discovered in the discourse produced by the Ankara School with 
influences ranging from Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) and Hassan Hanafi to Joseph 
Schacht (d. 1969) and Ignaz Goldziher (d. 1921). This eclecticism is further enhanced 
with the adoption of recent western methodological instruments such as 
 
33 Pacaci and Aktay, “75 Years of Higher Religious Education in Modern Turkey,” 130. 
34 Pacaci and Aktay, 130. 
35 Dorroll, “‘The Turkish Understanding of Religion’: Rethinking Tradition and Modernity in 
Contemporary Turkish Islamic Thought,” 1038. 
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hermeneutics, structuralism, phenomenology, and process philosophy36. Besides its 
evident dialectical nature that mediates between traditional and non-Islamic 
sources, researchers such as Şenturk and Körner have also noted clear reformist 
overtones in the discourse of the Ankara School. Şenturk, for example, has 
categorized the members of the Ankara School as the third generation of reformist 
Muslim intellectuals in Turkey. Whereas previous generations sought to reform 
predominantly through the traditional paradigm of Islamic legal hermeneutics (uṣūl 
al-fiqh), the Ankara School relies rather on “modern Western methods of scriptural 
interpretation”37. Likewise, Körner understands the members of the Ankara School 
as clearly involved in an enterprise of rethinking, and hence, reforming Islam38.   
 
Regardless of its inner eclecticism, there is an overarching motif to be discovered in 
the reformist discourse produced by the Ankara School. This motif can be more 
specifically described as a historicist approach to Islam, which ultimately extends to 
the Qur’an. The latter has even received a particular appellation and is commonly 
known as Kur’an tarihselcilik (Qur’an historicism). Nevertheless, if we are to 
condense the historicist approach by the Ankara School into a central 
hermeneutical tenet, it would be that the Qur’an can only be properly understood 
when the Qur’an’s ‘historical materiality’ is taken into account.  
 
This major hermeneutical tenet can be further elucidated with an example from 
Omer Özsoy’s works, who is one of the most prominent members of the Ankara 
School. Özsoy has argued that the Qur’an should be understood as an oral discourse 
that is embedded in a particular historical context. As with all oral discourse, there 
is always a dialogical situation involved that directs the meaning of speech: 
something is always spoken in a particular situation with a specific intent in mind. 
Since, the written Qur’an is a record of God’s oral discourse, it only follows that it 
 
36 Şentürk, “Islamic Reformist Discourses and Intellectuals in Turkey: Permanent Religion with 
Dynamic Law,” 232. 
37 Şentürk, 232. 
38 Körner, “Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology : Rethinking 
Islam,” 15. 
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too was presented in a dialogical situation that is external to the Qur’an (metin dışı 
bağlam)39. Accordingly, as Özsoy argues, to fully understand the Qur’an, it is 
necessary to reconstruct the original dialogical situation in which it was revealed. 
Given that the Qur’an was revealed in the past, it is only natural that the 
reconstruction of the original dialogical situation of the Qur’an is realised through a 
historical reconstruction40.  
 
One could wonder to what degree such ideas are revisionist or reformist, as Korner 
and Şenturk have depicted it to be, when traditional Islamic hermeneutics has in 
fact always given an important place to the historical context. In classical Islamic 
thinking, for example, there exists a particular concept, asbāb al-nuzūl, that 
investigates and employs in interpretation the historical data pertaining to the 
occasions that were cause for the revelation of a particular verse. Accordingly, from 
a methodological angle, there is nothing novel or revisionist to Qur’an historicism 
per se. However, it could be argued that the real revisionism is involved on the level 
of how the Qur’an is conceptualized. This is clearly evident in the opening section of 
Özsoy’s article on the historicity of the Qur’an’s address (Kur'an hitabının 
tarihselliği) wherein Özsoy proposes the revaluation of the dominant dogma 
(egemen dogma) that the Qur’an is a universal text (evrensel metin)41. Accordingly, 
Özsoy suggests that we should understand the Qur’an as an address from within 
history (historical and particular in content), rather than an address to humans from 
above history (transhistorical and universal in content), as the Qur’an has 
conventionally been understood. It is this shift in conceptualization that constitutes 
the real revision, not so much its methodological connotations.  
 
 
39 The expression used by Özsoy is metin dışı bağlam. This expression literally translates as the 
‘relation exterior to the text’. Which, in the context of the Turkish hermeneutical authors means the 
socio-cultural situation from and to which the Qur’an was speaking.  Ömer Özsoy, “Kur’an Hitabının 
Tarihselliği ve Tarihsel Hitabın Nesnel Anlamı Üzerine,” İslâmî Araştırmalar 9, no. 1-2-3–4 (1996): 
138. 
40 Özsoy, 139. 
41 Özsoy, 135. 
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Now that we have a better grasp on the discourse produced by the Ankara School, 
we can assert that the only seminal study on Qur’an hermeneutics, Körner’s, is 
ultimately a study on a type of Qur’an hermeneutics that is historicist, reformist, 
and academic. However, when the current literature in Turkey is taken into account 
concerning Qur’an hermeneutics, we also discover other vantages into 
hermeneutics that are neither academic, reformist or historicist.   
 
In Turkey, part of the Islamic intellectual discourse is produced by modern 
academia. There has been a particular designation in Turkey for academic 
institutions that produce Islamic discourse. This designation is better known as 
ilahiyat, and those who are trained by these institutes are called ilâhiyatçı. 
However, there are also other important contributors to the discourse in Islam in 
Turkey who are not ilâhiyatçı. An important group in this regard are the araştırmacı 
yazarlar, or ‘research-writers’ as Silverstein literally translates their appellation. 
These research-writers are “widely known through their journalistic activities, 
writing columns in dailies and weeklies, editorial work at publishing houses, and 
scholarly monographs.”42 One research-writer that has extensively written on the 
topic of Qur’an hermeneutics, and whose works are waiting to be studied, is 
Dücane Cündioğlu. Cündioğlu, contrary to the members of the Ankara School, 
argues in a way that can be best summed by his self-proposed slogan: “not the 
advancement of the new [but] the discovery of the old (vaz`-ı cedid değil, keşf-i 
kadim)”43. Thus, as Cündioğlu’s exemplifies, there is still a critical discourse on 
Qur’an hermeneutics to be explored that is deliberately conservative and produced 
at the periphery of academia, rather than only focused on the modernist/reformist 
and produced within academia.  
 
 
42 Silverstein, “Islamist Critique in Modern Turkey: Hermeneutics, Tradition, Genealogy,” 136. 
43 Dücane Cündioğlu, “Vaz’-ı Cedîd Mi, Keşf-i Kadîm Mi? (Varlık/Nesne>Düşünce/Kavram>Dil/Sözcük 
Bağıntısına Dair),” Kur’an ve Dil : Dilbilim ve Hermenötik Sempozyumu (17-18 Mayıs 2001) XV, no. 
542 (2002): 467. 
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On the other hand, while historically speaking the Ankara University spearheaded 
the academic discourse in Turkey on Qur’an hermeneutics, in recent times 
discourse produced by the academic landscape has become more diversified on 
account of the growth and participation of new ilahiyat faculties and scholars.  For 
ten years, the Ankara University was the predominant institution of higher religious 
education. However, in the last fifty years an additional twenty-two faculties have 
become established outside of Ankara44. These faculties have developed their own 
trajectories and supported the careers of diverse academicians. One clear example 
of the latter is Recep Alpyağıl. Alpyağıl, a former alumnus of Istanbul University, is 
presently a professor of philosophy of religion at the faculty of divinity in Istanbul. 
What clearly differentiates Alpyağıl from his Ankara cohorts, is his critique of the 
historicist method in understanding the Qur’an. Moreover, rather than having any 
reformist interest, Alpyağıl’s works engage with western thinking not to shed a 
critical light on conventional hermeneutical ideas but to transpose familiar 
questions from the Islamic tradition into new frameworks adopted from Western 
philosophy and reinvestigate their answers in light of these new frameworks. Thus, 
Alpyağıl’s works present an opportunity to uncover a perspective on Qur’an 
hermeneutics that is in some respects antithetical to the ideas and modus operandi 
of the Ankara School of Qur’an hermeneutics.  
 
Alpyağıl and Cündioğlu exemplify the heterogeneity of Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics 
by virtue of how their approach contrasts with the interests and methods of the 
Ankara School. However, there is also a category of thinking that can be best 
described as resonating with the Ankara School of thinking but developed in its own 
distinctive way. One such intricate example would be the works of Mustafa Öztürk. 
Öztürk, a former alumnus and professor of Ondokuz Mayis University, is not 
formally acknowledged to be part of the Ankara School; for, he is neither a former 
Ankara University alumni nor staff member. However, Öztürk has endorsed a 
historical-critical approach to the Qur’an that is akin to the views of the Ankara 
 
44 Pacaci and Aktay, “75 Years of Higher Religious Education in Modern Turkey,” 140. 
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School. So much so, that the same publishing house that regularly distributes the 
works of the members of the Ankara School, is also the home of the works of 
Öztürk. Given the fact that Körner formally only interested himself in the Ankara 
School, it is understandable why Körner ignored to study the works of Öztürk in his 
monograph. However, because of this fact, there is still much more to explore in 
respect to Öztürk’s contributions to the present discussion on Qur’an hermeneutics 
in Turkey. 
 
Following the example of previous studies, the present thesis also purports to 
further the understanding of a relatively unexplored segment of Islamic intellectual 
discourse in Turkey – in this case being the discourse on Qur’an hermeneutics 
formulated independently from or adjacent to the ideas of the Ankara School. 
Accordingly, by studying the theories formulated by Cündioğlu, Alpyağıl, and Öztürk, 
I wish to advance the study of Qur’an hermeneutics that was previously pioneered 
by Körner. This thesis should be considered as a further continuation of an-going 
exploration of the different areas of Islamic intellectual discourse on the Qur’an in 
modern Turkey.   
 
With the status of current research being clarified, as well as how this research has 
informed the choice of studying these particular Turkish authors, it is now 
imperative to delve into the further justification and elaboration of the main 
question. The main question of this thesis has been presented as follows: what is 
the status of new and variant interpretations of the Qur’an in contemporary Turkish 
Qur’an hermeneutics as exemplified by the works of Cündioğlu, Alpyağıl, and 
Öztürk? The inquiry into the status of new and variant interpretations has been 
particularly formulated to congrue with the deliberative character of present-day 
Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey. In other words, it takes into account the recent shift 
in contemporary Turkish intellectual thought from the actual production of a new 
exegesis of the Qur’an towards a meditation on the grounds upon which new 
interpretations can or should proceed.   
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The deliberative nature of Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics can be explained by a 
variety of genealogies. The first of which, is inevitably related to the historicity of 
Turkish reform of religious education. The specifics of this were previously 
discussed in reference to the Ankara School. As such, by virtue of its reformist and 
modernist orientation, institutions such as the Ankara School provided the material 
conditions for the further development and proliferation of a discourse specifically 
embedded in the desire to rethink Islam, and hence, our understanding of the 
Qur’an.  However, a further investigation of the Turkish intellectual discourse on 
the Qur’an will demonstrate that reform is but one of the impulses behind the 
rethinking of the ways in which the Qur’an is interpreted.  Another noteworthy 
impetus has been the desire to reflect on and respond to a perceived excessiveness 
in how the Qur’an is interpreted in Turkey. An excessiveness that is bolstered by an 
exuberance of ideologically motivated, anachronistic interpretations of the Qur’an 
that are perceived to be intellectually dishonest and/or theoretically defunct. 
 
This kind of excessiveness can especially be evidenced in the continuously growing 
market of Turkish translations of the Qur’an (mealler).  For every ideology in Turkey 
there is an accompanying and vindicating Qur’an translation.  
 
A clear example of the imprint of political ideologies on the interpretation of the 
Qur’an, can be discovered in Hasan Basri Çantay’s (d. 1964) popular translation of 
the Qur’an titled Kur'ân-ı Hakîm ve Meâl-i Kerîm45. Çantay was a critic of 
Bolshevism. He advised the 1st Parliament of Turkey that Bolshevik propaganda 
must be met with furore (hiddet) and not acceptance (mukabele)46. Accordingly, in 
verses 56:27-48 the Qur’an lauds the aṣḥāb al-maymana and critiques the aṣḥāb al-
 
45 Cündioğlu recalls that a Turkish paper was gifting this translation to readers who had collected 
enough coupons. Accordingly, by collecting enough coupons as a 17-year-old, Cündioğlu’s first 
translation of the Qur’an was the one written by Çantay. “Dücane Cündioğlu: Türkiye’deki Tek Filozof 
Benim,” 2007, https://www.yenisafak.com/yenisafakpazar/ducane-cundioglu-turkiyedeki-tek-filozof-
benim-71827. 
46 Gizli Celse Zabıtları, vol. 1, 1921, 329, 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/GZC/d01/CILT01/gcz01001136.pdf. 
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shimāl. The prior is translated by Yusuf Ali as the “Companions of the Right Hand”, 
whereas the latter is translated as “Companions of the Left Hand”. However, Çantay 
has translated these expressions as “right-wing supporters” (sağcılar) and “leftists” 
(solcular)47, thereby directing the praise of the Qur’an to political supporters of the 
right, and the Qur’an’s scorn to the supporters of the left.  
 
Çantay’s interpretation demonstrates a reading of the Qur’an in which the original 
context of the text is ignored in order to make an anachronistic, ideological point. 
For, if we take the context of the text into consideration, we discover that the 
Qur’an critiques the aṣḥāb al-shimāl - ironically - due to the fact that the aṣḥāb al-
shimāl “indulged, before that, in wealth (and luxury)”48 and questioned the 
resurrection49. Hence, a forceful interpretative leap is necessitated in order to 
conflate the aṣḥāb al-shimāl, namely Muhammad’s polytheist detractors, with 
modern supporters of left-wing socialist and communist politics. 
 
Another example of a well-known translation of the Qur’an that vindicates the 
ideology of its author through anachronistic readings, is found in the translation of 
Edip Yüksel, who has been publicly critiqued by Cündioğlu for its ideological 
excesses. Yüksel who comes from a conservative Muslim family, later became an 
ardent critic of traditional Sunni tenants and sources. He would particularly disagree 
with the Sunni reliance on reports from the Prophet as an explanation and 
application of the Qur’an. For Yüksel the hadith literature is full of fabrications and 
nonsense50. Given the controversy surrounding Yüksel, Cündioğlu recalls how he 
challenged a publisher for announcing the desire to print Yüksel’s translation of the 
Qur’an. However, the publisher retorted by firstly arguing that they knew this 
translation would sell a lot, because it was “full of exigencies” (aşırılıklarla dolu). 
 
47 Hasan Basri Çantay, Kur’ân-ı Hakîm ve Meâl-i Kerîm, 15th ed., vol. 3 (Istanbul: Mürşit Çantay, 
1990), 998–99. 
48 Quran 56:45 
49 “And they used to say, "What! when we die and become dust and bones, shall we then indeed be 
raised up again?”. Quran 56:47 
50 Edip Yüksel, “Why Trash All the Hadiths?,” 2012. 
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Moreover, had they declined to publish this translation, some other publisher 
would have done so in their stead51.   
 
As for these exigencies, Cündioğlu has documented a variety of them in his writings 
for the conservative newspaper Yeni Şafak. However, one example will suffice to 
demonstrate the previously made point about anachronistic, exigent readings of 
the Qur’an motivated by ideology. This example pertains to Yüksel’s translation of 
verse 12:111. The beginning of this verse is translated by Yusuf Ali as “There is, in 
their stories, instruction for men endued with understanding. It is not a tale 
invented”. However, rather than translating the Arabic word ḥadīth mentioned in 
this verse according to its everyday use of “tale” as Yusuf Ali did, or its Turkish 
equivalent “söz”, Yüksel purposefully employs the highly technical Turkish term 
hadis. This interpretation, as Cündioğlu observes, is not so much the text speaking 
but the author’s stance on the literature of ḥadīth (hadis tartışmalarındaki kişisel 
tutumu)52. An observation that is vindicated by the English version of Yüksel’s 
Qur’an translation, where Yüksel explains his translation in the exegetical endnotes 
as follows: 
 
“In this verse, God the Most Wise, rejects both the "hadith" and the basic excuse for 
accepting it as a source of Islam. No excuse is accepted from the followers of hadith 
in this world, nor on the Day of Judgment. The followers of fabricated hadiths 
claim that the Quran is not sufficiently detailed! They thus reject God's repeated 
assertion that the Quran is "complete, perfect, and sufficiently detailed" 
(6:19,38,114), and thereby justify the creation of 60 volumes of hadith, and a library 
full of contradictory teachings that are supposed to complete the Quran.”53 
 
This example from Yüksel, demonstrates again a translation of the Qur’an in which 
the original Arabic is being forced to make an exhortative, anachronistic point by 
 
51 Dücane Cündioğlu, “Bir Mütenebbi’nin Ultra-Modern Çevirisi: ‘Mesaj’ (I),” Yeni Şafak, 2000, 
https://www.yenisafak.com/arsiv/2000/aralik/22/dcundioglu.html. 
52 Dücane Cündioğlu, “Bir Mütenebbi"nin Ultra-Modern Çevirisi: ‘Mesaj’ (VII),” Yeni Şafak, 2001, 
https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ducanecundioglu/bir-mutenebbinin-ultra-modern-cevirisi-
mesaj-vii-45643. 
53 Edip Yuksel, Layth Saleh Al-Shaiban, and Martha Schulte-Nafeh, Quran: A Reformist Translation 
(Brainbow Press, 2007), 182. 
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virtue of the personal ideology of the author. In this case being an author that 
belongs to the “Qur’an alone” movement54. It is true that orthographically the word 
ḥadīth might lend itself to this interpretation, but it is a generally accepted fact that 
the technical term ḥadīth came to be developed in the centuries following the 
Qur’an’s revelation, and hence, could not have been intended by the Qur’an unless 
one is willing to concede to the fact that the Qur’an spoke in terms unfamiliar and 
ahead of its original audience. Accordingly, Cündioğlu and others interpret ḥadīth in 
harmony with its 6th century everyday use, which is “tale”, and not its later 
technical sense, namely a record containing the words or actions of the Prophet. 
 
These examples should illustrate some of the types of ideologically motivated, 
anachronistic interpretations of the Qur’an that were in circulation to which various 
Turkish intellectuals, the authors of this dissertation notwithstanding55, 
subsequently responded to with their hermeneutical inquiries and essays. 
Scientists, liberals, conservatives, post-modernists, and so forth, were all perceived 
according to their individual opponents as interpreting the Qur’an in anachronistic 
ways that accorded with their Weltanschauung. Both proponents and opponents of 
such interpretations, as the next sections will further explore, had to subsequently 
reflect on the hermeneutical grounds that would warrant or reject a certain 
interpretation of the Qur’an. 
 
The return to the Qur’an 
 
This proliferation of ideologically divergent interpretations of the Qur’an in Turkey, 
can be retraced to a variety of historical determinants. A significant study that helps 
us further understand these historical determinants is Omer Özsoy’s Discussions on 
 
54 Sometimes also referred to as Quranism.  
55 One of Öztürk’s first works was titled Kur'an'ı Kendi Tarihinde Okumak: Tefsirde Anakronizme Ret 
Yazıları (“Reading the Qur’an According to Its Own History: Writings that Refute Anachronism in 
Tafsīr”). 
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Qur’an Hermeneutics in Turkey: An Attempt at Genealogy56. This essay, which 
remains untranslated and overlooked by prior research, retraces the origins of 
recent discussions on Qur’an hermeneutics to the intellectual atmosphere of the 
latter half of the twentieth century. An intellectual atmosphere that was 
characterized by a growing desire for öze dönüş, which can be translated as a 
‘return to oneself’ or ‘return to one’s kernel.’ The Qur’an has always been a vital 
guide and identity marker since the inception of Islam. As such, in a country whose 
majority has historically been Muslim, a return to the source or kernel of one’s 
spiritual identity, meant inevitably a return to the Qur’an. As Özsoy puts it in more 
concrete terms, it meant “to classify (adlandırma) life and things anew from the 
perspective of the Qur’an, and to reconsider (yeniden ele alma) the concepts and 
world of ideas within the Qur’an.”57 
 
The desire to return to the Qur’an as a defining spirit of Turkish religious thought 
was spurred by a variety of historical developments. The rise and presence of 
academic theology (akademik ilâhiyatçılık) and its attempt to rethink tradition, was 
undeniably one of the contributing factors. This aspect has already been discussed 
in respect to the Ankara School and its history. However, according to Özsoy, the 
translations of the works of Arab and Iranian Islamist thinkers was another 
important contributor to the desire to return ad fontis. Despite himself being a later 
generation Ankara alumnus, Özsoy acknowledges without embarrassment that 
there were fundamental trust issues and a rift between devout believers (dindar 
halk) and the Ankara Faculty of Divinity58.  On the other hand, devout believers 
could also not resort to the state-led Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), as 
they were oblivious to the present-day issues. Nor could people turn to the 
conventional religious communities (cemaatler), since they were being ostracized 
and oppressed. Turkish intellectual religious thought was thus left to receive 
 
56 Ömer Özsoy, “Türkiye’de Kur’an Hermeneutiği Tartışmaları - Bir Soykütüğü Denemesi -,” in Kur’an 
ve Tarihsellik Yazılari, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Otto, 2015). 
57 Özsoy, 19. 
58 Özsoy, 18–19. 
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direction from elsewhere, more specifically from Egypt, Pakistan, and Iran. This 
direction was subsequently received from the 1960s onwards with translations of 
popular works, such as Seyyid Qutb’s (d. 1966) In the Shade of the Qur’an and 
Mawdudi’s (d. 1979) Four Key Concepts of the Qur’an. It were these kinds of works 
that Özsoy claims inspired “contemporary children of a people that had for 
centuries been unaccustomed to reading the Qur’an59, to face off with the Qur’an 
as an individual (birey) and become acquainted with an attitude to read the Qur’an 
with an intent towards understanding it.”60  
 
The Qur’an had initially been revisited by progressives, but their critical attitude 
towards tradition further instigated the participation of conservative groups. As 
Özsoy recounts, progressives would respond to the call to return to the Qur’an with 
publications that revisited familiar concepts in ways that were counter to traditional 
perspectives. From the 1980s onwards different works were published with 
designations such as “X according to the Qur’an” or “X in the Qur’an”, but in reality 
they were meant to say “X according to the Qur’an, rather than what we have 
known from tradition”61. Accordingly, in order to respond to this ongoing attack on 
traditional interpretations, conservative groups had no choice but to also 
participate in Qur’an related discussions. This participation continued to such an 
extent, that by the 1990s the most radical and conservative religious groups had 
also shifted their discursive focus to how the Qur’an was being understood62.   
 
It is also important to note the market consequences of this widening interest in the 
Qur’an, since it further agitated the growth of variant interpretations of the Qur’an. 
Özsoy recounts how the demand to understand the Qur’an directly led to the 
 
59 Since it was normally interpreted by religious authorities and not the common individual, and it 
was revealed in a tongue that was unfamiliar to them, i.e. Arabic and not Turkish.   
60 Özsoy, “Türkiye’de Kur’an Hermeneutiği Tartışmaları - Bir Soykütüğü Denemesi -,” 19. 
61 Özsoy, 19. 
62 Özsoy, 20. 
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publication craze (furya) of tafsīr and meal63 literature that started in the 80s and 
reached its apex during the 90s64. This ‘craze’ might be best illustrated by the sheer 
amount of Qur’an translations that have then come into circulation. While Özsoy 
does not present a specific tally, Üstun has argued that as of 2012 there are 500 
translations of the Qur’an that are currently in circulation in Turkey65.  
 
The fact that the return to the Qur’an was further supported by the particular 
medium of translation, is more than a simple coincidence. As much as the Qur’an is 
part of one’s core being, so is also the Turkish language. It should come as no 
surprise that the history of the Turkish Republic has become witness to ambitions 
and policies in which the return to Islam, and thus, the Qur’an, went hand in hand 
with nationalist aspirations. The most notorious example of this was the state-
enforced change of the Arabic call to prayer into Turkish in 1932. However, another 
instance of Turkifying the Islamic experience pertained to the desire to “reacquaint 
the Turkish nation with the Qur’an in its own language”66 As the infamous bard of 
Turkish nationalism Ziya Gökalp (d. 1924) romantically recanted: 
 
A country in whose mosques the call to prayer is in Turkish 
 A villager would even understand the supplication in the prayer 
 A country in whose schools the Qur’an is read in Turkish 
 Young and old would know the commands of God 
 Turkish son! Yours is this homeland!67 
 
As each ideologically different stakeholder within Turkish religious thinking directed 
their focus towards the Qur’an, not only were there diverse interpretations of the 
Qur’an proposed but also variant preconceptions (tassavurlar) of the Qur’an that 
 
63 Whereas, tafsīr is a familiar term used in various Islamicate languages, meal is distinct to the 
Turkish language. Accordingly, to translate these terms, tafsīr refers in Turkey to the exegesis of the 
Qur’an, and meal refers to the translation of the Qur’an 
64 Özsoy, “Türkiye’de Kur’an Hermeneutiği Tartışmaları - Bir Soykütüğü Denemesi -,” 21. 
65 Sema Üstun, “Cumhuriyetin Ilanından Günümüze Kur’an Tercümeleri Üzerine,” Türkiye 
Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi 10, no. 19–20 (2012): 457. 
66 Özsoy, “Türkiye’de Kur’an Hermeneutiği Tartışmaları - Bir Soykütüğü Denemesi -,” 20. 
67 Ziya Gökalp, “Vatan,” accessed December 2, 2019, http://www.siirleri.org/siir/5553/Vatan.html 
(my translation).  
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further directed these interpretations. Özsoy finds no better description than to call 
this situation a postmodern anarchy (postmodern anarşi) due to the fragmented 
superabundance of different interpretations and conceptualizations of the Qur’an. 
However, what is of note, is the proliferated presence of Qur’an interpretations and 
conceptualizations led to the urgency of meta-level reflections on the interpretation 
of the Qur’an; since, as Özsoy recounts, the presence of countless interpretations 
and theories of the Qur’an exposed the absence of solid methodological 
foundations (bilimsel yöntemsizlik) and ethical principles (etik ilkesellik) in Qur’an 
studies68.  
 
While Özsoy’s essay is unequalled in its attempt at reconstructing the genealogical 
origins of Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey, it unfortunately leaves out some 
important details. As a consequence, some matters are left implied, rather than 
outright stated. A case in point involves the prior claim that the oversaturation of 
Qur’an studies further aggrandised an awareness of how the field of Qur’an studies 
lacked solid methodological and ethical foundations. While not explicated by Özsoy, 
this inversely means that there must have been new interpretations and studies of 
the Qur’an circulating that were perceived to be either methodologically unsound 
and/or disingenuous. Accordingly, Özsoy’s claim implies that all the meta-level 
discussions on interpreting the Qur’an that were subsequently carried out from the 
1990s onwards  by both academicians and non-academicians in various publications 
and symposia, including those by the authors studied in this thesis, were to an 
important degree spurred by a deliberate need to respond to a perceived excess in 
Qur’an studies caused by unscrupulous and non-methodological approaches.  
 
The correlation between meta-level discussions on the interpretation of the Qur’an 
and the anarchy of Qur’an interpretations, is however more explicitly confirmed by 
Özsoy in relation to academic theology. As Özsoy states, “A group of academic 
theologians brought to the fore the historical character of the Qur’an as a 
 
68 Özsoy, “Türkiye’de Kur’an Hermeneutiği Tartışmaları - Bir Soykütüğü Denemesi -,” 22. 
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methodological problem in order to respond to the exigencies in interpretation 
(aşırı yorumlar) that were spurred by the unexpected rapid increase of the Qur’an 
becoming current within Turkish religious thought”69 This exigency, whose details 
are once more omitted, becomes more clear with a familiarity of the discourse by 
Qur’an historicists. Accordingly, as the chapter on Öztürk will vindicate, the typical 
critique that Qur’an historicists share, is that non-historicists over universalize the 
content and the pertinence of the Qur’an. Hence, exigency in this context, is to 
indiscriminately read the Qur’an without regarding the historical characteristics of 
the Qur’an.  
 
As the ongoing chapters will illustrate, this leitmotif of responding with theory to 
perceived exigencies in interpretation, is shared also by either non-academic or 
non-historicist intellectuals. Cündioğlu, for example, is not someone with an 
academic background, but his work does respond on a meta-level to what he has 
perceived as certain exigencies in circulating Qur’an interpretations.  One of the 
very reasons Cündioğlu resorts to a higher-level theoretical debate, is the fact that 
the wants to deal with the problem of false interpretations wholesale rather than 
with each individual interpretation. Accordingly, Cündioğlu’s work seeks to reflect 
and define the course of the presumptions that background and direct 
interpretation, rather than the interpretations themselves.  
 
With the problem of exigency as a central leitmotif, Turkish meta-level discussions 
on the Qur’an have inevitably concerned themselves with questions as to whether 
anyone can or should offer their particular take on the Qur’an? Whether it is 
necessary or not to adhere to a method or ethical principles when interpreting the 
Qur’an? In other words, a central motive behind recent debates in Qur’an 
hermeneutics in Turkey was to make theoretical sense of all these different 
interpretations of the Qur’an that were increasingly circulating. Accordingly, I have 
chosen to define the main question of this thesis in reference to this historical 
 
69 Özsoy, 24. 
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incentive, so as to centre and embed the proposed charting of Turkish Qur’an 
hermeneutics around one of its foundational problems.  
 
On the other hand, besides being a context-appropriate, and thus, methodologically 
conducive question, there are undoubtably also other considerations. One such 
important consideration, is in regard to its social relevance. For example, in the 
Netherlands there has been a decadelong debate by both Muslims and non-
Muslims on the status of ‘nether Islam’ (polderislam), that is an Islam that has been 
tailored specifically to the Dutch context. However, to what extent Islam can be 
translated and tailored to a specific context that is foreign to the historical situation 
from which it arose, has already been answered extensively by Turkish thinkers. 
Thus, a study of Turkish thinking that has specifically concerned itself with such 
questions in regard to the Qur’an, is certainly - to a degree - also relevant for the 
prior mentioned discussions that take place today in the Netherlands.  
 
The problem of subjectivity-objectivity as the main thematical framework 
 
As the previous section demonstrated, since the 1990s onwards, the history of 
Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey can be retraced to an imperative to respond at a 
theoretical level to the perceived exigencies in ever-increasing sectional 
interpretations of the Qur’an. However, when the theories themselves are studied, 
we discover that a noticeable strand within these theories pertains to discussions 
on objectivity and subjectivity in interpretation. Thus, contextually speaking the 
recent theories on Qur’an hermeneutics are rooted in the desire to respond to the 
perceived exigencies in ever-increasing divergent70 understandings of the Qur’an, 
but in respect to content, they are concerned with the abstract problems of 
subjectivity vis-à-vis objectivity in understanding. Accordingly, a question arises as 
to what the relationship might be between these exigencies and the specific 
 
70 Sectional in the sense of being limited to the interests and aims of a particular group (Cambridge 
Dictionary). 
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discussions on subjectivity and objectivity in interpretation that have been current 
in contemporary theories on Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey? Moreover, if there is a 
relationship to be considered, then a follow-up question arises as to what degree 
this relationship is of consequence for the study of these Qur’anic theories?  
 
While it might not be as obvious at face value, it is my claim that there is an innate 
relationship between both problems. In the next sections, I will first explicate this 
relationship by demonstrating a thematic connection between the problems of 
subjectivity and objectivity and the issue of perceived exigencies in ever-increasing 
sectional understandings of the Qur’an. Afterwards, I will conclude with a 
methodological proposition in which I suggest leveraging this thematic connection 
in order to efficaciously answer the question as to what the status of new and 
variant interpretations of the Qur’an is in contemporary Turkish Qur’an 
hermeneutics as exemplified by the works of Cündioğlu, Alpyağıl, and Öztürk.  
 
Subjectivity is usually associated with particularity, since the material cause of 
subjectivity, namely personality, is itself distinct and unique. Each subject has his or 
her distinct experiences, motivations, and sentiments. Hence, any process of 
interpretation that is consciously or unconsciously influenced by subjectivity, will 
inevitably also be just as unique, different, and particular as the person interpreting. 
Moreover, under the influence of subjectivity, understanding is bound to mutate 
over time, as new contexts, and thus, different subjectivities, arise that leave their 
unique imprint upon interpretations. Accordingly, any hermeneutical theory that is 
averse to the influence of subjectivity, will inevitably also disavow the legitimacy of 
new and unfamiliar readings of the Qur’an. On the other hand, a theory that 
constructively integrates the role of subjectivity within the process of 
interpretation, will maintain a more productive relationship towards differentiation 
and divergence within the ways in which the Qur’an is interpreted. In other words, 
the status of particular and context-driven readings of the Qur’an, is in essence 
answered by the question as to what degree the Qur’an can be read subjectively.  
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On the other hand, while subjectivity customarily relates to immanence, change, 
and divergence, objectivity relates to transcendence, persistence, and ipseity. A fact 
cannot be objective, unless it references a stable, subject-independent reality. 
Objectivity, as it is usually71 understood, revolves around a desire to bring 
something to the fore as it is “in-itself”—regardless of the subject that cognizes the 
thing in question. In the realm of interpretation, objectivity conventionally pertains 
to whether the interpreter has been successful in reconstructing the mens auctoris. 
The authorial intent, however, is a static fact bound to the moment in which a 
linguistic expression was formulated. It is for this reason recurrently identifiable. For 
example, when a spouse writes a note in order to instruct his or her partner to buy 
milk, there is no question that the intent embedded within the note is anything 
other than to instruct the recipient with buying milk. Every instance the author is 
asked for what their intention behind the note was, the answer will be to instruct 
the recipient with buying milk. Given such an understanding of objectivity, any 
theory that problematizes and foregrounds objectivity in method and 
understanding, will concomitantly emphasize a static understanding of the Qur’an. 
Moreover, an insistence on objectivity, will by extension stratify contradictory 
interpretations of the Qur’an into interpretations that are true and authentic to the 
text and interpretations that are false and disingenuous to the intentions of the 
text; for, in the context of objectivity, only one of the competing claims can be true 
and authentic to the text (one must buy milk and not (also) lemonade).  
 
With these base characteristics of subjectivity and objectivity described, we can 
continue to explore their relevance as hermeneutical problems within the Turkish 
context. To recall prior discussions, Özsoy stated that the prominence of Qur’an 
studies and the subsequent proliferation of variant interpretations further escalated 
the need to resolve two hermeneutical problems: a shortage of ethical principles 
 
71 As the Cambridge Dictionary defines it “the fact of being based on facts and not influenced by 
personal beliefs or feelings”. “Objectivity,” accessed March 20, 2020, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/objectivity. 
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and a lack of method in Qur’an studies. Both of these problems are fundamentally 
related to the status of subjectivity vis-à-vis objectivity in the process of 
understanding and interpretation. Objectivity and method are interrelated subjects, 
since objectivity can only be warranted if there is a method that guarantees that 
something is cognized in statically recurrent ways. Without method, interpretation 
would run the risk of becoming volatile, and thus, uncontrolled. Hence, as it is 
customarily understood, method is expected to warrant impartiality when 
something is interpreted. For, the outcome of an interpretation is guided by an 
impersonal, mechanical procedure, namely method, rather than ever-changing 
subjective feelings and opinions. Similarly, the problem of ethics in the context of 
interpretation, is likewise entangled with the problems of subjectivity as well as 
objectivity. For starters, the bearer of moral scruples is the subject. Hence, any call 
to be more conscientious in regard to interpreting the Qur’an cannot transpire 
without explicitly and constructively involving subjective virtues. Moreover, 
whether an interpreter was truly disingenuous or not, can subsequently be tested 
by questioning if objective rules were followed, rather than subjective, prone-to-
manipulation interests. Accordingly, a hermeneutical case can be made that the 
static character of objectivity reassures that certain interpretations are genuinely 
and honestly derived through an impartial reverence of certain methods, and not 
from the whims of the interpreter.  
 
Given the fact that in Turkey each different stratum of civil society and academia 
has recently presented a distinct take on the Qur’an directed by their personal 
beliefs and motivations, it is only natural by virtue of  their innate connection that 
the appreciation of such interpretations is settled by a theoretical valuation of 
subjectivity and objectivity in Turkish hermeneutical discourse. Accordingly, one of 
the most secure gateways to assert and comprehend the status of new and 
divergent explanations of the Qur’an in contemporary Turkish Qur’an 
hermeneutics, is by examining the various discussions on subjectivity and objectivity 
in interpretation that have become current in recent theories on Qur’an 
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hermeneutics in Turkey. As such, in complete correspondence with the character 
and context of the discourse studied, the first half of this thesis will be devoted to 
analysing each author’s views on subjectivity and objectivity, while the latter part 
will be focused on comparing and analysing the various implications these views 
have for possibilities and limits of reading the Qur’an in new and distinct ways.  
 
Re-examining Qur’an hermeneutics  
  
Before concluding this chapter, it is important to introduce the problem of defining 
Qur’an hermeneutics, as it will have important consequences for the structure of 
the argument. To a certain extent, it seems incongruent to problematize a term 
after it has already been used in the course of the earlier sections. In previous 
sections Qur’an hermeneutics was described as a meta-level investigation into the 
problems of understanding the Qur’an, or with different words: the reflection upon 
the grounds and means upon which the understanding of the Qur’an ought to rely 
and proceed. However, this description was only meant to function on a proleptic 
level in order to redirect the focal point first to the context and the subject of the 
present thesis. There is still a need to further re-examine, and more importantly, 
arrive at a more scientifically secure understanding of hermeneutics and Qur’an 
hermeneutics due to the ambiguity and problems surrounding these terms.  
 
Indeed, if there are any terms that need further re-examination and clarification, 
they are undoubtedly hermeneutics and Qur’an hermeneutics. The prior because of 
its particular history in western thinking in which its definition and development has 
traded many different hands, starting with the Attic Greek tradition all the way up 
to the Reformation and followed by German and French post-modern philosophy; 
thus, requiring elucidation as to which hermeneutics one is referring to.  
Conversely, the latter has ironically not enough of a historicity to be familiar and 
matured in its meaning. The classical Islamicate languages as well as the major 
Western languages are – the last few decades withstanding - foreign to the word 
 37 
‘Qur’an hermeneutics’; resulting in the fact that Qur’an hermeneutics is without 
question a neologism. However, the etymology of this neologism is often left 
ambiguous: is it a make-shift linguistic equivalent (translation) of a classical Islamic 
concept, or is it an already familiar concept known in the Western intellectual 
tradition that has been reframed in relation to the Qur’an? 
 
The answer to these questions will assuredly define the overall parameters of any 
subsequent inquiry into Qur’an hermeneutics, and must therefore be presented in 
advance in a clear and precise manner. For example, one of the current ways in 
which Qur’an hermeneutics is defined, is as a synonym for Qur’an interpretation, 
and thus, exegesis. However, as previously emphasized through the contextual 
analysis of recent discussions on the Qur’an in Turkey, the focal point of Turkish 
authors is to deliberate on the theoretical aspects of understanding the Qur’an, and 
not to actually produce a direct interpretation of the Qur’an. This has most 
eloquently been expressed by Şenturk in the following terms: “However, their [i.e. 
Ankara intellectuals] primary concern is to develop a new theoretical framework for 
the interpretation and application of Islamic sources. They believe that before 
turning to practical issues they need to justify their new ways of interpreting the 
Qur’an and the hadith.”72 Accordingly, hermeneutics understood as exegesis is not a 
conducive means to analyse the recent contributions by Turkish intellectuals to 
philosophies of the Qur’an. Likewise, other current definitions of hermeneutics as 
rules of interpretation or deeper reading, are for their own reasons also inadequate 
representations of what hermeneutics signifies within the earlier described context 
of Turkish thinking. However, their particular shortcomings will be detailed in the 
next chapter.   
 
 
72 Şentürk, “Islamic Reformist Discourses and Intellectuals in Turkey: Permanent Religion with 
Dynamic Law,” 237. 
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Overall structure of thesis  
 
In accordance with the earlier discussed topic, context, and method of research, the 
proceeding chapters will be organized according to the following structure.  
 
The first chapter will aim at establishing the theoretical grounds upon which 
hermeneutics, and subsequently, Qur’an hermeneutics are defined. In this chapter I 
will reconsider some of the dominant ways in which Qur’an hermeneutics is defined 
and to what degree these popular conceptions are impertinent to a more 
philosophical understanding of hermeneutics requisite for a study of contemporary 
Turkish intellectual discourse.  
 
Chapters two, three, and four will attempt at constructing an independent, basal 
narrative of each author’s works. Accordingly, each author will be introduced in 
respect to the context of their work, followed by an analysis of their major views 
and arguments pertaining to the problem of subjectivity and objectivity in the 
context of Qur’an interpretation.   
 
In the fifth chapter, however, a comparative analysis will be made of the arguments 
presented by the different authors that had previously been analysed 
independently from each other. This chapter will serve to draw out the 
predominant subthemes and shared sentiments by the different Turkish thinkers in 
order to gain a more comprehensive view of some of the general trends that are 
current within Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics.  
 
The sixth chapter is where the fundamental implications of chapter five will be 
drawn in respect to the understanding of the status of new and variant 
interpretations of the Qur’an. This chapter will thus revert all the prior discussion 
back to their ultimate conclusions. In other words, to how the views on subjectivity 
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vis-à-vis objectivity in interpretation affect the terms for justified or illegitimate 
interpretations of the Qur’an that are new and different from previously familiar 
readings.  
 
Finally, the last section of this thesis will be devoted to offering some final 
observations and remarks on the current status of Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey.  
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Neither hermeneutics nor Qur’an hermeneutics are - to borrow an expression from 
Foucault - a “tranquil locus on the basis of which other questions may be posed”. 
Both terms are used and described in disparate ways by different disciplines and 
studies, and thus, run the risk of being misappropriated or misunderstood. 
Accordingly, the first and foremost task of research in Qur’an hermeneutics is to 
clarify what is meant by hermeneutics in a given research context, before actively 
using it as a theoretical frame of reference wherewith a specific problem is 
analysed.  
 
Both classical and modern studies in hermeneutics have acknowledged the 
polyvalent character of hermeneutics.  As early as the 19th century, Schleiermacher 
(d. 1834) concluded that there were multiple hermeneutics (Hermeneutiken) in 
circulation, and that hermeneutics was not a name that had been exactly specified 
(genau fixierter Name)73. Likewise, Palmer describes various shifts in meaning that 
the term has undergone since the 17th century. Initially the term referred to the 
principles of biblical interpretation. At this time hermeneutics came to be especially 
relevant within Protestant circles, where the need for interpretative manuals of the 
Bible for ministers had increased after the rejection of the Church as the central 
authority on interpretation74. It was not until the 19th century that hermeneutics 
transformed by the influence of Schleiermacher into a general science of all 
linguistic understanding75. Hermeneutics was subsequently no longer 
conceptualized in regional terms, that is in the sense that it was confined to the 
problem of understanding a sacred or legal text. On the contrary, hermeneutics was 
 
73 F. D. E Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik Und Kritik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 75. 
74 Richard E Palmer, Hermeneutics, 1st ed., Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy 
(Northwestern University Press, 1969), 34. 
75 Palmer, 40. 
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extended to the general problem of understanding more broadly beyond these 
specific applications76. Finally, Palmer argues, that in the 20th and 21st century 
hermeneutics developed into two more directions: as a phenomenology of 
existence and of existential understanding, and the systems of interpretation, both 
recollective and iconoclastic, used by humans to reach the meaning behind myths 
and symbols.77   
 
The term Qur’an hermeneutics and its derivates, on the other hand, do not fare any 
better in respect to having a univocal meaning. A cursory investigation of current 
literature demonstrates the vast disagreements between each author as to what 
Qur’an hermeneutics signifies.  
 
In the Schools of Qur’anic Exegesis, Abdul-Raof identifies in passing hermeneutics 
simply as a translation of the classical Islamic notion of tafsīr.78  As implied, Qur’an 
hermeneutics is considered synonymous to tafsīr, which is elsewhere defined by 
Abdul-Raof as “a literary activity whose function is the clarification of the 
theological, grammatical, semantic and historical aspects of the Scripture.” 79 
Hermeneutics and tafsīr are in this sense understood as the exegesis of the Qur’an, 
and have little to do with other well-known associations with hermeneutics, such as 
the investigation into the rules or method of interpretation.  
 
McAuliffe, on the other hand, does associate Qur’an hermeneutics with the 
identification of various methods of interpretation. Cautioning against the 
misunderstood of hermeneutics caused by its divergent meanings, McAuliffe 
defines hermeneutics as “the enterprise which identified the principles and 
 
76 Paul. Ricoeur and John B Thompson, Hermeneutics and the human sciences : essays on language, 
action, and interpretation (Cambridge [England]; New York; Paris: Cambridge University Press ; 
Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’homme, 1981), 35. 
77Palmer, Hermeneutics, 33. 
78 Hussein Abdul-Raof, Schools of Qur’anic Exegesis: Genesis and Development, Reprint, Culture and 
Civilization in the Middle East (Routledge, 2013), 84. 
79 Ibid., 12 
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methods prerequisite to the interpretation of texts.80” By observing that the 
tradition of tafsīr contains a similar enterprise (‘parallel activity’) to the 
abovementioned definition of hermeneutics, she equates this aspect of the 
tradition of tafsīr to what she calls ‘Qur’anic hermeneutics’81. In this sense, unlike 
Abdul-Raof, McAuliffe is relating Qur’an hermeneutics to tafsīr not in relation to its 
quality as an exegetical activity but in relation to the fact that its tradition also 
exhibits the act of reflecting upon the fundamental principles and methods 
prerequisite to interpretation.  
 
While previous authors saw tafsīr as somewhat synonymous with the notion of 
Qur’an hermeneutics, Campanini (d. 2020) outright rejects this equation. For 
Campanini hermeneutics revolves around the uncovering of the inner meaning. 
However, according to Campanini, tafsīr as “grammatical analysis or historical 
surveys of the prophets and kings” does not disclose any inner meaning of the 
text82. Hence, in respect to Campanini’s argument, tafsīr cannot be called “a proper 
hermeneutics of the Qur’an”83. Rather, it is the classical Islamic notion of taʾwīl that 
is properly hermeneutical as it “represents the process by which the exegete tries 
to seize the deep, innermost meaning of a verse without abdicating to literality.”84 
 
Waardenburg further nuances the previously mentioned views by making an 
additional distinction between explicit and implicit hermeneutics. Waardenburg 
defines hermeneutics as the rules of interpretation, specifically in reference to 
sacred texts85. Moreover, hermeneutics is either explicit or implicit. Whereas the 
 
80 Jane Dammen. McAuliffe, “Quranic Hermeneutics : The Views of Al-Ṭabarī and Ibn Kathīr,” in 
Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Quran, ed. Andrew Rippin (Oxford; New York: 
Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1988), 47. 
81 McAuliffe, 47. 
82 M Campanini, Philosophical Perspectives on Modern Qur’ānic Exegesis: Key Paradigms and 
Concepts (Sheffield: Equinox, 2016), 23. 
83 “The question in point here is that the genre tafsir in Muslim literature cannot be considered a real 
'hermeneutics'”. Campanini, 23. 
84 Campanini, 24. 
85 Jean Jacques. Waardenburg, Islam: Historical, Social and Political Perspectives (Berlin: W. de 
Gruyter, 2002), 111. 
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prior refers to the explicit formulation and conscious application of the earlier 
mentioned interpretation rules, the latter refers to rules derived ‘post factum’ by us 
the present-day researchers86. Accordingly, like McAuliffe and Campanini, 
Waardenburg sets to inquire whether there is an analogue of either senses in the 
Islamic tradition of hermeneutics. Ultimately, Waardenburg draws, like the previous 
authors, another different conclusion about the status of hermeneutics in Islam by 
stating: “I am not sure if we can find in Muslim scholarship itself, outside Sūfī 
circles, a kind of explicit hermeneutics that clearly distinguishes different levels on 
which a text can be interpreted, such as was developed in the rabbinical and 
Christian theological traditions.”87  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the previous definitions were adequate to the 
research contexts in which they were formulated, they are not entirely suitable to 
the works of the Turkish authors. Put differently, the previous definitions cannot be 
applied in a way that does justice to describing and understanding the nature of the 
works written by Cündioğlu, Alpyağıl, or Öztürk. In subsequent sections, I will dive 
more extensively into this problem, but a few precursory examples can be 
presented that introduce and illustrate this issue further. For example, despite 
naming their projects hermeneutics (hermenötik)88, neither Cündioğlu nor Alpyağıl 
engage in providing an exegesis of the Qur’an, beside a few sporadic expressions.  
Thus, the equation of Qur’an hermeneutics with interpretation or the deeper 
reading of the Qur’an, as Abdul Raof and Campanini understood it, are by default 
not the kind of hermeneutics that Cündioğlu and Alpyağıl have engaged in. Likewise, 
 
86 Waardenburg, 112. 
87 Waardenburg, 127. 
88 All three authors constructively engage with the term hermeneutics (hermenötik) and 
contemporary western discussions on the subject matter. Alpyağıl and Cündioğlu go as far as to 
classify their works as an exercise or experiment in hermeneutics. However, not all contemporary 
Turkish intellectuals feel comfortable with this reliance on hermeneutics as they consider it to be 
foreign of origin. Ali Bulaç, for example, has stated that Muslim thinkers ought to first exhaust all 
their traditional means for interpreting the Qur’an before they venture out and resort to something 
as western hermeneutics. Ali Bulaç, “Kur’an’ı Okuma Biçimi Olarak Hermenötik,” Islâmi Araştırmalar 




Alpyağıl and Öztürk have also reflected on the aesthetical and ethical dimensions of 
understanding, neither of which have directly anything to do with method or 
delineating the rules of interpretation. Accordingly, both Waardenburg and 
McAuliffe’s definitions of Qur’an hermeneutics as the identification of the method 
and rules of interpretation, are also not entirely suited as a framing device 
wherewith the theories of the Turkish authors can be understood.  
 
Conversely, if a definition of Qur’an hermeneutics is to be advanced that is capable 
of denoting the discourse formulated by the studied Turkish thinkers, it has to fulfil 
four base conditions. First, the proposed definition must acknowledge the 
ruminative and purely theoretical aspect of their thinking and be removed from the 
necessity of having to produce exegetical literature in order to be called 
hermeneutical. In other words, there has to be a clear separation between 
hermeneutics and commentary. Accordingly, a definition of hermeneutics must be 
proposed that is not attuned to exegetical questions, such as what the deeper 
meaning of the Qur’an is. On the contrary, a definition must be proposed that is 
attuned to philosophical questions, such as whether there is any deeper meaning, 
and to what degree and under which conditions this meaning is accessible. 
 
Second, the proposed definition must have a history. It has to not only apply to the 
Turkish thinkers but also to traditional authorities that have inspired them or that 
they are challenging. Otherwise, it would lead to the inconsistency that we 
acknowledge the Turkish theories as Qur’an hermeneutics but not the source 
material and ideas upon which these ideas might be based. On the contrary, as I will 
demonstrate later, hermeneutics, and by extension Qur’an hermeneutics, are a 
cross-cultural discursive phenomenon that we can recognize to have existed prior 
to modernity in the larger Islamic intellectual tradition and that is still to varying 
degrees of effect in the thinking of the Turkish authors.  
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Third, the proposed definition must be divorced from the insistence of having to 
revolve around finding a method to interpretation or understanding, which is often 
the case when hermeneutics is defined as the method or rules of interpretation. 
Rather, as some of the Turkish thinkers would argue, not all understanding is incited 
or guaranteed by following a rational method. Accordingly, theoretical deliberations 
that describe the operations of understanding on purely existential grounds (e.g. 
through the influence of irrepressible cultural biases or God gifting understanding 
through faith) should also be taken seriously as being an exercise in hermeneutics—
even if they do not fulfil a prevailing Cartesian urge to make interpretation and 
understanding methodical, systematic, or based on indubitable axioms.   
 
Fourth, the proposed definition has to comprise a sufficiently universal idea of how 
Qur’an hermeneutics materializes. For example, is Qur’an hermeneutics only to be 
found in an aggregation of interpretation rules, in books bearing the title “Qur’an 
hermeneutics”, or perhaps in scattered aphorisms? This problem of materiality is 
especially relevant, on account of how it defines where Qur’an hermeneutics can be 
localized and what the parameters are of the content examined when Qur’an 
hermeneutics is researched. 
 
With these requirements considered, a pedantic definition of Qur’an hermeneutics 
will be unravelled in the next sections that describes Qur’an hermeneutics as “a 
contemplation on the operations and conditions in which the meanings of the 
Qur’an become intelligible, expressed at its lowest threshold in a statement”. 
 
The first part of this definition is aimed towards the abdication of hermeneutics 
from the necessity of method and production of exegesis.  Accordingly, by 
emphasizing contemplation according to this new definition, the telos of Qur’an 
hermeneutics is shifted from the goal of producing an interpretation (exegesis) of 
the Qur’an and allowed to be primarily theoretical. Secondly, the mention of 
operations and conditions allows for hermeneutics to involve method but not 
 46 
necessitate it; since, it also allows one to argue that the condition to understanding 
is not the systematic application of rules but other ideas or practices like faith or 
intuition. Finally, by noting the ‘intelligibility of meaning’ rather than exclusively 
mentioning interpretation, a space is cleared that allows for authors, such as 
Alpyağıl, to argue that not all meanings become intelligible (understood) through 
premeditated and contrived acts of interpretation.  
 
The last segment of this definition, on the other hand, is primarily focused at 
delineating the material conditions of hermeneutics.  Accordingly, by arguing that 
the lowest threshold is the statement rather than more complex entities such as a 
scientific system or method, another clearing is created for accepting a wide range 
of discourse as Qur’an hermeneutics that comprise discursive phenomena such as 
unfinished thought experiments, scattered aphorisms, and method independent 
ruminations. For, as we shall discover in the thesis, the hermeneutics of the Turkish 
thinkers are not complete scientific systems or methodologies. Their experiments in 
hermeneutics and the resulting statements are sometimes scattered and 
sometimes systematic, sometimes developed or revised in later works, but other 
times they have no theoretical continuation or epilogue. In other words, not all of 
their hermeneutical claims come together in a neatly planned and consistent 
scientific system of thought nor is it their intention to do so89.  
 
As a final note, it must also be recognized that this alternate definition of 
hermeneutics foregoes the requirement of self-designation, that is the need for a 
theory to be called “hermeneutics”; thereby opening a cross-cultural clearing for 
the term. In other words, an author could potentially call his or her discourse by 
other names, be foreign to the English designation of “Qur’an hermeneutics”, while 
according to this definition still engage in Qur’an hermeneutics. For, as I will argue, 
it is not a cultural designation, but the act of participating in the perennial 
 
89 For example, in the preface to his second work, Alpyağıl explicitly argues that his work is not 
intended to be systematic (sistematik değildir). Recep Alpyağıl, Fark ve yorum : Kur’an’i anlama 
yolunda felsefi denemeler II (Istanbul: Iz Yayincilik, 2009), 11. 
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discussion on the operations and conditions in which the meanings of the Qur’an 
become intelligible that makes something a Qur’an hermeneutics. Accordingly, 
whether an author has called his or her views an exercise in hermeneutics, does not 
stand in the way of these views being considered as hermeneutics.   
 
To unravel this alternate definition of Qur’an hermeneutics, the following sections 
will be broken up into three linked theoretical excursions. The first excursion will 
pertain to a critical evaluation of some aspects of Körner’s theory on what 
constitutes Qur’an hermeneutics in the larger Islamic tradition as well as the 
specific Turkish context. By re-examining part of Körner’s views, I will further 
workout the urgency for a theoretical revision of Qur’an hermeneutics, and lay the 
groundwork for the earlier proposed alternate conception of Qur’an hermeneutics. 
The second excursion will build on these foundations by guiding the earlier findings 
into the uncovering of a cross-cultural conception of hermeneutics. At this point of 
this chapter, I will mainly engage with Heidegger’s well-known reconceptualization 
of the hermeneutical circle found in Heidegger’s Being and Time and his discussions 
on art. The third, and final excursion, will predominantly pertain towards the formal 
determination of the lowest material threshold in which hermeneutics can manifest 
itself. In other words, in the statement. This part will be led by helpful insights from 
Foucault on the phenomenon of statements as outlined in the Archaeology of 
Knowledge.  
 
Hermeneutics beyond interpretation 
 
One of the more extensive and noteworthy positions in recent research on the 
definition of Qur’an hermeneutics, especially within the context of this thesis, is 
found in Körner’s study of revisionist Qur’an hermeneutics in the Turkish academic 
context. This study was already introduced in the previous chapter. However, 
besides presenting a pioneering overview of Turkish hermeneutical thought, Körner 
also presents notable ideas on how he understands hermeneutics within the 
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context of his research. Accordingly, there is not one definition of hermeneutics in 
Körner’s work but a variety. Nevertheless, despite the diverse manners in which 
Körner understands and delineates the term, the overall ambitions of Körner’s 
study are two-fold. First, to present a general account of hermeneutics that is of 
relevance within the grander narrative of the history of Muslim thinking. Two, 
advance a secondary, more restricted account of hermeneutics that wishes to stay 
true to the particularity of the contemporary Turkish works studied but 
simultaneously elevate the study on Qur’an hermeneutics to the level of 
contemporary western philosophical hermeneutics. 
 
This ambition90 notwithstanding, Körner’s theoretical framework is not entirely 
precise in respect to the Turkish context on account of some inexact suppositions. 
Nevertheless, as one of the invaluable pioneering works within this field, further 
examination and challenging of these inexact suppositions will help to lay the 
groundworks for an alternative theory through which the problem of Qur’an 
hermeneutics will be addressed. By further outlining and challenging the 
presuppositions and ramifications of Körner’s theoretical framework, I will lay the 
groundworks for an alternative theory where the problem of Qur’an hermeneutics 
will be addressed for the remainder of this chapter, and ultimately, this thesis. 
 
Neutral and normative hermeneutics 
 
Körner’s definitions of hermeneutics are at their most fundamental level 
distinguishable into two classes: neutrally descriptive and normative. According to 
Körner, neutral hermeneutics signifies “what X does with the text”91. Furthermore, 
 
90 Körner who was very much familiar with the hermeneutical circle, knew that he too had his own 
prior suppositions, which he needed to explicate before advancing his study: “Reflecting on 
hermeneutics may however prove valuable not only because it clarifies a concept frequently used in 
this study. It may also help us to clarify the goals, chances and dangers of such a study. After all, this 
study certainly presupposes an understanding of the texts it deals with.” Körner, “Revisionist Koran 
Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology : Rethinking Islam,” 22. 
91 Körner, 23. 
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we speak of “explicit hermeneutics” in the case of a person’s self-referential 
treatment of what they are going to do to the text, whereas in the case of 
describing what a person actually is doing to the text, we must speak of “implicit 
hermeneutics”92. On the other hand, the practice of normative hermeneutics is only 
reserved to thinkers that exhibit a proper historical consciousness93. 
 
Both of these classes have their distinct significances in Körner’s work. Accordingly, 
when hermeneutics is used in the neutrally descriptive sense, it can denote a wide 
range of discourse in Islam, since the only condition is for it to represent how 
Muslims “actually deal with the Koran”94. Conversely, normative hermeneutics can 
only apply to a type of discourse that fulfils the prerequisite of being properly 
historically conscious. In other words, when the discourse in question possess:  
 
“(a.) an awareness of the interpreter's pre-understanding, (b.) an awareness of the 
effects text and tradition have on the interpreter's pre-understanding, (c.) an 
awareness of the distance between text and interpreter, (d.) an awareness of the 
fact that text and interpreter are in principal confronted with the same reality and 
only see it from different perspectives, and (e.) an awareness of the therefore 
positive influence of this distance on the understanding.”95 
 
Despite being designated a neutral description and distinguished from normative 
hermeneutics, Körner’s neutral description is not without a degree of normativity. It 
is true that a prerequisite such as “what X does with the text” is more liberal than 
the earlier mentioned five conditions wherewith something becomes an expected 
(normative) kind of hermeneutics. However, this leniency notwithstanding, there is 
still a degree of normativity latent in this definition. First, there is a clear emphasis 
on the unidirectional relationship between the subject and the text, for it describes 
hermeneutics in terms of what X is doing to the text, rather than how X is affected 
by the text. Second, there is the clear reference to “doing”. In other words, for 
 
92 “Here, it is helpful to distinguish between 'X's explicit' and 'X's implicit hermeneutics', i.e., what X 
says X does with the text-and what X actually does with the text”. Körner, 23. 
93 Körner, 32. 
94 Körner, 23–24. 
95 Körner, 32–33. 
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something to be hermeneutics it has to always be implicated in exercising a force of 
interpretation on the text. For example, by applying a premeditated interpretative 
method to the text.  
 
If hermeneutics is by default, even in its neutral sense, predicated on the exercise of 
a unidirectional force from the subject, how are we to recognize theories that invert 
this relationship? For example, Alpyağıl argues that the Qur’an is not some black 
box whose secrets are waiting to be cracked open by interpretative instruments. On 
the contrary, Alpyağıl claims that the Qur’an can also force and understanding from 
the reader and that there are requirements to understanding the Qur’an that are 
more fundamental than method, such as faith and goodwill. Accordingly, by 
restricting the study of hermeneutics merely to theories that involve understanding 
through agency, we are excluding theories that are centred around the passive 
nature of understanding. Theories that might offer crucial and interesting insights 
on how an interpreter is enabled to understand the meanings of the Qur’an within 
sheer aesthetic and ontological parameters.  
 
A branch of hermeneutics must not be confused with the class of hermeneutics 
itself. This judicious nuance seems to be present in other disciplines but sometimes 
lacks in the definitions of hermeneutics. For example, in the study of theology, 
dogmatic theology and liberation theology are not conflated with the base 
definition of theology itself but are rather recognized as different branches of 
theology—each with their own particular subtopic and methods. Similarly, at the 
base level, biology customarily constitutes the “study of living beings”. However, 
when the scope of biology becomes more restricted, it assumes such forms and 
extended designations as microbiology (study of living microscopic beings) or 
marine biology (study of beings that live in water). In no case, does an astute 
biologist conflate one of these branches with the definition of the base class itself. 
However, when it comes to hermeneutics or Qur’an hermeneutics, there is still little 
awareness or recognition of the intrinsically polyvalent character of both. 
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Accordingly, rather than recognizing that hermeneutics might have different 
inherent forms, and therefore, a need for secondary designations (e.g. 
methodological hermeneutics or ontological hermeneutics) to represent the full 
range of possibilities wherewith it discloses itself, each author is presenting an 
unqualified definition of hermeneutics.  This leads to definitions that give an 
incomplete understanding of hermeneutics. For example, if we are to assume that 
the main question of hermeneutics is to understand how the meaning of things 
become accessed or disclosed to the interpreter, we would fall short of the 
theoretical possibilities in which this question can be answered by only restricting 
the inquiry to the contrivance of interpretative rules. There are other factors at play 
that might be just as important to answering this question, such as the theoretical 
structures of the influence of cultural biases (pre-understanding) or application of 
mystical practice (e.g. God gifting understanding through spiritual discipline) in the 
process of understanding.  
 
For some that are still guided by a positivist understanding of the sciences, 
theorizing according to metaphysical, religious, or esoteric frames of references, 
rather than empirical and logical grounds, is both suspect and deliberately averted. 
However, there is still a great amount of classical and modern discourse that is 
willingly and knowingly theorizing about understanding according to non-positivist 
parameters. For example, the muḥaddith96 Wakīʿ ibn al-Jarrāḥ (d. 812) records in a 
very early tradition how ʿUmar – one of the closest companions of the Prophet - 
considered understanding to be God’s gift and provenance. Accordingly, Wakīʿ 
reports that ʿUmar wrote to another companion that “understanding is not received 
through seniority but through God’s gift (ʿatā allah) and His provenance 
(rizqahu).”97 Thus, as terse as this statement is, it harbours a very critical 
hermeneutical perspective on the fact that the advance of years does not by default 
bring with it understanding. On the contrary, understanding is gifted and provided 
 
96 Collector and expert of oral transmissions. 
97 Wakīʿ ibn Al-Jarrāḥ, Kitāb Al-Zuhd (Maktaba al-Dār al-Madīna al-Munawwara, 1984), 221. 
 52 
by God.  Moreover, it tethers understanding around a hierarchy of the elect and 
non-elect: principally, anyone can become a senior, but not everyone is by default 
benefitted by God with understanding. Rather, as the Prophet Muhammad has 
argued in this regard, God has to choose to be beneficent towards that person: “For 
whomever Allah wants good, he gives him understanding in the religion”98. 
Furthermore, since understanding is in this frame of reference granted by God and 
God’s beneficence is bound to supplication, it follows that understanding can be 
something prayed for. This is clearly evidenced by Muhammad’s request to God on 
behalf of his cousin Ibn Abbas: “My God, make him gain understanding of religion 
and teach him the interpretation.”99   
 
It must be clear now that understanding can be achieved passively or through 
agency. In the context of this thesis, I will refer to the latter explicitly as 
interpretation. Interpretation, in this sense, leads by default to a different 
understanding of something or perhaps a more complete or deepened 
understanding of something. For example, a person might understand the central 
theme of a film in a certain way based on the prima facie sentiments evoked by the 
film. As such, that person might come to a wholly different or deeper understanding 
of the film once he or she consciously applies a secondary, more deliberate analysis 
to the film. In other words, when he or she tries to unravel the deeper themes not 
through direct intuition but through contrivance.  However, not all understanding is 
contrived, for there are also certain experiences in which understanding occurs 
without being effected by the deliberate and wilful acts of an interpretive subject. 
For example, one might hear a Psalm or a verse of the Qur’an completely out of 
historical and textual context but find a deep resonance in what is expressed in 
these media and understand its significance directly and intuitively from their own 
 
98 Abū ʿĪsā Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsā ibn Sawra Al-Tirmidhī, English Translation of Jāmi` At-Tirmidī, trans. 
Abu Khaliyl, vol. 5 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2007), 50. 
99 Yusuf Sıdkî El-Mardinî, Mesîru Umûmı’̇l-Muvahhıḋîn Şerh U Terceme-İ Kıṫâb-i İhyâu Ulûmı’̇d-Dîn: 
İhyâ Tercüme Ve Şerhı,̇ vol. 3 (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2016), 257. 
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life experiences, rather than through contrived historical, philological, or thematic 
analyses.  
 
It is important to distinguish between two degrees of interpretation: immediate and 
contrived. In this thesis, the term interpretation is mainly reserved to denotate the 
latter.  These two degrees of interpretation are better articulated by Heidegger’s 
distinction between Auslegung and Interpretierung. In English the dictionary 
equivalent of these terms is interpretation, but in German, these two terms have a 
distinct denomination. As Heidegger explains, Auslegung is our direct apprehension 
of things. For example, when I enter into a workbench, the object on the table is 
apprehended by me without deliberation as a hammer. However, a member of 
another culture that has different associations with this object might apprehend it 
intuitively as something different. Thus, despite being a direct and intuitive 
experience of understanding, this apprehension-as still involves a degree of 
interpretation in the sense of relating to known cultural symbols. Interpretierung, 
on the other hand, is as Heidegger puts it “thematized, discursive articulation and 
theorization”100. Or as Caputo further elaborates, Interpretierung is “is the way 
understanding gets developed, filled in, articulated.”101 Hence, to recapitulate, I will 
regard the apprehension of something as something, understanding, whereas 
interpretation will be mainly used to denote the thematic, discursive development 
of our initial apprehensions102. 
 
If we neglect to separate hermeneutics from the sense of Interpretierung, we might 
come to expect more from the works of certain thinkers, than we ought to.  In such 
an instance, we will accordingly hit a similar wall as Körner did: “But how can one 
study Koran hermeneutics, and then complain that what one has found is only 
 
100 David. Hoy, “Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn,” in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 
ed. Charles B. Guignon, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 181. 
101 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repitition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 69. 
102 I wish to also remark that this conceptual scheme is additionally wholly compatible with its 
Turkish equivalents anlama (understanding) and yorumlama (interpretation) used by the Turkish 
thinkers. 
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hermeneutics?”103 The answer to this question, is quite clear. Körner believes that 
“the Koran is ready to rethink the whole world”104, and was hoping that the Turkish 
authors would realize this potential. However, such an expectancy is misplaced. 
Hermeneutics, as demonstrated, does not necessarily need to be productive in the 
sense of being involved in an act that manufactures understanding at will.  The 
Turkish thinkers did rethink something, but this was not, as Körner had hoped, new 
solutions to our understanding of the whole world. Rather, the Turkish thinkers, as 
Körner’s study a fortiori confirmed, rethought what is implicated in thinking about 
the Qur’an. Rather than hastily providing new interpretations about the Qur’an, the 
Turkish thinkers first asked what is at all involved in understanding the Qur’an?  
 
Such a misplaced expectancy would also distort the conclusions of this thesis as 
soon as we start to discuss the first author, Cündioğlu. In the very first pages of his 
first work on hermeneutics, Cündioğlu argues that his project is specifically 
designed to inquire into the being (mahiyet) of understanding (anlama)105 and 
interpretation (yorumlama)106. Moreover, not only to inquire into the question how 
something should be understood but why it should at all be understood that way107. 
In other words, Cündioğlu’s work already announces itself ahead of time as 
engaging in a hermeneutics that also theorises aspects of understanding that 
involve no interpretation in the exegetical sense whatsoever. Accordingly, to truly 
accommodate Cündioğlu’s hermeneutics, it is important to analyse it with 
preconceptions that are able to understand his work for what it is, rather than with 
preconceptions that are skewed and ultimately fail to become fulfilled by the 
expectancy of meaning that they incorrectly project.  
 
103 Körner, “Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology : 
Rethinking Islam,” 205. 
104 Körner, 205. 
105 The fact that Cündioğlu inquiries into the ‘mahiyet’ of understanding as well as interpretation, 
already demonstrates that his work differentiates – as I do – between understanding and 
interpretation. Moreover, Cündioğlu wonders in both cases about the essence, as demonstrated by 
‘mahiyet’, and therefore, about the theoretical being of understanding and interpretation.  
106 Dücane Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I (Istanbul: Kaknüs 
Yayınları, 2005), 15. 
107 Cündioğlu, 15. 
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We must thus abstract away the problem of hermeneutics from the issue of 
intentional and laborious interpretation. This is but the first step of developing an 
applicable definition of Qur’an hermeneutics. There are still additional issues left - 
as alluded to in the earlier sections of this chapter - which pertain to the 
delimitation of the historicity of this term and its potential relationship to western 
philosophical hermeneutics.  These issues also surface and become addressed to a 
degree by Körner in his second, normative definition of hermeneutics. However, 
similar to his neutral description of hermeneutics, Körner’s normative description of 
hermeneutics is also open to question. 
 
It is true that in delineating the normative description, Körner has relinquished any 
claim to neutrality, as the normative description identifies an object as 
hermeneutics when it fulfils the specific parameters of historical consciousness in 
regard to understanding. This, in itself, is not problematic. Rather, the real problem 
is to be discovered in the theoretical implications that suggest historical examples 
of Qur’an hermeneutics to be irrelevant in modern hermeneutical discussions. This 
exclusion creates a theoretical framework wherewith the hermeneutical projects of 
the Turkish thinkers are de-historicized, that is considered to originate in the 
present, rather continue from the past. Accordingly, a theoretical rift is imagined 
between contemporary Turkish thinkers and their historical predecessors by virtue 
of the prior’s unique hypothetical ability to answer “the challenges of contemporary 
hermeneutic reflection”108. However, I will challenge these implications in the next 
section by arguing that there is a description of hermeneutics possible, and 
necessary for that matter, that allows for Qur’an hermeneutics, even in its classical 
expressions, to participate in some of the modern hermeneutical discussions that 
took shape post-Schleiermacher. However, before I can advance into the proposed 
solution, I will have to further delineate the problem, as outlined in the work of 
 
108 Körner, “Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology : 
Rethinking Islam,” 47. 
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Körner, to better understand the stakes surrounding such a solution as well as the 
solution itself. 
 
As stated, there is an intrinsic de-historicizing tendency at work in Körner’s 
normative understanding of hermeneutics that regards the classical Islamic 
tradition as devoid of a proper historical consciousness, and therefore, unsuitable 
of being referred to as hermeneutics in such a sense. The fact that classical Islamic 
hermeneutics considers revelation to have been occasioned by specific historical 
events (asbāb al-nuzūl), does not deter Körner from making this observation109, 
since for Körner historical consciousness is more than the awareness of context 
dependence. Rather, to be properly historically conscious means to also be aware 
of such elements as the effects text and tradition have on the interpreter's pre-
understanding110. 
 
Since other indicators in Körner’s work demonstrate that the normative description 
of hermeneutics is closely connected to the philosophical tradition of hermeneutics 
as exemplified by the continuous reference to modern authors such as Gadamer, 
this presupposition implies that pre-modern hermeneutics in Islam belongs to a 
markedly different order of discourse than contemporary western discussions of 
hermeneutics. This presupposition concerning classical Qur’an hermeneutics, is 
what renews the lease on Körner’s ultimate question: “How hermeneutical is 
Islam?”111. A question, that would be nonsensical if there was no assumed rupture 
between pre-modern Qur’an hermeneutics and modern hermeneutics, since Islam, 
as Körner admits, possess already “an old tradition of 'explicit hermeneutics'”112. 
Nevertheless, this old tradition is only hermeneutical in the neutrally descriptive 
sense, and not according to the proposed normative sense. It is only on account of 
the evolution in our understanding of hermeneutics, which its modern normative 
 
109 Körner, 32. 
110 Körner, 33. 
111 Körner, 33. 
112 Körner, 32. 
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sense inhibits, that we may ask again how hermeneutical Islam is. As such, modern 
works alone are eligible discussion partners, since their prospective potential to 
exhibit a proper historical consciousness remains open-ended until such a question 
is affirmatively answered—unlike classical hermeneutics where the question has 
already been dismissed by Körner.  
 
Moving forward with this hypothetical expectancy, Körner surveys extant literature 
on different modern hermeneutical theories of the Qur’an. Körner concludes the 
following:  
 
“The extant maps cover the aspect of historical awareness in Muslim Koran 
interpretation. It is precisely because of this coverage that we can say with relative 
certainty that what has been produced in the mapped areas does not meet all 
challenges of contemporary hermeneutic reflection yet.”113  
 
Authors such as Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (d. 2010) and Fazlur Rahman, might be aware 
of the distance between text and interpreter, but for Körner they still lack a proper 
sense of the positive role that distance can play in the process of understanding. 
Moreover, despite the awareness of distance, an analysis of the interpreters' pre-
understandings or that the point of understanding is not to try to slip into the 
author’s mind, remains still to be discovered in the works of these authors114. 
 
With other modern authors written off, Körner depends on the Turkish authors of 
his study for answering whether there is finally a Qur’an hermeneutics among 
Muslims that meets all the “challenges of contemporary hermeneutic reflection”115. 
In the final chapter of his work, Körner relates to what degree the Turkish authors 
were capable of responding to these challenges. As for his final verdict, Körner 
remains undecided. Körner does recognise some features of modern hermeneutical 
theories to be either explicitly, or in some cases, implicitly present, such as the 
 
113 Körner, 47. 
114 Körner, 47. 
115 Körner, 47. 
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interpreter having an awareness of: (1) his own pre-understanding and values116, (2) 
of the fundamental distance between the Qur’an and present-day readers, and (3) 
of the fact that this distance has a positive influence on interpretation117. However, 
the productive potential of the latter is not made fully conscious, which leads to 
these thinkers to overlook the fact that “with the new perspectives we have gained, 
the Koran can be heard to say things that were previously impossible to hear.”118 
Moreover, a fundamental feature of modern hermeneutics that is still missing in 
these theories, is the potential awareness “that the views of a reader today are 
already depending on the text-plus-tradition before they start asking questions.”119  
 
While Körner’s assessment is not incorrect on all fronts, there is an important 
contradiction overlooked by Körner that I claim bring parts of his method into 
question. This contradiction is evident in the fact that Körner is fully aware of the 
presence of some modern hermeneutical suppositions in Turkish thinking, even to 
the extent that some of these are directly influenced by Gadamer120, yet does not 
question why it is that Turkish authors chose to specifically adopt some of these 
suppositions while departing from others. In other words, why did the Turkish 
authors desist from explicitly arguing that the distance to the text is a productive 
means of understanding, as well as refrain from allowing the Qur’an “to say things 
that were previously impossible to hear”? To argue that the Turkish thinkers 
coincidentally omitted these themes of modern hermeneutics in their own thinking, 
would certainly be plausible if we knew for sure that the Turkish thinkers were not 
read in modern theories on hermeneutics. However, according to Körner’s own 
account, Turkish thinkers inhibit “a vital interest in contemporary thought”121. An 
interest, that has, according to Körner, resulted in a ‘cross-fertilization’ wherein 
Western philosophers “can observe their own tradition being used in a new 
 
116 Körner, 203. 
117 Körner, 203. 
118 Körner, 203. 
119 Körner, 203. 
120 Körner, 24. 
121 Körner, 205. 
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framework of questions”122. Accordingly, the fact that the Turkish authors chose not 
to integrate certain modern hermeneutical suppositions into their thinking, despite 
being aware of these suppositions, leads us to conclude that the Turkish thinkers 
had other deliberations that hindered the integration of these suppositions into 
their own thinking. 
 
If it is not contemporary hermeneutical thought where these deliberations are 
derived, since they contradict contemporary hermeneutical thinking, then it must 
be another source. This source, is more likely classical Islamic thinking than the 
author’s own private musings, given the fact that all of the thinkers exhibit the 
same pattern123, and that  similar hermeneutical reservations can also be 
discovered in classical Islamic thinking—the very tradition that the Turkish thinkers 
have been born and educated into. These conventional reservations prioritize 
proximity over distance in the context of understanding and secure the surplus of 
meaning to historical references.  
 
One traditional example that is especially relevant in the Turkish context124 of how 
historical distance is considered to deter understanding, and the fact that the 
strongest references employed within the context of understanding are more 
historically ancient references,  is found in the distinction that the classical scholar 
al-Māturīdī (d. 944) makes between taʾwīl and tafsīr. Taʾwīl and tafsīr are both 
considered by al-Matūrīdī to be statements indicating the meanings of the Qur’an. 
However, whereas tafsīr comprises statements expressed with great certainty, 
taʾwīl comprises speculative statements. To express certainty concerning the 
meanings of the Qur’an, requires one to have witnessed the event concomitant to 
 
122 Felix Körner, “Turkish Theology Meets European Philosophy: Emilio Betti, Hans-Georg Gadamer 
and Paul Ricœur in Muslim Thinking,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 62, no. 2/4 (2006): 809. 
123 Körner studied four thinkers belonging to the same context, with all four of them – despite being 
hermeneutically trained - having the same result in respect to the missing hermeneutical features 
Körner was so insisted on finding.  
124 By virtue of the fact that al-Matūrīdī was a 9th century Islamic theologian who founded the 
eponymous Matūrīdī school of theology, which subsequently become endorsed and promulgated 
within the Ottoman empire.  
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revelation (al-amr nazala fīhi al-qurʾān)125. Only through direct witnessing can one 
claim to possess knowledge (ʿilm) of the real intent (ḥaqiqat al-murād) deposed by 
God within a verse126. As such, understanding with certainty is only possible by the 
companions of the Prophet, as they were first-hand witnesses of the revelation. 
Later generations, as exemplified by al-Māturīdī’s reference to jurisprudents (al-
fuqāhaʾ)127, can only produce new statements concerning the Qur’an that are 
speculative in nature, since they have to rely on the linguistic possibilities of the 
text, rather than their direct personal experience of revelation. In other words, later 
generations cannot generate a tafsīr but only a taʾwīl of the Qur’an128. Moreover, 
the closer one is to the event of revelation, the more valuable – epistemologically 
speaking – one’s interpretative statements are concerning the Qur’an.   
 
Classical Muslim scholars were keenly aware of the historicity of understanding by 
virtue of a lot of different markers. For example, Ibn Khaldūn argued that the 
development and turn to the philological sciences in tafsīr was spurred on account 
of a historical loss of linguistic competence (malaka)129. In other words, whereas the 
Prophet’s contemporaries had a rich knowledge of the literary aspects of Arabic, 
over time this knowledge was forgotten130, thereby forcing later generations to rely 
on books written by linguistics in order to regain this knowledge and facilitate their 
understanding of the Qur’an. Accordingly, classical scholars came to recognize a 
difference between the understanding of the Prophet’s companions and 
subsequent generations. This is further evidenced by the complex epistemological 
systems found in various Islamic disciplines, such as hadith, fiqh, and tafsīr that 
grade knowledge in relation to whether this knowledge stems from the Prophet, his 
companions, or the latter’s students, also known as ‘the Followers’ (tābīʾūn). Entire 
sections and works, such as the Tabaqāt al-Mufassirīn, have been dedicated to 
 
125 Abū Manṣūr Al-Māturīdī, Taʾwīlāt Al-Qurʾān, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Dār al-Mizān, 2005), 3. 
126 Al-Māturīdī, 1:3. 
127 “Taʾwīl belongs to the jurists (wa al-taʾwīl li al-fuqāha)ʾ”. Al-Māturīdī, 1:3. 
128 This inevitably also explains why al-Matūrīdī, since he was not a companion, named his work to 
be Taʾwīlāt al-Qur’ān, rather than Tafsīr al-Qur’ān 
129 Abū Zayd ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn, Al-Muqaddima (al-Dār al-Tunisiyya li al-Nashr, 1984), 532. 
130 Khaldūn, 532. 
 61 
delineating hierarchies of authority concerning interpretative statements. 
Hierarchies that are grounded in the principle that understanding is directed by 
one’s societal and historical position, such as whether one was born during or post-
revelation of the Qur’an.   
 
In the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence, this historical consciousness has also 
resulted in the recognition and development of new interpretative techniques.  To 
recall the words of the Ottoman jurist Büyük Haydar Efendi (d. 1903): 
 
 “After the age of the Prophet (ahd-i nübüvvet) the [continuation of the] address of 
the Maker of the Sharīʿa (Shāriʿ) became naturally no longer possible, and revelation 
stopped (münkatiʿ). However, with the renewal (teceddüd) of time and 
circumstances (vukuat), an additional two other references [for the Sharīʿa] were 
needed. [In other words] the rulings of the Sharīʿa needed to be established by 
consensus (ijma’) and analogy (kıyas).”131  
 
In other words, with the discontinuation of revelation, the Sunni Islamic community 
knew they no longer had the means to directly learn how their ever-changing milieu 
was appreciated by God.  As a result, Muslim intellectual leaders had to resort to 
two different techniques by which they could justify addressing new situations in a 
manner that was in line with God’s intentions. In the first place they resorted to 
consensus. For, the Prophet had argued that the majority of his community would 
not collectively mistake themselves132. Furthermore, they also resorted to analogy, 
that is to finding rules for new issues by relating them to similar rulings that do have 
an explicit text in the accepted sources. Put differently, unlike the companions, 
newer generations could not ask the Prophet directly for the status of such matters 
as marihuana, organ donation, or cultured meat but have to assert this based on 
 
131 Büyük Haydar Efendi, Usul-i Fıkıh Dersleri (Istanbul: Meral Yayınları, n.d.), 334. 
132 Efendi, 334. While Büyük Haydar Efendi cites the words of the Prophet as “My community will not 
(lā) unite on misguidance”, this report can be retraced to the collection of Ibn Mājah (book 36, 
ḥadīth 3950) where the Arabic states “Never (lan) will my community unite on misguidance”. Ibn 
Mājah, English Translation of Sunan Ibn Mâjah, ed. Huda Khattab, trans. Nasiruddin Al-Khattab, vol. 
5 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2007), 174–75. 
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analogical cases. Understanding, as later thinkers recognized, changes thus from 
witness and audience to inference for succeeding generations. 
 
With such examples in mind, we must recognize that tradition has already 
something – explicitly or implicitly - to say about the matters that we might think 
are relatively new discussions in hermeneutics. This is strongly vindicated by how 
much inspiration modern Muslim thinkers derive from classical thinkers when they 
address contemporary hermeneutical problems.  For example, Cündioğlu, as we 
shall see in a subsequent chapter, supports his own hermeneutical claims with 
insights garnered from the well-known Muʿtazilī author Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 
1025), thus demonstrating that there are relevant insights to be found in classical 
thinking for present-day hermeneutics. Another example can be given from how 
one of the more well-known contemporary scholars of Islamic hermeneutics, Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zayd (d. 2010), was by his own admission deeply influenced in his 
hermeneutical insights by the ideas of the medieval Sufi Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240). Abu 
Zayd even argued that there was an overlap between the inquiries of Ibn ʿArabī (d. 
1240), Heidegger and Gadamer133. Thus, it seems by all accounts that we must 
desist from hastily discarding classical hermeneutical theories within Islam, and 
regard them as irrelevant for the discussions held by contemporary philosophical 
hermeneutics.  
 
Researchers who assume from the onset that certain hermeneutical questions have 
not been answered by classical thinkers, are bound to impede themselves from 
grasping the full genealogical depths of modern Muslim hermeneutical discourse. 
To borrow a Gadamerian concept, modern Muslim thinkers, such as the Turkish 
authors of this thesis, are in their consciousness effected by history. In other words, 
before they venture into contemporary hermeneutical debates, such as how we 
should understand the historicity of our understanding in the interpretative 
 




process, they already carry prejudices and presuppositions inherited from the 
discursive traditions of kalām, fiqh, tasawwuf, tafsīr, taʾwīl, and so forth. They do 
not leave these prejudices at the door and then venture into the aforementioned 
discussions. On the contrary, their thought is at every turn a dialectics between the 
traditional and the contemporary. In the words of Wilkinson, “Turkish theology 
needs to be read not through the lens of reductive dualities but to be understood in 
terms of its complex dialectical relations between intellectual traditions.”134 Hence, 
to reiterate, if we forego this awareness of how history is already effective in 
present-day thinking, we lose the means wherewith we are able to explain why 
certain theoretical choices are made by Turkish thinkers. The questions one asks 
and the answers one formulates, hence, what one assimilated into one’s 
understanding, is dependent on the structure of the pre-given horizon, such as 
inherited, classical hermeneutical prejudices, wherefrom such questions are asked. 
To neglect to inquire into this structure, means to neglect to understand why and 
how Turkish hermeneutics develops as it does. 
 
All these reflections inspired by Körner’s research, thus lead to the conclusion that a 
more applicable understanding of hermeneutics, especially in the context of Turkish 
thinking, has to fulfil two conditions. First, it has to transcend the requirement of 
volition and agency, since there is a range of hermeneutical discourse that also 
pertains to the sheer ontological and aesthetical dimensions of understanding. 
Second, it has to apply to classical as well as modern Islamic discourse, in order to 
not impede any potential genealogical understanding of the ideas expressed by 




If the previous section demonstrated anything, it is the fact that hermeneutics 
needs to be defined carefully, as certain definitions can hinder and restrict us from 
 
134 Wilkinson, “Dialectics Not Dualities: Contemporary Turkish Muslim Thought in Dialogue,” 326. 
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seeing the entire field of possibilities in which hermeneutics can manifest itself. For 
example, a definition of hermeneutics that centres around method, will become 
inattentive of unmethodical theories of understanding. Accordingly, we can already 
intuit that a definition is not merely something that communicates to us what a 
thing is in itself but also, as I will elaborate in the next sections, where to localise 
and recognise the thing’s presence.  
 
Each of the previously discussed definitions of hermeneutics, did not only define 
the what of hermeneutics but also the where. For starters, when we conflate 
hermeneutics with exegesis as Abdul-Raof did, we shall only discover hermeneutics 
in exegetical literature, such as tafsīr and taʾwīl, and not encyclopaedic and 
propaedeutic works, such as the literature on the ʿulūm al-qurʾān (sciences of the 
Qur’an). Since the latter contains ancillary discussions to exegesis, such as what the 
definition and rules of exegesis are but not the exegesis of the Qur’an itself. 
Likewise, two of the Turkish authors of the present thesis, will for that matter also 
be not recognised in engaging with hermeneutics, given the fact that their works 
have little to do with practicing exegesis. However, if we are to argue that 
hermeneutics revolves around the rules of interpretation, as Waardenburg did, we 
will generally only be able to study the aforementioned ʿulūm al-qurʾān and not 
tafsīr. Finally, if we are to understand hermeneutics as the disclosure of a deeper 
sense as Campanini did, we will not be able to discover hermeneutics in the 
previously mentioned literature on the ʿulūm al-qurʾān but also not in all kinds of 
tafsīr135 as Abdul-Raof’s more general definition did permit. Thus, there is no doubt 
that whatever we intent by hermeneutics, will have a fundamental impact on what 
we are subsequently permitted to categorise and analyse as hermeneutical 
discourse.   
 
 
135 Only works of tafsīr that delve into the deeper (bāṭin) meanings of the Qur’an will become 
eligible, not the common works of tafsīr, as Campanini had already argued, that restrict their inquiry 
to historical and philological dimensions of the Qur’an.  
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Definitions regulate and organise the analytical process of discourse. Accordingly, 
there is nothing left but to acknowledge that if a definition wishes to be as true as 
possible to the discourse that it helps to analyse, it must be somewhat informed by 
this discourse. This, accordingly, introduces a degree of circularity, which has 
inevitably been the main theme of this chapter. However, rather than to argue 
against this circular approach, I will in the next sections, in the vein of early 
Heidegger, expound upon the necessity involved in entering this circle correctly, 
and further embrace it in order to gain a productive footing for defining what 
Qur’an hermeneutics is.  
 
The circularity of understanding 
 
To answer the question of what art is, Heidegger noted he had to begin at the place 
where art ‘essentially unfolds’, that is the work of art136. Yet, this involves, as 
Heidegger rightfully noted, a circularity in method: “What art is should be inferable 
from the work. What the work of art is we can come to know only from the essence 
of art. Anyone can easily see that we are moving in a circle.”137 Attempting to 
escape this circularity by arguing that we can derive what art is from prior 
principles, is only a superficial solution. Since, we cannot derive what art is from 
prior principles, without again having an already familiar understanding of art that 
gives us the ability to recognise that these principles pertain to what art is138. We 
are therefore, as Heidegger concludes, compelled to follow the circle if we at all 
wish to know what the essence of art is 139.  
 
The validity of this method, often referred to as the hermeneutical circle in 
secondary literature, has been a recurrent theme within the discussions of 
 
136 Martin Heidegger, Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farell Krell, 2nd ed. (New York: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 144. 
137 Heidegger, 144. 
138 Karsten Harries, Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art 
(n.p.: Springer, 2009), 66. 
139 Heidegger, Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, 144. 
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Heidegger’s earlier works. Heidegger was not only confronted with the previously 
mentioned circularity in method, in the question of art, but also in respect to the 
question of being. In the case of Being and Time, Heidegger argued that we as 
humans were capable of inquiring into being as well as interpret its significance, 
because of our understanding of being that we had garnered in advance by already 
being acquainted and involved in being, that is by existing. In both studies 
Heidegger was fundamentally aware that “according to the most elementary rules 
of logic, this circle is a circulus vitiosus”140 and that “ordinary understanding 
demands that this circle be avoided because it violates logic”.141 Yet, Heidegger did 
not only persist in arguing the necessity of this method but also that it is productive 
to our understanding of things: “In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the 
most primordial kind of knowing.”142 
 
To better understand this context wherein our knowledge of something can only 
correctly advance by holding our prior familiarity anew against the thing inquired, 
we need to delve a little deeper into the Heideggerian concept of ‘fore-structures’. 
Let us recall the earlier discussion on how understanding is always an apprehension 
of something as something. However, for Heidegger such an understanding always 
needs presuppositions in order to get underway143. In other words, without our 
presuppositions that form the background of all our understanding, we would never 
have ‘a context of intelligibility’144 in which we could understand things. 
Accordingly, as Heidegger argues, our understanding is dependent upon a fore-
having, fore-sight, and fore-concept. For example, when one beholds a hammer in a 
workbench, one does so against the totality of possible practices involved. In other 
words, the hammer is always appreciated in light of an advanced grasp (fore-
having) of the whole situation of possible practices surrounding the hammer145. On 
 
140 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001), 194. 
141 Heidegger, Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, 144. 
142 Heidegger, Being and Time, 2001, 195. 
143 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repitition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, 72. 
144 Hoy, “Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn,” 182. 
145 Hoy, 190. 
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the other hand, in order to make a particular feature of something explicit, we need 
to be able to “see in advance the appropriate way in which things can appear”146, 
which is fore-sight. For example, a sociologist looks at human beings in terms of the 
expectancy of seeing social behaviour147, while an economist might expect to see 
economic relations.  Finally, we can only interpret things in accordance with the 
concepts that we have at our predisposal (fore-concept). As Inwood states, “I can 
see something as an implement, but not as a violin if I lack the concept of a 
violin.”148 
 
If an interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something 
presented to us149, we must concern ourselves not with ridding ourselves of our 
presuppositions, or naively deny their effects on the process of understanding; 
rather, we must try to work out our presuppositions in terms of the things 
themselves. In other words, to allow the circularity of our understanding to function 
constructively, we must understand “that our first, last, and constant task is never 
to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by 
fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by 
working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.”150  Ultimately, 
as Heidegger concludes: “What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come 
into it in the right way”151.  
 
After conceding to the necessity of a circularity in method, thus by acknowledging 
the necessity to start with a piece of art in order to uncover what art is, Heidegger 
was able to direct his interpretative gaze on Van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes and unfold 
the essence of art as “the truth of beings setting itself to work”152. Accordingly, Van 
Gogh’s painting does more than show a pair of shoes by also, for example, 
 
146 Hoy, 190. 
147 Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 107. 
148 Inwood, 107. 
149 Heidegger, Being and Time, 2001, 191–92. 
150 Heidegger, 195. 
151 Heidegger, 195. 
152 Heidegger, Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, 162. 
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disclosing to us an “uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the wordless 
joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending 
childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death.”153  This aspect of Van 
Gogh’s work is what makes the work in question ultimately art, i.e. the ability to 
make the onlooker experience the disclosure of what the pair of shoes are in truth. 
An aspect that might have been intuited by our preunderstanding of art, but now, 
thanks to Heidegger, has been thematically and discursively articulated in 
interpretation.  
 
In like manner, to uncover firstly what Qur’an hermeneutics is, we must also start 
with the venues that are usually recognised or expected to manifest to us the 
presence of Qur’an hermeneutics. However, before we are able to do so, we must 
ask ourselves what these venues are. For example, is a theory of Qur’an 
hermeneutics only discovered in a system of rules that are rigorously based on 
indubitable axioms? Or, can Qur’an hermeneutics for that matter, also manifest 
itself in loose, unconnected observations? Moreover, the prior seems to suggest 
that a complete Qur’an hermeneutics will more likely manifest itself in a larger 
work, such as a book, but not in a shorter form of discourse, such as a pamphlet or 
epistle. Inevitably, as it has been recurrently thematised in this chapter, we are 
already in possession of a preunderstanding (popular conceptions), concerning 
what the sites are in which Qur’an hermeneutics manifests itself. Accordingly, in the 
next section I will address some of the more pertinent examples of certain popular 
conceptions as to where the sites are at which we can discover Qur’an 
hermeneutics, as well as my own hypotheses. Consequently, after ascertaining the 
sites of Qur’an hermeneutics, I will further advance into bringing the circle to an 
end by distilling from these sites the definition of Qur’an hermeneutics.  
 
For starters, one might expect the site for hermeneutics, and by extension Qur’an 
hermeneutics, to be only found at the locale that is self-aware and self-identifying 
 
153 Heidegger, 159. 
 69 
with these terms. However, is it necessary, for example, that an author classifies his 
own work in a certain manner, for that work to belong to a particular genre of 
discourse or discussion? For example, Mustafa Öztürk, the last author of this thesis, 
speaks little if at all of hermeneutics in his own work, let alone in speaking of, i.e. 
identifying, his own work as hermeneutics. Yet, does this preclude the fact that his 
work is not through and through hermeneutical? Can we not discover Qur’an 
hermeneutics in discourse identified otherwise, such as with works that identify 
themselves as “a theory of interpretation”, “principles of understanding”, “reading 
method of the Qur’an”, “rules of exegesis”, “uṣūl al-tafsīr”, and so forth? Put 
metaphorically, is it possible to meaningfully and authentically identify something 
as something in the absence of its signpost, or for that matter, in contradiction to 
its own signpost? 
 
To explore this question, let us start with a self-evident premise that will function as 
a subsequent reference. In other words, let us start with a work of hermeneutics 
that is self-aware of being hermeneutical at all levels of its texture. A work that has 
both a reference to hermeneutics in its title, and self-reflexively partakes in 
discussing what hermeneutics is by someone who is considered to be an authority 
on the subject matter. The work in question is Dilthey’s The Rise of Hermeneutics. In 
this essay, Dilthey argues that “hermeneutics derives the possibility of universally 
valid interpretation from analyzing [sic] Understanding in general”154.  Thus, as we 
fixate on this statement, we can infer that hermeneutics involves - at its very core – 
the analysis of understanding in general. In other words, hermeneutics involves the 
analysis of general understanding before it is applied to specific kinds of 
understanding, such as the understanding of law or scripture. 
 
With this reference in mind, we can now divert our attention to a work of logic; a 
work, that at first sight, belongs to another genre. This work in question is titled The 
 
154 Wilhelm Dilthey and Frederic Jameson, “The Rise of Hermeneutics,” New Literary History 3, no. 2 
(1972): 233. 
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Principles of Understanding: An Introduction to Logic from the Standpoint of 
Personal Idealism. Neither in the title nor in the body, does this work contain any 
reference to the term hermeneutics. The author, Henry Sturt, argues that he is well 
aware of the fact that logic is usually defined as the theory of forms of argument. 
However, Sturt sees this definition as pertaining to a ‘subordinate interest’. Rather, 
as Sturt argues: “Logic should be defined as the theory of understanding”155. Does 
this accordingly mean that the “the whole of understanding comes within the 
purview of the logician”156? According to Sturt it does, even in “spite of the weight 
of authority”157 against him.  As such, despite being a work of logic, Sturt’s treatise 
studies various aspects of understanding, such as ‘the facts of understanding’ or 
‘functions of understanding’, as well as various kinds of understanding, such as our 
ordinary, everyday understanding158. 
 
Now, given our tentative reference to hermeneutics as being fundamentally 
involved in analysing understanding in general, does it not mean that Sturt’s work 
of logic that theorises understanding in a general manner is also a work of 
hermeneutics, despite having no mention of hermeneutics whatsoever? Moreover, 
if we were to further probe this assertion, do we not further discover a similarity in 
Sturt’s interest in everyday understanding and that of Heidegger? If we are able to 
recognise the latter as a theory of hermeneutics, as the secondary literature on 
Heidegger often does, then we must inevitably also recognise Sturt’s theory of logic 
as a theory of hermeneutics. In other words, if the example of Sturt has shown 
anything, it is the fact that hermeneutics can be discovered where there is no self-
recognition or self-identification with hermeneutics. What is more, one could even 
discover the presence of hermeneutics in spite of a work’s self-classification, as we 
had discovered in the example of Sturt, who classified his work as a work of logic 
and not hermeneutics.   
 
155 Henry Sturt, The Principles of Understanding: An Introduction to Logic from the Standpoint of 
Personal Idealism (London: Cambridge University Press, 1915), 1. 
156 Sturt, 4. 
157 Sturt, 4. 
158 That is, “the intellectual process which we exhibit in our conduct from hour to hour”. Sturt, 1. 
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The aforementioned example allows us to discover the presence of hermeneutics as 
a type of discourse, despite the absence of hermeneutics in the orthographical 
sense, that is without discovering the word hermeneutics mentioned within this 
discourse. This fact inevitably opens the possibility to discover the presence of 
hermeneutics at other cultural sites that are foreign to the word hermeneutics. 
Nevertheless, to discover how far this possibility goes, so that we may relate it to a 
Qur’an hermeneutics, we need to first delve into a conventional perspective 
wherewith hermeneutics is delineated in reference to its historical particularity. In 
other words, to examine whether hermeneutics is a type of discourse whose 
production hinges on a particular historicity, or whether it is possible to 
conceptualise hermeneutics independently of this particular history.   
 
Now then, the prevailing historical narrative concerning hermeneutics, traces the 
development of hermeneutics from its origins in Ancient Greece through Protestant 
theology and Romanticist philosophy. Thus, we are told that “like almost every 
persistent and important problem in the West, hermeneutics can be traced back to 
the Greeks and in particular to the rise of Greek philosophy”159. Accordingly, the 
term hermeneutics has its origins in the Greek root of hermeneuein, which in its 
most general sense, means to interpret. However, in more concrete everyday 
usage, we discover two derivative references to hermeneuein. The first pertains to 
Hermes, the messenger of the Gods, who brings a word from “the realm of the 
wordless”, and the second to hermeios, the priest who interprets the sayings of the 
Oracle of Delphi160.  Nevertheless, following the post-Hellenic era, hermeneutics 
received a second significance and evolved into the specific science of the method 
of interpreting Christian scripture. Similar to its Greek origins, hermeneutics in this 
secondary sense, was also related to making a divine word intelligible161. This 
 
159 Don Ihde, Expanding Hermeneutics: Visualism in Science, Northwestern University Studies in 
Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 9. 
160 Ihde, 9. 
161 Ihde, 10. 
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concern to bring the divine word to better intelligibility, became renewed with the 
movement of Protestantism and its call to reinterpret scripture in accordance with 
itself, unfettered and undistorted by tradition. It was not until the nineteenth 
century, when the previously mentioned narrow sense of hermeneutics was 
spurred by post-Enlightenment rationalism to accommodate the wider universal 
claims of scientific criticism, that hermeneutics evolved into its contemporary 
sense162. In other words, it was at this moment in history when hermeneutics 
became a philosophical concern that interests itself with the theory of 
understanding in general, rather than the specific application of understanding to 
particular texts. An accomplishment usually credited to the great Protestant and 
Romantic thinker Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (d. 1834). 
 
The prior history of hermeneutics has also been reframed by Ricoeur in terms of 
‘deregionalisation’. To elaborate, Ricoeur differentiates between regional and 
general hermeneutics. Whereas regional hermeneutics pertains to hermeneutics in 
relation to a specific domain, such as Bible hermeneutics, general hermeneutics 
concerns itself with the universal problem of understanding. Accordingly, by looking 
at the history of hermeneutics we discover various degrees wherein hermeneutics 
became deregionalised. The first ‘real movement of deregionalisation’ begins 
according to Ricoeur with the earlier mentioned Schleiermacher. Before 
Schleiermacher hermeneutics concerned itself on the one hand with a philology of 
classical texts, and on the other hand with the exegesis of the Old and New 
Testaments. After Schleiermacher, hermeneutics was forged anew on the 
requirement “that the interpreter rise above the particular applications and discern 
the operations which are common to the two great branches of hermeneutics”163.  
However, as Ricoeur argues, the deregionalisation of hermeneutics could not be 
pressed to the end, until the epistemological concern for a more extensive 
universality was to be subordinated to a more fundamental ontological concern. In 
 
162 Ihde, 11. 
163 Paul. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. John B Thompson (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 5. 
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other words, deregionalisation reaches its apex at the moment “understanding 
ceases to appear as a simple mode of knowing in order to become a way of being 
and a way of relating to beings and to being”164.  This evolution in hermeneutics, as 
Ricoeur has noted, took place in the post-Romanticist hermeneutical works of 
Heidegger and Gadamer, in which hermeneutics is elevated to a more radical 
enterprise by becoming not only general but thanks to its ontological 
preoccupations, also fundamental165.   
 
Given the particularity of the actors involved and the uniqueness of certain events, 
in the formation and evolution of hermeneutics, it is only natural to assume that 
hermeneutics itself is bound specifically to certain historical and cultural 
constraints. The history of hermeneutics is predicated on unique events. 
Hermeneutics in the classical, regional, as well as its contemporary, general 
(epistemological) and fundamental (ontological) senses, seems to be indebted for 
its grounds and content to events that are specific to the west, such as Reformation 
theology, post-Enlightenment epistemologies, and contemporary German 
ontological thinking. Dilthey’s undeniable contribution to the deregionalisation of 
hermeneutics, was for that matter motivated by his conscious desire to mimic Kant 
by writing a critique of historical reason, similar to how the latter had written a 
critique of the experiential knowledge of the natural sciences166. As such, given this 
unique historicity, must we not surrender to the inescapable foreign nature of 
hermeneutics when we relate it to other non-western traditions such as classical 
Islamic thinking? With the unassailability of philosophical (general) hermeneutics 
being a western invention, may we at best hope to speak of a hermeneutics only in 
the regional sense in the case of the history of Islamicate societies, since there are 
obviously traditions found in classical Islam that resemble the regional character of 
Bible hermeneutics? 
 
164 Ricoeur, 4. 
165 Ricoeur, 4. 
166 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd 
ed. (London: Continuum, 2006), 215. 
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While such rhetoric appears to be appealing, I will not affirm its conclusions. On the 
contrary, unlike existent theories and previously stated hypotheses, my thesis will 
be that hermeneutics is in none of its earlier discussed regional, general, and 
fundamental senses foreign to classical and contemporary thinking in historically 
Islamicate contexts.  
 
In respect to the general and fundamental senses of hermeneutics, this conclusion 
needs little evidence where contemporary thinking is concerned. For, we can 
discover in the open Schleiermacher and Dilthey being discussed and endorsed by a 
Mustafa Öztürk, or Betti’s general, Romanticist hermeneutics being preferred by 
Fazlur Rahman in favour of Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics. The ingress of 
general and fundamental hermeneutics in modern Muslim discourse is only to be 
expected, given the fact that the previously mentioned authors have either studied 
at western universities or at native universities that were modelled to resemble 
western universities. Accordingly, by virtue of academic exchange, hermeneutics in 
the general and fundamental sense has inevitably made its way into the discourse 
of certain contemporary Muslim thinkers.   
 
On the other hand, by continuing this theme of intellectual exchange, it is also 
possible to discover hermeneutics in its various senses in classical Muslim discourse. 
For example, Gilliot states, “Although tafsīr with no other qualification refers in 
most cases to a qurʾānic interpretation or commentary, its origin is not Arabic.”167 
Rather, the term is speculated to be borrowed, either from Christian or Jewish 
sources. If this holds true, then hermeneutics and tafsīr, as they both spring from 
Christian sources, must thus already be intrinsically related in their essence.  
Likewise, if we were to move our attention from its Christian origins to the Hellenic 
character of hermeneutics, it is a historical fact that Ancient Greek works made 
 
167 Claude Gilliot, “Exegesis of the Qurʾān: Classical and Medieval,” Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, 
Qurʾānic Studies Online (Brill, n.d.), https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-
3922_q3_EQCOM_00058. 
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their way very early into Islamic thinking, to become further interpreted and 
worked out by Muslims intellectuals. As such, we can discover that early Muslim 
thinkers were already acquainted through the Greek-Arabic translation movement 
with the various derivatives of the Greek hermeneuein. Among the more pertinent 
derivatives, we inevitably discover Aristotle’s work Peri Hermeneias. The 10th 
century scribe Ibn Nadīm (d. 998), reports that this work of Aristotle was very early 
made available in Arabic as Bārī Armīniyās by Isḥāq b. Ḥunayn (d. 910)168. Following 
its translation, Peri Hermeneias was subsequently abridged by al-Kindī (d. 873) and 
Averroes (d. 1198), provided with a commentary by al-Fārābī (d. 951), and 
reworked by Avicenna (d. 1037) into Kitāb al-ʿIbarāh. Thus, if Ihde is right about the 
fact that the general philosophical sense of hermeneutics hearkens back to Ancient 
Greek philosophy169, and that Peri Hermeneias belongs to an intellectual moment of 
self-conscious, philosophical theorising of hermeneutics170, we must conclude that 
Muslim thinking has already an acquaintance with hermeneutics on a philosophical 
level that goes back to more than a millennium ago.    
 
Yet, we can wonder whether it is possible to think of the cross-cultural presence of 
hermeneutics in Islamicate discourse beyond the limits of appropriation – even if 
we have already gone beyond earlier discussed theories on hermeneutics in Islam 
by meting out to this appropriation an aged existence? It is at this junction, that I 
wish to further extend my earlier thesis by arguing that hermeneutics is not an 
appropriated concept but a transcultural, discursive practice that can independently 
come, and has come for that matter, into existence in various cultures at different 
points in time. This practice I refer to, however, is not random, and does have 
certain conditions. The most important conditions, which I shall discuss shortly, 
pertains to theoretical reflectivity and discursive materialization – both of which will 
be explained in due course.  
 
 
168 Abū al-Faraj Muḥammad ibn Ishāq Al-Nadīm, Al-Fihrist (Beirut: Dār al-Maʾrifah, n.d.), 358. 
169 Ihde, Expanding Hermeneutics: Visualism in Science, 11. 
170 Ihde, 9. 
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To reframe hermeneutics in these terms, we must firstly reread the history of 
hermeneutics not in terms of a linear actualization, wherein hermeneutics has truly 
come into a different being in modern times by producing newer, universal and 
fundamental senses, but rather in terms of having already actualized its various 
senses in pre-modernity. Such a reading of hermeneutics has already been to some 
degree advanced by certain researchers. Palmer, for example, argues, that the 
modern definitions of hermeneutics emphasize a different direction of an already 
latent, “rich reservoir of meaning resident in the Greek roots”, and that the field of 
hermeneutics would do well to return to this rich reservoir171. However, those who 
are familiar with the works of Heidegger and Gadamer, know that these two 
exemplars that are credited with bringing hermeneutics in recent times to a more 
fundamental, ontological sense, were in fact already consciously returning to the 
‘rich reservoir’ of Greek thinking. Heidegger’s Being and Time, for example, is a very 
conscious effort to undo the Cartesian legacy on our thinking of being and return to 
the Ancient Greek way of thinking about being. Gadamer was likewise influenced by 
the Ancient Greeks and chose to consciously build his hermeneutics around such 
concepts as Aristotle’s phronesis and Plato’s dialectics. Moreover, as Ihde argues, 
both Schleiermacher and Dilthey, the actualizers of the deregionalisation 
movement of hermeneutics, were in fact also returning “the sense of hermeneutics 
to its more general ancient philosophical sense”, while -naturally - also “giving 
hermeneutics somewhat of a specific shape”172. By these tokens, it seems that 
hermeneutics was not abducted in the recent history of western thinking from a 
primordial regional significance into its general and fundamental significance but 
actually brought back into its general and fundamental significance.   
 
Hermeneutics, as I interpret it from all of the earlier reflections, is rooted in an 
event wherein human beings bring the problem of understanding into theoretical 
reflexivity. In the perennial questioning of how the meaning of something, 
 
171 Palmer, Hermeneutics, 31–32. 
172 Ihde, Expanding Hermeneutics: Visualism in Science, 11. 
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whatever that thing may be, becomes intelligible to any intelligent being. Ultimately 
the birth of hermeneutics lies in this event, and not in, as I have demonstrated 
earlier, the conscious application of a certain lexical term or the relation to specific 
historical figures and movements. Accordingly, to the extent that any culture has 
some tangible proof that documents this event, we are able to recognize the 
presence of a hermeneutics in that culture. Hermeneutics, in the philosophical 
sense, should by this account be no longer considered in mere Eurocentric terms. 
Moreover, since hermeneutics is on a cultural level bound to an event, which itself 
can develop a particular historicity, it means that there is neither one culture nor 
history of hermeneutics but a multiplicity of hermeneutics and histories of 
hermeneutics. Some histories even, as we demonstrated earlier, intersecting at 
various points in time.  
 
To make an additional point about the cross-cultural presence of hermeneutics, it is 
my contention that if the various, transhistorical and transcultural monuments of 
hermeneutical thinking, i.e. written hermeneutical discourses, demonstrate 
anything, it is the fact that there have also been various fields, genres, and works 
wherein it is difficult to clearly demarcate and uncover only one sense wherein 
hermeneutics operates. Rather, upon closer inspection, one uncovers the 
synchronous presence of multiple senses of hermeneutics, that is regional, general, 
or fundamental; sometimes even in one single work. Thus, if the history of 
hermeneutical discourse demonstrates anything, it is not always that hermeneutics 
developed in terms of a linear progression wherein one sense of hermeneutics 
sublates a previous sense, as was the case in recent western hermeneutical 
discourse, but also that different kinds of hermeneutics were developed 
synchronously; whereby concurrent senses of hermeneutics could even inform each 
other.    
 
Illustrating this latter claim further, is perhaps best done in reference to the concept 
of the active intellect as developed by the classical Muslim philosophers. This 
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concept serves as the foundational explanation as to how humans can at all 
comprehend anything, including the meaning of things173. As the argument goes, 
anything potential cannot be actualized by itself, and is in need of an external, 
already actualized cause, for its own actualization. Therefore, the human, material 
intellect, cannot come to cognize any potential meanings unless it is with the aid of 
the external active intellect who has already an actualized possession of these 
meanings174. Accordingly, up to this point, the discourse on the active intellect 
informs us of a general theory of understanding that all humans partake in, and 
answers thereby how it is at all possible that humans understand anything. 
However, the active intellect itself receives its fundamental ontological significance, 
by ultimately emanating from God. As Salim states:  
 
“As the highest point above the Active Intellect, God, the pure intellect, is also the 
highest object of human knowledge. All sense experience, logic and the faculties of 
the human soul are therefore directed at grasping the fundamental structure of 
reality as it emanates from that source and, through various levels of being down to 
the Active Intellect, becomes available to human thought through reason or, in the 
case of prophets, intuition. By this conception, then, there is a close relation 
between logic, thought, experience, the grasp of the ultimate structure of reality 
and an understanding of God.”175  
 
Accordingly, at this crossing within overall the discourse on the active intellect, we 
are inevitably met with a theory of understanding, that has significant and deep 
ontological preoccupations. Finally, the overall discourse on the active intellect goes 
into its regional hermeneutical significance, thereby becoming constitutive of a 
proper theological or Qur’an hermeneutics when it becomes the framework 
wherewith the possibility and the operations of prophecy and revelation are 
explained. For example, Avicenna argued that a prophet has a special, immediate 
 
173 On a side note, comprehension, is always a comprehension-of, and the word that we can discover 
in the writings of the Muslim philosophers to describe the object of comprehension is al-maʿānī , 
which is also the word that denotes ‘meanings’ in every day and technical usage.      
174 Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of 
the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 315. 
175 Kemal Salim, “Ibn Sina, Abu ‘Ali Al-Husayn (980–1037),” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
Genealogy to Iqbal, ed. E Craig, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge, 1998), 650. 
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relationship with the Active Intellect, thereby allowing him to be privy to a special 
form of cognizance, that is revelation176.  
 
Related to the latter, is inevitably another intersection where the general theory of 
understanding synchronously crosses a regional theory of understanding. This 
intersection can be found in the general epistemological differentiation between 
the various levels of understanding that Muslim philosophers made, which 
subsequently also informed their Qur’an hermeneutics. For starters, al-Fārābī 
makes the most generic statement possible concerning understanding by saying, 
“And the understanding of anything is brought into realisation in either of two ways 
(wa tafhīm al-shayʾ ʿalā ḍarbayn).”177 Firstly, by causing a thing’s essence to be 
perceived by the intellect, or secondly, by causing the thing to be imagined through 
a similitude178. Whereas the first kind of understanding is actualized through the 
methods and discipline of philosophy reserved for the elect, al-Fārābī argues that 
the second kind of understanding is mediated by religion and pertains to all the 
masses179. Thus, in religion, rather than finding abstract problems such as 
nothingness being discussed in their naked theoretical immediacy, one discovers 
another more accessible method, which is by speaking of approximative symbols, 
e.g. darkness as symbolic reference for nothingness180. Since revelation is part of 
religion, it must therefore mean that the Qur’an is also composed of approximative 
symbols meant to instruct the masses.  
 
While, al-Fārābī lays the groundwork for a regional theory of understanding, 
respectively a Qur’an hermeneutics, through his general theory of understanding, 
 
176 Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy, 4th ed. (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 
34–35; Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the 
Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect, 340. 
177 Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Abū Naṣr Al-Farābī, Kitāb Taḥṣīl Al-Saʻādah, ed. Ali Bu Milhim 
(Beirut: Dār wa maktabah al-Hilāl, 1990), 88. 
178 Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Abū Naṣr Al-Farābī, Al-Farabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, 
trans. Muhsin Mahdi (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 44. 
179 Al-Farābī, 45–45. 
180 Al-Farābī, Kitāb Taḥṣīl Al-Saʻādah, 90. 
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he does so only on an implicit level. A more explicit theory, however, can be 
discovered in the works of Avicenna and Averroes, who bring the presuppositions of 
al-Fārābī directly into relationship with the Qur’an. Thus, we discover that Avicenna 
claims that the Qur’an wittingly speaks of God in anthropomorphic terms, in favour 
of abstract theoretical terms. If the Qur’an had done otherwise, argues Avicenna, 
the ‘bedouin [sic] Arabs or crude Hebrews’ would think that “the belief they were 
being invited was belief in an absolute nonentity”.181 Accordingly, since the Qur’an 
contains symbolic truth catered to the masses, it is possible through interpretation 
to revert these symbols into their underlying scientific truth182. However, this is a 
task only reserved to the wise and learned. On the other hand, Averroes who also 
followed suit with similar general hermeneutical suppositions as al-Fārābī and 
Avicenna183,  relates the problem of understanding through demonstration versus 
understanding through symbols, to the fundamental issue of truth. The resolution 
to this theme ultimately characterises Averroes` explicit theory of Qur’an 
hermeneutics. Thus, Averroes argues that the Qur’an and the discursive 
philosophical tradition based on demonstration, both contain truth, and “truth does 
not contradict the truth but, rather, confirms and testifies to it”184. Accordingly, in 
case our understanding of something derived from demonstrative evidence 
contradicts our understanding derived from scripture, we must try to reconcile both 
sources of information by reinterpreting the latter185. 
 
The concurrent presence and entwinement between general and regional 
hermeneutics, was not only exclusive to the works of the philosophers but can also 
be found in the uṣūl al-fiqh tradition. In his work on uṣūl al-fiqh, which I will 
 
181 Rahman, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy, 42. 
182 Peter Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna (Ibn Sînâ) (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 152. 
183 “Scripture contains literal and esoteric statements because human nature and disposition vary in 
respect of assent”. Muhammad Ibn-‘Abd-al-Malik. Ibn-Tufayl and Averroes., Two Andalusian 
Philosophers : The Story of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan by Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Tufayl & the Definitive 
Statement by Abu’l Walid Muhammad Ibn Rushd, trans. Jim Colville (London: Kegan Paul, 1999), 82. 
184 Ibn-Tufayl and Averroes., 81. 
185 Ibn-Tufayl and Averroes., 81. 
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purposefully leave untranslated in order to not force certain preconceived notions 
into its discussion186,  the Ḥanafī jurist al-Sarakhsī (d. 1090) dedicates an entire 
subsection (faṣl) to the problem of elucidating the manner in which absolute 
statements signify meanings (“ibānat tarīq al-murād bi mutlaq al-kalām”)187. 
Accordingly, we are met with a section that is but one of the different places 
wherein al-Sarakhsī makes statements that pertain to a universal, linguistic 
understanding, demonstrating thereby the undeniable presence of a general 
hermeneutics in his works. However, since the Qur’an is also a linguistic expression, 
these insights also characterize and are further supplemented by al-Sarakhsī’s 
regional, scoped hermeneutics of the Qur’an. Moreover, because the Qur’an 
discloses God’s binding address to humankind (taklīf), which is the subject of fiqh, 
al-Sarakhsī inevitably also engages in another regional hermeneutics, i.e. of the Law 
(sharīʿa). Thus, where we can really see this entwinement come to fruition, is for 
example in the discussion concerning directives (al-amr) where we are first met 
with an inquiry into how the universal, phenomenological essence of a directive 
should be understood, subsequently with how the specific directives of the Qur’an 
should be understood, and finally how one is to relate the prior understandings to a 
jurisprudential understanding (fiqh) of the Law.  
 
To return to the question of what Qur’an hermeneutics is. It is my claim that the 
differentia of Qur’an hermeneutics can be recognised through the earlier 
mentioned concurrent interplay between the various senses of hermeneutics. 
Accordingly, when we recall the prior examples among the Muslim philosophers 
and jurists, we discover the presence of hermeneutical statements that might 
advance our knowledge of how understanding operates on a universal level but say 
little of what is particularly and exactly involved in understanding the Qur’an. 
Conversely, we might discover hermeneutical statements within the works of the 
 
186 For example, by referring to it as ‘theory of jurisprudence’, thereby losing a terminological 
relationship to hermeneutics.  
187 Al-Sarakhsī Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Sahl Abū Bakr, Uṣūl Al-Sarakhsī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 
2005), 153. 
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philosophers and jurists that inform us specifically of the conditions or operations 
involved in understanding the Qur’an, which are not pertinent on a universal level, 
and therefore, inapplicable in relation to other entities than the Qur’an. 
Accordingly, while I will refer to the prior theoretical undertaking as hermeneutics 
in the absolute sense, the latter is what I will call Qur’an hermeneutics. In other 
words, the qualifier of ‘Qur’an’ in Qur’an hermeneutics, denotes only the 
particularity and exactitude wherewith the general hermeneutical task of reflecting 
on how the meaning of things become intelligible is further constricted and 
derivatively developed. In other words, by specifically theorising how the particular 
meanings of the Qur’an become intelligible. Such an understanding of Qur’an 
hermeneutics is inevitably regional in character. However, this regionality, as 
previously discussed, is a matter of scope, not a matter of being culture-specific in 
respect to concepts (e.g. tafsīr), historical movements, genre of works (e.g. uṣūl al-
fiqh, ʿulūm al-qurʾān), or authors. Qur’an hermeneutics is therefore in the absolute 
sense not the exclusive possession of Muslims or their history. Massimo 
Campanini’s Philosophical Perspectives on Modern Qur'anic Exegesis is for this 
reason no less a ‘proper work’ of Qur’an hermeneutics, than Averroes` Fasl al-
Maqāl188.  
 
Qur’an hermeneutics and the statement  
 
In the course of receiving their final abstract sense, both hermeneutics and Qur’an 
hermeneutics were discussed in the previous sections in relation to different media, 
e.g. works, discourse, genres, and statements.  While the problem of materiality 
was announced and thematised earlier, among others in reference to the circular 
approach wherewith the apprehension of a thing’s essence is sought to through the 
site at which it manifests itself; a formal conclusion concerning the materiality of 
Qur’an hermeneutics has yet to be drawn. Accordingly, in this final section, I will 
 
188 All the more evidenced by the fact that Campanini imports the discussions of Averroes into his 
own work.  
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focus on bringing the material aspects of Qur’an hermeneutics to a formal 
conclusion, since it has important consequences for how Qur’an hermeneutics is 
conclusively defined and studied within this thesis.   
 
Let us begin with the self-evident premise that the reflective event that is Qur’an 
hermeneutics, always intersects with thought. However, unless the thinking that is 
Qur’an hermeneutics is externalised in a material form that is persistent and 
recurrently accessible, we have no ways of studying such thinking. Hypothetically 
speaking, it is quite possible for there to have been various hermeneutics of the 
Qur’an that have been lost to the sands of time. Either because these theories were 
privately held, they were shared orally without ever being written down, or they 
were simply lost, because their manuscripts have been either hidden or destroyed. 
Such theories cannot become in any case a subject of a study, for there is nothing to 
analyse. Thus, the only sensible way to discursively inquire into the problem of 
Qur’an hermeneutics, is by attending to material records that we can persistently 
call upon to disclose us the thinking that is Qur’an hermeneutics.  
 
With this in mind, we discover that certain conventional assumptions, as the 
previous sections demonstrated, extend this premise by defining the materiality of 
Qur’an hermeneutics in terms of a specific form of writing, e.g. the formulation of 
rules (Waardenburg). However, as the history of hermeneutics suggests, this 
expectancy seems more likely to be a bias inherited from theology and post-
enlightenment empiricism. The quest for rules is synonymous to the desire of 
method, the know-how wherewith assertions can become elevated to the level of 
universal validity. However, as the history of the Reformation and Enlightenment 
demonstrates, such a quest is fundamentally motivated by certain dogmatic and 
positivist aspirations. In other words, in the aspirations to claim that one’s religious 
interpretations hold truer than the claims of other religious groups (e.g. 
Protestantism versus Catholicism), or that one is scientifically secure and rigorous in 
their truth claims.  However, not all understanding of hermeneutics was pursued 
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with such consequences in mind. Admittedly, the question of how the meaning of 
something becomes intelligible, can potentially be answered through 
methodological conditions by delineating certain rules or other kinds of 
preparations, such as a particular spiritual discipline. Moreover, such an answer can 
accordingly become prescriptive, tradition, and even scientifically objective 
(repeatable).  But, as we argued earlier, it is not necessary for hermeneutics to 
present an answer that pertains only to method. For, to ask this question again, 
what is to deter one from fixating on understanding in passive terms, i.e. 
understanding that has not been manufactured procedurally and wittingly? What 
about understanding received through the poetics of revelation or through divine 
provenance? In such cases, is it not possible to investigate the essence of 
understanding in reference to a poetics or theology of the gift without involving the 
apologetic or scientific problem of method? The history of Islamic discourse 
confirms such a possibility, since we discover authors like Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) 
explicitly relating in their hermeneutical frameworks understanding to God’s 
provenance (rizq)189. Accordingly, we must conclude that the requirement for 
method, expressed for example in the material structures of rules, is not a 
necessary material condition for the existence of Qur’an hermeneutics.  
 
Another temptation would be to pursue the necessary material characteristic of 
Qur’an hermeneutics in the unity of the book. Speaking of ‘a book of Qur’an 
hermeneutics’, seems to be an enticing and stable foundation to formalise the 
material aspects of Qur’an hermeneutics. One could thus study Qur’an 
hermeneutics in a very straight-forward manner by locating, organising, and 
analysing such books of Qur’an hermeneutics.  However, on closer inspection, we 
can quickly discover that the book (or kitāb) as the material condition for Qur’an 
hermeneutics provides only a naïve and superficial solution to the problem. For 
starters, in classical Islamic literature the understanding of the Qur’an is not only 
 
189 Yusuf Sıdkî El-Mardinî, Mesîru Umûmı’̇l-Muvahhıḋîn Şerh U Terceme-İ Kıṫâb-i İhyâu Ulûmı’̇d-Dîn: 
İhyâ Tercüme Ve Şerhı,̇ vol. 1 (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2016), 491. 
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theorised in books but also epistles (rasāil), fatwas, in the marginalia of 
commentaries and meta-commentaries, and even what some have referred to as 
novels. To give an example of the latter, we can refer to the tale Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, 
written by Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185). Not only is Davidson able to read a  theory on 
understanding from this tale but also relate it to hermeneutical theories that we 
know to be expressed in other written media: “But Ibn Tufail, in contrast to Ghazali, 
apparently does attempt to go beyond Avicenna in ranking direct experience above 
discursive thought as the preferable road to human understanding.”190 
Furthermore, as evidenced by the recent participation of academia in the field of 
Qur’an hermeneutics, the types of written media wherein we can discover Qur’an 
hermeneutics has become extended beyond the media known to classical Islamic 
traditions. Accordingly, we now also find Qur’an hermeneutics in published 
monographs based on theses, essays, conference proceedings, interviews, and so 
forth. Thus, by all accounts, the book as the necessary material condition of a 
Qur’an hermeneutics, does little justice to the many forms in which Qur’an 
hermeneutics manifests itself.   
 
A final temptation, based on the discussion above, would be to secure the 
materiality of Qur’an hermeneutics to the phenomenon of the work. In other 
words, while the earlier mentioned media, such as epistles, essays, and novels, are 
inherently different, they are still at their very core works. However, this avenue 
proves ultimately to also be too constrictive. For, the work assumes too great a 
unity that is not present in some of the places we can also discover Qur’an 
hermeneutics. For example, there are sections that pertain to Qur’an hermeneutics 
in works devoted to other topics, or perhaps the author is only mentioning a few, 
although very important, statements on what is involved in understanding the 
Qur’an. Such statements might furthermore be even dispersed, not in only one 
single work but over a multitude of works. The Muslim philosophers who are a clear 
 
190 Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active 
Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect, 180. 
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example of the latter, have their entire hermeneutical outlook dispensed in 
statements that are dispersed over a variety of previously mentioned media. The 
great classical reference works of Qur’an hermeneutics developed by al-Zarkashī (d. 
1392) and al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505), are very much predicated on collecting and 
sometimes analysing dispersed statements of Qur’an hermeneutics. This – 
sometimes - sporadic presence of Qur’an hermeneutics, might delude some to 
believe that there is no intricate, explicit hermeneutics to be found. However, this is 
only a superficial perspective on the matter. This would for example be tantamount 
to arguing that Ibn ʿArabī, one of the most influential and brilliant Sufis of the 
Islamic tradition, had no deep knowledge of what is involved in our understanding 
of the Qur’an, merely because he speaks about the understanding of the Qur’an in a 
dispersed fashion, rather than by dedicating a single treatise to a solemn, unified 
exposition of his theory of Qur’an hermeneutics as we are accustomed with modern 
monographs on hermeneutics. Thus, all things considered, we must seek the 
necessary material conditions in a different measure than the work. A measure that 
allow us to also discover Qur’an hermeneutics in dispersion.    
 
It is at this cross-section that I wish to draw partial theoretical support from 
Foucault’s understanding of the statement in order to come to a formal conclusion 
concerning the necessary material condition of Qur’an hermeneutics. In other 
words, to argue that at its lowest limit, thereby at its necessary level, Qur’an 
hermeneutics can be found in the statement. It is of note, as I will soon explain the 
rationale behind this, that I am wittingly speaking of a statement in reference to 
Qur’an hermeneutics at its most fundamental level, and not the more accustomed 
lower unities of sentence or proposition.  
 
Let me advance the discussion with the premise that the statement provides unique 
features whose awareness force a level of discernment that is otherwise missing in 
relation to propositions or sentences. For starters, as Foucault demonstrates, one 
could discover in ‘No one heard’ and ‘It is true that no one heard’ one proposition, 
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but two different statements. These sentences are from a logical view, i.e. a 
propositional standpoint, identical, since they represent the same state of affairs. 
However, in respect to their nature as statements “these two formations are not 
equivalent or interchangeable. They cannot occupy the same place on the plane of 
discourse, nor can they belong to exactly the same group of statements.”191 For 
example, ‘No one heard’ could be spoken by an author or a character within a 
novel, while ‘It is true that no one heard’ could be discovered in an interior 
monologue or a silent discussion with oneself192. Likewise, identical sentences could 
be repeated on the same ink, paper, and position, yet still constitute two different 
statements193. Webb presents an example of such an instance by arguing that 
“when the line “Le sommeil est plein de miracles!” appears in the 1868 edition of 
Les Fleurs du mal, it is a new statement when compared to the same line in the 
1861 edition, since Baudelaire died in 1867, making the later edition “posthumous 
and placing it in a different institutional and economic set of relations.”194 In other 
words, the second time that the sentence “Le sommeil est plein de miracles ”(Sleep 
is full of miracles!) appears, it becomes a statement to some readers on 
Baudelaire’s own death on account of the metaphoric relationship between death 
and sleep and Baudelaire’s own passing. 
 
Another discerning characteristic of statements is its dynamic relationship to a 
subject. Our usual instincts might conflate the subject of the statement with the 
first-person grammatical elements expressed within the sentence of a statement. 
Moreover, we might expect this first-person subject to be the very author behind 
the formulation of the sentence. However, in reality the subject of the statement is 
much more variable, and not always inseparably connected with the author of the 
formulation. This dissociation between the author of the formulation and the 
 
191 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (Oxon: Routledge, 
2002), 91. 
192 Foucault, 91. 
193 Foucault, 101. 
194 David A. Webb, Foucault’s Archaeology: Science and Transformation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013), 97. 
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subject of the statement is very clearly discovered in literature where the author of 
the novel is not the subject of the statements made by the characters of the novel. 
The variable nature of the subject of a statement might even shift on a per 
statement basis. For example, in a preface to a mathematical treatise, the original 
author could explain his personal methodology and problems which he has been 
unable to resolve. Accordingly, as Foucault states, the enunciative subject can only 
be occupied by the author. However, in the same treatise one might discover the 
following proposition: ‘Two quantities equal to a third quantity are equal to each 
other’. Inevitably, in this case the subject of this statement can be anyone who 
affirms such a proposition195. Thus, as Foucault concludes:  
 
“The subject of the statement is a particular function, but is not necessarily the 
same from one statement to another; in so far as it is an empty function, that can 
be filled by virtually any individual when he formulates the statement; and in so far 
as one and the same individual may occupy in turn, in the same series of 
statements, different positions, and assume the role of different subjects.”196 
 
Such a degree of proposed discernment favoured by the theory of statements, 
might seem overdelicate and fastidious in a thesis on Qur’an hermeneutics. 
However, various discursive phenomena from both classical and contemporary 
discourse on Qur’an hermeneutics warrant and necessitate such a level of 
discernment. 
 
For starters, in classical Islamic discourse we are met with these two discursive 
phenomena: repetition of sentences with proper attribution to the author 
responsible for the original formulation, and repetition of sentences without 
mentioning the author responsible for the original formulation.  Thus, there are 
different discourses wherein one discovers the words of the Prophet being 
expressed verbatim. However, there is an inherent difference to whether these 
statements are repeated in Sufi literature or the biography of the Prophet. In both 
 
195 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 106. 
196 Foucault, 105. 
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cases the sentences are identical while the statements differ. Even the subject of 
the statement, for that matter, can shift from the Prophet to the Sufi thinker, 
thereby becoming his words, representing his statement, rather than that of the 
Prophet. On the other hand, we can identify the presence of the same sentences 
over a variety of works without proper attribution to the author responsible for 
their original formulation. One could, barring any potential accusation of 
anachronism, argue that this is merely a prototypical form of plagiarism. However, 
it is also quite possible to surmise from this repetition of sentences a 
transformation whereby the dissociation from the original author elevates the 
former sentences to a level in which they state the position of a school or tradition 
of thought, rather than the particular views of the original author. Such a reading 
becomes all the more plausible when we discover an on-going repetition of these 
sentences without subsequent attribution within future works belonging to the 
earlier mentioned tradition or school.  
 
The present, contemporary thinkers of this thesis are also no exception where the 
need for the earlier mentioned discernment is concerned. First and foremost, 
similar to the prior discussion on classical authors, contemporary authors also 
repeat sentences originally formulated by other thinkers. Likewise, the very act of 
embedding these sentences in their own discourses, inevitably alters the modality 
of the statement expressed by these sentences.  
 
A peculiar example of such an alteration can be found in the works of Cündioğlu. In 
two different works, Cündioğlu relates the words of ʿUbaydallah b. Ḥassan (d. 784): 
“Verily the Qur’an evidences disagreement. Thus, the claim of freewill is correct 
(ṣaḥīḥ) and has a textual basis (aṣl). Likewise, the claim of fatalism (al-ijbār) is also 
correct and has also a textual basis.”, as ʿUbaydallah continues, “For, each verse is 
one, possibly signifying two different aspects, and potentially carrying two different 
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meanings”197. Moreover, ʿUbaydallah argues that whoever accords the witting 
adulterer the status of believer is correct, but the one who argues that such a 
person is a disbeliever by virtue of their sin is also correct. For, “The Qur’an signifies 
all these meanings”198.  Nevertheless, what is of note in respect to Cündioğlu’s 
work, is the fact that in the first work, Cündioğlu refers to ʿUbaydallah’s words to 
make a statement on the unrestricted potential of the Qur’an to be equivocal in its 
meanings199. At this junction, the statement’s frame of reference is very much 
theoretical, and ʿUbaydallah’s assertion functions in a manner that is akin to 
borrowing laboratory data or field research wherewith Cündioğlu supports his own 
claims. For, ʿUbaydallah has demonstrates in line with Cündioğlu’s beliefs how one 
can cultivate multiple, conflicting meanings from the Qur’an. However, in his 
second work, Cündioğlu makes the reference to ʿUbaydallah’s words again but with 
a different purpose. This second time, Cündioğlu uses ʿUbaydallah’s words in order 
to make a statement about how present-day Muslims are modern day incarnates of 
ʿUbaydallah, as their interpretations (yorumlar) and approach (yaklaşım biçim) 
remind us (hatırlatır) of ʿUbaydallah200. A new post-modern, perhaps cynical, 
undertone is thereby ascribed to ʿUbaydallah, that becomes reverberated through 
ʿUbaydallah’s recurrent claims of “they are also correct”, “they also have a textual 
basis”, and “all of these meanings can be found in the Qur’an”. An undertone that is 
reminiscent of some post-modern relativist attitudes towards texts. As such, in the 
works of Cündioğlu we are met with two identical citations that ultimately embody 
two different statements. As Foucault describes this phenomenon: “Not only can 
this identity of the statement not be situated once and for all in relation to that of 
the sentence, but it is itself relative and oscillates according to the use that is made 
of the statement and the way in which it is handled.”201 
 
 
197 Abū Muḥammad Ibn Qutaybah, Taʾwīl Mukhtalif Al-Ḥadīth (Beirut: Al-Maktabat al-Islāmī, 1999), 
95. 
198 Qutaybah, 95–96. 
199 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 57–58. 
200 Dücane Cündioğlu, Anlamin buharlaşması ve Kur’an : Hermeneutik bir deneyim II (Istanbul: Kapi 
Yayinlari, 2013), 64–65. 
201 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 117. 
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Another more modern practice warranting the earlier proposed discernment, is 
specifically found in the re-publication of existing essays in new works. For example, 
Cündioğlu originally presented his first work on Qur’an hermeneutics for an 
academic audience at a symposium. Initially this presentation became collected and 
made available with other proceedings. However, the same work, with the same 
exact sentences, was later published multiple times as a book with newly added 
prefaces. Inevitably, each new preface became a new relationship for the original 
statements wherewith their modality became potentially reconfigured. Likewise, 
Alpyağıl collected three of his earlier published essays and further supplanted them 
with three newly written essays into a new book on Qur’an hermeneutics. 
Accordingly, previously expressed sentences in earlier statements, evolved again in 
their modality in accordance with the fact that they are now collected with three 
additional essays written with their collection in mind. Alternately, if one were to 
give little weight to such material conditions, it would mean, for example, that 
there is no inherent difference whether one studies Cündioğlu’s original article or 
the later reprint with the additional prefaces. However, it is easy to see how much 
of a disservice this would be to the thought of the author in question.  
 
One might approach the hitherto build-up and promotion of the statement in the 
context of Qur’an hermeneutics with a degree of scepticism. For, as one could 
tauntingly ask: “How much Qur’an hermeneutics can there even be of note in a 
statement?” To properly reply to this question, I wish to answer with various 
samples from the great body of classical Islamic discourse wherein statements are 
found that despite their small stature, are both profound and monumental.  
 
Let us begin the discussion with the seminal work of the classical scholar al-
Zarkashī, who specifically intended to author a book “that would collect (jāmiʿ) 
everything men have spoken of in respect to its [i.e. the Qur’an’s] sciences.”202 
Among the statements that al-Zarkashī found noteworthy, was a statement by al-
 
202 Badr al-Dīn Muhammad Al-Zarkashī, Al-Burhān Fī-ʿUlūm Al-Qurʾān (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2006), 19. 
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Shāfiʿī (d. 820), the eponymous grand jurist of the Shāfiʿī school of law to which al-
Zarkashī belonged. The statement in question is as follows: “All that the community 
speaks of, is an explanation of the Prophetic precedent (al-sunna). The entire 
Prophetic precedent is an explanation of the Qur’an. And the entire Qur’an is an 
explanation of the exquisite names of God.”203 Al-Shāfiʿī, who was known for his 
eloquence, masterfully moves the statement by the grace of its order through a 
vertical relationship from the most profane (the community) to the most sacred 
(the names of God). Representing a coherent intertwining of praxis (e.g. the 
sunnah) and intertextuality (e.g. fiqh, ḥadīth, Qur’an)204. Each added layer of 
understanding coming to mediate another, finally ending up at the precipice of the 
end of human intelligibility, which are the names of God, and whose transgression 
inevitably ends with the ineffable205 and the inaccessible: God’s essence. Despite 
being succinct, such a statement undoubtably demonstrates the intricate Qur’an 
hermeneutics that one can discover even in a single statement, especially when it is 
unpacked by being further linked – to the degree of having no end in sight - with 
related statements belonging to other discourses, such as the literature on fiqh, 
tafsīr and tasawwuf. 
 
Another noteworthy example of a statement of Qur’an hermeneutics, can be found 
in the work of al-Wāḥidī (d. 1075). The work in question, Asbāb al-Nuzūl (Occasions 
for Revelation), is introduced by al-Wāḥidī with the complaint that contemporaries 
have not been earnest in their pursuit of the sciences of the Qur’an. Accordingly, to 
present a counternarrative, al-Wāḥidī wrote a book for beginners in the subject 
matter that would teach them the occasions in which the Qur’an was revealed. For, 
and this is the statement of note, “It [i.e. occasions for revelation] is the best 
[science] that one ought to know and the most appropriate thing to which one 
 
203 Al-Zarkashī, 19. 
204 Each layer is inevitably ‘embodied’ in text. The community, among others, in texts of 
jurisprudence (fiqh), the Prophet in the recorded oral reports (hadith), and God, of course, in the 
Qur’an.   
205 Alluded to by the fact that al-Shāfiʿī does not speak of God’s essence (dhāt) as the last element in 
the grand chain of understanding but of the names of God.    
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should direct one’s attention, since it is not possible to know the interpretation of a 
given verse or the meaning it alludes to without knowing its story and the occasion 
of its revelation.”206 Despite being an elementary statement, this theoretical 
presupposition became an important staple of Qur’an hermeneutics within Islamic 
discourse. Thus, we discover that nearly five centuries later al-Suyūṭī still 
underwrote the propaedeutic and fundamental importance of al-Wāḥidī’s 
statement for the understanding of the Qur’an by repeating the statement 
verbatim207 and by structuring his work on the sciences of Qur’an to begin with the 
data on the occasions of the revelation of the Qur’an. Moreover, the statement 
finds itself even repeated up to our present in the work Mabāḥith fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān 
(‘Investigations into the Sciences of the Qur’an’) written by Mannāʿ al-Qaṭṭān (d. 
1999)208. Almost a thousand years has passed, and still the truth once stated by al-
Wāḥidī concerning the most proper means to understanding had not weaned in the 
least, that is “And the knowledge of the occasion for revelation is the best manner 
(khayr al-sabīl) to understand (fahm) the meanings of the Qur’an.”209 
 
These examples demonstrate that the breadth and weight of a statement should 
not be underestimated. Not in Islamic discourse, but I would additionally argue, also 
not beyond. For example, the Jewish sage Hillel was asked by a gentile to be taught 
the entire Torah while standing on one foot. Hillel replied with the following, “That 
which is hateful to you do not do to another; that is the entire Torah, and the rest is 
its interpretation. Go study.”210 Likewise, Jesus was asked what the greatest 
commandment in the law is, to which he responded as follows: “Love the Lord your 
God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the first 
and greatest commandment.” Jesus explained that it is this commandment 
 
206 Alī ibn Ahmad Al-Wāhidī, Asbāb Al-Nuzūl, ed. Yousef Meri, trans. Mokrane Guezzou (Amman: 
Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, 2008), x. 
207 Jalāl al-Dīn Al-Suyuṭī, Al-Itqān Fī ʿUlūm Al-Qurʾān, vol. 4 (Wizārat al-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya wa-al-
Daʿwa wa-al-Irshād, n.d.), 82. 
208 Mannāʿ Al-Qaṭṭān, Mabāḥith Fī ʿUlūm Al-Qur’ān (Beirutt: Muassah al-Risālah, 2000), 80. 
209 Al-Qaṭṭān, 80. 
210 William Davidson, “The William Davidson Talmud: Shabbat 31a,” n.d., 
https://www.sefaria.org/Shabbat.31a.6?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en. 
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together with its similar ‘Love your neighbour as yourself’, that are ultimately the 
basis upon which “all the Law and the Prophets hang”211.  
 
With all of this said, we can finally draw formal conclusions concerning the 
essence/materiality of Qur’an hermeneutics.  As prior stated, hermeneutics in the 
absolute sense concerns itself reflectively with the conditions and operations 
involved in any kind of understanding (passive or active). In other words, it 
fundamentally inquiries into how and under which circumstances the meaning of 
something, whatever that thing is, becomes intelligible. Qur’an hermeneutics, on 
the other hand, denotes only the particularity and exactitude where this general 
hermeneutical task of reflecting on how the meaning of things become intelligible is 
further constricted and derivatively developed in reference to whatever is signified 
specifically by ‘the Qur’an’. Qur’an hermeneutics is specifically involved in 
theorising on the conditions and operations as to how the particular meanings of 
the Qur’an become intelligible. Moreover, Qur’an hermeneutics, or hermeneutics 
for that matter, are at their lowest level expressed by statements relating to the 
aforementioned theoretical concerns. Qur’an hermeneutics, is therefore not, as 
often thought, materially bound to exclusive concepts or movements such as tafsīr, 
fiqh, taʾwīl, nor is it particularly related to various literary genres (e.g. uṣūl al-fiqh, 
ʿulūm al-qurʾān, or uṣūl al-tafsīr). Rather the discourse belonging to such concepts, 
movements, and literary genres, are some of the fields in which we can discover 
statements of Qur’an hermeneutics.  
  
 
211 NIV Matt. 22:36-40 
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A Case Against Subjectivity and Relativism: The Hermeneutics 




Born in 1962 in Istanbul in the district of Üsküdar, Cündioğlu started his career in 
the early eighties by writing for various magazines and newspapers. He has since 
grown into a prolific author who has written different articles, columns, books, and 
novels on a variety of philosophical and theological topics. To the general public he 
is perhaps best known for his columns in the conservative Turkish newspaper Yeni 
Şafak and his occasional appearance on Turkish television.  
 
Unlike the other authors of this thesis, Cündioğlu is the only author without formal 
academic training or teaching position. Nevertheless, despite not being an academic 
professor, Cündioğlu is known to give the occasional lecture, teaching various 
subjects such as philosophy and tafsīr at various institutions and research 
foundations. According to Silverstein, Cündioğlu’s absence in the formal academic 
circuit, seems to be more of a technical nature, rather than related to the quality of 
his work. “The reasons for his institutional marginality would seem to be mainly 
technical and/or legal ones, for the quality and quantity of his publications is, it 
must be said, far superior to those of many on the country's university faculties.”212 
This fact becomes further evident when we discover the many references other 
academics make to Cündioğlu’s work in their papers and books. 
 
Despite Cündioğlu’s marginal presence in the formal academic circuit, or perhaps 
because of it213, Cündioğlu has developed a veritable following throughout the 
years. This is particularly evidenced by his social media following.  His Twitter 
 
212 Silverstein, Islamist critique, p. 150 
213 Certain conservative Turkish readers distrust Turkish academia due to its members espousing 
anti-conservative ideas.  
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account alone is followed by three hundred sixty thousand members214. One will be 
hard pressed to find similar numbers among Cündioğlu’s academic peers. 
Moreover, since the end of March 2020, Cündioğlu also has built a respectable 
presence on YouTube by uploading videos on a weekly basis that he films with a 
simple webcam from the comfort of his own home. Some of these videos have 
reached almost a hundred thousand views. In these videos Cündioğlu addresses a 
range of philosophical and religious topics, such as what freedom and justice are, 
and what the significance of fasting is. 
 
Besides a few sporadic references, relatively little research has been done on the 
works of Cündioğlu outside the Turkish context. The most substantial Western 
study to date, has been Silverstein’s article Islamist Critique in Modern Turkey: 
Hermeneutics, Tradition, Genealogy. While this study does not specifically explain 
the fundamental principles of Cündioğlu’s hermeneutical outlook, it does provide a 
noteworthy description of the specific context and features of Cündioğlu’s thought. 
From Silverstein’s essay, we discover that Cündioğlu belongs to a larger movement 
of Islamist thinkers that are characterized by a twofold ambition. First, they aim to 
develop a critical genealogy of present social forms and practices. Second, they seek 
to reflect on the nature of sources and interpretation215.  
 
What the latter meant in the case of Cündioğlu, is further delineated in one of 
Cündioğlu’s interviews. In this interview, Cündioğlu describes the advent of his 
thinking on the sources of Islam. To recall Cündioğlu’s words: 
 
“I was solemnly preoccupied with the Qur’an. During those times216 this was the 
dominant tendency (eğilim). I was also following that tendency217. After this 
tendency, the mealcilik (exclusive reliance on the translation of the Qur’an) 
 
214 As of October 2020. 
215 Silverstein, Islamist critique, p. 134-135 
216 The timeline to which Cündioğlu is referring is not entirely clear. However, given the mention of 
Yaşar Nuri Öztürk translation of the Qur’an, and the time that Cündioğlu himself started publishing 
on the Qur’an, it seems Cündioğlu is referring to the 90s.   
217 This tendency, namely the return to the Qur’an, was discussed in more details in the first chapter 
in reference to Özsoy’s genealogy of Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey. 
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movement came to be. For example, names such as Edip Yüksel and Yaşar Nuri 
Öztürk were influenced by this tendency. Everyone that had an issue with tradition 
and lived Islam, were looking for an unblemished foundation and source. What 
could this be but the Qur’an? It could have also been the practices (uygulamalar) of 
our Prophet. [However] the practices [of the Prophet] had issues and did not carry 
certainty (kesinlik taşımıyor). Accordingly (o halde), there was only one foundation 
(dayanak) that we could blindly apply our lives to. I on the other hand, opened my 
eyes218 and preferred to only rely on the Qur’an.”219 
 
These last sentences are also very revealing in regard to the marginal role of the 
sunna of the Prophet in the hermeneutical theories of certain Turkish thinkers. In 
other words, it gives one possible answer as to why the explicit significance of the 
sunna in interpreting the Qur’an is often omitted from the discussions on Qur’an 
hermeneutics – despite authors, more so when they are conservative, being aware 
of its existence. Cündioğlu explains this attitude towards the sunna by stating that 
the sunna did not carry the same epistemic force, namely ‘certainty’ (kesinlik) as the 
Qur’an did. While Cündioğlu does not further divulge into the details of this 
problem, it is possible to intuit from references to ‘unproblematic foundations’ and 
‘certainty’, that Cündioğlu is alluding to the loss of the self-evident primacy of the 
sunna in modernity as a foundational source of Islamic thought220.  
 
Cündioğlu’s words demonstrate that the stage for the discussions on the 
interpretation of the Qur’an was set by known skeptics of the classical ḥadīth 
tradition, such as Edip Yüksel and Yaşar Nuri Öztürk. While the Qur’an was 
universally accepted, the tradition of ḥadīth – the source that embodied the sunna 
– was not. Thinkers such as Yüksel would contend that the ḥadīth tradition was full 
of fabrication and lies attributed to the Prophet.  Any desire for a broad appeal and 
 
218 Cündioğlu is alluding to the reflective nature of his work. In other words, he did not blindly rely on 
the Qur’an but with open eyes, i.e. consciously and with intellectual deliberation.  
219 Özgül Apaçe, “Sıradışı Bir Entelektüel: Dücane Cündioğlu,” Yeni Aktüel, 2011. 
220 “Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, some Muslim scholars began challenging 
core components of the pre-modern Islamic tradition. Some concluded that the hadith tradition was 
not at all a reliable representation of Muhammad's message. A few of these thinkers went so far as 
to reject altogether the authoritativeness of the Prophet’s precedent. We can label this overall trend 
as Islamic Modernism, which is characterized by a radical reconsideration of classical Islamic beliefs.” 
Jonathan A.C. Brown, Hadith: Muhammad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World (Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 2009), 243–44.  
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alignment with ongoing discussions, would require that the first principles of any 
new outlook on Islam, even those proposed by conservatives as Cündioğlu, had to 
be formulated in relation to a universally accepted source, namely the Qur’an.  
 
Another characteristic of Cündioğlu’s works, comes from the fact that Cündioğlu 
primarily writes from a self-designated philosophical perspective; hence, his works 
should not be understood in the frame of classical Islamic works or the modern 
ideas of Turkish academic theologians (ilâhiyatçı). For example, the first section of 
his second book in hermeneutics is titled: A Philosophical Analysis of the Essence of 
Understanding the Qur’an (Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Mahiyeti Üzerine Felsefi Bir 
Çözümleme). Thus, Cündioğlu should be identified as a contemporary Muslim 
philosopher, rather than a conventional madrasa educated scholar or academically 
trained theologian. Nevertheless, despite not writing according to the standards of 
classical Islamic scholarship, Cündioğlu’s oeuvre is still laden with Ottoman-Turkish 
terminology and expressions that might feel very arcane by colloquial standards but 
demonstrate his strong literacy in classical Islamic sources.  
 
While Cündioğlu has written a variety of interesting works, the focus of this thesis 
will be primarily limited to two works that are dedicated to the topic of Qur’an 
hermeneutics: The Meaning of Understanding the Qur’an: An Experiment in 
Hermeneutics I (Kuran’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I) and The 
Evaporation of Meaning and the Qur’an: An Experiment in Hermeneutics II (Anlamın 
Buharlaşması ve Kur’an: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim II). The fact that these works are 
hermeneutical in nature, is clearly evidenced by their respective subtitles. 
Moreover, the enumeration present in both subtitles, suggests a relationship of 
continuity between both projects on which I shall return shortly. However, both 
works are ultimately part of a larger series called Critical Qur’an Studies (Kur’an 
Tedkikleri), which also includes other works by Cündioğlu on different Qur’an 
related topics, such as the integrity of Turkish Qur’an translations.  
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Cündioğlu deems his second publication to be a continuation (devamı) of his prior 
work221.  In like manner to his first work, Cündioğlu argues to once more (yine) 
centre his inquiry around “the problem of understanding of the Qur’an” (Kur’an’ı 
anlama sorununu), namely, how to establish the conditions of understanding a text 
from the structure of the text itself (metnin yapısından)222. Accordingly, given the 
repetitious nature of Cündioğlu’s goals, it should come as no surprise that his 
second work is only complimentary to his first work. While both works exhibit a 
shared goal, the manner and concepts wherewith this goal is realized, are – as we 
shall soon discover - different.  
 
Besides their repetitious nature, both of Cündioğlu’s works exhibit a strong critical 
character. To recall, in the introduction chapter of this thesis, it was argued that a 
recurrent characteristic found in Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics is the desire by 
theoreticians to respond to a perceived excess in the way that the Qur’an was 
interpreted by different parties in contemporary Turkey. The theories of the three 
authors that are the topic of this thesis are no exception. Nonetheless, while each 
theory shares a reactive and pedagogical trait, there is still a difference in how each 
author envisions what the fundamental problems of circulating Qur’an 
interpretations are. In the case of Cündioğlu, as a further analysis of the context of 
his works will evidence, his hermeneutics is devised to act as a counteragent to the 
subjectivist and relativistic readings of the Qur’an that Cündioğlu finds both 
theoretically defunct and unconstructive.  
 
In the following sections I will analyse these two works of Cündioğlu in order to 
show that the essence of Cündioğlu’s hermeneutics revolves around the 
reconstruction of the objective authorial intent. In Cündioğlu’s framework the 
ultimate reference of meaning is not the subject’s private and contingent 
understanding but the transcendent, objective intention of the original author. The 
 
221 Cündioğlu, Anlamin buharlaşması ve Kur’an : Hermeneutik bir deneyim II, ix. 
222 Cündioğlu, ix. 
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transcendent, objective intention of the original author, however, can only be 
retrieved by examining the historical and linguistic material aspects of expressions. 
However, since the Qur’an’s meaning is also intrinsically historical, it means that a 
present-day subject is given no license to apply himself to creative readings of the 
Qur’an that were historically foreign or implausible. Otherwise, as Cündioğlu 
retorts, if the Qur’an could only be understood by a future audience, it would 
conflict with the Qur’an’s imperative to be reflected upon by those present during 
the 22-year period of revelation. Hence, the subject’s role must ultimately not be 
defined in terms of an inventor of new meanings but as an archaeologist of 
objective meanings anchored in the past. 
 
The Meaning of Understanding the Qur’an 
 
The Meaning of Understanding the Qur’an was initially written and published as an 
article for the first ever annual Week of the Qur’an, Qur’an Symposium (Kur’an 
Haftası Kur’an Sempozyumu) held during the month of Ramadan in 1995. The very 
same period that Özsoy had characterised as the decade in which heightened 
discussions were held in Turkey concerning how the Qur’an should be studied and 
understood. While this article was originally conceived as an academic work, 
Cündioğlu would soon present his work to the general populace by having it 
republished in book format with additional prefaces. It is in these prefaces, that 
Cündioğlu sheds further light on his original motives and the reception history of his 
work in Turkey. Accordingly, in the following segment I will first examine some of 
the relevant contextual aspects of Cündioğlu’s thinking before I advance into the 
fundamental assumptions of his hermeneutical theory. 
 
Cündioğlu argues that the goal of his first work was to develop a set of fundamental 
principles of Qur’anic interpretation and demonstrate how these principles would 
affect the understanding of the Qur’an223. The principles that he enumerates are 
 
223Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 9. 
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based on a hermeneutical inquiry into what the exact relationship between reader 
and text is, or how the circumstances and conditions surrounding text and reader 
influence the process of understanding the Qur’an224. Cündioğlu is inevitably aware 
that such questions were already addressed in the tradition of tafsīr. However, 
without divulging into any details as to why this is the case, Cündioğlu concludes 
that the classical tradition has answered these questions insufficiently (yeterli 
değil). Moreover, the tafsīr tradition is seen by Cündioğlu as being hardly accessible 
to the modern reader, since it demands arduous and long research in order to 
properly function as a hermeneutical frame of reference225.  According to 
Cündioğlu, rather than helping to bridge the fundamental rift between modern 
humans and the Qur’an, the tafsīr tradition, by virtue of its difficult and inaccessible 
nature, only further exacerbates this rift.  
 
In his second preface, however, Cündioğlu confesses a different motive behind his 
work. Accordingly, Cündioğlu writes that he wanted to write a work that would 
establish the fundamental conditions for understanding the Qur’an that would 
defend ‘the children of this nation’ (bu toprakların cocukları) from those who try to 
beguile (aldatanlar) them in the name of the Qur’an226. Moreover, he wanted to 
come to terms with developments in 20th century Western hermeneutics, and to 
demonstrate that postmodernism227 could not provide any constructive 
contribution to the problem of understanding and interpreting the Qur’an228. 
 
Despite his best intentions, Cündioğlu laments that his work was not as well 
received as he had hoped for. As Cündioğlu recalls, he was ahead of his time, since 
 
224 Cündioğlu, 9. 
225 Cündioğlu, 9–10. 
226 While Cündioğlu does not go into further details, it can be surmised from his overall text that 
Cündioğlu is referring to interpretations that serve to further an ideological agenda, rather than 
what the Qur’an is believed to be saying by Cündioğlu. Cündioğlu, 7. 
227 Cündioğlu refrains from what he understands as postmodernism. However, going by his overall 
text, as we shall discover in the proceeding sections, it seems that Cündioğlu is referring to a broad 
cultural movement that has renounced the belief in objective meaning, and as such, deems every 
interpretation of texts to be relative.     
228 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 7–8. 
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he had presented an answer to an audience that had not yet come to ask the 
questions he had answered229.  Instead, the Turkish theological community met his 
work with sneer and criticism, sometimes going as far as claiming a relation (alâkalı) 
to New Testament exegesis (Incil yorumlarıyla)230. Nonetheless, Cündioğlu argues, 
while it might not have been explicitly attributed to his own efforts, the terminology 
and views he had expressed had become gradually more and more accepted and 
helped define the topics of subsequent graduate and postgraduate theses. Rather 
than feeling happiness from this turn of events, Cündioğlu was only left embittered, 
claiming that the pursuit of knowledge was not without its price231.  For, as we can 
surmise, the price of being a pioneer is to be chastised for novel ideas that are at 
first instance assaulted, only for these ideas to subsequently become mainstays 
with increased understanding and exposure.  
 
Hermeneutical beginnings  
 
The first premise of Cündioğlu’s hermeneutics, is the conviction that the Qur’an is a 
linguistic event (dilsel bir olgu)232. Cündioğlu defines this assumption as follows: 
“Since the Qur’an is God’s discourse (kelâm), His speaking (konuşması), it is pre-
eminently related to language (dil), [and is therefore] a linguistic event (dilsel bir 
olgu).”233 Hence, to understand the Qur’an, is “to understand and interpret a 
speech, a word (söz), [or] an expression (linguistic text) in language.”234 However, 
since the Qur’an is realized in language, our understanding of language will 
reciprocally define our understanding of the Qur’an. 
 
 
229 Cündioğlu, 8. 
230 Unfortunately Cündioğlu does not name or elaborate on the arguments made by  his detractors. 
Cündioğlu, 8. 
231 Cündioğlu, 8. 
232 Another synonym that Cündioğlu uses is nass-ı lugavî (linguistic text). Cündioğlu, 15. 
233 Cündioğlu, 18. 
234 Cündioğlu, 19. 
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Up to this point nothing has been said by Cündioğlu, that the classical authorities on 
Qur’an hermeneutics had also not argued before. Cündioğlu acknowledges this and 
reminds us how language has always taken centre stage in the traditions of uṣūl al-
fiqh and tafsīr. The latter can inevitably be witnessed, argues Cündioğlu, in the 
classical enumeration of sciences that a scholar ought to master before he or she 
can start to interpret the Qur’an. In al-Taysir fī Qawāʿid ʿIlm al-Tafsīr (An Easy 
Introduction into the Rules of the Science of Exegesis), the Ottoman scholar Kafiyeci 
(d. 1474) had listed fifteen prerequisite sciences needed by the exegete. Out of 
these fifteen, notes Cündioğlu, seven pertain to language. Including such sciences as 
rhetoric, morphology, and grammar. In other words, more than two thirds of a 
tafsīr scholar’s qualifications revolve around the expertise of language235.  
 
The significance of language for the understanding of the Qur’an is undeniable, and 
Cündioğlu’s own hermeneutics incepts from a fundamental phenomenological 
understanding of communication within language. At the base of this 
phenomenological understanding resides the dialectical distinction between 
meaning-conveyance and meaning-understanding. In other words, his 
hermeneutics pivots on the elementary assumption that when something 
meaningful is expressed, there will always be someone one the one end that 
conveys a message with meaning, and someone on the other hand that receives 
and interprets this meaning.  
 
For Cündioğlu, meaning-conveyance involves a conveyor (anlatan), the act of 
conveying (anlatım) and an object being conveyed (anlatılan)236. As Cündioğlu 
explains, to convey meaning is to realize a communicative event with three 
fundamental elements: a person that addresses (muhatıb) someone, a person that 
is being addressed (muhatab), and the address (hitab) itself237.  For example, if I 
 
235 Cündioğlu, 18. 
236 An alternate translation of “anlatan-anlatım-anlatılan” would be “enunciator-enunciation-
narrative”.  
237 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 20. 
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were to ask my daughter to drink her milk, the conveyor or addressing subject 
would be me, while my daughter would be the addressee, and the imperative to 
drink milk would be the object, or more specifically, the address conveyed. 
Meaning, as Cündioğlu contends, is nothing other than the object (şey) which the 
conveyor wishes to convey (iletmek).  
 
On the other end, where the reception and understanding of meaning is concerned, 
Cündioğlu presents a corresponding tri-partite division structured around the 
understanding subject, the act of understanding, and what is understood. As 
Cündioğlu argues, when a linguistic message is conveyed, one customarily also 
witnesses the presence of a subject who receives the message (anlayan). After 
receiving the message, the recipient subsequently engages in the act of 
understanding (anlama). The latter act effects consequently a “what-is-understood” 
(anslaşılan)238. The following example could shed some further light on this 
understanding of meaning recipience. Accordingly, let us imagine that there is a 
person A and a person B. Person A exclaims “help!” to person B, thereby resulting in 
person B to become the understanding subject (anlayan). Person B receives this 
message and proceeds in an act of understanding (anlama). By engaging in the act 
of understanding, he or she comes to the realization that person A is requesting 
urgent assistance (anslaşılan/what-is-understood). 
 
With this model of communication in place, Cündioğlu is able to outline a concrete 
criterium where correct understanding (doğru anlam) can be differentiated from 
misunderstanding (yanlış anlam). Accordingly, Cündioğlu argues that when the 
what-is-understood does not correspond with the object intended by the original 
interlocutor, then the original intention has undeniably been misunderstood239. 
However, the opposite also holds true: if one is able to reconstruct the intended 
 
238 Cündioğlu, 20–21. 
239 Cündioğlu, 21. 
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meaning and correspond his or her own understanding in accordance with the 
intention, then correct understanding has been realized.  
 
If understanding is achieved through correspondence between what is originally 
intended and what has been understood, then the main question becomes how one 
can reconstruct the original intention? In a conventional dialogical situation, one 
can simply ask the interlocutor to explain his intent. However, according to 
Cündioğlu, in instances where this is not possible, such as when the interlocutor is 
no longer present, the main question within a process of interpretation has to shift 
away from “What do you mean with this expression?” to “What does this 
expression signify?”240 In other words, whatever the answer is to what an 
expression means must be constructed from the strict material confines of the 
expression itself, and not through a questioning of the original author. 
 
The material confines of an expression are defined by what Cündioğlu calls “the 
natural connections of an expression” (söz’ün tabii bağlamı). To further clarify, the 
natural connections are the characteristic, material relationships that any 
meaningful linguistic expression has. They are the necessary components that are 
constitutive of any meaningful expression. As Cündioğlu explains, “The natural 
connections (tabii bağlam), however, are made up of elements such as the content 
(söylenen), the addressee (kendisine söylenen), the reason for something being 
uttered (niçin söylenen), the time and place that belongs to the utterance (ne 
zaman ve nerede söylendiği)” 241  A description, which he in a subsequent section 
further extends by arguing that the manner in which the author expresses 
something (nasıl söylüyor), e.g. by way of metaphor or narratives, also belongs to 
the natural connections an expression has242. Accordingly, by reconstructing an 
expression in reference to these characteristics, as a later section will further 
 
240 Cündioğlu, 23. 
241 Cündioğlu, 22. 
242 Cündioğlu, 101–2. 
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illustrate, an interpreter is assured the retrieval of the objective meaning of an 
expression.   
 
There is no doubt that this material approach to interpretation addresses the 
typical hermeneutical problem of historical distance. By suggesting a reconstructive 
method, Cündioğlu attempts to present a remedy to the problem of how new 
recipients can understand a historical message that was originally conveyed during 
certain circumstance in which they were absent, and whose original author they can 
no longer reach for further clarification. As such, Cündioğlu presents a very critical 
answer to age-old problem within Qur’an hermeneutics: how is one to shed light on 
God’s word and decipher it after the departure of the Prophet of God, humanity’s 
most direct communication channel to understanding the revelation of God? 
 
The problems of a Qur’an hermeneutics grounded in subjectivity 
 
Before Cündioğlu fully answers this question with his proposed epistemology of 
interpretation, Cündioğlu further edifies his objectivist theory by counterpoising it 
with its intellectual counterpart, subjectivism. For Cündioğlu the starting point of 
subjectivism begins with the dissolution of the earlier mentioned dialectics between 
meaning-conveyance and meaning-understanding. In other words, as Cündioğlu 
claims, when interpretations no longer relate their understanding to the 
interlocutor’s intention behind a statement (anlatılan) but to what an interpreter 
regardless of this intention personally understands (anlaşılan).  In such an instance, 
the subject becomes the sole authority of meaning. However, when the authority of 
meaning is no longer located exterior to the subject, then the subject, according to 
Cündioğlu, receives a carte blanche to interpret the Qur’an in whatever way that 
suits his or her interests. As a result, Cündioğlu concludes that the Qur’an runs the 
risk of being “made to speak” (konuşturmak)243 according to the terms laid out by 
the subject’s vested interests, rather than what the Qur’an wishes to objectively 
 
243 Cündioğlu, 28. 
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convey.  In more technical terms, the Qur’an becomes explained (müfesser), rather 
than what it really is according to Cündioğlu: self-explaining (bi zatihi müfessir)244. 
 
Cündioğlu who is deeply conversant with recent Turkish studies and translations of 
the Qur’an, presents three examples that he believes that demonstrate how the 
Qur’an’s understanding might be impeded by subjective interests. These examples 
involve the explanation of verses that relate to the following controversial topics: 
the covering of women’s bodies, the disciplining of women by their husbands, and 
the corporal punishment of thieves. Cündioğlu suspects that the modern 
explanations of these verses, all of whom undermine their classical understanding, 
were all born out of the inability to harmonize modern sensibilities with the 
message of the Qur’an, rather than what the text really has to say245.  However, 
rather than allowing for the dissonance to persist between what the text prima 
facie signifies and the values and norms set by the modern world, interpreters are 
accused of revising their understanding (yeni bir forma sokmak)246 into something 
which they deem more acceptable.   
 
The first example presented by Cündioğlu is his most terse, and hence, most 
ambiguous example247. This example pertains to the covering of women and begins 
with the premise that the Qur’an is univocal about the fact that women have to be 
covered. Whether this means head or face is not clarified by Cündioğlu. However, 
that the Qur’an only seems to suggest that women ought to cover only their 
breasts, as Cündioğlu’s anonymous opponent translates verse 24:31, is vehemently 
opposed by Cündioğlu. Without going into detail, Cündioğlu argues that such a 
reading is not something derived from philological evidence (filolojik deliller) but 
 
244 Cündioğlu, 33–34. 
245 Cündioğlu, 29. 
246 Cündioğlu, 29. 
247 We have to remember that Cündioğlu was talking to an academic public when he initially 
presented this work. Accordingly, I suspect  that the omission of details in Cündioğlu’s examples is 
due to the fact that simple allusions would have sufficed in those times to remind his audience of the 
“exegetical deception” (Cündioğlu’s ultimate point) that is currently in effect amongst circulating 
politically correct, anachronistic interpretations of the Qur’an.  
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from screened causes (arkada kalan sebepler)248. What these screened causes are is 
not entirely clear, but Cündioğlu believes that the previously mentioned revisionist 
reading of the verse stems from the interpreter’s belief that the covering of the 
head is no longer defensible (savunulabilir)249. This could mean a variety of things, 
none of which are explicitly presented by Cündioğlu, as Cündioğlu cuts off his 
argument. However, given the history of westernization in Islamicate countries, it 
seems to hint towards the fact that modern interpreters can no longer advocate the 
head scarf as it conflicts with the dress code of women defined by contemporary 
western standards. that had already been appropriated by a large population of 
Turkish society. Accordingly, Cündioğlu suggests that these interpreters revise their 
understanding into something more practical, such as the covering of the breasts, 
which is inevitably already an acceptable custom within the majority of the western 
world. 
 
On the other hand, Cündioğlu’s second example is more straightforward and 
explicit. There is no doubt that all of Cündioğlu’s examples pertain to very 
controversial topics in Qur’an studies. His discussion of 4:34 is no exception, since it 
deals with the issue of whether men are allowed to swat their wives or not. 
Cündioğlu claims that the Qur’an allows according to a conventional reading for 
men to swat their wives under exceptional circumstances. However, argues 
Cündioğlu, in light of our modern understanding of women rights and male-female 
relationships, this conventional reading becomes indefensible. As Pink clarifies the 
Turkish context from which Cündioğlu speaks: 
 
“Regardless of what construct of marriage and gender hierarchy one holds to be 
preferable or even God-given, it is hard to see the act of beating his wife as a man’s 
natural right today in the same unconcerned way that an exegete in the nineteenth 
or early-twentieth century might have done. For exactly that reason, the debate to 
which the above-mentioned thread starter refers has emerged: a debate on 
whether the Arabic word for ‘beating’, ‘striking’ or ‘hitting’, ḍaraba, might have an 
entirely different meaning here. That opinion has increasingly been promoted since 
 
248 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 30. 
249 Cündioğlu, 30. 
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the 1990s in the context of a debate on marital violence in particular and gender 
equality in general.”250 
 
Accordingly, argues Cündioğlu, interpreters who were conflicted with traditional 
readings, enumerated other potential meanings (anlam dökümü) from which they 
subsequently selected a more suitable interpretation to ḍaraba251. As a result, what 
was previously understood as ‘hitting’ (ḍaraba), was now – on account of the 
word’s rich polysemy – reinterpreted as ‘expelling’252.  
 
In contrast to the two previous gender related examples, Cündioğlu’s final example 
pertains to the issue of capital punishment in the Qur’an. The verse in question 
within this example is 5:38. Accordingly, to illustrate Cündioğlu’s point about how 
this verse is conventionally read, we can refer to  Yusuf Ali’s translation: “As to the 
thief, Male or female, cut off his or her hands: a punishment by way of example”. As 
one can imagine, some interpreters that might feel such verses to be too brutal, will 
inevitably opt for an alternate interpretation of this verse. Hence, argues Cündioğlu, 
it is no surprise that some interpreters have revised the conventional translation of 
‘cutting’ for ‘scathing’ (çizmek)253. Nonetheless, as with the previous examples: 
what is guiding in interpretation is not so much a philological honesty, since the 
Arabic imperative iqṭaʿ mentioned in the verse means customarily cutting, but what 
is palatable by the interpreting subject.   
 
When the de facto reference of meaning is the interpretation of the subject, then it 
is most likely that subjects who face interpretative dilemma’s, will resolve these 
dilemma’s by involving their own private or cultural inclinations about certain 
issues. Hence, as the previous examples argued, if an interpreter is faced with a less 
acceptable reading of the Qur’an, they could potentially resort to the rich polysemy 
present in the Qur’an. Such interpreters, as one of the examples demonstrated, 
 
250 Pink, Muslim Qurʾānic Interpretation Today, 285. 
251 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 30. 
252 Cündioğlu, 31. 
253 Cündioğlu, 32. 
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could argue that the customary understanding of ḍaraba, which is ‘hitting’, is in 
reality not the one intended by the Qur’an. Rather, the Qur’an intends to mean 
‘expelling’, thus giving spouses the right to correct (te’dib) their wives under 
exceptional circumstances by expelling themselves from their homes, rather than 
allowing men to hit their wives. In lieu of these examples, it is no surprise that 
Cündioğlu directs his next hermeneutical question to the status of polysemy in the 
Qur’an.  
 
Polysemy, subjectivity, and the Qur’an 
 
The status of polysemy is not only relevant in cases when there are interpretative 
dilemma’s but also in regard to the problem of what I would like to call ‘meaning 
concurrency’. In other words, in regard to the question as to whether the Qur’an 
can intentionally and simultaneously mean multiple different things? In the likely 
event that the Qur’an does simultaneously intend multiple different meanings, then 
inevitably different subjectivities can claim to understand the Qur’an in variant 
ways. However, on the other hand, if the Qur’an does not intentionally embody 
multiple meanings, then the door to relativism in interpretation closes, and the 
appeal to objectivism becomes both critical and revitalized by a new argument.  
 
By analysing the problem of meaning concurrency and the classical views on 
language, Cündioğlu comes to the conclusion that the presence of polysemy in the 
Qur’an cannot be leveraged to legitimize any subjective pluralism in understanding 
the Qur’an. To make his case, Cündioğlu relies on both arguments from reason as 
well as tradition. In respect to the prior, Cündioğlu points out that a belief in 
concurrent meanings is an untenable idea that undermines the very possibility of 
meaningful communication. Whereas in respect to the latter, Cündioğlu 
demonstrates that the presence of polysemy in the Arabic language has never been 




For Cündioğlu divergent understandings are not so much purported by expressions 
but are rather side-effects occasioned by the audience’s subjective diversity254. In 
other words, the surplus of meaning is not so much in “what is conveyed” 
(anlatılan) but “what is understood” (anlaşılan)255.  Meaning, as a previously 
demonstrated, is effected by an objective intention. This intention has to function in 
a solitary way. Otherwise, if one were to intend everything simultaneously, one 
would in the end intend nothing at all256. As Cündioğlu cites Aristotle:  
 
“If on the other hand it be said that “man” has an infinite number of meanings, 
obviously there can be no discourse; for not to have one meaning is to have no 
meaning, and if words have no meaning there is an end of discourse with others, 
and even, strictly speaking, with oneself; because it is impossible to think of 
anything if we do not think of one thing”257.   
 
Cündioğlu goes on to argue that by intending different, contradicting things 
simultaneously (farklı anlamlar), one undoubtably generates meanings that cancel 
each other out258. One simply cannot intend multiple contradicting things 
simultaneously: “it is impossible that ‘being man’ should have the same meaning as 
‘not being man’”259. 
 
As the previous section on the revisionist readings of the Qur’an demonstrated, a 
notable size of Cündioğlu’s hermeneutical views can be retraced to problems in the 
relatively new Turkish culture of Qur’an translations (meal). Cündioğlu’s advocacy of 
objectivism and antipathy of meaning concurrency, can similarly be retraced to a 
very concrete Qur’an translation that is exemplary of this problem in interpretation. 
The translation in question, cited by Cündioğlu without source, translates verse 96:2 
 
254 Cündioğlu, 34. 
255 Cündioğlu, 36. 
256 Cündioğlu, 34. 
257Aristotle, The Metaphysics: Books I-IX, trans. Hugh Tredennick (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 
1923), 137; Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 34–35.  
258 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 34. 
259 Aristotle, The Metaphysics: Books I-IX, 167. 
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as follows: “He created the human from an embryo/from sticky water/love and 
care.”260 As the translation evidences, the author presents three different 
translations of the Arabic ʿalaq, all of which are separated by a slash. According to 
Cündioğlu, the word ʿalaq cannot concurrently signify all these three different 
entities on account of irreconcilable differences between these entities261. For 
example, given the question as to what the human is created from, Cündioğlu 
argues that the answer cannot be love (immaterial) and embryo (material) at the 
same time, since two contradictions cannot exist together in the same place262. In 
other words, if one were to ask whether the human was created from a material or 
immaterial substance, the answer cannot be both, because a substance is either 
material or immaterial.  
 
Nonetheless, disagreements as occasioned by multivalent expression in the Qur’an 
cannot be denied among the schools of legal thought in Islam, and Cündioğlu is 
acutely aware of this. One concrete example presented by Cündioğlu, concerns the 
meaning of lamastum in verse 5:6. In this verse, believers are commanded to purify 
themselves after having performed the act of lamasa on women. Lamasa, on 
account of its multiple meanings, can either signify general physical contact or more 
specifically coitus. While the prior has been a reading advocated by the jurist al-
Shāfiʿī (d. 820), the latter reading was opined by Abu Ḥanīfa (d. 767)263. 
Nevertheless, while Cündioğlu acknowledges that one can read the verse in 
different possible ways, as different legal schools have done, this does not mean 
“that the interlocutor (kelam sahibi) intended two different meanings concurrently 
in the same verse.”264  
 
Cündioğlu has certainly not been the first to argue that polysemic expressions are 
not evidence of concurrently different intentions in the Qur’an. The problem of 
 
260 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 36–37. 
261 Cündioğlu, 37. 
262 Cündioğlu, 37. 
263 Cündioğlu, 37. 
264 Cündioğlu, 37. 
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polysemy, or its classical Ottoman equivalent lafz-i müşterek, has already been the 
topic of many uṣūl al-fiqh works. The majority of classical Ḥanafī scholars have 
according to Cündioğlu all expressed the fact that polysemic expressions do not 
function by way of concurrency (şumul)265 but by way of substitution (bedel). In 
other words, a word with a multitude of meanings will always function in a given 
sentence with one of its meanings to the exclusion of all its other potential 
meanings.  
 
While numerous uṣūl al-fiqh scholars, especially among the Ḥanafīs and Muʿtazilīs, 
have argued against meaning concurrency, there have been noteworthy authorities 
such as al-Shāfīʿ that have argued in favour of the possibility of meaning 
concurrency266. Proponents of this view derive support from such verses as 22:18 
wherein the verb yasjudu (‘bowing’, ‘prostrating’) is being used in reference to 
animals, trees, stars, and humans. To reiterate the verse in question: “Seest thou 
not that to Allah bow down [yasjudu] in worship all things that are in the heavens 
and on earth,- the sun, the moon, the stars; the hills, the trees, the animals; and a 
great number among humankind?” Those who accept meaning concurrency267 
argue that this verb cannot relate with the same meaning to categorically different 
entities such as trees, stars, and humans. Trees obviously cannot perform the act of 
prostration in which they render their faces unto the ground. However, trees can 
figuratively ‘bow down’ by obeying God’s will. Thus, while prostration should be 
understood literally in reference to humans, it should be understood figuratively in 
reference to trees or stars.  
 
Classical authors who deny the presence of meaning concurrency in the Qur’an268, 
have presented an alternate reading of 22:18. According to these authors, it is 
 
265 This word literally means ‘comprehensive’, and in reference to the topic at hand, would refer to 
the fact that one single expression cannot denote in a comprehensive manner all its potential 
meanings concurrently. Cündioğlu, 52. 
266 Cündioğlu, 51. 
267 Cündioğlu provides no exact identities to who these classical authorities are.  
268 Cündioğlu presents yet again only the view and not any references to those who have held such a 
view.  
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possible to apply the figurative meaning of yasjudu to all the different categories 
mentioned in the verse without having to compromise the idea of a single meaning. 
In other words, if the starting point of our understanding is that yasjudu means 
submission (inkiyad), then the verb can apply without any alteration to both 
humans, stars, and trees269. As such, by not taking the literal meaning as the 
fundamental starting point of our understanding of yasjudu but the figurative 
meaning, no interpretative quandary remains that would have otherwise forced a 
resolution by admission of meaning concurrency. 
 
Some classical linguists have also argued against the presence of meaning 
concurrency. One of the authorities referenced by Cündioğlu in this regard is Ibn al-
Anbārī (d. 940). According to Ibn al-Anbārī, the words of the Arabs are in a 
structural relationship with each other: certain words realize meaning by aiding and 
complimenting other words in an expression.  Only when all words are 
comprehended, can the intended meaning truly be understood. As such, a part of 
an expression can by itself signify multiple possible meanings; however, when it is 
related to its totality, it will become clear what an expression’s true, singular 
signification is. As Ibn al-Anbārī vindicates Cündioğlu: one always intends one thing 
and not multiple things when informing someone270. 
 
 
The natural relations of expressions 
 
After demonstrating the untenable nature of relative meaning as well as its 
potential false legitimization through a misunderstanding of the status of polysemy 
in language, Cündioğlu delves into his own theoretical proposal of an objective 
Qur’an hermeneutics. As alluded to in the section on hermeneutical premises, 
Cündioğlu’s hermeneutics is fundamentally reconstructive. In other words, the 
 
269 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 53. 
270 Cündioğlu, 56–57. 
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objective meaning of a verse can be found by reconstructing its ‘natural 
connections’, i.e. by inquiring into questions as to what, why, by whom, and when 
something was stated in the Qur’an. 
 
Towards the end of his work, Cündioğlu advances into describing these natural 
connections with varying degrees of details. Starting with the first connection, 
which is the fact that any meaningful expression, is necessarily connected to a 
content, the what (ne) of an expression. This feature of linguistic expressions is the 
thing that the original author wished to convey271. As elementary as Cündioğlu’s 
conclusions might be, the fact remains that no understanding is possible without 
knowing what has been said.  
 
According to Cündioğlu, the content of any meaningful expression is also 
intrinsically bound to its raison d'être. In other words, the what of an expression is 
organically bound to the why272.  An example illustrative of this is verse 2:45. This 
verse states: “seek (Allah's) help with patient perseverance and prayer “.  Cündioğlu 
argues that by understanding the reason behind this statement, which is to 
encourage its audience to seek help through patience and prayer, we inevitably also 
understand what it wishes to convey, which is nothing other than its desire that its 
audience seek help through patience and prayer273.  
 
Besides the content of and motives behind an expression, it is also important to 
reconstruct the identity of a message’s addressees274.  According to Cündioğlu, any 
variance in respect to identity assessment, will necessarily also change the outcome 
of an understanding. As a case in point, Cündioğlu presents verse 5:44: “And 
whoever does not judge according to what Allah has revealed is of the kāfirūn.” 
Customarily, kāfirūn is translated as “unbelievers”. Hence, argues Cündioğlu, if one 
 
271 Cündioğlu, 71. 
272 Cündioğlu, 73. 
273 Cündioğlu, 73. 
274 Cündioğlu, 80. 
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understands this appeal to pertain to Muslims, it would mean that any detraction 
from the application of the Sharīʿa, results in a fall from faith275. Historians of Islam 
are aware of this reading of the Qur’an, since different historical sects such as the 
Kharijites have advanced such an interpretation276. On the other hand, if the 
addresses are acknowledged to be the Jews of Medina, then the verse no longer 
has applies to Muslims.  
 
An address also has a necessary organic relationship with a spatial-temporal 
context. As Cündioğlu clarifies, an address has an addressee (muhatab). However, 
any human addressee is bound to space and time. Accordingly, as Cündioğlu 
concludes, for expressions to be understandable by human beings, they have to be 
uttered in space and time277. In other words, they have to have a certain historicity 
to them. How we identify this spatial-temporal context will determine our 
understanding of an address. As Cündioğlu asserts, “Meaning is realized in 
adjunction with time, [meaning] receives its shape within a specific time.”278  
 
To prove this intrinsic relationship between the meaning of expressions and the 
context in which they were uttered, Cündioğlu imagines a scenario in which a 
Turkish reader is being confronted with the following headline: “The head scarf is 
gaining great popularity among high society!” Now, argues Cündioğlu, if the origin 
of the statement is retraced to the Turkish context of the 90s when Muslims were 
banned in Turkey from wearing the head scarf at universities, this statement would 
be met with gleeful hope. For, such a statement would signify that the secular elite, 
which represented high society during the 90s in Turkey, had also come to accept 
the head scarf; resulting thus in a broader and renewed interest in religious symbols 
after Turkey’s growing embrace of laicity. On the other hand, if one were to 
contextualize this statement in reference to the end of the Ottoman era, then its 
 
275 ‘kāfir’ in this context would refer to ‘disbeliever’.  
276  Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 82. 
277 Cündioğlu, 83–84. 
278 Cündioğlu, 94. 
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significance would more likely change from a message of hope, to a message of a 
foreboding future of further secularization and growth of indecent behaviour. For, 
as Cündioğlu states, women during Ottoman times were not only covering their 
heads but their whole bodies with a robe-like dress (çarşaf)279.  Accordingly, the 
prior headline would evoke among conservatives a sentiment of regression, rather 
than progression as the previous example demonstrated.  
 
The historicity of expressions necessitates that expressions have a primary 
addressee (ilk muhatab). The primary addressee is the first intended recipient of an 
address280. In the case of the Qur’an, the primary addressees are the direct 
witnesses of revelation. On the other hand, we – the contemporary readers - are 
merely recognized by Cündioğlu as the indirect addressees (dolaylı muhatablar) of 
the Qur’an. Moreover, since Cündioğlu also states that the original recipient is the 
cause for the inception of a message, it follows that the reconstruction of the 
meaning of such a message should be done in reference to how this expression 
would have been received historically281. Put differently, because a message is 
directed and tailored towards a specific audience, it means that the significance of a 
message is organically bound to the capacity in which the recipient is expected to 
receive the message.  Moreover, this also implies that a modern reader cannot 
derive meaning from the Qur’an that would have otherwise been historically 
foreign.  
 
Cündioğlu goes even as far as to imply that no one can understand a message as 
well as its historical recipient. This can be inferred from the fact that Cündioğlu 
believes that the passage of time results in the regression (zayıflamak) of meaning. 
For, the passage of time, as Cündioğlu claims, results in “the disappearance 
(kaybolmak) of the addressee” of an expression282. While Cündioğlu does not 
 
279 Cündioğlu, 92–94. 
280 Cündioğlu, 80. 
281 Cündioğlu, 80. 
282 Cündioğlu, 80. 
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further expand upon this somewhat cryptic statement, the statement can be 
interpreted to mean that meaning is ephemeral, since one of meaning’s necessary 
components, a connection to an addressee, is also ephemeral (addressees die). 
Accordingly, it is implied that a message that was caused by someone’s actions and 
presented during circumstances that were personally witnessed by such a person, 
can never be better understood by others who have no direct experience of 
either283. 
 
It would only make sense to argue for the reconstruction of meaning in accordance 
with what the Qur’an’s first audience understood, if we can admit that the Qur’an’s 
initial audience was capable of, and had indeed, already fully understood the 
Qur’an. To prove this was indeed the case, Cündioğlu cites a variety of classical 
authorities that have argued that the Qur’an was fully understood by its initial 
audience. Accordingly, Ibn Khaldun, the first authority referenced by Cündioğlu, had 
stated in his socio-historical analysis that all classical Arabs knew the Qur’an’s 
meaning both on a semiotic and semantic level284. This, as Cündioğlu’s second 
authority Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) argues, had to be the case, because of the Quran’s 
claim to have been revealed in order to be reflected on by its recipients. Since 
reflecting without understanding is impossible, it means that the first recipients 
were fully cognizant of the Quran’s meanings285. As Cündioğlu puts it, to demand 
reflection on a message, would only make sense if one were to believe in the 
intelligible nature of one’s message286.  
 
This assumed historical capacity to understand the Qur’an is not exclusive to 
believers. On the contrary, Cündioğlu believes that the Qur’an was understood by 
non-believers and believers alike. The most explicit support Cündioğlu receives for 
 
283 This reading is supported by another citation from Cündioğlu: “It is natural that those who were 
present during an event know the very things that those who were absent do not know of or have 
not seen.” Cündioğlu, 92.  
284 Cündioğlu, 87. 
285 Cündioğlu, 90. 
286 Cündioğlu, 90. 
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this assumption, is from the ideas of the 14th century jurist al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388). 
According to al-Shāṭibī the Qur’an never argued that its detractors could not 
understand the Qur’an but that its detractors did not will to understand the Qur’an. 
Al-Shāṭibī uses the following verse in support of this argument: “What is amiss with 
these people that they come not nigh to understand a happening?”287. This verse, 
whose linguistic intricacies will be outlined shortly, is read by al-Shāṭibī to signify 
the following, “This verse means that the disbelievers do not understand God’s 
intention from His address. This verse does not mean to say that they do not 
understand the Word itself (nafs al-kalām). How could that even be the case when 
the Qur’an has been revealed in their language? On the contrary, they are not 
inclined to understand God’s intention from His word.”288 This reading, which is less 
straightforwardly adduced from an English translation, seems to be inferred from 
the fact that the Qur’an does not outright state that disbelievers do not understand 
what God is saying (lā yafqahūn); rather, the verse uses an additional verb 
yakādūna in conjunction with the verb yafqahūn, thereby potentially rendering the 
meaning in the way that Pickthall has translated it: “they come not nigh to 
understand”. Thus, as this reading suggests and al-Shāṭibī concludes, the detractors 
of the Qur’an do not even attempt at (approach, “come nigh to”) understanding 
what God is saying. 
 
Finally, the Qur’an should also be interrogated according to Cündioğlu in respect to 
the mode of its expression. According to Cündioğlu, this question is a very critical 
question, since it pertains not to the problems surrounding the discourse of the 
Qur’an (e.g. its context) but directly involves the language of the Qur’an’s discourse, 
and hence, the essence of its discourse289. For example, to recognize whether the 
Qur’an expresses by way of historical narrative or allegory, will inevitably make a 
great difference for the manner in which the Qur’an is interpreted290. A case in 
 
287 Cündioğlu, 90–91. 
288 Free translation from the Arabic edition. Abū Isḥāq Al-Shāṭibī, Al-Muwāfaqāt, vol. 4 (Cairo: Dâr 
Ibn ’Affān, 1997), 208. 
289 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 102. 
290 Cündioğlu, 102. 
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point is verse 7:4, wherein the following is expressed: “And thy garments keep free 
from stain!”. Accordingly, argues Cündioğlu, it makes a great difference whether the 
call to purification is meant in a figurative or literal way. For, if it is meant literally 
then the object of purification is merely one’s garments, whereas if it is meant 
figuratively, then the object of purification can be understood to mean the soul291.  
 
Another important concern related to the Qur’an’s mode of expression, is whether 
the Qur’an should be understood as an oral or written work. In other words, as 
Cündioğlu wonders, whether the Qur’an should be understood as a product of 
‘written language’ (yazı dili) or ‘spoken language’ (konuşma dili)? For Cündioğlu the 
answer is clear: the Qur’an should be understood as an oral entity, rather than a 
written entity292. Cündioğlu supports his view with a variety of arguments. First of 
all, argues Cündioğlu, the Qur’an was revealed to a culture that was predominantly 
oral in its mode of expression by a Prophet that was illiterate (ummi)293. It thus 
follows that Qur’an would reveal itself in accordance with the tradition familiar to 
its audience. Secondly, while it is true that there is an imperative in the Qur’an 
commanding to read (iqraʾ), Cündioğlu argues that this command should be 
interpreted as “listen!”.  For, argues Cündioğlu, the Qur’an explains that the 
reception of the Qur’an is through listening, not by reading it with our eyes:   
“When the Qur'an is read, listen to it with attention, and hold your peace: that ye 
may receive Mercy.”294 Hence, as Cündioğlu concludes295, the fact that the Qur’an 
speaks of an auditory relationship, is evidence of its oral natural and a refutation of 
 
291 Cündioğlu, 102. 
292 This view is congruent with the dominant Sunni tradition where it is well-known that the Qur’an 
was first spoken and heard, and only became codified after the passing of the Prophet. Accordingly, 
the primary event of revelation is oral, whereas the codex of the Qur’an is only derivative of this 
event.  
293 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 104. 
294 Cündioğlu, 104. 
295 It is true that the Qur’an speaks of listening to its message, but the Qur’an also speaks of being 
God’s kitāb (a term that is conventionally translated as “book”). Accordingly, one wonders how 
Cündioğlu reconciles these two seemingly disparate ways wherewith the Qur’an describes itself. 
Since Cündioğlu neglects to address this issue, his claim that the Qur’an is intrinsically oral, remains 
rushed and underdeveloped.  
 121 
any potential understanding that argues that the Qur’an was a written report (yazılı 
bildiri)296. 
 
The conclusion that the Qur’an has an oral essence might seem trivial but does have 
certain hermeneutical consequences. According to Cündioğlu, by accepting that the 
Qur’an has an oral essence and is not a literary product, we can contextualize 
certain features of the Qur’an that might have otherwise feel as idiosyncratic. For 
example, argues Cündioğlu, in a written work repetitions might seem redundant, 
however they are quite normal in oral discourse. A similar case might also be made 
for other characteristics of the Qur’an, such as its alternation between pronouns, 
sudden change in topics, or its answers to questions without the mention of the 
questions themselves297.  
 
Hermeneutics in practice 
 
Besides a few small allusions, there is only one significant example that could shed 
some light on how Cündioğlu’s reconstructive epistemology would work in practice. 
The example revolves around the polysemic word kāfirīn present in verse 26:19: 
“You acted in the manner that you acted, and you are of the kāfirīn”. This word is 
the plural dative of the active participle of kafara. Kafara, however, carries the 
following conventional significations: “to hide, cover up”, “to be ungrateful”, and 
“to disbelieve”298. There is without doubt a major technical difference between 
being ungrateful or being a disbeliever. Accordingly, it is pertinent to resolve which 
of the meanings is intended by the verse, for as Cündioğlu has recurrently 
emphasized: verses in the Qur’an do not concurrently signify different meanings.  
 
Cündioğlu’s solution to this interpretative predicament is to work through the 
reconstruction of the aforementioned natural connections of this verse. In other 
 
296 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 104. 
297 Cündioğlu, 107. 
298 Cündioğlu, 23. 
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words, by reconstructing the secondary references of the verse in order to advance 
what the original intention behind the word kāfirīn might have been in the context 
of this verse. Accordingly, the first step Cündioğlu takes is to establish the identity 
of the interlocutor who pronounces the statements in verse 26:19. Taking the 
preceding verses into account, we know that the interlocutor is the infamous 
Pharaoh of Egypt.  As for Pharaoh’s addressee, Cündioğlu identifies this person to 
be Moses.  
 
Now that it is clear who the interlocutor and addressee are, Cündioğlu inquires into 
the moment and the circumstances in which the Pharaoh had expressed his 
sentiments. Accordingly, a summarized version of the Islamic account goes as 
follows: Moses was taken by Pharaoh’s wife as an infant and raised within 
Pharaoh’s court. After intervening in a fight between an Israelite and an Egyptian, 
Moses struck the Egyptian and ended his life299. Afraid of the repercussions, Moses 
fled Egypt. After building a new life for himself, Moses was approached by God and 
commanded to go to Pharaoh: “Go thou to Pharaoh, for he has indeed transgressed 
all bounds.”300 Thus, when Moses returned as a messenger to Pharaoh, demanding 
that Pharaoh release the Children of Israel, Pharaoh reminded Moses of his earlier 
transgression (“you acted in the manner that you acted”) as well as the fact that he 
was of the kāfirīn.  
 
To reiterate, a kāfir can be someone who either disbelieves or is ungrateful. 
However, now that we know the context of the verse, Cündioğlu argues that the 
most plausible meaning of kāfir in this context is not a disbeliever, or someone who 
covers up something, but an ungrateful person301. In other words, Pharaoh wishes 
 
299 See Qur’an 28:15-16: “And he entered the city at a time when its people were not watching: and 
he found there two men fighting,- one of his own religion, and the other, of his foes. Now the man of 
his own religion appealed to him against his foe, and Moses struck him with his fist and made an end 
of him. He said: "This is a work of Evil (Satan): for he is an enemy that manifestly misleads! He 
prayed: "O my Lord! I have indeed wronged my soul! Do Thou then forgive me!" So (Allah) forgave 
him: for He is the Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful." 
300 Qur’an 20:24 
301 Cündioğlu, Kur’an’ı Anlama’nın Anlamı: Hermeneutik Bir Deneyim I, 24. 
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to express how ungrateful Moses was by commanding and threatening him after all 
that Pharaoh had done for him by taking Moses in as a foundling and raising him 
within his own court. 
 
The Evaporation of Meaning and the Qur’an 
 
Now that Cündioğlu’s first attempt at hermeneutics has been discussed, we can 
advance into the fundamental theoretical propositions of his second hermeneutical 
work: The Evaporation of Meaning and The Qur’an. This work is a continuation of 
Cündioğlu’s first work. Nonetheless, it would be more appropriate to think of this 
continuation not in linear terms but in cyclical terms. Cündioğlu embarks not on a 
new quest with his second work but continues on the same quest in which 
subjectivity in interpretation is deconstructed and a hermeneutics centred around 
the historical reconstruction of the authorial intent is advanced instead.  
 
While Cündioğlu’s fundamental outlook has not changed over the course of his two 
works, there is arguably more attention devoted by Cündioğlu to certain points of 
his theory in his second work that were previously neglected or shortly explored. In 
his second foray into hermeneutics, Cündioğlu pays stronger attention to the 
importance of why interpretations should be objectively justifiable, what it means 
for the Qur’an to be a linguistic event, and what the interpretative challenges are of 
a diachronic reading of the Qur’an. In the proceeding sections, I will further analyse 
and explore these three themes in order to develop a deeper understanding of 
Cündioğlu’s overall hermeneutics. 
 
 
Objectivity, subjectivity, and the justification of interpretations 
 
The preface of the Evaporation of Meaning informs us once more of the 
motivations behind Cündioğlu’s involvement in hermeneutics. For Cündioğlu, the 
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prime instigator behind this work has been his observation that - besides some 
attempts - no concrete step has as of yet been taken to escape ‘the chaos’ 
generated by what he perceives to be the subjectivist trend (öznel(ci)lik cereyani) 
within Qur’an exegesis302.  What this chaos exactly entails, remains unexplained, 
and it is assumed that the reader already shares the same sentiment. Nevertheless, 
as Cündioğlu continues, attempting to discredit each individual interpretation 
produced by this trend in Qur’an would be highly unfeasible: “It is my contestation 
that the criticism of each individual interpretation is not a very constructive path in 
order to get ahead of this wide-spread weakness that may be called ‘liberalism’ or 
‘subjectivism’.”303 For, each critique, argues Cündioğlu, will only become but 
another ‘interpretation amongst interpretations’ (yorumlardan bir yorum). Rather, 
as Cündioğlu suggests, a more productive path would be to critically parse through 
the pre-understandings (ön-anlamlar) and presumptions (ön-kabulleri) that precede 
interpretation (yorumlara tekaddum eden)304. Since, by inspecting the elements 
that precede and guide interpretation, we are able to advance a more thorough 
discussion that also includes the circumstances (koşullar) that generate disputable 
interpretations; important circumstances that are otherwise neglected in a purely 
exegetical discussion. 
 
Conversely, in the main text itself, Cündioğlu presents a more devotional view as to 
why a critical hermeneutics is so important. There is no doubt that the Qur’an is 
fundamentally a book of guidance305, and hence, every Muslim tries, or should try 
according to Cündioğlu, to appropriate and live by its message. However, before 
one is able to live by the Qur’an’s message, one should first be able to understand 
the Qur’an’s message.  Understanding, on the other hand, is only possible if one has 
knowledge of why and how (niçin ve nasıl) the Qur’an means what it does306. For, as 
Cündioğlu argues, without the ability to discern why and how the Qur’an means 
 
302 Cündioğlu, Anlamin buharlaşması ve Kur’an : Hermeneutik bir deneyim II, x–xi. 
303 Cündioğlu, xi. 
304 Cündioğlu, xi. 
305 Cündioğlu, 4. 
306 Cündioğlu, 7. 
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what it does, no certain (kesinlik) knowledge can be reached about one’s 
interpretations307. As Cündioğlu states, “Where there is no certainty, there can be 
no speak of right or wrong interpretations. Let there be no doubt: when we cannot 
speak of right or wrong interpretations, we can also not speak of meaning!”308 In 
other words, if we have no criteria with which we can assess what the meaning of 
something is, we can never come to know what something actually signifies. In such 
a case, being ignorant of the meaning of something is no different than a scenario in 
which meaning did not exist at all.   
 
Cündioğlu’s second work is envisaged to succeed where a decade of understanding 
the Qur’an through sheer translations and exegetical works has failed. As Cündioğlu 
clarifies, the distance between the Qur’an and the modern subject has 
fundamentally enlarged and continues to do so: “neither do they [modern Muslim 
readers] attempt to read it nearly as much as they should, and if they read it, they 
do not understand it [the Qur’an].”309 To remedy this problem, diverse attempts 
were made by Turkish writers to make the Qur’an more accessible by translating 
both the Qur’an as well as its tafsīr, that is exegesis, into the Turkish language. 
Inevitably this led to the fact that almost any major work of tafsīr, even those who 
span dozens of volumes, to have been translated to Turkish, and countless Qur’an 
translations, often varying in quality, to have been made available in the Turkish 
language. However, as Cündioğlu argues, experience has proven that the mere 
access to classical exegetical works as well as Qur’an translations in one’s own 
language, do not simply guarantee the understanding of the Qur’an, and therefore, 
still fail to bridge the earlier mentioned distance between the text and the 
contemporary reader310. Translations do not speak to a modern audience, and the 
classical exegetical works provide so many different interpretations that they 
confuse the meaning of the Qur’an rather than clarify it311.  
 
307 Cündioğlu, 7. 
308 Cündioğlu, 7. 
309 Cündioğlu, 4. 
310 Cündioğlu, 5. 
311 Cündioğlu, 5. 
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These opening sections prove that Cündioğlu is an advocate of judiciously knowing 
why and how the Qur’an signifies a certain meaning. An important part of this 
knowledge is to understand the relationship between the preconceptions that we 
have and how they influence our subsequent interpretations. A great pedagogical 
effort is devoted by Cündioğlu to raise awareness amongst his readers of this 
relationship. However, given the predominantly Muslim character of Cündioğlu’s 
Turkish audience, it should not come as a surprise that this effort is rooted in the 
discourse of classical and contemporary Islamic studies.   
 
Cündioğlu’s inculcation begins with a parallel relationship being drawn between the 
hermeneutical notions of preconceptions and interpretations and the classical 
Arabic logic of conceptions (tasavvurat) and judgments (tasdikat)312. As Cündioğlu 
recalls, the base epistemological principle of classical Islamic traditions of logic and 
kalām is the fact that “all knowledge is either conception [tasavvur] or assent 
[tasdik].”313 Whereas conceptions pertain to terms and definitions, assents pertain 
to judgements and propositions314. No scientific proposition is possible without 
conceptions. However, as Cündioğlu argues, there is a fundamental similarity 
between preconceptions and interpretations and conceptions and judgments:  
 
“What the difference between conceptions and assents can teach us is the 
following. Similar to how the event of thought is realized by first proceeding from 
objects being conceptualized in the mind followed by these conceptions being 
strung together, the act of interpretation also incepts with certain presumptions 
that are subsequently transformed in the name of ‘interpretation’ into a cohesive 
unity.”315  
 
In other words, interpretations are merely the logical conclusions about the 
meaning of things that have come together through our presumptions.  
 
312 Cündioğlu, 11. 
313 Cündioğlu, 12. 
314 Cündioğlu, 12. 
315 Cündioğlu, 14. 
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This kinship between preconceptions and interpretations and conceptions and 
judgments also means that interpretations can be held accountable according to 
the integrity of their preconceptions. For, judgments can be tested according to the 
accuracy of the conceptions on which they are based. Accordingly, if our 
conceptions are incorrect, so are by extension our propositions: “When our 
conceptualizations are inaccurate, our propositions that exhibit judgments will 
inevitably also be inaccurate.”316 Likewise, since Interpretations also express 
judgment concerning the meaning of something, they can also be tested in 
accordance with the soundness of the presuppositions undergirding their claims.   
 
Preconceptions are for Cündioğlu more fundamental for the interpretative process 
than faith itself. This can be evidenced from a classical discussion that Cündioğlu 
recalls in which the substantiality of magic is debated. According to Cündioğlu, the 
dominantly held position within Sunni discourse is to accept that the magic 
mentioned in the Qur’an is real. However, despite being considered as one of the 
most important standard bearers of Sunni thinking, Abū Ḥanīfa has rejected the 
substantiality of magic. As such, argues Cündioğlu, Abu Ḥanīfa’s dissent is a clear 
example of how interpretative differences can occur even within the same religious 
faction. If faith was of consequence for how things are understood, then it would 
have implied that Abu Ḥanīfa – whose faith is indisputable in Sunni circles – would 
have come to the same conclusion as the Sunni majority. Since this is not the case, 
it means that there are other factors at play that overrule (aşan) mere faith 
(mucerred iman kabullenişi)317. Cündioğlu concludes that the ultimate fate of 
interpretations is decided by methodology (metodoloji), not one’s creed (itikad)318. 
 
It is important that at every turn our preconceptions, and by extension 
interpretations, are based on dependable objective claims, and not on purely 
 
316 Cündioğlu, 13. 
317 Cündioğlu, 19. 
318 Cündioğlu, 19. 
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subjective impulses. To further support this argument, Cündioğlu refers once more 
to a classical concept in Islamic thinking called müsellemat.  
 
This traditional concept of müsellemat can be translated in this context to mean 
accepted postulates. To recall, in classical dialectics a healthy disputation requires 
an argument that is based on postulated shared by both debaters. The theologian 
and encyclopaedia writer al-Jurjāni (d. 1414) presents a helpful example on the 
etiquette of disputation.  Accordingly, al-Jurjāni argues that when a jurist argues 
that an adolescent girl’s gold adornments can be taxed based on a solitary report 
(khabarun wāḥid) from the Prophet, the contrarian cannot simply defeat the 
argument by stating that he does not acknowledge this judgment, because he does 
not accept solitary reports. For, as al-Jurjāni argues, the admissibility of solitary 
reports, is an accepted interpretation principle in classical jurisprudence319. Rather, 
as we can further extrapolate, if the contrarian wishes to defeat the argument, he 
must do so based on propositions admitted by both parties.  
 
Cündioğlu, true to this spirit of classical dialects, argues that our interpretative 
claims must also be based on postulates that are not only shared but also 
sustainable, convincing, and true to the spirit of Islam. First of all, postulates that 
have been based on unquestioned falsities (sahte bilgiler) run the risk of being 
exposed one day. Interpretations that are accordingly based on such postulates, will 
inevitably have their rug pulled from under them320. Moreover, interpretations that 
lack clear and objectively proven premises, will never become potent or convincing 
(ilzam edici olmaz)321. Interpretations that are only based on subjective impulses, 
will by their nature become withdrawn and timid, and will lose any kind of potential 
to be critical on account of a lack of confidence that these interpretations really do 
signify the ultimate truth of things. Finally, when interpretations no longer exhibit 
any critical fervour, they inevitably become foreign to the spirit of Islam itself. As 
 
319 Al-Sharīf Al-Jurjāni, Al-Taʿrifāt (Beirut: Dar al-Kotob al-ilmiyah, 2000), 212. 
320 Cündioğlu, Anlamin buharlaşması ve Kur’an : Hermeneutik bir deneyim II, 20. 
321 Cündioğlu, 23. 
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Cündioğlu recalls, “Islam, has from its very inception expressed itself in terms of a 
rebellion and a challenge; being critical, opposing, dared to be criticized, and 
arguing that its principles could be accepted by all. What is more, it even voiced the 
critique of others in its own holy scripture.”322 
 
The subjectivist reading is ultimately a fideist reading for Cündioğlu. According to 
Cündioğlu, when an interpretation cannot be rationalized, meaning can also not be 
ascertained or validated, thereby rendering our inquiries into interpretation 
meaningless: “This verse means such and such. Why? Because it simply does!”323 
Such an attitude is for Cündioğlu akin to fideism. Fideism, as Cündioğlu describes it, 
“is to be closed, to have a predisposition to not openly voice one’s claims, to desire 
darkness, to be without claims (iddiasizdir), to be conservative, to be complacent, to 
pose no challenge, and since it does not have an open mind towards critique, it also 
does not like critical attitudes.”324 However, this attitude is clearly against the 
overall critical spirit of Islam that was previously mentioned. 
 
Only when the rationale behind an interpretation is correct, can we really claim that 
an interpretation is legitimate. Otherwise, as Cündioğlu has argued, if the rationale 
behind an interpretation is simply what the subject fancifully imagines, and not 
from a reasoned inference of what the author intents, then meaning will become 
‘evaporated’325.  While the metaphor of evaporation is referenced by the title of 
Cündioğlu’s second work and some places by the content of his work, it is left 
without any concrete and detailed explanation. Nonetheless, it can be adduced 
from Cündioğlu’s overall argument that this term reflects the loss326 and 
forgetting327 of meaning as occasioned by a theoretical renunciation, for whatever 
epistemological reason this may be, of the authorial intent; for, as we witnessed in 
 
322 Cündioğlu, 22. 
323 Cündioğlu, 7. 
324 Cündioğlu, 22. 
325 Cündioğlu, 8. 
326 Cündioğlu, 54. 
327 Cündioğlu, x. 
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Cündioğlu’s prior work, and we shall once more in his second work, meaning is 
inseparable from the authorial intent, and to abandon the author, is to abandon 
meaning all together.  
 
The Qur’an as a linguistic event 
 
Since understanding is structured through preconceptions, it is necessary that any 
proper, critical hermeneutics first establishes what its preconceptions should be. 
Accordingly, a Qur’an hermeneutics, must first establish what its base notions of 
the Qur’an are. Put differently, a critical hermeneutics needs to answer the 
question as to what the object is that we are understanding when we are 
understanding the Qur’an. However, as Cündioğlu warns us, when we try to answer 
this question, we must be careful not to conflate the content (muhteva) of the 
Qur’an with the (mahiyet) essence of the Qur’an. The Qur’an contains warnings, but 
this does not mean that the Qur’an is at its core a warning. Rather, as Cündioğlu will 
argue, “To understand the Qur’an, is to understand [in essence] a language (lisan) 
within a language; [in other words] to understand a word (kelam) expressed in 
language.”328 For, the Qur’an is at its core a word (kelam), a discourse. It is this 
appellation, argues Cündioğlu, that best describes the essence (mahiyet), nature 
(tabiyat), and constitution (yapı) of the Qur’an. Whereas an attribute such as 
“admonisher” (nezir) can only describe the content and function (işlev) of the 
Qur’an329.  
 
Alternately, our preconceptions can also be tested according in respect to whether 
they are analytical or synthetical. In other words, by wondering to what extent our 
propositional statements, when we explicate our preconceptions, state something 
that is inherently embedded within the term Qur’an itself. Cündioğlu’s argument 
hearkens back to Kant’s familiar distinction between analytical and synthetical 
 
328 Cündioğlu, 26. 
329 Cündioğlu, 24–25. 
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statements—something that Cündioğlu willingly admits. Accordingly, within a 
Kantian framework, predicates such as “[bachelors] are unmarried” are analytical, 
because they only tautologically describe what is already evident in our 
understanding of the term bachelor. Such predicates are independent of 
experience. Whereas a predicate “[a bachelor] is running outside”, is synthetical, 
since it depends on experience and does not relate to us something that we can 
infer from the term bachelor itself. Hence, when we return to Cündioğlu’s own 
statement that the Qur’an is a discourse, Cündioğlu argues that we are stating 
nothing new but are repeating an analytical description of what the Qur’an is330. 
This, while not an example provided by Cündioğlu, contrasts with such statements 
as “the Qur’an is a very relevant book in the 21th century”. The latter statement, 
while describing what the Qur’an is, is not an analytical statement that describes 
the essence of the thing itself that we can cognize independently of certain 
experience but is rather a synthetic statement that can only be supported by 
specific experiences.  
 
Once the essence of the Qur’an is conceptualized, it is not difficult to infer from this 
conceptualization the direction in which our subsequent interpretations should 
proceed. As Cündioğlu states, “When we replace the term Qur’an for language 
(because it is revealed in the Arabic language) and discourse (because it is God’s 
word), we necessarily arrive at the means wherewith understanding is procured, 
[and] what kind of relationship we will have with the ‘thing’ [i.e. the Qur’an]”331 In 
other words, by knowing that the Qur’an is a word revealed in the Arabic language, 
we inevitably know that we can only understand the Qur’an by understanding 
language itself. As Cündioğlu’s argument insinuates, had the Qur’an for example 
been a musical composition, it would by default mean (on account of this 
constitution) that we can only understand the Qur’an through hearing and by 
investigating the significance of sounds.  
 
330 Cündioğlu, 26. 
331 Cündioğlu, 31. 
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Now that it is clear that the Qur’an should be considered in terms of a linguistic 
event, more specifically a discourse (kelam) expressed in language (lisan), we can 
wonder what the further hermeneutical consequences are. Accordingly, as the next 
sections will indicate: to understand the Qur’an, is to understand God’s intent 
(murad-i ilahi). However, before we can advance into this conclusion, it is first 
necessary to describe the language philosophical paradigms on which Cündioğlu 
relies. In other words, it is first necessary to delve a bit deeper into what Cündioğlu 
understands when he says that the Qur’an is a discourse expressed in language. 
 
Lisan and kelam 
 
While the terms discourse and language were introduced by Cündioğlu in Turkish 
(lisan-kelam), there are various signs in Cündioğlu’s work that demonstrate that 
they hearken back to, or at least converge with, the Saussurian distinction between 
langue and parole and the Chomskian distinction between competence and 
performance. This is first of all evidenced by the fact that Cündioğlu mentions 
langue in brackets together with lisan, while kelam is similarly juxtaposed with 
parole. This juxtaposition suggests that lisan and kelam are in essence synonyms of 
langue and parole. Moreover, when Cündioğlu delineates the concepts of lisan and 
kelam, he also mentions verbatim in brackets the English words competence and 
performance. This fact clearly demonstrates once more that Cündioğlu’s ideas are 
rooted in certain foreign concepts; in this case being Chomsky’s distinction between 
competence and performance.  For, if they were original and organically derived 
from the Turkish language, there would be no reason for Cündioğlu to mention 
their foreign equivalents.  
 
Saussure’s impact on modern linguistics and philosophy can hardly be overlooked. 
Especially his distinction between langue and parole has become a staple in recent 
theories of deconstruction and hermeneutics. To recall, Saussure argued that 
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language has two aspects: langue and parole. As Chapman explains, langue 
“denotes a system of internalized, shared rules governing a national language’s 
vocabulary, grammar, and sound system”332 On the other hand, parole signifies 
actual oral and written communication between members of a particular linguistic 
community333. Accordingly, to clarify this with an example, in Kurdish the first-
person pronoun is always “me” in the accusative case, and “ez” in the nominative 
case. This rule is part of the langue of the Kurdish language. Hence, there is no 
possible way to switch “ez” for the accusative and “me” for the nominative without 
going beyond the bounds of the system in which the Kurdish language is set-up. 
Conversely, parole does not denote the system itself but the expressions that are 
formulated by putting the earlier described system into use, such as when someone 
says in Kurdish ez hatim malê (“I came home”). 
 
It is also by extension possible to think of langue and parole in terms of competence 
and performance. In other words, borrowing Chomskian terms, langue represents a 
linguistic community’s competence. Hence, language is the competence that is 
ready at hand which can be utilized by members of the linguistic community in 
order to generate expressions. For example, English speakers all share a 
competence that enables them – based on a set of grammatical rules - to express 
declarative, interrogative, or imperative sentences. However, parole denotes the 
performative aspects of language, i.e. when the earlier mentioned competence to 
communicate interrogations or imperatives is put to use in actual conversations, 
poems, or literature334. 
 
With these concepts clarified, we can turn to their hermeneutical significance in 
Cündioğlu’s thinking. According to Cündioğlu, meaning must be sought in the 
performance of language, not in the bare system of language. As Cündioğlu clarifies, 
 
332 Chapman, Key Ideas in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language, p. 113 
333 Chapman, Key Ideas in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language, p. 113 
334 Pelletier Francis Jeffry Scholz Barbara C. and Geoffrey K Pullum, “Philosophy of Linguistics,” ed. 
Edward N Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford 
University, 2016). 
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“For meaning, to repeat once more, is more so found in the use of language, than 
language itself. Whereas language is a possibility, desire (istem) is its necessary 
condition. In other words, meaning is not in language, in the general knowledge 
thereof, but hidden in the purpose (maksad) and intention (murad) of the speaker 
of that language.”335 By itself, language is merely ready at hand, unspecified, and 
incapable in defining meaning (tayin etmez)336 However, language performance, 
e.g. speaking, is what brings meaning about, because one utilizes language in order 
to convey a meaning, an intent337. For example, the word “mouse” can either refer 
to an animal or a computer peripheral. It is by virtue of the technician’s desire to 
speak of the peripheral that the word mouse means a peripheral and not a type of 
animal.  
 
As with all of his modern arguments, Cündioğlu also finds support from classical 
Islamic literature. Accordingly, Cündioğlu puts his more conservative readers to 
ease by also locating the traditional Islamic equivalents of the earlier mentioned 
langue-parole paradigm. The traditional concepts that Cündioğlu recalls in this 
regard are muvâdaa (convention) and kasd’ul-mütekellim (authorial intent). The 
reference made to tradition in this case is interestingly not to the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī 
tradition, which has been historically the dominant intellectual tradition in Turkey, 
but the Muʿtazilīs, which are considered customarily to have been a heterodox sect 
in Islam. The Muʿtazilīs, as Cündioğlu points out, had argued that the understanding 
of the Qur’an always depends on two variables: muvâdaa and kasd’ul-mütekellim. 
One must first of all be aware of muvâdaa. Muvâdaa defines what expressions 
customarily signify, which also includes whether certain expressions were 
conventionally known to be used literally or metaphorically338. In other words, 
muvâdaa is the langue, the system of a language. However, knowing muvâdaa is 
not enough by itself, for one must also infer (istidlāl) the kasd’ul-mütekellim 
 
335 Cündioğlu, Anlamin buharlaşması ve Kur’an : Hermeneutik bir deneyim II, 44. 
336 Cündioğlu, 43. 
337 Cündioğlu, 44. 
338 Cündioğlu, 45. 
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(authorial intent). Since, it is the interlocutor that decides how to utilize (perform) 
language in order to convey an intention339.  
 
The kasd’ul-mütekellim is more fundamental than the muvâdaa. Without actually 
being performed, words can mean in their potential and neutral state a variety of 
things that are compliant with the rules of the system. Accordingly, the system itself 
cannot be the final arbiter in deciding what something means. Rather, as Cündioğlu 
has recurrently emphasized, it is the intent of the author that decides how a 
potential meaning is actualized in speech. Cündioğlu further clarifies this point with 
a discussion from al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) works. As al-Ghazālī pointed out, the Arabic 
word fawq can signify either elevation in rank or elevation in physical space. 
However, we can wonder which of these meanings is used by the Qur’an when the 
Qur’an states: “He is the irresistible, (watching) from above [fawq] over His 
worshippers”340. Is God above believers in physical space or in rank? For Cündioğlu 
the answer can only be resolved by taking into account what the authorial intent 
could have been. In this case, given the premise that God is absolutely 
transcendent, al-Ghazālī and Cündioğlu have concluded that God could not have 
meant that He is elevated in physical space, since that would anthropomorphise 
God and diminish His transcendence. Accordingly, fawq can only be sensibly 
understood as elevated in rank, for that is more fitting of God’s intention341. 
 
 
339 Cündioğlu, 45–46. 
340 Qur’an 6:61 
341 This is veritably a rationalist perspective on the matter, whereby reason dictates 
the most appropriately rational signification a polysemic expression might have. In 
this case undercutting potentially anthropomorphistic significations that fawq has. 
However, this approach to expressions in the Qur’an has also been contested by 
other scholars, such as the Ḥanbalī scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). As Ibn Taymiyya 
states, “The Creator, glorious and exalted is He, is elevated in a real manner above 
the world, not elevated in rank” (wa al-bāriʾu subḥānahu wa taʿālā fawqa al-ʿālami 
fawqiyyatan ḥaqīqatan wa laysat fawqiyya al-rutbati). Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān Al-
Talbīs Al-Jahmiyya, vol. 1 (Madina: Majmaʿ al-Malik Fahd li Tibāʿat al-Muṣḥaf al-
Sharīf, 2005), 390. 
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Understanding can thus only succeed by reconstructing an expression according to 
its original intention. Cündioğlu recalls the position of Schleiermacher in this 
respect: “Every event of understanding, according to Schleiermacher, has its 
counterpart in the event of the word; for understanding, is nothing more than the 
reconstruction of the saying of the interlocutor by the addressee.”342  As a 
consequence, understanding is not an activity in which new meanings are sought or 
creative readings are developed343. Rather, as Cündioğlu makes it adamantly clear,  
“Understanding is a second reconstruction344, a new realization; wherein an 
understanding subject tries to figure out in language how the original constitution 
[i.e. word] of the speaking subject was realized and realizes it anew in accordance 
with its essence.”345  
 
The diachronic aspects of understanding 
 
Cündioğlu’s theory has certain diachronic implications. As the prior section argued, 
to understand is to reconstruct an expression in reference to its original intention. 
However, as Cündioğlu points out, this reconstruction is not purely linguistic (dilsel) 
but also historical (tarihsel) 346. For starters, as the lisan-kelam paradigm clarified, 
meaning is realized in relation to a linguistic system. However, the system behind 
language is always evolving and changing, and thus, in possession of different 
historical states (diachroneity). Accordingly, when we reconstruct the meaning of an 
expression, we must pay careful attention to the particular system that was in place 
during the time that the expression was first uttered347. Otherwise, as we can 
surmise, our interpretations run the risk of ascribing a meaning that might have 
been current at one stage in history but foreign to the language of a work in 
another stage.  
 
342 Cündioğlu, Anlamin buharlaşması ve Kur’an : Hermeneutik bir deneyim II, 53. 
343 Cündioğlu, 53. 
344 This English phrase is directly derived from Cündioğlu’s text.  
345 Cündioğlu, Anlamin buharlaşması ve Kur’an : Hermeneutik bir deneyim II, 54. 
346 Cündioğlu, 63. 
347 Cündioğlu, 47–48. 
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Given this hermeneutical premise, the interpretation of the Qur’an also requires a 
competent knowledge of how words were used during the period of the Qur’an’s 
revelation. However, this leads us to a follow-up question as to whether there is 
proper and sufficient historical data to allow for a proper diachronic reading of the 
Qur’an? Based on the findings by the recent Egyptian scholar al-Khūlī (d. 1966), 
Cündioğlu has no choice but to accept that existent lexicons have failed in providing 
a helpful record of the diachronic aspects of the Arabic language. According to al-
Khūlī, even very renowned lexicons such as the Lisān al-ʿArab and the Qamūs al 
Muḥīṭ have just aimlessly collected the various meanings between words, relating 
meanings from sources that were ages and cultures apart348.  
 
The lack of proper data on the diachrony of words, undoubtedly creates a 
hermeneutical conundrum. As Cündioğlu relates, al-Khūlī himself conceded to the 
fact that extant dictionaries were of little help for establishing the diachrony behind 
meanings. Accordingly, a modern exegete has for al-Khūlī by default no choice but 
to reconstruct the historicity behind words349. After diligently reconstructing the 
various meanings behind words to the best of his knowledge, al-Khūlī argues that 
the exegete should relate his findings to the Qur’an itself. How one should 
subsequently relate the Qur’an is not entirely clear from al-Khūlī’s words. 
Moreover, unlike his previous work, Cündioğlu also does not divulge into what a 
proper answer to this question might be. However, given the previous example on 
whether God was above humans in rank or physical space, we can only surmise that 
words can be tested to be true to the Qur’an if we can somehow make a rational 
case as to why God would purport this meaning of a word versus another 
historically potential meaning. For, in Cündioğlu’s system, as we have repeatedly 
seen, meaning is constituted by the objective intent behind expressions, and not by 
 
348 Cündioğlu, 48–49. 
349 Cündioğlu, 49. 
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the potential, polysemic significance words might have. 
 
Conclusory remarks  
 
Cündioğlu is an ardent advocate for objectivism in Qur’an hermeneutics, that much 
should be clear by now. However, it does not by necessity mean that Cündioğlu is 
against understanding the Qur’an in differing ways. This might seem like a 
counterintuitive assertion, given that the starting point of objectivity is to reclaim a 
meaning that is singular and distinctly true to the original intention of the text. 
However, Cündioğlu’s conservatism, and thus, reverence of the different legal 
schools in Islam, all of which are known for their divergent understandings of the 
Qur’an, evidences that the advocacy for objectivity does not by default preclude the 
tolerance for multiple readings of the Qur’an. Rather, it is my conclusion that the 
actual aim of Cündioğlu’s advocacy of objectivism, is to insulate the Qur’an and 
Muslims from theories and readings that argue that the Qur’an intends 
concurrently different things to different subjects. In other words, as all the 
previous sections recurrently demonstrated, Cündioğlu is principally against a 
meaning relativism that accepts all understandings and interpretations as equally 
valid and indicative of God’s intention, and not – as his works might insinuate – 
against the co-existence of different applications and interpretations of the Qur’an 
in the larger Muslim community.  
 
This attitude towards objectivity and relativism in Qur’an hermeneutics and 
exegesis, expels on the one hand all readings of the Qur’an that are unfounded and 
flimsy, but it also creates a clearing for disputation in exegesis that is open to non-
believers. 
 
Cündioğlu’s objectivism centres around the authorial intent (kasd’ul-mütekellim). In 
the case of the Qur’an this is conventionally believed by Muslims to be what God 
intended with His revelation. Accordingly, in Cündioğlu’s framework, valid 
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interpretations of the Qur’an have to always aim at disclosing God’s intent. 
However, Cündioğlu requires that these interpretations are rationally justifiable. 
One simply cannot argue that they understand a verse in a certain manner just 
because they “feel or believe it to be so”. Interpretations that lack rational 
justification are according to Cündioğlu unsustainable and contradict the overall 
spirit of the Qur’an. For, as Cündioğlu argued, readings that are simply based on 
subjective whims rather than solid rational foundations, are always a hair length 
away from being exposed of being incorrect and unfounded. Moreover, these kinds 
of interpretations are weak and unconvincing, since they rely on private sentiments, 
rather than universal rational grounds. The reliance on private sentiments 
contradicts the overall spirit of the Qur’an who revealed a message that was meant 
to be convincing to and intelligible by everyone, including disbelievers. As such, we 
must conclude that in Cündioğlu’s framework the capacity for understanding is not 
grounded in subjective faith but objective reason.  
 
This need for interpretations to be rationally justifiable, creates by implication a 
space for disputation in exegesis. In other words, Muslims may entertain different 
interpretations, but always in a manner that they can explain why they hold these 
interpretations, rather than other competing interpretations. Moreover, since the 
capacity for understanding is not grounded in subjective faith, but objective reason. 
It means by extension that any non-Muslim can partake in writing an exegesis of the 
Qur’an as long as they too can justify on reasonable grounds why their explanation 




Subjective Bearing is More Fundamental to Understanding than 




Born in 1977 in Samsun as the son of the local imam350, Alpyağıl’s formal religious 
education began in 1998 when he attended one of the traditional religious lyceums 
(Imam hatip lisesi) in Turkey. To recall the first chapter, the Imam-Hatip schools 
were designed to groom the next generation of religious clergy—a task previously 
carried by the currently defunct madrasas. However, after finishing a religious 
lyceum, one could also, as Alpyağıl did, advance further into one of Turkey’s 
theological universities (ilahiyat fakültesi). As such, after obtaining a bachelor and 
master’s degree in theology, Alpyağıl wrote a doctoral thesis for Istanbul University 
titled Din Felsefesinde Dekonstrüksiyon (Deconstruction in the Philosophy of 
Religion). Having received his doctoral degree, Alpyağıl started teaching and 
researching for his alma mater Istanbul University, which he continues to this day.  
 
As an author, Alpyağıl possesses an impressive oeuvre, comprising a wide range of – 
mainly – Turkish contributions to the philosophy of religion. These works can 
accordingly be divided into to three categories: monographs on certain thinkers, 
comparative and dialectical analyses of different thinkers, and Alpyağıl’s own ideas. 
It is especially in the last two categories that we discover the broad range of 
Alpyağıl’s knowledge and an explicit mediating engagement between both Islamic 
ideas and contemporary Western philosophy. Articles such as Faslu’l-Makâl’i 
Wittgensteincı Bir Bağlamda Okumak (Reading [Averroes’] Decisive Treatise from a 
Wittgenstenian perspective) or Trying to Understand Whitehead in the Context of 
 
350 Ibrahim Türkan, “Prof. Recep Alpyağıl Ile Kütüphane Sohbeti,” 2019, 
https://www.ilimdergisi.org/kitap-sohbetleri/prof-recep-alpyagil-ile-kutuphane-sohbetleri/. 
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Ibn ‘Arabi351, are but a few examples of the cross-cultural nature of Alpyağıl’s 
intellectual activities.  
  
Despite the broad range of Alpyağıl’s writings, two works primarily represent 
Alpyağıl’s own hermeneutical thinking, and will be the primary focus of this chapter. 
These two works, which shall be described shortly, contain a collection of essays, 
both constituting earlier published essays as well as new essays.  The first work in 
question is titled Kimin Tarihi, Hangi Hermenötik? Kuranı Anlama Yolunda Felsefi 
Denemeler I (Whose History, Which Hermeneutics? Philosophical Experiments in 
Understanding the Qur’an I). This work revolves primarily around Alpyağıl’s own 
ideas. His second work, on the other hand, is titled Fark Ve Yorum: Kur'an'ı Anlama 
Yolunda Felsefi Denemeler II (Difference and Interpretation: Philosophical 
Experiments in Understanding the Qur’an II), and contains besides Alpyağıl’s own 
ideas, also essays dedicated to reviewing the work of other thinkers. 
 
Alpyağıl describes his interest in hermeneutics in the preface to his first work. 
According to Alpyağıl, contemporary thought is marked by a fundamental turn to 
language, known as the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy. The linguistic turn has 
disturbed the self-evident nature of what we understand as a text and has 
reinitiated inquiries into the status of the text, the essence of meaning, the 
relationship between text and history, and the relationship between the text and 
the reader352. With regard to the latter, Alpyağıl claims similar to Cündioğlu that 
contemporary hermeneutical thinking has become biased towards taking the 
subjective reader as the referent of meaning (okur yanlı), rather than the objective 
meaning of the text, as classical hermeneutics used to do353. Neither opting for a 
radical subjectivism nor a so-called objectivism, Alpyağıl wants to explore to what 
extent it is possible to maintain a hermeneutical position that allows for both 
 
351 This title is one of the few English written articles by Alpyağıl.  
352 Recep Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1 
(Istanbul: Iz Yayincilik, 2013), 7. 
353 Alpyağıl, 7. 
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approaches to operate simultaneously (eş zamanlı)354. In other words, Alpyağıl aims 
to contribute to the ongoing hermeneutical discussions by trying to find a middle 
way (arabulucu olmak)355. For, it is only by finding a middle way, argues Alpyağıl, 
that we can hope to escape the otherwise inevitable reductionism (indermegecilik) 
that a radical objectivism or subjectivism fall prey to356. 
 
In a 2019 interview, however, Alpyağıl provides a more personal recollection of his 
first foray into hermeneutics. Alpyağıl states in this interview, that the previously 
mentioned work Kimin Tarihi, Hangi Hermenötik? Kuranı Anlama Yolunda Felsefi 
Denemeler I, was influenced by the quest to find an answer to the questions that 
were stirring inside himself. As Alpyağıl recalls: 
 
“For example, one of the works that I published was my book Kimin Tarihi? Hangi 
Hermenötik? This work that comprises philosophical attempts at understanding the 
Qur’an, was a kind of conversation, a reckoning – without differentiating between 
the first or second person–- that I had with the person in my mind.  When that book 
was born, the most discussed topics in the field of theology (ilahiyat sahasında) 
were questions pertaining to such issues as how the Qur’an should be understood, 
whether the Qur’an was historical or not, and what kind of stance one ought to take 
in hermeneutical discussions. These discussions were also demanding an answer 
from me. It is possible to consider (telakki etmek) this book as a response [to these 
problems].“357 
 
Unlike Cündioğlu’s staunch objectivism discussed in the previous chapter, Alpyağıl 
notes the limitations of an objectivist Qur’an hermeneutics in a few substantial 
ways. While Alpyağıl acknowledges the importance of a rule-based approach to 
hermeneutics, he simultaneously argues that understanding cannot always be 
 
354 Alpyağıl, 7. “Alpyağıl does not wish to eliminate either the subjective or objective elements which 
may factor into an interpretative act. He recognizes that a reader’s context is essential to meaning, 
but he also does not wish to reduce textual interpretation to subjective relativity.” Taraneh 
Wilkinson, Dialectical Encounters: Contemporary Turkish Muslim Thought in Dialogue (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2019), 68. 
355 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 7. 
356 Unfortunately Alpyağıl does not give examples of which authors might have succumbed to a 
radical objectivism or subjectivism, only that he specifically does not want to fall into the trappings 
of either. Alpyağıl, 7–8. 
357 Türkan, “Prof. Recep Alpyağıl Ile Kütüphane Sohbeti.” 
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realized through the static application of rules. First, because of the text’s nature to 
elude any static, recurrent identification of meaning by virtue of its ambiguous 
character. Second, because the text only discloses its full meaning to readers that 
fulfil a set of subjective preconditions. For example, without subjective variables, 
such as faith, empathy, imagination, or existential humility, it is not possible to fully 
understand the Qur’an.  
 
In the next sections, we will discuss in more depth how Alpyağıl tries to manage his 
dual commitment to objective rules as well as subjective experiences in interpreting 
the Qur’an. This discussion will mainly revolve around four important essays written 
by Alpyağıl. 
 
The problem of private language and subjectivist Qur’an readings 
 
One of the first major essays where Alpyağıl explores the dialectics of objectivity-
subjectivity and the status of the subject’s role in interpreting the Qur’an is in a 
work focused on the problem of private language. With private language, Alpyağıl is 
referring to a language that is exclusively understood by one person358. Alpyağıl, 
wants to explore whether such a language can exist. At first instance, this problem 
might seem unrelated to the problem of Qur’an hermeneutics, but as Alpyağıl 
states: “If a language can only be a communicative medium under certain 
conditions, then, in a similar fashion, giving meaning to a Qur’an that presents a 
message in a language, is also bound to certain conditions.”359 In other words, 
whatever we understand language to be in its limitations and possibilities, will have 
consequences to how we relate to the Qur’an, since the Qur’an is a message 
expressed in language. For example, if we conclude that significations are only 
meaningful in a language if they are established in relation to fixed objective 
grounds (e.g. by following communal rules of a language), we simply cannot make a 
 
358 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 27. 
359 Alpyağıl, 27. 
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justified case for an interpretation of the Qur’an that is purely based on volatile, 
subjective convictions. However, on the other hand, if language always eludes the 
possibility of conveying objective meaning, then we cannot but interpret everything 
subjectively, nor be blamed for doing so. 
 
Alpyağıl’s discussion of the private language problem begins with recalling some of 
the later Wittgenstein’s examination of language found in the Philosophical 
Investigations. The first relevant discussion mentioned by Alpyağıl concerns the 
question of whether it is possible for someone to name his or her private sensations 
in a meaningful way without taking recourse to a pre-established language. 
According to Alpyağıl’s reading of Wittgenstein this is not possible:  
 
“What would it be like if human beings did not manifest their pains (did not groan,  
grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 
‘toothache’.” – Well, let’s assume that the child is a genius and invents a name for 
the sensation by himself! – But then, of course, he couldn’t make himself 
understood when he used the word. – So does he understand the name, without 
being able to explain its meaning to anyone? – But what does it mean to say that he 
has ‘named his pain’? – How has he managed this naming of pain? And whatever he 
did, what was its purpose? – When one says “He gave a name to his sensation”, one 
forgets that much must be prepared in the language for mere naming to make 
sense. And if we speak of the someone’s giving a name to a pain, the grammar of 
the word “pain” is what has been prepared here; it indicates the post where the 
new word is stationed.”360  
 
This, very dense philosophical inquiry by Wittgenstein, is unpacked by Alpyağıl to 
imply two important conclusions. First of all, a private denotation of a sensation can 
never be meaningful to others on account of its reference being constricted to the 
private knowledge of someone361. Others will never come to know what the 
sensation of a hypothetical private language user truly is, because they only have 
their own communal language to go by to communicate, and inversely understand, 
 
360 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. P.M.S Hacker and Joachim Schulte, 4th 
ed. (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 98e; Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : 
Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 29. 
361 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 29. 
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such a sensation. Accordingly, any arbitrary denotation that circumvents a pre-
established communal language, as hypothetical private language users do, can 
never be meaningful to them. Secondly, as the latter half of Wittgenstein’s citation 
indicated, one cannot begin to name things – even privately – without already being 
acquainted with a language362.  As Alpyağıl concludes, naming is always done 
against the ‘stage-setting’ (sahne dekoru) of language, that is in reference to prior 
fixed references and rules363.  As such, this implies that even a private language user 
cannot create, and inversely understand, his own private denotations without 
starting from a pre-established language.  
 
In further clarification of the last point, Alpyağıl  argues that even if were to assume 
that someone circumvented a pre-established language to privately conceive 
references that signify private sensations, that person would still be confronted 
with the inability to recurrently identify whether new experiences are indeed 
recurrent experiences signified by the earlier mentioned self-conceived references. 
In other words, as Alpyağıl questions: “If a person has not learned to bring words 
together in a specific rule-based manner, how would he be able to know that his 
current sensation is equal to the sensation he experienced last Wednesday?”364  
Alpyağıl would argue that this is impossible, since, as Wittgenstein has reasoned, 
such a person lacks a pre-established reference wherewith the criterion for correct 
identification of sense can be established: “But in the present case [i.e. in the case 
of privately conceived references] I have no criterion for correctness. One would 
like to say: whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And that only means 
that here we can’t talk about ‘correct’.”365 Since privately conceived references to 
sense lack an objective criterion wherewith they can be recurrently identified, it is 
not possible to be sure that recurrent instances of an experience are signified by the 
 
362 Alpyağıl, 30. 
363 Alpyağıl, 30. 
364 Alpyağıl, 31. 
365 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 99e; Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i 
anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 31–32. 
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earlier, privately constructed references; which hinders self-conceived references 
from being persistent signifiers both to the self and others. 
 
After having overweighed Wittgenstein’s remarks, Alpyağıl extrapolates a set of 
generic postulates concerning the nature of language. The first postulate states that 
language has a complex structure (yapı) that prevents it from being confined 
(hapisedilemeyecek) to pure subjective constraints366. Wittgenstein’s remarks on 
the incongruity of private denotation, have demonstrated that it was impossible for 
the subject to arbitrarily denote something.  Rather, as Alpyağıl concludes, the 
internal structure of language transcends the subject and always receives its 
meaning from a collective (toplumsal) level367. Accordingly, proper sense references 
cannot be conceived by mere subjective fancy, or in the words of Alpyağıl: “A 
person cannot create a connection between a word and its object through some 
fancy prestidigitation (hokkabazlık)”368. The second postulate, which continues the 
first, admits that language has to be based on a consensus, that is on objective rules 
whereupon agreement rests369. For, as the previous discussion demonstrated, the 
meaning of something necessarily depends on the ability to recurrently identify this 
meaning, which is only possible if meaning is related to subject independent rules.  
 
Alpyağıl’s second postulate receives further conceptual clarification in light of 
Searle’s views on the interconnection between language and constitutive rules. To 
clarify, according to Searle there are two types of rules: constitutive and regulative. 
When rules regulate pre-established activities, they are called regulative, whereas 
when they establish whether a given act constitutes an activity, they are called 
constitutive. Alpyağıl, further illuminates this distinction by referring to two 
examples from Searle: handing out wedding invitations and playing football370. As 
Alpyağıl recounts, by law of custom, one is supposed to send out wedding 
 
366 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 34. 
367 Alpyağıl, 34. 
368 Alpyağıl, 34. 
369 Alpyağıl, 35. 
370 Alpyağıl, 40. 
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invitations at least two weeks in advance. However, while this rule does regulate 
the activity of sending wedding invitations, it does not constitute the activity, as it is 
quite possible to send out wedding invitations in a world where this rule did not 
exist. On the other hand, if there were no football rules, there would be no speak of 
playing football:  
 
“It is possible that twenty-two men might go through the same physical movements 
as are gone through by two teams at a football game, but if there were no rules of 
football, that is, no antecedently existing game of football, there is no sense in 
which their behavior could be described as playing football.”371 Hence, as both 
examples can be further generalized, regulative rules often take the form of 
“perform X!”, or if “Y is the case, then perform X”. While, constitutive rules take the 
form of “X counts as Y”, or “in the context of C, X counts as Y”372.  
 
Language also involves constitutive rules373. Rather than fully explaining the 
connection between language and constitutive rules, Alpyağıl hints at the fact that 
promises are a demonstration of how constitutive rules relate to language use374. 
To clarify Alpyağıl’s reference to promises further, we can turn to the self-evident 
fact that promises only become realised when certain rules are followed.  As Searle 
puts it, one can only promise something when a promising device specific to 
convention is utilized in order to undertake a matter of obligation375. For example, 
when someone states in English “I promise to wash the car”. One simply cannot 
randomly pronounce utterances and expect to signify a promise. Likewise, as I 
would like to call attention to religious language use, there are specific rules that 
constitute the pronunciation of a blessing. For example, in Arabic – customarily – 
Muslims will pronounce a blessing by specifically adhering to a set of phrases, such 
as mabrūk or barakāllah. A meaningful blessing cannot become constituted in 
Arabic other than by referring to such pre-established conventions.  
 
371 John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, 34th ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 35–36; Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama 
yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 40–41. 
372 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 40. 
373 Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, 37. 
374 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 41. 
375 Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, 40. 
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Having clarified his basic preconceptions concerning language, Alpyağıl further 
ventures into relating these preconceptions to the problem of Qur’an 
hermeneutics. Alpyağıl commences his discussion on how the private language 
problem relates to the issue of Qur’an hermeneutics, with the introduction of a few 
contemporary, primarily scientist and anachronistic, readings of the Qur’an. One 
noteworthy example recounted by Alpyağıl pertains to verse 29:19. This verse is 
conventionally interpreted as follows: “See they not how Allah originates creation, 
then repeats it: truly that is easy for Allah.” However, a contemporary Turkish 
interpretation which Alpyağıl cites, introduces a very contemporary vocabulary to 
the verse: “Do they not scientifically research nature that turns green and withers? 
How God makes the DNA seed absorb and exhort energy?”376 Such contemporary 
readings, according to Alpyağıl, while not consciously motivated by a theory of 
private language, are in practice nevertheless akin to private language use377. 
Primarily, because such readings are deemed by Alpyağıl to be arbitrary, without 
displaying any consideration of how and where the words in the Qur’an were 
originally used or the rules that gave shape to their original meaning378. In other 
words, by ignoring the linguistic horizon (dilsel zemin)379 wherein the Qur’an was 
originally revealed, these interpretations are inevitably circumventing the language 
in which the Qur’an was revealed in favour of the interpreter’s own arbitrary 
interpretations; which, is in the end no different than if the interpreter would have 
ascribed meaning to the Qur’an based on his own private language.  
 
Alpyağıl challenges interpretations based on arbitrary uses of language with a 
variety of arguments. First, Alpyağıl believes that the linguistic horizon of a given 
text, should be in any case the base reference when interpreting the text in 
consideration380. As Wittgenstein had argued elsewhere, meaning is constituted in 
 
376 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 47. 
377 Alpyağıl, 46. 
378 Alpyağıl, 48. 
379 Alpyağıl, 46. 
380 Alpyağıl, 48. 
 149 
use, and signs receive their meaning within a context381. Moreover, the rules that 
regulate a language come to be and receive their meaning through certain 
institutions382.  Accordingly, to ignore the linguistic horizon wherein a text came to 
be, will result in certain anachronistic absurdities. For example, as Alpyağıl argues, 
to claim that Aladdin’s lamp was not a mysterious lamp but a device that worked 
according to the second principle of thermodynamics and who could bend the 
space-time continuum, is inevitably to remove it from its original life form and 
language game; since, modern science and its terminology had not been invented at 
the time the Thousand and One Nights was written383. Similarly, to argue that the 
poet Woodsworth was referring to a sexual orientation when saying that a poet 
could not be gay, is equally anachronistic, as the term gay originally had different 
connotations, such as being happy, and only came to be referring to a sexual 
orientation in recent times384. 
 
Anachronistic interpretations of the Qur’an that are laden with modern scientific 
terminology are according to Alpyağıl abstracted from their original language game. 
According to Alpyağıl, substituting the original 6th and 7th century Arabic words for 
contemporary scientific terms, is akin to changing chess pieces for checker stones. 
In such an instance, the status of the individual chess pieces would change 
dramatically in their significance. When substituted for a simple checker stone, the 
king piece would no longer be a king at all385, and therefore, receive a completely 
different meaning in chess. Similarly, to substitute an Arabic word from the 7th 
century for a contemporary scientific term in a Qur’an verse as the earlier 
translation of verse 29:19 demonstrated, would equally drastically alter the 
meaning of the verse in question. For, such a substitution would anachronistically 
allow the Qur’an to be speaking of DNA and photosynthesis.  
 
 
381 Alpyağıl, 38. 
382 Alpyağıl, 39. 
383 Alpyağıl, 48. 
384 Alpyağıl, 49. 
385 Alpyağıl, 49. 
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Alpyağıl also challenges such anachronistic readings in reference to the earlier 
discussed identification principle of language. If an interpreter can only rationalize 
his interpretation on subjective grounds, as Alpyağıl claims certain contemporary 
Qur’an interpreters do, it follows that there would be no external, static reference 
wherewith meaning is recurrently guaranteed. As such, as Alpyağıl argues, if certain 
Qur’an verses meant one thing in the past, and something else in the present, what 
prevents these verses from gaining another new meaning for a future audience?386 
One might, as Alpyağıl rightfully notes, argue that such interpretations are 
indicators of a surplus of meaning (anlam zenginliği)387. However, Alpyağıl finds this 
to be naïve, since the actual outcome of such a hermeneutical outlook and practice 
is not the constructive surplus of meaning but the very destruction of 
communication (iletişim tahribi)388. As Aristotle had stated, “For not to have one 
meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning there is an end of 
discourse with others, and even, strictly speaking, with oneself; because it is 
impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing”389. In other words, if 
an understanding of the Qur’an lacks any fixed meaning that can be recurrently 
referenced throughout time, a verse would be able to mean one thing while 
simultaneously also meaning its opposite, and therefore, lose meaning altogether.  
  
Up to this point, Alpyağıl has only argued in favour of an objectivist view of Qur’an 
hermeneutics. However, as stated in the introduction, Alpyağıl intends to find a 
position that goes beyond a pure objectivism or subjectivism. Accordingly, after 
establishing the importance of the objective aspects to understanding, Alpyağıl 
starts to move his arguments in the opposite direction: in favour of a constructive 
integration of subjectivity in Qur’an hermeneutics. First of all, Alpyağıl reminds us 
that conventions and rules are contingent on how they are subjectively understood 
by a community. A religious text can express the same imperative to be generous to 
 
386 Alpyağıl, 50. 
387 Literally signifying ‘meaning richness’.  
388 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 50. 
389Aristotle, The Metaphysics: Books I-IX, 167; Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i 
anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 50. 
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each successive generation of readers, but what generosity truly entails for this 
community of readers, is dependent upon contingent and context specific 
circumstances in which the text’s readership lives. Second, not all hermeneutical 
problems are occasioned, nor solved for that manner, by our relationship to the 
text: “To give meaning to a text rules are necessary but not sufficient.”390. Rather, 
there are also certain hermeneutical problems that originate – naturally as Alpyağıl 
would argue–- from the text itself391. In fact, Alpyağıl argues, even the Qur’an itself 
has admitted not to be entirely unequivocal (muhkem)392. In other words, the 
ambiguous elements of the Qur’an prevent a wholesale objectivist theoretical 
approach, as the nature of the text itself resists continuous recurrent identification 
of the same sense393.  
 
To return to the relationship between language and rule-following, Alpyağıl argues 
elsewhere that the necessity to follow rules does not entirely discard the role of 
subjective interpretation. Alpyağıl demonstrates this with a poignant example from 
the Qur’an. Accordingly, verse 25:67 reminds us that God favours those who “when 
they spend, are not extravagant and not niggardly, but hold a just (balance) 
between those (extremes)”. However, argues Alpyağıl, whether one is considered 
to be extravagant or niggardly, is dependent upon a variety of contingent factors394. 
For example, the amount of expenditure that is seen as extravagance could well be 
seen according to the standards of another culture as a very modest or even 
niggardly consumption. Hence, while objectively speaking a believer cannot be 
extravagant, as the verse clearly emphasizes ‘they are not extravagant’, the 
parameters that define what extravagance is, are subjective. 
 
 
390 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 53. 
391 Alpyağıl, 52. 
392 Alpyağıl is referring to the Qur’an’s self-description as expressed in such verses as 3:7: “He it is 
Who has sent down to thee the Book: In it are verses basic or fundamental (of established meaning) 
[muḥkamāt]; they are the foundation of the Book: others are allegorical [mutashabihāt].” Alpyağıl, 
52.  
393 Alpyağıl, 53. 
394 Alpyağıl, 20–21. 
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The previous discussion demonstrates that the application of rules cannot avoid the 
interpretation of rules according to circumstances. However, as Alpyağıl concludes, 
the interpretation of rules always demands practical wisdom on behalf of the 
subject, or in Aristotelian terms, phronesis (prudence)395. To describe prudence, 
Alpyağıl refers to Macintyre’s definition that prudence is “the virtue of practical 
intelligence, of knowing how to apply to general principles in particular 
situations.”396 Accordingly, to add credence to Alpyağıl’s arguments, we know that 
the general principle behind extravagance, as defined by the Cambridge Dictionary, 
is the “behaviour in which you spend more money than you need to”. However, 
what constitutes the conditions for ‘more than you need to’, is without doubt 
dependent upon the particularities that pertain to a given situation and the 
subject’s ability to recognize these properly. As such, only a prudent person is able 
to properly interpret the abstract principle of extravagance in light of the 
particularities of that situation and guard himself against squandering.  
 
While it is true that the interpretation of rules is contingent and subjective, it does 
not however mean that all subjective interpretations are by default valid. On the 
contrary, Alpyağıl argues that the final judgment on whether a rule is properly 
followed rests in the hands of the community. As Alpyağıl states, “When a rule is to 
be followed, it is possible that a subjective interpretation is needed. However, this 
subjectivity does not fall outside communal supervision. If one may say so, the 
subjective interpretation must be acquitted (temize çikması gerekir) by the 
community.”397 Hence, if we are to return once more to the imperative of avoiding 
extravagance in the Qur’an, we know that each person can interpret the imperative 
of not being extravagant according to changing circumstances. However, it is not 
the person but the community to which the person belongs that can vindicate his or 
her interpretation of what might customarily constitute extravagant behaviour.  
 
395 Alpyağıl, 22. 
396 Alisdair Macintyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 74; Alpyağıl, 
Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 22. 
397 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 24. 
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Besides rule-following, the Qur’an also eludes absolute objectivity by being partially 
ambiguous in nature. There are certain subjects in the Qur’an “that cannot be 
interpreted with certainty in one single try. It is by design very difficult to arrive at 
an interpretation of these subjects that can convince everyone equally.”398 Alpyağıl 
presents two examples in this regard. The first example pertains to the fact that the 
Qur’an contains otherworldly (öte dünya) descriptions and metaphors 
(benzetmeler). While Alpyağıl does not relate any particular examples from the 
Qur’an, it is not difficult to assume that Alpyağıl is referring to the many verses 
concerning the theological concepts of the Unseen (al-ghayb) or the Hereafter. For 
example, the Qur’an states: “Near the Lote-tree beyond which none may pass. Near 
it is the Garden of Abode.”399  One can question whether the Qur’an is referring to a 
metaphorical or a real tree? Moreover, we can wonder why it is specifically a lote-
tree that stands near paradise and not some other tree? The second example, 
which inevitably continues the discussion above, refers to the narratives of the 
Qur’an wherein the Qur’an also employs certain imagery (tasvir dili)400. An example 
referred to, but not further detailed by Alpyağıl, is sūra Kahf401.  For Alpyağıl the 
degree in which the Qur’an has used univocal or metaphorical language in such 
narratives is unclear. Accordingly, it is not possible to make a wholesale claim 
(bütünüyle) about the reality or fictitious nature of such narratives. While, to a 
degree this ambiguity arises from the language of the text itself, Alpyağıl does not 
exclude the possibility that modern readers are experiencing ambiguity because 
they are simply unfamiliar with the Qur’an’s poetics. In other words, it might have 
been that the early Qur’an audience knew full well how to navigate through the 
literary aspects of the Qur’an, while contemporary readers have lost this ability 
 
398 Alpyağıl, 52. 
399 Qur’an 53:14-15 
400 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 53. 
401 Alpyağıl is referring to the well-known chapter in the Qur’an that contains the story of the 
Companions of the Cave (asḥāb al-Kahf).  
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through an inescapable, fundamental historical distance (tarihsel mesafe) to the 
text402.  
 
After having outlined his arguments in favour of an objectivist and subjectivist 
orientation in Qur’an hermeneutics, Alpyağıl concludes his own position in terms of 
what he refers to as a dialectical/synthetical account on the matter403, or in other 
words, a ‘dualistic hermeneutics’ (ikili bir hermenötik). Alpyağıl indicates that he 
wished to demonstrate a hermeneutics where the rules that constitute a text’s 
meaning would be respected, while also appreciating the internal (içsel) dialogue 
between the subject and the Qur’an404. According to Alpyağıl, we have to 
acknowledge that an unregulated relationship to the text, will inevitably render the 
text indefensible against being overrun (istila) by subjective interpretations405. 
However, argues Alpyağıl, we must also acknowledge that all the rules and 
regulations set out in the tradition of Qur’an sciences (Kur’an ilimleri) must be bend 
on occasion406, since ambiguous elements of the Qur’an, such as otherworldly 
descriptions, demand a creativity in interpretation that goes beyond a static 
application of pre-defined rules.      
 
In later essays, Alpyağıl further emphasizes that a subjective relationship with the 
text transcends method because of the latter’s limits. By delving into the aesthetic 
and historical significance of the Qur’an, Alpyağıl accentuates the role of the subject 
in interpretation by arguing at various turns that the full meaning of the Qur’an can 
only be disclosed when the right subjective preconditions are in place. In other 
words, how the earlier mentioned dialogue between reader and text will fare, is 
dependent on how the reader relates himself or herself to the text and not so much 
on whether the right theoretical method of interpretation is adhered. Accordingly, 
faith and emotion play an important role in Alpyağıl’s hermeneutics. Moreover, 
 
402 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 53. 
403 Alpyağıl, 54. 
404 Alpyağıl, 55. 
405 Alpyağıl, 54. 
406 Alpyağıl, 54. 
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since everyone is not prone to share the same belief or emotional sentiments 
towards the Qur’an, this also means that the Qur’an will not be accessible to 
everyone in the same objective way.  
 
The Qur’an and art 
 
The discussion concerning the transcendent relationship of the subject to the 
Qur’an, as well as the limits of method, is continued by Alpyağıl in reference to the 
aesthetic experience of the Qur’an. In Heidegger'in Ontolojik Hermenötiği 
Bağlamında Kuramsal An- lamanın Tenkidi: Kur’an Bizim Ne’yimiz Oluyor (The 
Critique of Analytical Understanding in Light of Heidegger’s Ontological 
Hermeneutics: What Is the Qur’an for Us?), Alpyağıl challenges the hermeneutical 
presupposition that the Qur’an is a ‘black box’ waiting to be deciphered by the right 
theoretical instrument, such as hermeneutics, structuralism, or anthropology407. On 
the contrary, the Qur’an is not some passive object waiting to be decoded but is 
according to Alpyağıl like a piece of art (sanat eseri) guiding its own experience. In 
other words, when we engage in understanding the Qur’an: “the reader does not 
guide the text, but the reader is guided by the text.”408  
 
The fact that the aesthetic nature of the Qur’an guides its own experience, might 
suggest that the earlier mentioned interpretive instruments (araçlar) such as 
anthropology have no place in understanding the Qur’an. However, Alpyağıl 
reassures that this is not the point he is trying to make. Rather, he only wishes to 
emphasize that the aesthetic experience a believer has of the Qur’an is such a 
fundamental and profound experience, that it is not possible to explain its inner 
dimensions by a single theory (kuram) alone409.  For, as we shall see in a subsequent 
section, Alpyağıl will argue that the communication realized in the aesthetic 
experience between a person and the reality spectated, is ineffable. As such, the full 
 
407 Alpyağıl, 57. 
408 Alpyağıl, 58. 
409 Alpyağıl, 59. 
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reality of the communication and understanding that ensues from such an 
experience eludes methodic dissection.  
 
It is important to note that the qualifications made by Alpyağıl, which refers to the 
Qur’an as art and its reading by a believer as an aesthetic experience, should only 
be treated in a metaphorical and heuristic sense. For starters, Alpyağıl makes it 
clear that he does not equate (özdeş) the Qur’an with art but wishes to discuss the 
Qur’an in the context of art, since he believes it is the best context wherewith the 
experience of reading the Qur’an by a believer can be best elucidated410. Moreover, 
Alpyağıl only likens and does not identify the experience a believer has of the 
Qur’an to that of a spectator of art: “The essence of this experience [i.e. reading the 
Qur’an], most resembles a work of art (sanat yapıtı) and its spectator (izleyici).”411 
In other words, by claiming that reading the Qur’an most resembles the experience 
of a work of art, Alpyağıl is explicitly enunciating that both experiences are similar 
but not the same.  
 
After establishing the context of the ensuing discussion, Alpyağıl refers again to 
another Western philosopher, whose insights are used to form his own ideas. In this 
case, these ideas belong to Heidegger. By recounting some key insights from 
Heidegger on art and meaning, Alpyağıl will critically re-examine the classical 
subject-object dichotomy, and establish the fact that truth reveals itself not 
independently from either the subject or the object but in the intersubjective 
interaction of both. As a consequence, when related to the problem of 
understanding the Qur’an, we will discover that Alpyağıl will argue that the Qur’an’s 
meaning can only be recovered by a reader who fulfils the right personal 
qualifications, such as having an awareness of his or her finitude. However, to fully 
understand the extent of this important hermeneutical presumption, it is necessary 
 
410 Alpyağıl, 59. 
411 Alpyağıl, 58. 
 157 
to discuss some of the earlier mentioned Heideggerian insights as recounted and 
interpreted by Alpyağıl.  
 
Alpyağıl’s discussion of Heidegger’s insights, starts with Heidegger’s question as to 
what a piece of art really represents. Accordingly, to recount this question of 
Heidegger:   
 
“A painting by Van Gogh: a pair of sturdy peasant shoes, nothing else. The picture 
really represents nothing. Yet you are alone at once with what is there, as if you 
yourself were heading homeward from the field on a late autumn evening, tired, 
with your hoe, as the last potato fires smolder out. What is in being here? The 
canvas? The brushstrokes? The patches of color?”412 
 
According to Alpyağıl, the answer to Heidegger’s question as to ‘what is in being 
there?’, is undeniably not the material elements of the painting, such as the paint or 
the canvas used. Rather, as Alpyağıl argues, the painting communicates a reality 
that is ineffable: “We remain silent, only the fact that we have experienced is 
certain. The image tells us many things, [and] between us a profound (yoğun) 
communication occurs that is not expressed or cannot be expressed in language.”413 
 
To scrutinize the profound experience of art with a theoretical inquiry, is according 
to Alpyağıl, a cause for breaking the natural relationship (doğal ilişkimiz) we have 
with art414. Alpyağıl argues that it is the nature of theory to dissect, however, by 
dissecting our experience of art, the holistic meaning received through this 
experience becomes disseminated (bütünlüklü anlam saçılır)415, and thereby 
impossible to recollect afterwards (toparlanamaz bir hale gelir). Moreover, by 
theoretical investigating, for example, what the material of the shoes was made of 
 
412 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, Yale Nota 
Bene (London: Yale University Press, 2000), 37–38; Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : 
Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 60. 
413 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 60. 
414 Alpyağıl, 61. 
415 Alpyağıl, 61. 
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in the earlier mentioned Van Gogh painting, we are diverting the deeper 
significance of the painting away towards a simple chemistry explanation 416.  
 
The importance of the unitary relationship between the subject and the object for 
the constitution of meaning is further emphasized by Alpyağıl in another important 
discussion of Heidegger. This discussion concerns Heidegger’s concepts of ‘present-
to-hand’ (vorhanden) and ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden) as illustrated in the well-
known example of a person’s relationship to a tool, such as a hammer.  According 
to Alpyağıl’s reading, Heidegger argued that we come to know what a hammer is 
not by considering it as an object present-to-hand but as a tool that is ready-to-
hand wherewith nails can be hammered417.  As Heidegger states:  
 
“The less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and 
use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more 
unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is - as equipment. The hammering itself 
uncovers the specific 'manipulability' ["Handlichkeit"] of the hammer. The kind of 
Being which equipment possesses - in which it manifests itself in its own right- we 
call "readiness- to-hand" [Zuhandenheit].”418 
 
On the other hand, argues Alpyağıl, by removing a hammer from our lifeworld, that 
is its context of use, the hammer becomes devoid of meaning, and turns into a 
simple wooden handle with a piece of metal attached to it419.   
 
Inspired by the earlier remarks from Heidegger, Alpyağıl commences into the 
argument that the Qur’an also receives its meaning in practice and from experience.  
First, to the extent that a hammer could ever be really understood in the event of 
hammering, the full meaning of rituals described in the Qur’an, such as prayer, 
fasting or ritual charity (zekat), are also according to Alpyağıl only understood in 
 
416 Alpyağıl, 61. 
417 Alpyağıl, 62. 
418 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1985), 98; Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi 
denemeler 1, 63. 
419 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 62. 
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practice420. Second, Alpyağıl believes that the dialogue between the Qur’an and 
reader is defined by a relationship that is akin to the earlier expressed aesthetic 
experience of a Van Gogh painting. In other words, in the event of understanding 
the Qur’an, one also enters a communicative relationship without being able to 
express this communication in words. According to Alpyağıl, this deeper, more 
intuitive nature of experiencing the Qur’an has also been expressed by the Qur’an 
itself, as these verses attest: 
 
“For, Believers are those who, when Allah is mentioned, feel a tremor in their 
hearts, and when they hear His signs rehearsed, find their faith strengthened, and 
put (all) their trust in their Lord;”421 
 
“And when they listen to the revelation received by the Messenger, thou wilt see 
their eyes overflowing with tears, for they recognise the truth: they pray: "Our Lord! 
We believe; write us down among the witnesses.”422 
 
While the similarities between the experience of art and the Qur’an have been 
emphasized up to this point, it must be noted that Alpyağıl also sees a fundamental 
difference in both experiences. This difference primarily revolves around a set of 
preconditions necessary for understanding the Qur’an that are not directly 
pertinent to the understanding of art. The preconditions a reader of the Qur’an 
must meet, are enumerated by Alpyağıl as follows: adherence to a proper politics of 
recognition (tanıma siyaseti), have awareness of personal finitude (fanilik bilinci), 
harbour good will (iyi istenç) and exercise common sense (sağ duyu). Accordingly, 
whereas art might not be dependent for its understanding on whether someone 
harbours good will against it or whether someone is aware of their own finitude, 
the Qur’an, according to Alpyağıl, only discloses its full meaning to a reader that 
properly fulfils these conditions.  
  
 
420 Alpyağıl, 66. 
421 Qur’an 8:2 
422 Qur’an 5:83 
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The first condition to understand the Qur’an, according to Alpyağıl, is to adhere to 
the right politics of recognition. This term is conventionally used in the context of 
international relations between nation states. Accordingly, argues Alpyağıl, if a 
nation were to declare their independence, as long as other nations would not 
recognize this independence, this declaration of independence would be 
meaningless to other nations423. In other words, the significance of something 
changes according to how it is recognized.  Likewise, faith is also marked to a great 
degree (büyük ölçüde) by a politics of recognition424. While not entirely explained by 
Alpyağıl what faith exactly recognizes, it can only be assumed and surmised that 
Alpyağıl means that one recognizes the Qur’an to be from God. As such, the degree 
in which someone recognizes the Qur’an as a source of divine truth, will inevitably 
be of consequence for the what kind of meaning the Qur’an has to offer. 
 
Besides the politics of recognition, or in indirect words faith, the degree as to which 
someone is aware of their own finitude will also direct the meaning of the Qur’an 
according to Alpyağıl. This awareness, which is called a knowledge of finitude 
(fanilik bilinci) by Alpyağıl, is described as follows: “The knowledge of finitude, is the 
awareness of humanity’s limitations, that there cannot be an absolute subject 
(mutlak özne), and that they [i.e. humans] cannot encompass (kuşatmayacağını) all 
knowledge.”425  As such, one must be aware of their own limitations, and thereby 
sustain an openness to learn from the other426. Without the willingness to listen to 
the other, one will never be able to understand as the following Qur’an verse 
states: “When Our Signs are rehearsed to such a one, he turns away in arrogance, 
as if he heard them not, as if there were deafness in both his ears”427. 
 
Both abovementioned preconditions to reading the Qur’an, inevitably have an 
important bearing on the status of the relationship between the reader and the 
 
423 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 69. 
424 Alpyağıl, 69. 
425 Alpyağıl, 71. 
426 Alpyağıl, 71. 
427 Qur’an: 31:7 
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Qur’an. While humans are flawed and finite, God and His message, on the other 
hand, are perfect and infinite428. Accordingly, the relationship between the Qur’an 
and its reader, cannot be realized in horizontal and equal terms, since the text has 
an authority over the subject by having its origins with God. As such, while 
interpretation is still a legitimate means to engage with the text, it must always 
respect the status of the text, and therefore, never try to force itself on the text429.  
On the contrary, a reader of God’s revelation must let the text ‘open itself’ to the 
reader by standing in service of the text and by letting oneself be guided by what 
the text has to say430. 
 
Good will is also deemed to be another important subjective precondition.  
According to Alpyağıl, the base condition for a healthy communication between 
author and audience is the will to understand each other (anlama istenci)431. In 
other words, an author believes in the fact that he or she can be understood by his 
or her audience, and the reader tries his best to listen and understand the 
author432. Accordingly, when the communication between reader and text lacks this 
good will, a breakdown in communication occurs, which inevitably perturbs the 
understanding of the text in question. The reception history of the Qur’an, which 
Alpyağıl references, illustrates this point further. As it is known, the Qur’an 
describes a variety of similes, referring to the likes of mosquitos and other symbols. 
However, the detractors of the Qur’an were questioning as to why God would refer 
to something as lowly as a mosquito in His message. The answer presented by the 
Qur’an to this problem is as follows: “Allah disdains not to use the similitude of 
things, lowest as well as highest. Those who believe know that it is truth from their 
Lord; but those who reject Faith say: "What means Allah by this similitude?"433 As 
this verse demonstrates, those who believed in the Qur’an did not experience any 
 
428 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 71. 
429 Alpyağıl uses in this context the notion of the “rape of the text”, see: Alpyağıl, 72. 
430 Alpyağıl, 72. 
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problems in the understanding of the verses that contained similes; rather, it was 
the detractors of the Qur’an that wondered as to what God meant by a certain 
analogy. Another verse of the Qur’an, also referenced by Alpyağıl, might shed light 
on the cause of this misunderstanding: “And that those in whose hearts is a disease 
and the Unbelievers may say, "What symbol doth Allah intend by this?" In other 
words, as Alpyağıl concludes, believers understood the verses because of their 
intrinsic openness to understand the text, whereas the inability to understand the 
Qur’an by the detractors of the Qur’an was accounted for by their ill intent (art 
niyet) towards the Qur’an. 
 
Finally, one must also exercise common sense in order to understand the Qur’an.  
While the importance of common sense is being noted on various occasions by 
Alpyağıl, it is only explained with one particular example. The example in question, 
whose extreme nature is also acknowledged by Alpyağıl434, pertains to the Qur’an’s 
strong disapproval of slander: “O ye who believe! Avoid suspicion as much (as 
possible): for suspicion in some cases is a sin: And spy not on each other behind 
their backs. Would any of you like to eat the flesh of his dead brother? Nay, ye 
would abhor it... But fear Allah: For Allah is Oft-Returning, Most Merciful.”435 Taking 
this verse into account, Alpyağıl argues that while his Turkish audience might find it 
abhorrent to eat the flesh of one’s brother by virtue of their common-sense 
understanding, a cannibal could maintain a totally different perspective on the 
perspective. Accordingly, without a reference to common sense, the dreadful 
significance of slander, which the verse wishes to convey through its analogy to 
eating human flesh, would be lost, thereby shifting the meaning and understanding 
of the Qur’an. 
 
By stipulating preconditions to the understanding of the Qur’an, Alpyağıl is limiting 
the possibility for the message of the Qur’an to be universally accessible or 
 
434 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 75. 
435 Qur’an 49:12 
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understood. Alpyağıl, who is fully aware of this, argues that the Qur’an itself has 
already accepted the fact that it cannot be understood by everyone: “And We put 
coverings over their hearts (and minds) lest they should understand the Qur'an, and 
deafness into their ears: when thou dost commemorate thy Lord and Him alone in 
the Qur'an, they turn on their backs, fleeing (from the Truth).”436As such, we must 
admit that the Qur’an itself points towards the fact that some people are wilfully 
removed by God from understanding the Qur’an.   
 
As with his previous essays, Alpyağıl brings the current essay to an end with some 
final reflections. These final reflections revolve around two questions Alpyağıl 
imagines a hypothetical, critical reader would have asked in response to all his 
previous claims concerning the understanding of the Qur’an. The first question 
inquires as to whether Alpyağıl’s elevation of the aesthetic experience of the Qur’an 
did not move too strongly from an optimistic assumption (iyimser varsayım) that 
the audience of the text and the text would not be subjected to any problems 
during the process of understanding?437 While Alpyağıl does not explain explicitly 
how such a question could come about, it can be theorized that it comes from the 
fact that Alpyağıl has as of yet only spoken positively of the aesthetic experience, 
and neglected to explore also its potential issues. The second question, on the other 
hand, asks whether Alpyağıl is not introducing meaning subjectivism (anlam 
subjektivizm) to Qur’an hermeneutics. This second question, however, can be 
straightforwardly deduced from Alpyağıl’s continuous accentuation of subjectivity 
in understanding.   
 
Rather than rebuking this potential criticism, Alpyağıl chooses to acknowledge it. 
Indeed, argues Alpyağıl, the history of Qur’an interpretation demonstrates that the 
meaning of the Qur’an might not be as self-evident and directly intuited as his 
earlier analogy between reading the Qur’an and the aesthetic experience might 
 
436 Qur’an 17:46. See also Qur’an 6:25 
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suggest. Moreover, it cannot be denied that even with good will, one can 
potentially fail to understand the Qur’an438. Accordingly, in such cases where 
understanding becomes problematic, interpretation by recourse to objective 
methods becomes indispensable (vazgeçilmez)439.  
 
Alpyağıl also admits that his ideas introduce a degree of subjectivism to Qur’an 
hermeneutics: “For this author, there is no meaning in an [absolute] subject 
independent of the text, or an [absolute] text independent of the subject.”440 
However, this does not mean that the subject can read any kind of meaning that 
they desire into the Qur’an441, since in the aesthetic experience the object directs 
the subject, rather than the other way around. Moreover, it would also be contrary 
to the earlier mentioned principle of being aware of one’s limitations442, which 
always desires to service the text, rather than to overrule it.   
 
Given the prior remarks, it should become clear that the subject-object dialectic in 
Alpyağıl’s thought is fundamentally grounded in a mutually interdependent 
relationship. In the dialogue between the Qur’an and the reader, both the subject’s 
private pre-understanding and the use of objective theoretical methodologies are 
given a right to exist by Alpyağıl. In this sense, as Alpyağıl admits, his theory differs 
from objectivist theories on account of their fundamental neglect of the subject’s 
undeniable role in the constitution of meaning. Conversely, his respect of objective 
rules, simultaneously demonstrates how his theory veers away from a 
hypersubjectivist position. However, if we are to measure subjectivity against 
objectivity, it would be according to Alpyağıl in terms of precedence, and not in 
terms of the one cancelling the other’s right to exist. For, as Alpyağıl clarifies, 
without people believing in a text, there is no value to having all these complicated 
instruments wherewith the text can be interpreted. In other words, “The essence of 
 
438 Alpyağıl, 77. 
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what we are trying to say is as follows: instruments are only meaningful when the 




The aesthetic experience of the Qur’an is also explored in a second instance by 
Alpyağıl. However, this time in reference to the ideas of Wittgenstein. In the essay 
Farklı Görme, “…Olarak Görme” (Seeing Differently, Seeing-as), Alpyağıl explores 
the problem of why the same phenomena can be ‘seen’ differently by diverse 
parties. Alpyağıl inquires why it is that some people see rain to be merely a natural 
occurrence (doğal hadise), while others see it as an act of God’s mercy?444 
Moreover, to what extent does interpretation play a role, if at all, in such divergent 
perceptions of the same phenomena?  In order to answer these questions, and to 
understand the Qur’an hermeneutical consequences of these answers, Alpyağıl 
returns once more to the remarks written by the later Wittgenstein, or as Alpyağıl 
puts it: “The perspective maintained in discussing this topic, will be fundamentally 
Wittgensteinian.”445 
 
As was the case in the first essay, Alpyağıl first lays the groundwork of his own 
argument by recounting some of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical inquiries, 
beginning with Wittgenstein’s distinction between the various uses of ‘seeing’. 
Accordingly, we discover that Wittgenstein describes the two uses of seeing as 
follows: “Two uses of the word “see”. The one: “What do you see there?” - “I see 
this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in 
these two faces” - let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I 
do myself.”446  
 
443 Alpyağıl, 79. 
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Alpyağıl states that whereas the first manner of seeing, such as seeing a simple 
rock, is one of sensory perception, the second seeing, such as noting the likeness 
between two faces, goes beyond sensory perception (algı)447. The latter, which 
Alpyağıl subsequently refers to as seeing-as (“olarak görme”), is according to 
Wittgenstein evident when we suddenly perceive something in a different manner, 
because of another aspect of the phenomenon dawning on us: “I observe a face, 
and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and 
yet I see it differently. I call this experience “noticing an aspect”448.  
Wittgenstein gives in this regard the well-known example of Jastrow’s duck-rabbit:  
 
“I’m shown a picture-rabbit and asked what it is; I say “It’s a rabbit”. Not “Now it’s a 
rabbit”. I’m reporting my perception. a I’m shown the duck–rabbit and asked what 
it is; I may say “It’s a duck- rabbit”. But I may also react to the question quite 
differently. - The answer that it is a duck–rabbit is again the report of a perception; 
the answer “Now it’s a rabbit” is not. Had I replied “It’s a rabbit”, the ambiguity 
would have escaped me, and I would have been reporting my perception.”449 
   
In other words, by claiming that something is ‘now’ - in all suddenness - a rabbit, we 
are presenting a report about an experience that is more than a mere visual 
experience450; for, as it can be surmised, if it were to be a mere visual experience, 
the object would have had to remain static in experience and not change as it did.  
 
The fact that seeing-as is more than a visual experience, is further expanded upon 
by Wittgenstein with another example concerning our observation of a rabbit. 
When we plainly see a rabbit, we can be inquired as to what we see, and report 
back: “a rabbit”. However, when we look at a landscape and suddenly see a rabbit 
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running past us, we would exclaim “a rabbit!”. Nevertheless, as Wittgenstein 
argues:  
 
“Both things, both the report and the exclamation, are expressions of perception 
and of visual experience. But the exclamation is so in a different sense from the 
report: it is forced from us. - It stands to the experience somewhat as a cry to pain. 
But since the exclamation is the description of a perception, one can also call it the 
expression of thought. - Someone who looks at an object need not think of it; but 
whoever has the visual experience expressed by the exclamation is also thinking of 
what he sees.”451  
   
Concordantly, as Wittgenstein concludes, the ‘lighting up of an aspect’ seems to be 
both a ‘half visual experience’, as well as a ‘half thought’.  
 
Seeing-as is defined by other variables besides visual experience alone. The first set 
of variables discussed by Alpyağıl are education and the mastery of technique. 
According to Alpyağıl, one needs only to consider traffic signs. The meaning of such 
signs is dependent upon convention. As such, our reaction (reaksiyonumuz) to these 
signs is determined by our familiarity and education of these signs452. Those who 
are unfamiliar with these signs will inevitably have a totally different reaction. To 
clarify, while we might see traffic signs as a regulating device and organize our 
actions around its conventional significance, someone who has not learned traffic 
rules, or does not know what a traffic sign is for that matter, might see it as a 
something differently, and accordingly, react in a wholly different manner. Likewise, 
argues Alpyağıl, mastery of technique (bir teknikte usta olma), also plays an 
important role in the subject’s experience of seeing-as. This matter has been 
described as follows by Wittgenstein:  
 
“In the triangle I can see now this as apex, that as base - now this as apex, that as 
base. —– Clearly the words “Now I am seeing this as the apex” cannot so far have 
any significance for a learner who has only just met the concepts of apex, base, and 
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so on. But I do not mean this as an empirical proposition. Only of someone capable 
of making certain applications of the figure with facility would one say that he saw it 
now this way, now that way. The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a 
technique.”453 
 
Besides education and the mastery of technique, Alpyağıl also credits volition 
(irade) with an important role in defining the experience of seeing-as. According to 
Alpyağıl, this fact implies that a person can be asked to see things differently. 
Without doubt, it is not possible to command someone to see a blue object when 
that person experiences the object as red454. However, according to Alpyağıl, it is 
possible to ask someone to see a form differently (şimdi bu şekli böyle gör). While 
Alpyağıl does not present a concrete example, we can theorize that Alpyağıl is 
referring to such phenomena as when one is asked to see their seemingly bad 
predicament as a blessing in disguise. Accordingly, a person who is told to see his or 
her predicament in another manner, can choose to fulfil such a request or reject it.    
 
After establishing these base reflections concerning the experience of seeing-as, 
Alpyağıl advances further into describing the relationship between the concept of 
seeing-as and the philosophy of religion, and by extension, its relationship to what 
Alpyağıl calls religious hermeneutics (dinsel hermenötik). According to Alpyağıl, 
religious beliefs are a form of seeing-as. As such, in Alpyağıl’s experience, which he 
shall shortly further elaborate, there is no fundamental difference between the 
earlier discussed examples from Wittgenstein, such as seeing a face as similar to 
another face or coming to see something as a duck that hitherto been pictured as a 
rabbit, and seeing an event as a miracle or a text as God’s revelation455. Moreover, 
Alpyağıl also deems the earlier discussed expressions, such as “I see a rabbit!”, and 
its religious counterpart: “The Lord has given, the Lord has taken away; blessed be 
the name of the Lord!”, as being similar expressions of seeing-as.456  
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Alpyağıl sheds further light on these claims, by briefly discussing the concept of 
seeing-as in reference to familiar problems within the philosophy of religion, 
commencing with the arguments for the existence of God. Alpyağıl notes that these 
arguments, such as the cosmological argument or the argument from design, are 
inevitably not without their weak points, nor are they closed to any further 
criticism457. As such, these arguments cannot compel someone to believe458. They 
are only meaningful to those who are already capable of seeing the thing which is 
argued for459. In other words, as Alpyağıl makes it clear, the argument from design 
is only meaningful to those who are capable of seeing the universe as a design from 
God.  According to Alpyağıl, religious experience, another topic of the philosophy of 
religion, is also defined by a private experience of seeing. For example, argues 
Alpyağıl, we cannot see something as beautiful on account of another’s experience. 
Rather, we must see the thing as beautiful for ourselves460. Likewise, it is not 
possible to believe in God on account of another person’s experience, but one must 
believe for themselves461. 
 
To present a final example, Alpyağıl argues that religious conversions also relate to 
the concept of seeing-as, because it could be argued, as Alpyağıl does, that an 
aspect of something can dawn on a person, and thereby make them see things 
differently. Accordingly, someone who saw the universe as a product of blind 
evolution, could suddenly see it is as creation of God462. To Alpyağıl’s mind comes 
the experience of Job, who came to lose a lot in life such as his children. However, 
rather than seeing his tragic loss in naturalistic terms, Job called out the following: 
“The Lord has given, the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord.”463  
 
 
457 Alpyağıl, 24. 
458 Alpyağıl, 24. 
459 Alpyağıl, 24–25. 
460 Alpyağıl, 27–28. 
461 Alpyağıl, 28. 
462 Alpyağıl, 28. 
463 Alpyağıl, 29. 
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It should be clear by now that for Alpyağıl there is an undeniable relationship 
between the concept of seeing-as and certain religious experiences. However, it is 
still not clear what the relationship of seeing-as is to the problem of interpretation. 
Given the prior discussions, we might be inclined to identify the phenomenon of 
interpretation with the experience of seeing-as. Religious worldviews are for that 
matter often said to be different interpretations of the world. However, according 
to Alpyağıl, while there is a relationship, there are also marked distinctions between 
the experience of seeing-as and the act of interpreting. First and foremost, argues 
Alpyağıl, interpretation is an activity, something we do, while seeing is an 
experience464. Secondly, the act of seeing is not something that can be validated, 
whereas an interpretation can465. Lastly, interpretations have a coercive nature to 
them. An interpretation can argue that something must actually be understood as 
something else. On the other hand, the experience of seeing-as is not at all forced, 
nor the outcome of any logical deliberation or overweighing of evidence466.  
 
The direct experience of seeing-as in juxtaposition to interpretation, is further 
advanced by Alpyağıl by drawing a parallel with language. Accordingly, argues 
Alpyağıl, the difference in experience between seeing-as and interpretation is 
similar to the difference between our experience of our mother tongue and a 
foreign tongue467.  To elaborate, when we converse or read in our native tongue, 
we do not interpret the words used. However, when we are engaging with a foreign 
language, we are often thinking about the words used, interpreting these words, 
and if necessary, searching for their meaning in a dictionary468.  As such, Alpyağıl 
concludes, interpretation is an incidental recourse, only taken when something is 
foreign to our natural and intuitive experience469.  
 
 
464 Alpyağıl, 31. 
465 Alpyağıl, 31. 
466 Alpyağıl, 31. 
467 Alpyağıl, 32. 
468 Alpyağıl, 32. 
469 Alpyağıl, 32. 
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In continuation with the aforementioned argument, Alpyağıl considers seeing-as as 
the most primary relationship a believer has with the text, far more fundamental 
than interpretation, which is seen by him as an incidental recourse. For example, 
what defines the relationship of a believer to the text is the fact that a believer sees 
God in scripture470. This experience is the base, fundamental experience of the text, 
and is not reliant on nor occasioned by logical inference (çıkarım), interpretation 
(yorum) or dogma471. This, however, does not mean according to Alpyağıl that the 
text cannot or should not at all be interpreted, only that there are certain elements 
in the Qur’an that cannot be interpreted because their meaning derives from a 
more direct experience of seeing-as472. 
 
One such element that relies on the direct experience of seeing-as, rather than 
interpretation, are the miracles described in the Qur’an.  According to Alpyağıl, 
believers see miracles as a direct revelation (tezahür) of God’s will, without 
resorting to logical inferences (mantıksal çıkarım) or interpretations473. For a 
believer, to witness (tanık) or be told of miracles, is not an experience guided by 
interpretation. For example, argues Alpyağıl, a believer that experiences the event 
of Moses splitting the Red Sea, does not come to the conclusion that it was an 
event from God after needing to deliberate and interpret. Rather, as Alpyağıl 
argues, a believer sees the event directly (aniden) as a revelation of God’s will474.  
 
Following these comments on miracles and seeing-as, Alpyağıl concludes his essay 
with the question as to what the status of someone is who cannot see something as 
something else (olarak görememek). For example, a person who, in contrast to the 
abovementioned believer, cannot see a miracle in an event. In other words, as 
Alpyağıl further sharpens his question, what is the determining factor for aspect 
 
470 Alpyağıl, 33. 
471 Alpyağıl, 33. 
472 Alpyağıl, 38. 
473 Alpyağıl, 33. 
474 Alpyağıl, 34. 
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blindness (görünüş körlüğü)?475 Recounting Wittgenstein, Alpyağıl argues that the 
notion of seeing-as is intimately tied to the concept of imagination: “The concept of 
an aspect is related to the concept of imagination. In other words, the concept 
‘Now I see it as . . .’ is related to ‘Now I am imagining that’.”476 Accordingly, as 
Alpyağıl concludes, the ability to see more than what is ordinary (sıradan) or 
mundane (olağan), as believers do with miracles, has to do with the degree to 
which a person is able to apply his or her imagination477. For Alpyağıl, persons who 
lack in imagination, will inevitably become prisoners (tutsak) of one mode of 
appearance (görünüş)478, and therefore, as implied, become blind towards other 
aspects. 
 
Aspect-blindness is an impediment that does not only pertain to visual experiences 
but can also, according to Alpyağıl, pertain to meaning. In other words, one can also 
be afflicted by meaning-blindness (anlam körlüğü)479. The relationship between 
meaning-blindness and the hitherto discussed concept of seeing-as, is substantiated 
by Alpyağıl with a few remarks from Wittgenstein. The first remark by Wittgenstein 
establishes the fact that there is an intimate connection between the experience of 
words and seeing-as: “The importance of this concept [i.e. aspect-blindness] lies in 
the connection between the concepts of seeing an aspect and of experiencing the 
meaning of a word.”480 Accordingly, someone who is not capable of, for example, 
seeing a sign as an arrow, is simultaneously not capable of understanding the words 
“to see the sign as an arrow”. In such an instance, as Alpyağıl recounts Wittgenstein, 
we must consider the aforementioned person to be meaning-blind: “Anyone who 
 
475 Alpyağıl, 35. 
476 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 224e; Alpyağıl, Fark ve yorum : Kur’an’i anlama 
yolunda felsefi denemeler II, 35. 
477 Alpyağıl, Fark ve yorum : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler II, 36. 
478 Alpyağıl, 35. 
479 Alpyağıl, 36. 
480 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 225e; Alpyağıl, Fark ve yorum : Kur’an’i anlama 
yolunda felsefi denemeler II, 35.  
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cannot understand and learn to use the words “to see the sign as an arrow”—that's 
whom I call “meaning-blind.” 481  
 
Imagination also plays an important role in the experience of meaning, as Alpyağıl 
faults a lack of imagination for causing the earlier mentioned meaning-blindness. 
482. Alpyağıl relates in this regard the following citation by Ricoeur: “Imagining is 
first and foremost restructuring semantic fields. It is, to use Wittgenstein's 
expression in the Philosophical Investigations, "seeing as . . . ."483 While this citation 
makes it clear that Alpyağıl supports Ricoeur’s claim, the reader unfamiliar with 
Ricoeur’s work is left to wonder what the exact significance of imagination is in its 
ability to “restructure semantic fields”, since it is a question left unanswered by 
Alpyağıl. Nevertheless, taking the grander context of this citation in consideration, 
we are told by Ricoeur that it is imagination which allows for a person to see a 
relationship, as in the case of a metaphor, between two objects that would 
otherwise be considered to be logically distant from each other: 
 
“Resemblance is itself a function of the use of unusual predicates. It consists in the 
rapprochement in which the logical distance between far-flung semantic fields 
suddenly falls away, creating a semantic shock which, in turn, sparks the meaning of 
the metaphor. Imagination is the apperception, the sudden view, of a new 
predicative pertinence.”484 
 
In other words, as the example of metaphors illustrates, by utilizing his or her 
imagination, a person is able to see why a seemingly illogical predication, could still 
be sensible. Inversely, a person lacking in imagination will neither be able to forge 
 
481 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, G.H. 
von Wright, and H. Nyman, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), para. 344; Alpyağıl, 
Fark ve yorum : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler II, para. 36.  
482 Alpyağıl, Fark ve yorum : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler II, 36. 
483 Paul Ricoeur, “Imagination in Discourse and in Action,” in The Human Being in Action: The 
Irreducible Element in Man Part II Investigations at the Intersection of Philosophy and Psychiatry, ed. 
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1978), 7; Alpyağıl, Fark ve yorum : 
Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler II, 36. 
484 Ricoeur, “Imagination in Discourse and in Action,” 7. 
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nor understand the meaning of a metaphor; evidencing thereby the connection 
made by Alpyağıl between imagination and meaning-blindness. 
 
Faith and history 
 
The subject-object dialectic also plays an important role in the problem of Qur’an 
historicism. Accordingly, the final essay of Alpyağıl that will be discussed is Kimin 
Tarihi, Hangi Hermenötik? Kur’an ve Tarihsellik Tartişmalarina Elestirel Bir Katıi 
(Whose History, Which Hermeneutics? A Critical Contribution to the Debates 
Concerning the Qur’an and Historicism). As the title suggests, this essay focuses 
primarily on a critical evaluation of the problem of Qur’an historicism. The latter’s 
legitimacy has undoubtedly been an important topic of contemporary discussions 
on Qur’an hermeneutics within Turkey. Mainly due to its controversial nature and 
advocacy by the illustrious Ankara School discussed in the introduction chapter. 
While a discussion of the problem of Qur’an historicism might at first instance 
suggest little direct relevance to the problem of subjectivity-objectivity in Qur’an 
hermeneutics, Alpyağıl’s critique of Qur’an historicism bears at certain junctions an 
important intersection with the problem of subjectivity vis-à-vis objectivity in 
interpretation. This intersection can be attributed to the fact that a central problem 
of Qur’an historicism is to answer the question as to how a present-day subject 
could understand a historical object as the Qur’an. As such, to enlarge our 
understanding of Alpyağıl’s ideas concerning the status of subjectivity in 
understanding the Qur’an, it is important to expand upon Alpyağıl’s perspective on 
Qur’an historicism.  
 
According to Alpyağıl, before any healthy understanding of Qur’an historicism can 
be offered, some general observations concerning the relationship between 
interpretations (yorumlama faaliyeti) and power (iktidar) have to be offered485. 
 
485 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 136. 
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Every interpretation is bound to a political context (siyasal baglam)486. Accordingly, 
by admitting that interpretations are not free from political contexts, we can 
understand that historicism can also not operate without itself being influenced by 
its own political context. Hence, if we wish to fully understand historicism, we must 
understand it in light of its political context. 
 
A keen awareness of this connection between power and historicism becomes 
especially critical in regard to the problem of maṣlaḥa and maqāṣid. As Alpyağıl 
recounts, historicist discourse proposes that we not consider the literal (ẓāhir) 
interpretation of verses but the higher intents (maqāṣid) behind verses and their 
goal towards prosperity (maṣlaḥa)487. However, we must not overlook according to 
Alpyağıl that both of these notions are a product of a ‘politics of interpretation’ 
(yorum siyaseti)488. In other words, as we can surmise, these notions receive their 
meaning according to the political context in which they are understood. For 
example, argues Alpyağıl, “Turkey’s prosperity [maṣlaḥa] in the Middle East is not 
the same of that of the United States, because the powers are not the same.”489  
 
Alpyağıl’s critique lays bare an important oversight in some theories of historicism, 
which is the inability to acknowledge that our understanding of the Qur’an’s 
objective intents is in fact relative to the socio-political context in which we live and 
therefore, subjective. For example, as Alpyağıl recalls, Fazlur Rahman had argued 
that in respect to the Qur’an “the ratio legis is the essence of the matter, the actual 
legislation being its embodiment so long as it faithfully and correctly realizes the 
ratio; if it does not, the law has to be changed.”490  There is no doubt, as the overall 
work of Rahman further attests, that Rahman sees the ratio as a transhistorical, 
objective fact, while legal rulings are seen as transient. However, if we are to 
 
486 Alpyağıl, 143. 
487 Alpyağıl, 147. 
488 Alpyağıl, 147. 
489 Alpyağıl, 147. 
490 Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an, 2nd ed. (Chicaog: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 
48. 
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subscribe to Alpyağıl’s hermeneutical tenets that interpretation cannot be 
separated from power relations, we have to acknowledge that both the ratio legis 
and the ratio, or with similar notions, the maqāṣid and the maṣlaḥa, are not 
transhistorical, objective facts undergirding the law of the Qur’an. On the contrary, 
as Alpyağıl stated, the significance of the maqāṣid and maṣlaḥa changes in 
accordance with the socio-political context.  
 
Since Alpyağıl’s method relies more on heuristics, rather than on an explicit catering 
of examples, there is some conjecture involved in what could be possible cases of 
Qur’an interpretation that demonstrate Alpyağıl’s point concerning the subjectivity 
involved in the maqāṣid and maṣlaḥa. Nevertheless, if we are to continue the 
discussion from the works of Rahman, we can find an interpretation that can be 
easily deconstructed in light of Alpyağıl’s ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’. To recall, 
Rahman argued that verse 4:3 permitted polygamy because of historical necessity, 
since it was “not possible to remove polygamy legally at one stroke.”491 However, 
while the verse did permit the marriage of multiple women, the same verse also 
argued that “if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly (with them) [i.e. your 
wives], then [marry] only one”. Thus, as Rahman concludes, while polygamy was 
permitted because of contingent legal reasons, the sanctions put on its practice 
were “in the nature of a moral ideal towards which the society was expected to 
move.”492 Concordantly, we can gather from Rahman’s statements that the Qur’an 
has two-levels of significance: contingent and ideal. While the permission on 
polygamy exhibits the Qur’an’s contingent significance, the sanctions put on 
polygamy express the Qur’an’s ideal for a society that is monogamous. However, as 
we return to Alpyağıl’s hermeneutics, we could question whether it is indeed some 
objective moral ideal that is at work in the Qur’an or actually Rahman’s subjective 
projections on the text. As Alpyağıl states elsewhere, Rahman inherited a world in 
which the Islamic world had lost all endurance and became dominated493. There is 
 
491 Rahman, 48. 
492 Rahman, 48. 
493 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 145. 
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no doubt that polygamy is a practice eschewed in most of the modern western 
world. For Alpyağıl, even with the best of intentions, interpreters could still fall prey 
to their context: “A good intention is not enough by itself. For, there could always 
be ill-intended political powers that direct this good intention.”494 Accordingly, it 
would not be too difficult to question whether Rahman’s characterization of 
polygamy as contingent and monogamy as an objective moral ideal is not in reality 
a guised apologetic attempt to weaken the status of polygamy in Islam and elevate 
the status of monogamy instead.  
 
For Alpyağıl there is no doubt that historicist readings of the Qur’an harbour a 
progression bias. In other words, historicists assume that the text was revealed in a 
distant, less ethically progressed past495. As such, Alpyağıl likens the historicist 
attitude towards that of the positivist anthropologist. According to Alpyağıl, the 
positivist anthropologist always approaches a foreign culture from the perspective 
that their own culture is better (daha doğru) than the culture studied496. Similarly, 
as Alpyağıl reverts the discussion to the understanding of the Qur’an, historicists 
advance a like position by confronting the text as the historical Other (başkası gibi) 
and judging it according to the perceived more elevated standards of the present497. 
 
Such an approach to interpretation leads to two different consequences. First, as 
Alpyağıl argues, there is an inevitable alienation occurring (yabancılaşmak) between 
the Qur’an and the reader498. The Qur’an is always the historical Other that stands 
at a distance from the modern reader. Second, by always measuring the Qur’an 
according to the relative standards of our subjective present, we lose the ability to 
be judicious and pragmatic in regard to the application of the Qur’an within 
different contexts.  
 
 
494 Alpyağıl, 143. 
495 Alpyağıl, 153. 
496 Alpyağıl, 151. 
497 Alpyağıl, 152. 
498 Alpyağıl, 153. 
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Alpyağıl clarifies the latter point by arguing that historicism has a flawed 
understanding of time (zaman tasavvuru)499. Alpyağıl’s text seems to be referring to 
the earlier mentioned progression bias inherent in Turkish historicist discourse. In 
other words, historicists appreciate the Qur’an in reference to a perceived history 
of progress in which they find themselves. However, what they forget to 
understand, is that synchronously speaking the Qur’an can be read by different 
communities with different histories. As such, “It would not be a right approach, to 
argue that the understanding of a Muslim in North America should be absolutized 
and be put against an understanding developed in South Africa. If we are to expand 
upon this, while raising warhorses [as the Qur’an has argued] is not something 
incumbent upon American Muslims, the same could not be said in respect to 
someone from Afghanistan.”500  
 
For Alpyağıl, the Qur’an never meant to address or resolve all possible issues that 
humans would face over the course of history501. Accordingly, when we return to 
verse 8:60 wherein the Qur’an proposes that believers ready “steeds of war”, it is 
not done so by the Qur’an in order to suggest that war can be only prepared in one 
way. In the words of Alpyağıl, “a horse was even for those times one of the possible 
examples that could have been mentioned (besides such items as swords, camels, 
or catapults).”502 Rather, the Qur’an is a book that indicates between the lines (söz 
arasında) that it is merely presenting a possible example of how to resolve an issue 
(örneğin diyen bir kitaptır)503.  It is up to believers to further expand upon the model 
of the Qur’an and find suited solutions to certain problems504. As such, to 
extrapolate Alpyağıl’s claims, if in 7th century Arabia the best preparation for war 
was by means of readying horses, Western Muslims in the present ought to follow 
 
499 Alpyağıl, 156. 
500 Alpyağıl, 156–57. 
501 Alpyağıl, 157. 
502 Alpyağıl, 158. 
503 Alpyağıl, 158. 
504 Alpyağıl, 158. 
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this model and prepare for current wars with the best resources of our times (e.g. a 
tank).  
 
While some verses can be actualized in new contexts, other verses seem less 
suitable to be assimilated with the circumstances of the present. Alpyağıl recounts 
in this regard verses that pertain specifically to the Prophet’s relationship with his 
spouses: “It is not lawful for thee (to marry more) women after this, nor to change 
them for (other) wives, even though their beauty attract thee”505. It is very difficult 
infer from such verses an example or model to be followed, since the verse is very 
much particular to the Prophet and his own personal experiences. However, does 
this mean we should merely regard such verses as objective historical facts, or is 
there a possibility to even draw significance from such verses in our seemingly 
unrelated experiences?   
 
For Alpyağıl there are two potential answers to this question. First, we could still 
appreciate seemingly historical verses as an inspiration for different modes of 
thinking (alternatif düşünce biçimi)506. For example, while the Qur’an’s corporal 
punishments might not fit present circumstances, it is possible that the future might 
bring a different perspective on the applicability of corporal punishments, and 
thereby reintroduce it as one of God’s penalties (hudud)507. What is important for 
Alpyağıl is not whether we should apply corporal punishment or not, but that we 
should not become incapable of seeing a world wherein it does make sense to apply 
corporal punishments. This, in contrast to Qur’an historicism’s neurotic tendency to 
fear any regression into the past (geçmişe duşmeme nevrozu içinde olmak)508. 
Second, even if certain verses cannot become actualized again, they still have 
important bearings for the Islamic cultural consciousness. As Alpyağıl states, “The 
Qur’an that recounts the 7th century, is not [a source of] historical [facts], but a 
 
505 Qur’an 33:52 
506 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 164. 
507 Alpyağıl, 165. 
508 Alpyağıl, 165. 
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totality of events (olaylar bütünü) that gives us identity and defines our [collective] 
memory (bellek).”509 Thus, if we are to return to the example of the Prophet and his 
wives, we could argue that such a verse has no practical relevance for modern 
Muslims. Nevertheless, it is a record of the Prophet’s experience, and hence, 




Unlike Cündioğlu’s solemn dedication to an objective understanding of the Qur’an 
discussed in the previous chapter, Alpyağıl has exhibited throughout his works a 
concurrent dedication to both a subjective and objective understanding of the 
Qur’an. Similar to Cündioğlu, Alpyağıl respects the linguistic horizon in which the 
message of the Qur’an was revealed. Language, as both Alpyağıl and Cündioğlu 
have argued, cannot function without being intrinsically intersubjective. Moreover, 
to be intersubjective, language has to involve subject independent rules. However, 
while Alpyağıl defends and advocates a reverence to the rules of a language, 
Alpyağıl does not believe that all of the Qur’an’s meanings can be resolved by sheer 
rule-following, i.e. method, alone. For, as Alpyağıl has argued, our relationship to 
the Qur’an is not one sided. The Qur’an also has power over us. First of all, the 
Qur’an’s ambiguity eludes our ability to fixate its meaning objectively and 
persistently. Second, the Qur’an also demands from us the right subjective 
preconditions such as faith in order to receive its message fully.  
 
What has been unexpected in the previous discussions, given the open confessional 
and sometimes conservative510 stance of Alpyağıl, is the fact that Alpyağıl’s dualistic 
hermeneutics lacks significant references to classical Islamic thought. In other 
words, the references to traditions such as tafsīr are made very sparingly. As a 
consequence, it is not clear from Alpyağıl’s own discussions how much of his ideas 
 
509 Alpyağıl, 169. 
510 Such as Alpyağıl’s open attitude towards corporal punishments in Islamic jurisprudence. 
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are borrowed from the hermeneutical traditions of tafsīr and uṣūl al-fiqh, nor what 
the status of these theories are in Alpyağıl’s thinking. The most noteworthy 
reference to tafsīr, is Alpyağıl’s statement that the rules and regulations set out in 
the tradition of Qur’an sciences, must be bend on occasion; since, as previously 
discussed, certain ambiguous elements of the Qur’an, such as its historical 
narratives, demand a creative understanding that goes beyond a static application 
of rules.  
 
The fact that Alpyağıl solves familiar Qur’an hermeneutical problems without much 
reference to tradition, demonstrates the distinct, and thereby, novel nature of 
Alpyağıl’s hermeneutical narrative. However, given the fact that Alpyağıl also does 
not present a significant explicit or implicit critique of tradition, so that it might be 
characterized as reformist or revisionist, it becomes very difficult to locate Alpyağıl’s 
work in relation to other hermeneutical theories by contemporary Muslim thinkers 
that are deemed to be reformist or traditionalist.  
 
The difficulty of situating Alpyağıl’s works, becomes even more evident if we 
compare his works to those written by his Turkish colleagues, such as Ali Bulaç and 
Ömer Özsoy. In the essay Hermeneutics as a Means to Read the Qur’an, Bulaç 
questions the recent Turkish turn to hermeneutics as a framework wherewith the 
Qur’an should be understood. He insinuates that hermeneutics is not compatible 
with the fundamental Islamic outlook511, and argues that we ought to first exhaust 
our traditional frameworks (elimizdeki usuller) before we venture to adopt other 
methods (yöntem) such as hermeneutics512. Accordingly, Bulaç’s work exemplifies a 
clear view of a conservatist attitude towards hermeneutics. However, if we recall 
Alpyağıl’s work, we discover no such reservations towards hermeneutics, since 
Alpyağıl explicitly describes his work as an experiment in hermeneutics and 
 
511 In hermeneutics, as exemplified by the works of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, an important 
aspiration is to understand the author better than he understood himself.  However, given the 
Muslim belief that God is the author of the Qur’an, it would imply that we could understand 
something better than God Himself. Bulaç, “Kur’an’ı Okuma Biçimi Olarak Hermenötik,” 117. 
512 Bulaç, 118. 
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constructively engages with non-Islamic philosophies and ideas stemming from 
Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Similarly, in the works of Özsoy, and for that matter 
other Ankara School theologians, we can discover an explicit critique of traditional 
conceptions (tasavvurlar) and a proposal to revise our traditional understanding513. 
However, in none of the previously studied works of Alpyağıl do we even discover a 
hint of a critique of tradition, let alone any propositions to revise it. As such, the 
challenge and need arises to extend, or perhaps revise, the conventional typology 
wherewith Muslim intellectual discourse is typified into such binary distinction as 
traditionalist-modernist or conservative-revisionist, since Alpyağıl’s work 
demonstrates the existence of a narrative that is neither a simple reform or revision 
of tradition, nor a sheer apologetics of the latter.   
 
Regardless of how we classify Alpyağıl’s thought, one important contribution made 
by Alpyağıl to the overall discipline of Qur’an hermeneutics, is by providing a 
framework in which interpretation can be separated from understanding. In other 
words, in Alpyağıl’s views not every understanding is based on an interpretation, 
since as the essays on the aesthetic experience and seeing-as have demonstrated, a 
text can also be understood without involving volition or words that express our 
understanding. As a result, Alpyağıl has offered a hermeneutical framework that 
challenges methodic approaches to Qur’an hermeneutics that envision 
understanding as a process that can always be mechanically induced and in 
discourse be expressed by applying a set of interpretation rules. 
 
Conversely, by introducing a more direct and intuitive experience of understanding 
the Qur’an, Alpyağıl developed a hermeneutics which assumes that the full 
understanding of a religious text is only the prerogative of that text’s community, 
rather than every potential audience that text might have. This was made evident 
by the fact that Alpyağıl argued that one of the conditions for fully understanding a 
 
513 Hence the reason why Korner named his study on Özsoy Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in 
Contemporary Turkish University Theology. 
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text is belief, and this by defaults precludes those with no faith in the Qur’an from 
fully understanding its message. This outlook, however, stands in stark contrast 
with the views of Cündioğlu discussed in the previous chapter, since Cündioğlu 
argued that reason and not faith is the ultimate arbiter or guarantor of our 
understanding of the Qur’an.   
 184 
In between Subjective Scruples and Objective Historical 




Born in 1965 in Giresun (Turkey), Öztürk’s foray into Islamic studies started with his 
training at one of Turkey’s conventional religious lyceums (Imam Hatip). After 
graduation, Öztürk further advanced his religious education by attending a Turkish 
divinity school (ilahiyat). As his graduate thesis, Öztürk wrote a dissertation on the 
Bāṭinī tradition in tafsīr and taʾwīl, setting the first steps for what would become a 
long-standing academic career related to the historical tradition and problems of 
tafsīr. In addition to an illustrious research career in tafsīr, Öztürk has also 
published one volume of his own personal tafsīr of the Qur’an; which makes him 
the only author analysed in this thesis that has written an exegesis of the Qur’an.  
 
Despite the breath and diversity of Öztürk’s publications, there are certain 
overarching characteristics that define the works of Öztürk. First and foremost, 
unlike his peers Alpyağıl and Cündioğlu, Öztürk’s works contain a very vocal critique 
of traditional ideas expressed in the fields of fiqh and tafsīr. The motivation behind 
this critique emerged from a personal struggle, which Öztürk describes as follows in 
one of the prefaces of his works: “these writings are a result of an effort to 
understand the divine speech (ilahi kelam) by a mind tormented (sancılı zihin) and 
disturbed by conventional ideas or stereotypical beliefs concerning Islam in general 
and the Qur’an in particular.”514 As a consequence, Öztürk does not merely research 
the history of tafsīr to regurgitate its fundamental ideas in a descriptive manner 
(tasvir), but he also seeks to analyse (tahlil) and critique (tenkit) the tradition of 
 
514 Mustafa Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler (Ankara: Ankara Okulu 
Yayınları, 2011), 7. 
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tafsīr at various turns515. As expressed by his own words, Öztürk does not only 
worry about “what is” (olan) but also about “what should be” (olması gereken)516.  
 
Öztürk’s dual commitment towards criticizing and revising traditional ideas, is what 
elevates his works from a mere study into the history of ideas in classical Islamic 
thinking. Accordingly, by engaging on a personal level with the fundamental 
theoretical elements of interpretation, Öztürk’s works become hermeneutical. It is 
particularly these theoretical reconsiderations of Öztürk that will take centre stage 
in the proceeding sections.  
 
The quest for a normative hermeneutics is always pursued by Öztürk in a dialogical 
manner. Either by stirring up a conversation with other Muslim and non-Muslim 
thinkers in order to support his argument, or by demonstrating how the prior fails 
in presenting an adequate hermeneutics of the Qur’an. In the latter case Öztürk 
deconstructs the arguments made by Muslim thinkers, so that he may subsequently 
create an intellectual clearing for his own perspective on the matter.  
 
A second defining characteristic of Öztürk’s works, is its historicist (tarihselci) 
approach towards understanding the Qur’an. Given the fact that historicism, like 
hermeneutics, has different meanings according to a particular context or author, it 
is important to define what the term means in reference to Öztürk’s works.  In one 
of his latest works, Öztürk has offered some remarks that demarcate what 
historicism signifies for him. According to Öztürk, a historicist interpretation 
(yorum) and approach (yaklaşım), is at its very core an inquisition into the answer as 
to what the Qur’an tells or wishes to tell us in the present517.  However, since the 
present-day reader is not the direct addressee of the Qur’an, it is necessary to 
understand the Qur’an’s pertinence through a ‘historical detour’. In other words, by 
 
515 Öztürk, 7. 
516 Öztürk, 7. 
517 Mustafa Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tarihsellik Üzerine: Çerçeve Yazılar, Örnek Konular (Ankara: Ankara 
Okulu Yayınları, 2018), 10. 
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first understanding what the Qur’an meant for its direct, historical addresses, and 
thereafter attempt to mediate its meaning with present-day circumstances. 
 
While Öztürk is not an alumni of the Ankara School of Divinity, his hermeneutical 
thinking does share a fundamental premise with the works of the alumni from the 
Ankara School of Divinity, such as Ilhami Güler and Omer Özsoy. The hermeneutical 
premise in question is the dialectical approach to the Qur’an as having both a 
historical component and transhistorical/universal aspect. This dialectic feature can 
also be discovered in the works of some thinkers affiliated with the Ankara School 
of Divinity. For example, Güler argues that while all God’s universal religion (dīn), 
such as the belief in a monotheistic God, is transhistorical, God’s revealed law has 
always been historically conditioned, and therefore, contingent518. Öztürk, as we 
shall discover in the proceeding sections, also maintains a dialectical approach to 
the Qur’an by arguing that the Qur’an contains elements that are both contingent 
and transhistorical, universal and particular, irrelevant as well as relevant. Given 
this fundamental similarity in hermeneutics between the Ankara School and Öztürk, 
it is no surprise that the Ankara School of Theology Publishing House has also 
become the home for almost all of Öztürk’s books, despite the fact that he has not 
formally studied or taught at the Ankara School of Divinity.  
 
The fact that Öztürk neither graduated nor taught at the Ankara School of Divinity, 
could potentially be the reason as to why Körner neglected to include Öztürk in his 
book on revisionist Koran hermeneutics in Turkey, despite the impressive body of 
work Öztürk has produced, the revisionist nature of his works, and the similarity of 
Öztürk’s ideas with members of the Ankara School519. Nevertheless, in the later 
phase of his career, Körner did introduce Öztürk’s work to the western world by 
translating one of Öztürk’s articles into German, and by providing some reflections 
 
518 Ilhami Güler, Sabit Din Dinamik Şeriat (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2012), 27. 
519 In Revisionist Kur’an Hermeneutics, Körner speaks only of wishing to analyze four authors 
belonging to the Ankara “tradition”. However, Körner does not specify what this tradition exactly 
entails, nor what belonging to this tradition signifies. Körner, “Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in 
Contemporary Turkish University Theology : Rethinking Islam,” 62. 
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on some of the ideas of Öztürk. According to Körner, Öztürk is able to make an 
empathic case for an historical-critical approach to explaining the Qur’an that is 
earnest and aware of the shortcomings of tradition. However, while such an 
approach might find resonance (gehör) with non-Muslims, Körner doubts whether 
other Muslims sceptical of revisionist readings, can become convinced of the 
validity of the historical-critical approach by reading Öztürk’s texts520. Nonetheless, 
other than Korner’s insightful remarks, other valuable article translations521, and 
certain footnotes, discussions of Öztürk’s ideas are virtually non-existent in western 
literature. A matter also affirmed by Korner: “Mustafa Öztürk has as of yet received 
little attention outside of Turkey.”522  
 
The vocal nature of Öztürk’s critique of tradition paired with some of his historicist 
claims, have also made Öztürk the most contested scholar amongst the three 
intellectuals studied in this dissertation. One controversial feature of Öztürk’s, has 
to do with Öztürk’s challenge to, what can be best described as, the ‘principle of 
pertinence’. As Todorov explains this concept: 
 
“In order to account for the triggering of the interpretative process, we must 
assume from the outset that the production and reception of discourse (of 
utterances, and not sentences) obey a very general rule of pertinence, according to 
which if a discourse exists there must be a reason for it. So that when at first glance 
a given discourse does not obey this rule, the receiver’s spontaneous reaction is to 
determine whether the discourse might not reveal its pertinence through some 




520 Felix Körner, “Türkisch Islamische Theologie Im Aufbruch: Mustafa Özturk,” Lebendiges Zeugnis 
63, no. 2 (2008): 107. 
521 Besides Körner, Zimmerman has also published a translation: Mustafa Öztürk, “Über Die 
Notwendigkeit Und Die Methoden Der Entmythologisierung Des Koran,” trans. Johannes 
Zimmermann, Die Welt Des Islams 50, no. 2 (2010). 
522 “Mustafa Öztürk hat bisher außerhalb der Türkei noch wenig Beachtung gefunden.” Felix Körner, 
“Modernistische Koranexegese in Der Türkei : Eine Diskussion Mit Mustafa Öztürk,” in Im Dienst Der 
Versöhnung (Regensburg: Pustet, 2008), 13. 
523 Todorov Tzvetan, Symbolism and Interpretation, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornel University 
Press, 1982), 28. 
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As it will become more evident in the coming sections, Öztürk challenges the 
principle of pertinence in respect to the Qur’an by questioning whether all verses in 
the Qur’an are pertinent for a modern audience. Moreover, Öztürk does not believe 
that some verses should be manipulated, i.e. interpreted in order to reveal their 
pertinence to modern audiences. Some verses, Öztürk will argue, are merely 
pertinent to the historical situation in which they were conveyed.  
 
Some conservative critics have taken note of such claims and have publicly rebuked 
Öztürk. Ihsan Şenocak, a conservative scholar who is known to critique the 
historical-critical view of the Qur’an adhered to by the Ankara School, has gone as 
far as to appeal and reproach the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). 
In the words of Şenocak:  
 
“… Diyanet, you respond when the Qur’an is being offended in France. However, 
this person [referring to Öztürk], goes into tafsīr classes, speaks of the Qur’an to the 
children of this nation; this man that enters the tafsīr classes, subsequently says 
that some of the narratives of the Qur’an bear no truth. Tell me, what is the ruling 
concerning a person that holds such beliefs? What is the ruling concerning the one 
who says that some of the verses of the Qur’an are – God forbid (haşa) – fables 
(masal)?”524 
 
A few of these controversies have had lasting consequences for Öztürk’s life. For 
example, in 2018 Öztürk came forward with screenshots from a fatwā that was 
circulating in a WhatsApp group calling for Öztürk’s death. Some members of this 
group shared the writing that “Öztürk has to be killed (katledilmeli), in case he does 
not repent (tevbe etmezse)”525  Moreover, perhaps due to these kinds of threats, 
Öztürk has closed his social media accounts, and no longer actively engages with 
the general public through social media.  
 
 
524 “Prof. Dr. Mustafa Öztürk’e ‘ölüm Fetvası’ Hakkında Suç Duyurusu,” Duvar, 2019, 
https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/gundem/2019/01/04/prof-dr-mustafa-ozturke-olum-fetvasi-
hakkinda-suc-duyurusu. 
525 “Prof. Dr. Mustafa Öztürk’e ‘ölüm Fetvası’ Hakkında Suç Duyurusu.” 
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Despite the active resistance by various groups in Turkey to Öztürk’s ideas, Öztürk 
remains both resolute and conspicuous in his hermeneutical method of 
approaching the Qur’an in a historical-critical manner. Öztürk argues that there are 
very few people committed to the historical-critical view of the Qur’an in Turkey. 
Furthermore, those who hold historicist ideas, are also reluctant to come forward.  
While he refrains from giving names, Öztürk claims that there are various fellow 
academics who are in reality “crypto-historicists” (kripto tarihselci) that have due to 
zeitgeist (zamanın ruhu) chosen to appear as traditionalists (gelenekçi). These 
academics, argues Öztürk, are forced to live double lives526.  
 
Öztürk’s unwavering commitment to a historical-critical view of the Qur’an was 
recast in one of his latest works Kur’an ve Tarihsellik Üzerine: Çerçeve Yazılar, Örnek 
Konular (On the Qur’an and Historicism: Side Writings, Example Cases). Not only 
does Öztürk discuss and reaffirm his own historical-critical view of the Qur’an but 
also that of one of his biggest influences: Fazlur Rahman.  
 
Fazlur Rahman, a modern intellectual of the Qur’an, became popular among certain 
Turkish Muslims due to his direct contact with Turkish students that attended his 
doctoral classes during the 70s, the subsequent translations of his works into 
Turkish, and the various symposiums held in Turkey in the 90s discussing Rahman’s 
ideas527. Rahman’s contextualist approach to the Qur’an was one of the 
fundamental reasons as to why certain Turkish intellectuals became enamoured by 
his ideas. As Wielandt recalls, certain Turkish intellectuals took particular interest in 
Fazlur Rahman’s hermeneutics, “because it facilitates a historical understanding of 
the Qurʾān in the sense of reading it within the original context for which it was 
formulated and then recontextualizing its message in view of the situation of 
 
526 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tarihsellik Üzerine: Çerçeve Yazılar, Örnek Konular, 9. 
527 Mustafa Öztürk, “Kur’an’ı Anlamada Tarihselciliğin İmkan, Sınır ve Sorunları,” in Kur’an’ı Anlama 
Yolunda: Kuramer Konferansları - I (Istanbul: Kuramer, 2017), 24–30. 
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modern believers, without abandoning the belief that it is God’s verbal revelation.” 
528  
 
In more technical terms, the interest in Rahman was partially spurred by his ‘double 
movement theory’.  Rahman describes the interpretative process in terms of two 
movements. The first movement attempts at understanding the given meaning of a 
statement in the Qur’an by studying the historical situation or problem to which it 
was the answer529. After establishing the meaning of a verse in relation to a 
historical situation or problem, the exegete continues to the second step, which “is 
to generalize those specific answers and enunciate them as statements of general 
moral-social objectives that can be "distilled" from specific texts in light of the 
sociohistorical background and the often-stated rationes legis.”530 
 
There is little doubt that Fazlur Rahman was a major source of inspiration for 
certain modern Turkish scholars531, especially to scholars such as Öztürk who 
advocate a historical-critical view of the Qur’an. It is no surprise that some elements 
of Öztürk’s thoughts are reminiscent of Rahman’s works. One of the most 
conspicuous similarities, pertains to Rahman aforementioned two-tiered approach 
to the Qur’an. In other words, both authors propose the idea that the Qur’an must 
first be read in relation to the historical situation in which its verses were revealed, 
and then in respect to what these verses potentially signify for the present. 
Furthermore, both authors do not seek this latter significance via the Qur’an’s 
historical idiosyncrasies but according to the more generic, universal principles 
behind the verses.   
 
 
528 Rotraud Wielandt, “Main Trends of Islamic Theological Thought from the Late Nineteenth Century 
to Present Times,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. S Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 739. 
529 Fazlur Rahman, Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 6. 
530 Rahman, 6. 
531 Wielandt, “Main Trends of Islamic Theological Thought from the Late Nineteenth Century to 




Unlike Alpyağıl and Cündioğlu, however, Öztürk has not published any work that 
solely focuses on the subjectivity-objectivity debates in Qur’an hermeneutics. 
Nevertheless, Öztürk has directly addressed at various turns different issues related 
to the problems of subjectivity and objectivity in Qur’an hermeneutics532. 
Accordingly, it is possible to formulate an overall narrative from Öztürk’s works that 
describes subjectivity vis-à-vis objectivity in interpretation in the thought of Öztürk. 
However, in order to construct such a narrative, it is necessary to venture through 
different tiers of Öztürk’s thought. In the following sections, various levels of 
Öztürk’s thinking will be discussed in order to describe the complex and multi-
layered view of Öztürk on the status of subjectivity vis-à-vis objectivity in regard to 
the interpretation of the Qur’an. 
 
Rehabilitating the historical 
 
An important cornerstone of Öztürk’s overall work is to rehabilitate the historical in 
relation to the Qur’an. In other words, to acknowledge the historicity of the Qur’an. 
Not for this acknowledgement to become a negation of the universal aspects of the 
Qur’an, i.e. its ability to address an audience beyond its initial revelation period533. 
Rather, as a sober corrective measure against an exaggerated interpretative stance 




532 For example, in one of his works, Öztürk presents some of his views under the following heading 
Yorum Mahiyeti ve Yorumda Nesnellik-Oznellik Meselesi (The Essence of Interpretation and the 
Problem of Objectivity-Subjectivity in Interpretation); demonstrating thereby that he has at various 
turns of his writings addressed this epistemological issue. 
533 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tarihsellik Üzerine: Çerçeve Yazılar, Örnek Konular, 50. 
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By acknowledging both qualities of the Qur’an, Öztürk opens the pathways to 
bifurcations, such as transhistorical-in-essence versus historical-in-form534, historical 
meaning versus contemporary meaning, and so forth. These consequent 
bifurcations have a consequence for the status of subjective understanding in 
Öztürk’s Qur’an hermeneutics. To clarify, by differentiating between a historical and 
a contemporary meaning, Öztürk will on the one hand judge that the Qur’an has a 
necessary objective meaning determined by its original engagement with the 
Qur’an’s historical audience, while simultaneously maintaining that its 
contemporary meaning becomes accomplished by deliberating anew on its message 
in reference to present-day subjective considerations.   
 
In order to rehabilitate the historical dimensions of the Qur’an, Öztürk relies on a 
variety of different analyses and premises, depending on the context of the 
discussion. One key-premise is to historicize the appeal of the Qur’an. He argues 
that the present-day Muslim is not the direct addressee (muhatap) or the recipient 
of the Qur’an’s address (hitap)535. Rather, as Öztürk states, “The Qur’an’s direct 
addressees are the Arabs of the Prophet’s time.”536 As such, by being the indirect 
addressee of the Qur’an, and therefore, unable to be addressed by the Qur’an “as-
is”, the present-day reader can only reconstruct the pertinence of the appeal of the 
Qur’an through mediation. That is to say, the contemporary reader or hearer must 
investigate how the appeal of the Qur’an is still relevant to them in the here and 
now despite not being its direct or original addressee.    
 
While this might seem like a very logical hermeneutical premise, Öztürk has argued 
that both classical as well as modern Muslim intellectuals have been very reluctant 
 
534 The Turkish concepts of tarih-üstü and tarihsel are respectively translated as ‘transhistorical’ and 
‘historical’. The notion of ‘trans’ in transhistorical is substituted for the ‘üstü’ in tarih-üstü, which 
conventionally speaking relates to something ‘above’, and in this context to ‘history transcending’, 
thus transhistorical. Such a translation is also supported by Körner in his translation of tarih-üstü as 
Übergeschichtlichkeit. See Körner, “Modernistische Koranexegese in Der Türkei : Eine Diskussion Mit 
Mustafa Öztürk.” 
535 Mustafa Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tefsir Kültürümüz (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2015), 18. 
536 Öztürk, 18. 
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to historicize the Qur’an’s address. According to Öztürk, Muhammad Asad’s 
(d.1992) interpretation of verse 88:17 would be a case in point of such forced 
universalist readings of the Qur’an. Instead of translating the Arabic ibil as “camels”, 
as many other translators such as Yusuf Ali and Pickthall have done, Asad has 
suggested the translation “clouds pregnant with water”. For Asad, translating ibil as 
camels would be too provincial, and not proper to the Qur’an’s universal appeal: 
 
“If the term were used in the sense of "camels", the reference to it in the above 
verse would have been primarily - if not exclusively - addressed to the Arabian 
contemporaries of the Prophet, to whom the camel was always an object of 
admiration on account of its outstanding endurance, the many uses to which it 
could be put (riding, load-bearing, and as a source of milk, flesh and fine wool) and 
its indispensability to people living amid deserts. But precisely because a reference 
to "camels" would restrict its significance to people of a particular environment and 
a particular time (without even the benefit of a historical allusion to past events), it 
must be ruled out here, for the Qur'anic appeals to observe the wonders of the 
God-created universe are invariably directed at people of all times and all 
environments.”537 
 
For Öztürk such excessive universalisations of the Qur’an’s address are not 
sustainable, on account of the various pathologies caused by its insistence.  These 
pathologies are defined as follows by Öztürk:  embarrassed/apologetic universalism 
(mahçup evrensellik), deceptive universalism (muğfil evrenselcilik), and noxious 
universalism (müstekreh evrensilcilik). In other words, if someone were to ignore 
the historical aspects of the Qur’an, because they insist that the Qur’an is always 
universally pertinent, they would by default have to succumb to either of these 
pathologies to warrant the universal nature of the Qur’an. Some interpreters will 
thus feel embarrassed, because they will have to defend certain verses that they 
feel are conflicting with their modern sensibilities. As a result, rather than outright 
acknowledging that these verses historically signified what they do, such 
universalists will seek to find a different more appropriate universally pertinent 
meaning behind certain verses. Other interpreters, however, might in such a case 
 
537 Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur’ān (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, n.d.), 949; Öztürk, Kur’an 
ve Tefsir Kültürümüz, 19–20. 
 194 
offer deceptive interpretations that either restricts (hasıraltı almak) verses or acts 
as if they do not exist (görmezden gelmek)538. Finally, some interpreters will 
maintain an attitude that states “The Qur’an is universal as long as its rules do not 
force or bind me.” Unlike the previous two categories, Öztürk does provide an 
example of the latter. Accordingly, Öztürk argues that a Muslim woman might state 
that a ruling concerning the freedom of polygyny is a universally valid rule as long as 
it is not incumbent upon her to be part of a polygamous relationship. In other 
words, such a person would acknowledge the universal pertinence of polygamy but 
would avert its application on account of a personal aversion to polygamy.  
 
This excessive insistence on the universality of the Qur’an can according to Öztürk 
be retraced to three principal theoretical causes in tradition539. These causes are 
described by Öztürk as follows: thinking that the speech of God is inseparable from 
the eternal essence of God, subscribing to the notion that one shall not consider the 
particularity of the cause but the generality of statements, and finally, the Qur’an’s 
seeming self-description. All three causes are addressed and deconstructed by 
Öztürk in order to establish a clearing for his own hermeneutical understanding.  
 
Excessive universalist readings of their Qur’an are first of all rooted in the 
theological premise that God as well as His speech are eternal. Primarily, because 
God’s speech is conceptualized as being part of God’s knowledge, and therefore, to 
be part of God’s attributes. Accordingly, since God and His attributes are eternal, 
and speech is one of His attributes, His speech must therefore also be eternal540. By 
committing to this idea, classical Sunni theologians belonging to the Ashʿarī or 
traditionalist541 schools have gone through great lengths in order to stave off the 
 
538 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 69. 
539 Öztürk, 72. 
540 Öztürk, 72–73. 
541 Öztürk calls them ‘Selefiyye’, which, as the context seems to indicate, refers to the Ahl al- Ḥadīth 
(partisans of traditions). See: J. Schacht, “Ahl Al-Ḥadīth,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, 




idea that the Qur’an was not eternal but created. Unfortunately, as Öztürk argues, 
some of these same theologians resorted at times to weak reports (ḥadīth) and 
even ideas that contradicted with common sense principles. According to Öztürk, a 
clear example of the latter is the traditionalist conviction that the written letters of 
the Qur’an were even eternal542.  
 
Not all grounds for excessive universalism, are theological according to Öztürk. 
There is also a particular hermeneutical reason for such a position. This reason 
pertains to the accepted interpretative principle within classical jurisprudence and 
exegesis, where it is stated that the particularity of the cause (sebep) will not be 
considered, but the generality of the statement (lafzın umumiliği)543. To further 
clarify this principle, it is a well-documented fact that certain verses of the Qur’an 
were revealed in response to the particular actions of specific persons that lived 
during the time of the revelation.  Nevertheless, rather than understanding this 
causal relationship between specific situations and the content of the Qur’an to be 
restricted to those specific situations, the general theoretical perspective adhered 
to by jurisprudents and tafsīr scholars was to read the response as transcending the 
particularity of its cause. Moreover, the fact that the Qur’an was speaking in 
generalities could only add further support to why the generality of the statement 
(lafzın umumiliği) was to be considered, rather than the particularity of the cause 
(sebep) behind the statement. 
 
Öztürk questions whether statements are truly general or made to be general on 
account of the abovementioned principle of interpretation? 544 For, as Öztürk 
 
542 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 75. 
543 Öztürk is referring to the classical tenet that states al-ʿibratu bi ʿumūm al-lafẓ, lā bi khuṣūṣ al-
sabab (“the generality of the statement will be considered, not the particularity of [its] cause”).  
While this tenet can be found reiterated in principle usūl al-fiqh works belonging to Shāfiʿī and 
Ḥanafī scholars, al-Razī (d. 1210) reports that some students of al-Shāfiʿī have argued the opposite. 
In other words, scholars such as Abū Thawr (d. 854) and al-Muzanī (d. 878) argued that the 
particularity of the cause for a statement will be leading, and not the generality of the statements in 
which the Qur’an addresses an issue. Fakh̲̲r al-Dīn Al-Rāzī, Al-Maḥṣūl Fī ʿIlm Al-Uṣūl (Beirut: Dar al-
Kotob al-ilmiyah, 1999), 370. 
544 That is, not the particular cause, but the generality of the statements will be considered. 
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retorts, the Arabic language also permits, and in some cases as Öztürk argues, 
necessitates reading seemingly general statements in more restricted ways. Öztürk 
presents a clear example of why some seemingly general statements should still be 
read in restricted ways, by referring to the word al-insān in the Qur’an. Taken at 
face value, one would conventionally be inclined to read this word as “humankind”. 
Accordingly, there are plenty of verses to be found in the Qur’an that utter very 
harsh criticism about al-insān. If we were to de-historicise such verses and read 
them in unrestricted, universal terms, that is as applying to the entire species of 
humankind, Muslims would have to subscribe to a very negative and unoptimistic 
outlook on humankind, since God, their creator, criticizes al-insān at various turns.  
However, on the other hand, if we were to contextualise such verses in terms of 
their original historical referents, we would inevitably be able to restrict their 
meaning in relation to these referents, and thereby avoid a misanthropic reading of 
the Qur’an. In such cases al-insān, and its concomitant critique, would only refer to 
a handful of people.  
 
Based on these claims, Öztürk regards the argument from the Qur’an’s own self-
description to be the strongest. After all, as Öztürk argues, the Prophet’s mission 
has been described by verse 34:28 as being kāffatan li al-nās, which 
straightforwardly translates “to all of humankind”. Additionally, there are other 
verses of the Qur’an that start with the following address yā ayyuhā al-nās, which 
can be understood as “o ye people!”. As such, it is quite enticing to believe that the 
Qur’an’s message is not specific to a certain audience or time and that the Qur’an 
universally addresses all of humankind545. A plausibility that is only further 
supported by certain statements of the Prophet, such as “I have been sent to the 
red [skinned] as well as the fair [skinned].”546 
 
545 Although not an example presented by Öztürk, Yusuf Ali’s translation of the verse 34:28 is a clear 
case in point of such a belief: “We have not sent thee but as a universal (Messenger) to men, giving 
them glad tidings, and warning them (against sin), but most men understand not.” It should be 
noted, given the context of the present discussion, how Yusuf Ali substitutes the earlier kāffatan li al-
nās for the English “universal (Messenger) to man”.   
546 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 82. 
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As with the prior arguments for universalist readings, Öztürk retorts whether the 
earlier discussed expressions in the Qur’an, are truly purporting a generic meaning. 
Öztürk brings evidence from the fields of classical jurisprudence and exegesis that 
question such readings. For example, al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) has argued that it is not 
possible to elicit a universal pertinence from the Qur’an’s statements alone 
(mujarrad al-alfāẓ)547. On the contrary, there is always a need for accompanying 
evidence in order to argue that a Qur’anic injunction is not context specific, and 
accordingly, relevant to all occasions548. Moreover, as al-Ghazālī argued, the 
Prophet being sent to all of humankind, does not necessarily mean that his message 
addresses everyone in homogenous terms549. Similarly, different exegetes, such as 
Ibn al- Jawzī (d. 1200), have explained the earlier mentioned yā ayyuhā al-nās not 
as “o ye people” but in a more restricted sense as “people of Mecca”550. The 
famous classical tafsīr scholar and linguist al-Zamaksharī (d. 1144), even claimed 
that interpreting the earlier mentioned kāffatan li al-nās as “all of humankind” is 
not grammatically possible551. Rather, as Öztürk demonstrates, there exists a 
possibility to read kāffatan li al-nās as “to prevent Meccan people”, which 
inevitably renders verse 34:28 in the following, more restricted manner: “We have 
merely sent you to hinder the Meccan people from polytheism and disbelieve.”  
 
As mentioned earlier, the historical nature of the Qur’an is rehabilitated to coexist 
with the premise that the Qur’an is transhistorical, and not to completely negate 
any transhistorical potential. However, it should also not be forgotten that Öztürk’s 
historicism is a corrective to an excessive universalism. This inevitably means that in 
Öztürk’s framework the transhistorical elements of the Qur’an are co-defined by 
 
547 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Mustaṣfa Min ʿIlm Al-Uṣūl, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar Sader, 2010), 51; Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir 
ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 84. 
548 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Mustaṣfa Min ʿIlm Al-Uṣūl, 2:51; Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler 
Tespitler, 84. 
549 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Mustaṣfa Min ʿIlm Al-Uṣūl, 2:51–52; Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & 
Problemler Tespitler, 84. 
550 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 85. 
551 Öztürk, 86. 
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the historicity of the Qur’an. As such, despite having a universalist perspective on 
the Qur’an, and thereby, acknowledging the history-transcending nature of the 
Qur’an, Öztürk does so with certain qualifications.  
  
This double commitment to the historical and transhistorical qualities of the Qur’an 
is determined in Öztürk’s thinking by a set of interrelated conceptual bifurcations. 
Among the key distinctions Öztürk makes, is the differentiation between address 
and message (hitap-mesaj) and essence and form(öz-suret). By virtue of these 
distinctions Öztürk will extend the historical-transhistorical/universal dichotomy 
further and argue that the Qur’an is in address and form historical, while in its 
underlying message and core the Qur’an is universal and transhistorical.  
 
By distinguishing between address and message, Öztürk brings the earlier discussed 
circle to a close that started with the notion that the present-day subject was not 
the direct addressee of the Qur’an; even if, as Öztürk’s prior critique demonstrated, 
one might be inclined to believe otherwise, because of the Qur’an’s seemingly 
general expressions.  The address of the Qur’an as exemplified by its vocative 
expressions (“O believers!) are therefore technically speaking only directed towards 
the historical audience present during the revelation of the Qur’an. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that the Qur’an does not speak to a contemporary audience. 
Rather, as Öztürk argues, it is not the historical address but the essential message 
that speaks or should speak to a contemporary audience.  
 
Various elements of the Qur’an have been discerned by Öztürk to be truly 
universally relevant. In one of his earlier works, Öztürk argued that the Qur’an 
contains a set of universal themes, which can be recognised by their consistent 
repetition throughout the history of prophecy: “All themes that have existed during 
every moment of history, and as such, have been expressed in the message of every 
prophet, are transhistorical (tarih-üstüdür).”552 Öztürk follows this statement with 
 
552 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tefsir Kültürümüz, 17. 
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three beliefs that are exemplary of the universal concerns of the Qur’an: the belief 
in God’s absolute unity in respect to His divinity (uluhiyet) and lordship (rububiyet), 
the belief in a hereafter, and the advocation of a variety of important virtues, such 
as being kind to one’s parents, to be just, and to help the destitute553. A similar but 
different reformulation of which aspects of the Qur’an are universal, can also be 
discovered in a later work of Öztürk : ”in respect to its base (faith, ethics, 
spirituality) the Qur’an is universal, while in respect to its branches (social order and 
law) it is historical.”554 In the case of the prior, Öztürk has additionally emphasised 
the primacy of articles of faith over all other elements of the Qur’an’s message, 
since he argues that the most universal aspect of the Qur’an’s universality are 
related to its articles of faith (inanç ilkeleriyle ilgilidir)555.  
 
Öztürk continues to further nuance his views on the dialectics between 
transhistorical-historical, by arguing the possibility that certain verses of the Qur’an 
are in form (suret) particular to a historical situation, while in essence (öz), that is 
their underlying message, transhistorical and universally relevant.  As Öztürk states, 
“the Qur’an is an address that considers the situation at hand (verili durum) of the 
Prophet’s time. Accordingly, even the transhistorical messages of the Qur’an have 
been presented in forms that express the situation at hand.”556 To illustrate this, let 
us look at verse 31:14: “And We have enjoined on man (to be good) to his parents: 
in travail upon travail did his mother bear him, and in years twain was his weaning”. 
This verse, as Öztürk argues, presents a universal message through a frame of 
reference that was particular to a historical practice. Put differently, verse 31:14 
reminds its audience of the universal injunction to be kind to their parents, through 
a reference to a historical practice: two years of weaning557.  Likewise, to refer to 
another example by Öztürk, the universal fact of God’s absolute authority over the 
universe, was made relatable to the Arab recipients of the Qur’an through the use 
 
553 Öztürk, 17. 
554 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 93. 
555 Öztürk, 87. 
556 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tefsir Kültürümüz, 21. 
557 Öztürk, 21. 
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of provincial regal imagery. To clarify, by describing God as governing the universe 
from a throne situated above the highest of heavens, the Arab recipients of the 
Qur’an who were already familiar with monarchs, were told of God’s absolute 
dominion in terms that they could relate to558.   
 
The two stages of interpretation: reconstruction and mediation 
 
Both these degrees of differentiation applied by Öztürk between 
historical/particular-in-form and transhistorical/general-in-essence, become the 
very foundation of the two-stage hermeneutics of Öztürk. This two-stage 
hermeneutics can be delineated in terms of reconstruction and mediation. First 
reconstructing the meaning of the Qur’an within its historical horizon, and then 
relating it to the present559. While the first stage answers the question as to what 
the Qur’an meant in the past, the latter revolves around the question as to how and 
what a modern-day reader can sensibly appropriate from the Qur’an’s contents 
given the fact that the form wherein this content was delivered was conditioned for 
a specific historical understanding. Moreover, the prior stage emphasises the 
objective relationship to the text, and the latter the more subjective relationship to 
the text. 
  
These two stages of reconstruction and mediation do not only harken back to the 
earlier mentioned bifurcations but also to Öztürk’s understanding of the difference 
between tafsīr and taʾwīl, and how this difference relates to the disciplines of tafsīr, 
kalām and fiqh. Tafsīr and taʾwīl are distinguished by Öztürk in similar lines to how 
the classical scholar al-Mātūrīdī (d. 944) differentiated between these interpretative 
activities. According to al-Matūrīdī, tafsīr concerns itself with elucidating what 
God’s intention was towards the first recipients of the Qur’an560. Taʾwīl on the other 
 
558 Öztürk, 24. 
559 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tarihsellik Üzerine: Çerçeve Yazılar, Örnek Konular, 13. 
560 Mustafa Öztürk, “Kur’an Vahyinin Anlaşılması ve Yorumlanması,” in Tefsir Geleneğinde Anlam-
Yorum Nüzul-Siret Ilişkisi, ed. Mustafa Öztürk (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2017), 17. 
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hand, is to bring the original meaning (özgün anlam) into later times, as well as 
reinterpret this original meaning in renewed circumstances561. Moreover, while the 
science of tafsīr, as the name already states, concerns itself with the activity of 
tafsīr, fiqh and kalām revolve mainly around taʾwīl:  
 
“The Qur’an does not establish a relationship with humans living in time periods 
distant from its revelation by virtue of the science of tafsīr. On the contrary, it 
establishes this relationship with the science of kalām where beliefs (itikâd'i alan) 
are concerned, and fiqh were praxis (ameli alan) is concerned. For, while the 
science of tafsīr focuses on what the Qur’an has said in the context of its revelation, 
the sciences of kalām and fiqh busy themselves with the problem of what the 
Qur’an wants to say in the present and the future.”562  
 
In other words, as Öztürk summarises: “Tafsīr is the science that looks back and 
understands, while fiqh and kalām are the sciences that look forward through living 
[what is understood].”563  
 
Among the more pertinent consequences of this bifurcation between tafsīr and 
taʾwīl, is the fact that two meanings are ascribed to the Qur’an: past and present. 
Accordingly, rather than contextualising a primary and secondary meaning of the 
Qur’an in terms of superficial versus deeper meanings, or literal versus allegorical 
meanings, as mystics might have done in the past, the primary and secondary 
meaning in Öztürk’s framework revolves around historical and 
contemporary/future. The prior being often described by Öztürk in terms of ‘first 
and principal meaning’ (ilk ve asli mana)564, ‘principal and historical meaning’ (asli 
ve tarihi anlam)565, as well as ‘original meaning’ (özgün anlam)566.  
 
Reconstruction: an archaeology of meaning  
 
 
561 Öztürk, 17. 
562 Mustafa Öztürk, Ilahi Hitabın Tefsiri - 1, vol. 1 (Ankara: Ankara Okulu, 2018), 30. 
563 Öztürk, “Kur’an’ı Anlamada Tarihselciliğin İmkan, Sınır ve Sorunları,” 255. 
564 Tafsīr, p. 38 
565 Kuramer, p. 263 
566 Understanding and Interpretation, p. 18 
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Since the first step of interpretation is tasked with reconstructing the divine intent 
directed towards the first recipients of the Qur’an, it must engage in a process 
which Öztürk has described as an ‘archaeology of meaning’ (anlam arkeolojisi). This 
process involves working through language (dil), history (tarih), and the oral 
tradition (rivayet) of Islam567.  The desired outcome of this archaeology is to build a 
repository of meaning upon which the sciences of kalam and fiqh can derive their 
inspiration and develop new practical and religious meanings from the Qur’an for 
the present day568.   
  
The first point of departure within this archaeological uncovering of the Qur’an’s 
meanings, is by decoding the Qur’an’s linguistic codes. According to Öztürk, no 
mediation can ever be initiated without first understanding what a text means. 
Given the fact that the Qur’an stands in front of us as codified text, it follows that its 
mediation must also begin by first decoding its linguistic codes:  
 
“Without doubt, the assimilation and internalization of the divine message, is only 
possible by correctly understanding it. However, to understand, we have to decode 
the linguistic codes of the text that stands in front of us as a written document. 
Technically speaking, at this level of understanding and interpretation, approaching 
the Qur’an as an epistemic object (epistemik bir nesne) becomes inescapable.”569  
 
Decoding the linguistic codes of the Qur’an is not something that can be done 
merely in reference to the strict confines of the text’s linguistic materiality but has 
to be reconstructed in relation to the historical context that is external to the text. 
Primarily, because, as Öztürk argues, meaning is never constituted without context: 
“meaning is not a thing hidden in mere words and/or present in the text waiting to 
be transferred - as is - to our present. Rather, meaning is constituted through 
context (bağlam).”570 As such, the confines of interpretation should not be 
 
567 Tafsīr, p. 39 
568 Kuramer, p. 254 
569 Mustafa Öztürk, Kur’an’ı Kendi Tarihinde Okumak : Tefsirde Anakronizme Ret Yazıları (Ankara: 
Ankara Okulu, 2013), 41. 
570 Usul, p. 93 
 203 
restricted to the relationship between expressions and meaning (lafız-mana) but 
text and history (metin-tarih) 571.  
 
By reframing the scope of understanding in terms of text and history, Öztürk 
reiterates the dialectical relationship between history and the formation of the 
Qur’an’s text – something already hinted towards with the earlier bifurcation 
between the Qur’an’s historical content and its transhistorical message. For Öztürk 
it is a given that “the content of the Qur’an (Kur’an’daki muhteva) was formed from 
the dialectical relationship between God and humans.”572 Otherwise, as Öztürk 
states, we would have to admit that God is inconsiderate of the circumstances 
surrounding the first recipients of the Qur’an, which would lead to a fatalistic view 
of revelation. Öztürk argues that “to think that the elements of man, history and 
society are not of influence during the time of revelation, is equal to saying that 
God desired from the onset (ibtidaen) to address, and that, accordingly, He directed 
(tahvil) the state and conditions of the human addressees in accordance with what 
He wanted to say.”573  In other words, if God’s address does not adapt to history, 
then it must mean that the events of history were laid out in pre-advance by God, 
so that God would have the right audience and circumstances for His message to be 
relevant. Otherwise, if history would be independent of God’s message, while God’s 
message has been laid out in advance, there would be a risk that God would say 
things that do not conform with the volatility of the circumstances at hand. On the 
contrary, as Öztürk argues, “God decides when He will descend his revelation, but 
the subject of revelation is defined by what humans do574. 
 
This tight association between text and history necessitates that the Qur’an should 
be read alongside other sources that disclose the historical experience of the 
Qur’an. At various turns, Öztürk has further specified what some of these sources 
 
571 Ibid., p. 26 
572 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 264. 
573 Öztürk, 264. 
574 Öztürk, 264. 
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are. Accordingly, one of the first sources mentioned by Öztürk is the Prophet’s 
biography (sīra): “it should be put forward that what the divine intent (ilahi irade) 
wants, should be gathered from reading the Qur’an in parallel to its historical 
particularity (tarihsel özgüllüğü) and the Prophet’s biography.”575 Another obvious 
source mentioned by Öztürk is the literature explaining the causes for revelation 
(asbāb al-nuzūl). Finally, there is also the sunna. However, as Öztürk has argued, the 
idea of sunna should not be restricted to documented reports that were related 
from the Prophet (metinleşmiş hadisler). Rather, the sunna should be understood in 
broader terms as a way of Islam (Müslümanlık) that was transmitted from the 
Prophet’s generation onwards and has since then become part of the genetic code 




After reconstructing the objective meaning intended for the Qur’an’s initial 
audience, the question arises as to how this meaning can be brought into 
pertinence for the present-day reader of the Qur’an. As previously stated, it is at 
this step of Öztürk’s hermeneutics wherein subjectivity plays a more important 
constructive role, since it is at this step that the second meaning of the Qur’an is 
constructed. This is the meaning that can be derived from a dialogue between the 
Qur’an’s initial meaning and present/future subjective circumstances. Accordingly, 
Öztürk’s work deals with the parameters of this dialogue in reference to the 
following topics:  narratives (kasas), theology (îtikad), and jurisprudence (ahkam). 
However, in each case with a reference to the earlier discussed dialectics of 
historical-transhistorical. In the following section all three topics will be discussed in 
order to further gain insights into Öztürk’s specific views on the limitations and 
possibilities of understanding the Qur’an either subjectively or objectively. 
 
575 Mustafa Öztürk, Tefsir Tarihi Araştırmaları (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2011), 26. 
576 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 27. 
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The inescapable particularity of narratives 
 
The Qur’an contains a variety of narratives that speak of experiences not belonging 
to the first recipients of the Qur’an but to other actors. Examples belonging to this 
category, are narratives concerning Adam and Satan, the prophets of Israel, or the 
peoples of Ad and Thamud. While these narratives are pre-dominantly understood 
to be historical in character, recent scholarship in the fields of Biblical and Qur’an 
hermeneutics have taken a renewed interest into the status of these narratives, 
inquiring whether these narratives are in character mythological rather than 
empirical. Following this trend, Öztürk has also readdressed the problem of the 
status of the narratives within the Qur’an.  
 
Among the more salient sub-problems Öztürk addresses is the question concerning 
the purposes of the narratives of the Qur’an. Accordingly, three purposes (gaye-
amaç) are ascribed by Öztürk to the narratives of the Qur’an: guiding people 
towards the assertion that Allah is the only god (tek gerçek tanri)577, to morally 
support the Prophet and the believers578, and finally, to provide ethico-religious 
profundities/lessons (ibretler)579. While the first and last purposes might be relevant 
on a transhistorical level, it is not clear how the second purpose can be mediated 
into the present, since it is rooted in a specific historical problem. In such cases, the 
reader might have to admit that there is no transcendent, objective meaning to be 
appropriated into the present from these narratives, other than the 
acknowledgement of the historicity of these narratives580.  
 
 
577 Mustafa Öztürk, Kıssaların Dili (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2013), 37. 
578 Öztürk, 38. 
579 Öztürk, 38. 
580 This is clearly admitted to by Öztürk by arguing that some narrations are merely the answer to 
some historically contingent questions, and therefore, “it can even be said that some narratives do 
not contain any ethico-religious message.” Öztürk, 102. 
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The latter possibility, in other words the unassimilable nature of certain narratives, 
is elaborated by Öztürk in reference to two specific cases within the Qur’an: the 
narrative concerning the Asḥāb al-Kahf (People of the Cave) and the narrative 
concerning Dhū al-Qarnayn (Possessor of Two Horns). There is no question about 
the abstract nature of these narratives, most evident by the fact that no concrete 
names, places or dates are presented within these narratives. From this fact, Öztürk 
infers that these narratives were not meant to present historical and factual data, 
nor any ethico-religious message; otherwise such narratives would have done so 
explicitly581. Rather, these kinds of narratives were merely meant to support the 
Prophet by providing an answer to the questions set by the Prophet’s detractors. 
 
Öztürk supports his historicist claim by turning to the general tradition concerning 
these narratives. According to tradition, these narratives were revealed as an 
answer to the questions posed by the Prophet’s detractors. As history recalls, the 
polytheists inquired into the status of Prophet with the Jews of Medina. In 
response, the Jews of Medina instructed them as follows: “ask Muhammad three 
questions. If he is able to answer these questions, he is a Prophet. However, if he is 
unable to answer them, then he is not a prophet, and you can do with him as you 
please.”582 As such, the following three questions were asked: what is the story 
concerning the youth that escaped their homeland, the man who travelled to the 
ends of the west and the east, and what is the quiddity of the spirit? 583 The answers 
to the first two questions became the narratives of the People of the Cave and Dhū 
al-Qarnayn. 
 
If one were to make more of these narratives by de-historicizing them and arguing 
that they harbour various transcendent truths, it would lead according to Öztürk to 
forced and fanciful interpretations (hayali yorumlar) 584, that might even contradict 
 
581 Öztürk, 46. 
582 Öztürk cites Ibn Hishām. Öztürk, 45. Ibn Al-Hishām, Al-Sīrat Al-Nabawiyya Li Ibn Al-Hishām, vol. 1 
(Beirut: Al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyya, n.d.), 301. 
583 Öztürk, Kıssaların Dili, 45. 
584 Mustafa Öztürk, Kur’an Kıssalarının Mahiyeti (Istanbul: Kuramer, 2017), 19. 
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the Qur’an’s message. One example of the prior, is the scientist reading arguing that 
Dhū al-Qarnayn might be a space traveller who journeyed through various 
galaxies585. Another example would pertain to the earlier mentioned narrative of 
the People of Cave. As the narrative goes, various young men sought refuge in a 
cave from a despotic ruler. Öztürk asks rhetorically if present-day Muslims ought to 
also seek refuge in a cave when confronted with oppression? If this is the message 
to be inferred, then to whom is the message addressed within the Qur’an that 
commands to always incite the good and forbid the wrong within the public 




Historicity is not only limited to the narratives but also pertains to the theology of 
the Qur’an. God’s divinity (uluhiyet) as well as absolute unity (tevhid) has, according 
to mainstream Islamic views, been consistently asserted by many different prophets 
throughout history. However, as Öztürk argues, while the proclamation of God’s 
unity has never changed throughout history, other aspects, such as the names 
wherewith God was referenced, e.g. Elohim, Yahweh, and Allah, have. In other 
words, to reiterate Öztürk’s metaphor: while the message enveloped (mazruf) has 
been transhistorical, its envelope (zarf) has been historically defined. Moreover, 
while the prior might be absolute and objective, i.e. signify a meaning that can be 
recurrently identified, the latter is contingent and rooted in culture: “However, 
when the three great religions are considered (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), it 
can be seen that each religion and generation has a subjectively valid (kendisi için) 
idea (imge) of God, rather than an objective (nesnel) idea of God.”587 
 
585 The tone in which Öztürk mentions this is one of perplexity. That is, Öztürk cannot fathom how a 
historical message as the Qur’an is being read by some present-day interpreters in ways that are 
almost reminiscent of science-fiction literature. Öztürk, Kıssaların Dili, 46. 
586 Öztürk, 47. 
587 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tefsir Kültürümüz, 25. 
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Hence, it is no surprise to Öztürk that the Qur’an depicted God as a king, because a 
king symbolised the greatest possible authority to the early Arab recipients of the 
Qur’an588.  
 
Part of the provincial nature of the Qur’an’s theological imagery is due to the nature 
of language itself. Language is a dynamic entity with its own historicity. As Öztürk 
states, “The language of the Qur’an is not absolute (mutlak), primordial (kadim) 
[but] the language of a particular human experience, tradition, history, and 
culture.”589 Öztürk refers in this regard to the Heideggerian metaphor that Sprache 
ist das Haus des Seins (language is the home of being). Arabic, argues Öztürk, “is 
also the house of the Arab’s being (arabi varlığın meskeni).”  Since God utilises 
Arabic, God speaks by default in terms that stem from the Arabs culture and 
history.   
 
While the previously discussed examples and context demonstrates the 
interreligious historicity of how God is conceptualised, Öztürk also notes a degree of 
historicity within the larger tradition of Islam itself. These observations by Öztürk’s 
are rooted in an analysis of two classical disciplines: tafsīr and kalām.  According to 
Öztürk, both disciplines bear witness to the way in which ideas concerning God 
have changed and evolved within the overall Muslim community.  
 
In respect to tafsīr, Öztürk relates how the word rab was transformed from its 
primary, historical meaning within the exegetical tradition.  As Öztürk recounts, the 
Qur’an describes God as rab (lord), while we, His human creation, are designated as 
ʿabd (slave). These notions which were very familiar to the early recipients of the 
Qur’an, were carefully selected in order to challenge the concept of God that the 
Meccan polytheists had. The Meccan polytheists, while they did believe God 
created everything, did not believe that God intervened with human life. Not God, 
 
588 Öztürk, 24. 
589 Öztürk, “Kur’an’ı Anlamada Tarihselciliğin İmkan, Sınır ve Sorunları,” 251. 
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but fate (dahr) governed their lives. By claiming God’s lordship over humans, a 
revised concept of God was brought forward wherein God was described as having 
mastery over people’s life590. However, in later exegetical works, Öztürk states that 
God’s lordship moved away from its domineering connotations, to one that laid 
more emphasis on education (eğitme) and cultivation (yetiştirme), rather than 
authority591.  
  
Similarly, in the instance of kalam, there is a clear discrepancy to be noted between 
some of the earlier and later generations of theologians and how they envisioned 
God. For example, the Qur’an states that God is to be found in the heavens (fī al-
samāʾ). Early theologians such as Ahmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 855) and Saʿīd al-Dārimī (d. 
893), have taken this statement literally, and even argued the heretical status of 
those who understand God to be omnipresent592. However, as Öztürk notes, later 
theologians leading up to the present, have interpreted “being in heaven” as God 
being above everything in terms of authority (saltanat) and power (kudret)593— 
arguing that this is the proper way of thinking about God (sahih Allah tassavuru). In 
other words, what used to be unthinkable and heretic notions of God, became 
mainstream, and what used to be the default way of thinking about God, became 
itself contested.  
 
In conclusion, the historicity of Islam’s theology as witnessed by the traditions of 
tafsīr and kalam ratifies the possibility of future, different theologies. In other 
words, as past generations have demonstrated how they revised their theological 
notions in relation to previous generations, so – Öztürk argues - can subsequent 
generations also revise their theology in relation to the past. Accordingly, new 
 
590 Öztürk, 252. 
591 Öztürk does not name the later exegetical works in which this shift in emphasis has occurred. He 
does refer to al-Ṭabarī’s (d. 923) tafsīr as a source in which rab signified authority. Öztürk’s 
abstinence from naming specific sources could be attributed to the fact that his ideas were voiced in 
the context of an academic conference. In other words, to an audience that was already familiar 
with the source material, and therefore, not in need of specific titles. Öztürk, 252. 
592 Öztürk, 250. 
593 Öztürk, 250; Mustafa Öztürk, Söyleşiler, Polemikler (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2015), 110. 
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generations can revise the meaning of what a token revealed by the Qur’an, such as 
“the Almighty”, signifies for them subjectively. In other words, they can apply their 
personal taʾwīl to certain notions. However, it can be gathered from Öztürk’s works 
that such revisions do not happen leisurely but are rather preceded by certain 
theological conceptions becoming no longer tentative to a certain age: “However, 
depending on certain theological concerns and discussions, or philosophical ideas, a 
conceptualisation of God belonging to a certain time frame could become 
problematic in another period. In such an instance, a new conceptualisation of God 
needs to be constructed.”594  
 
The teleology of the Sharīʿa 
 
Besides narratives and theology, the Qur’an also expresses judgments concerning 
practical and societal matters.  Verses that contain legal content, are called by 
Öztürk ahkam ayetleri (lit. ‘verses that contain rulings’). Akin to the earlier 
categories, i.e. narratives or descriptions of God, verses that pass judgements on 
practical matters, are according to Öztürk also defined by the dialectics of 
revelation and context of revelation:  “It is our contestation, that God revealed all 
verses, legal verses (ahkam ayetleri) included, with consideration of the current 
state of praxis (fiili durumlar) of the people that witnessed the Prophet and the 
environment of the revelation.”595 Moreover, similar to the previous categories, 
Öztürk also distinguishes between the contingent and transhistorical qualities of the 
Qur’an’s legal verses, and defines the parameters of subjective mediation 
accordingly.  
 
For Öztürk, a proper separation between the transhistorical and historical in respect 
to legal rulings, is necessary in order to escape the pitfalls of ugly analogies (iğreti 
benzerlikler). In other words, if one were to wholly argue that the Qur’an’s legal 
 
594 Öztürk, “Kur’an’ı Anlamada Tarihselciliğin İmkan, Sınır ve Sorunları,” 253. 
595 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tefsir Kültürümüz, 28. 
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dimensions are universal, transcendent, and therefore, transhistorical, they would 
have to for example relate these attributes to the Qur’an’s acknowledgement of the 
institution of slavery, which runs against some of our modern-day moral 
sensibilities. As a result, rather than accepting the historical reality of the institution 
of slavery, as Öztürk does, some might attempt at dismantling such a controversy 
by analogically arguing that “slave” carries a meaning in the Qur’an that is more 
akin to our present-day notion of “working-class person”, rather than our classical 
definition of slave.  Such analogies, argues Öztürk, are merely apologetic and by 
virtue of their blatant anachronism not reasonable (makul) nor acceptable (makbul) 
596.  
 
The Qur’an is according to Öztürk in respect to legal concerns realist and 
pragmatist, rather than idealist as the Qur’an might be with matters of faith and 
ethics597.  For example, argues Öztürk, the Qur’an was unequivocally clear about its 
condemnation of polytheism, and attached great urgency towards its abolition. 
However, in respect to the institution of slavery, the Qur’an maintained an 
ambivalent approach that supported its gradual abolition, while simultaneously also 
making use of this institution for its own practical purposes. The latter can 
inevitably be evidenced from the fact that slavery was tolerated as an institution, 
because the prospect of gaining slaves was a great incentive for some Muslims to 
participate in military campaigns against the Meccan polytheists. Mainly, because 
captives of war could be kept as personal slaves598.   
 
To reiterate one of Öztürk’s core hermeneutical principles, as insisted by the 
transhistorical-historical dialectics: not everything in the Qur’an is meant to be 
applicable (geçerli) and of value (değerli) for all times and places599. Nor, is 
everything part of religion (din) or religious (dinî) in nature. Some judgments passed 
 
596 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 91. 
597 Öztürk, 90. 
598 Öztürk, 91. 
599 Öztürk, 91. 
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by the Qur’an are contingent in nature, i.e. defined by a historical and contingent 
pragmatic value. Historical injunctions, such as those  related to the physical 
reprimanding of women, are according to Öztürk not part of Islam’s transcendent 
message, and therefore, do not contain virtues worthy of future repetitions: 
“swatting women in order to discipline, is neither religion (din), nor an ethico-
religious virtue (dinî-ahlaki).”600  
 
As for the clarification of what might be the transhistorical quality in the Qur’an’s 
legal message, Öztürk resorts to a teleological framework. The transhistorical 
quality of legal judgements is understood by Öztürk to be the incentive, i.e. purpose 
undergirding an injunction, and not the specific, historical implementation recorded 
by the Qur’an. What must therefore be assimilated into the present is not the 
historical judgement per se but the realization of the original incentive behind the 
judgement.  
 
Öztürk’s teleological understanding of law is supported by his understanding of 
language. According to Öztürk’s understanding of language, the composition of an 
expression is not necessarily identical to the intention preceding its utterance or 
writing. Rather, as Öztürk argues: “the expression (lafiz) is not the purpose (maksat) 
itself but an example implementation (örnek uygulama).”601 In other words, a 
particular expression can be separated from its intentio602. This implies that the 
abandonment of the Qur’an’s literal instruction does not necessarily entail 
abandoning the purpose behind its instruction. For example, as Öztürk argues, one 
can separate the Qur’anic injunction “cut the hands of a thief”, from its raison 
d'être: the protection of private property (özel mulkiyet)603. 
 
600 Öztürk, 91. 
601 Öztürk, 94. 
602 This aspect of Öztürk’s thinking, was also acutely observed by Körner from another element of 
Öztürk’s work. Körner argued that Öztürk’s bifurcation between the previously mentioned address 
(hitap) and message (mesaj), signified the differentiation between what the Qur’an said (Gesagtem) 
and what it actually meant (Gemeintem). Körner, “Modernistische Koranexegese in Der Türkei : Eine 
Diskussion Mit Mustafa Öztürk,” 15. 
603 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 94. 
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What is important in Öztürk’s thinking concerning the mediation of Qur’anic law, is 
not so much the earlier mentioned objective (nesnel) and textual (metinsel) reality 
of the judgements passed by the Qur’an, but its relevance and applicability on a 
social level (sosyal ve işlevsel gerçeklik)604. Put differently, rather than jumping 
through various interpretative hoops, Öztürk understand the cutting of hands, as 
the literal cutting of physical hands; which, is from a historical and philological 
standpoint the most straightforward reading. However, the objective reality 
concerning the meaning of the verse, does not necessarily mean that a Muslim 
should apply himself to the verse in question. Rather, one must measure the 
applicability (işlevsellik) of such a verse within present-day social circumstances605. 
In other words, one must also take into considerations the subjective aspects of 
those who are addressed by the Qur’an in the present.  
 
Öztürk argues that even classical authorities such as Ibn Abbas were evaluating 
verses in terms of their applicability in changing circumstances and did not feel any 
uneasiness in accepting the historicity of the Qur’an. This is made clear by a report 
wherein Ibn Abbas is confronted by a group of Muslims decrying that no one is 
applying the command in verse 24:58. In this particular verse, preadolescent 
children are commanded to ask permission at certain times before entering the 
house. Ibn Abbas replies that this verse was revealed at a time when the majority of 
Muslims did not have houses with properly separated rooms or doors. As such, a 
child would enter upon their parent at embarrassing times. However, once people 
got to have houses with properly separated rooms and doors, the injunction in the 
verse was no longer being practiced606.  
 
 
604 Öztürk, 97. 
605 Öztürk, 97. 
606 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tefsir Kültürümüz, 31; Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tarihsellik Üzerine: Çerçeve Yazılar, 
Örnek Konular, 55.  
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Changing circumstances will keep challenging Muslims in regards to how they apply 
the Qur’an’s injunctions. Öztürk argues that in some cases it is even possible to find 
better ways wherein the earlier mentioned universal interests of the Qur’an can be 
mediated into the present607. To return once more to the injunction of cutting the 
hands of thieves, we are informed by Öztürk that one of the interests behind this 
verse is to correct the thief from stealing any further. Accordingly, rather than 
cutting hands publicly after the Friday prayer as Saudi Arabia does, Öztürk 
empathises more with the example of the municipality of Gaziantep (Turkey) and 
their wellness programs, which have helped liberate glue-sniffing (tinerci) youth 
from a continuing life of larceny608. In other words, with modern resources, 
perennial concerns of the Qur’an can be honoured in new and different ways by 
Muslims in the present that might be better609 than their historical 
implementations.  
 
Öztürk understands that such a teleological take on the Qur’an’s legal content, will 
open a pathway for a myriad of differing understandings concerning what the real 
interests behind certain verses might be.  It is quite possible, argues Öztürk, that 
some interpreters might rise up and claim that a verse that commands women to 
veil, was not a categorical imperative but a piece of advice (tavsiye). Such an 
understanding would be quite atypical to conventional readings of such verses. 
However, despite the controversial nature of some disagreements, Öztürk only 
hopes that such interpretations are realist (gerçekçi), have proper bases 
(temellendermis) and supporting principles (ilkeli olmak), and are more than mere 
rhetoric (retoriksel) alone610. In other words, different interpretations are quite 
natural but are only respectable if they fulfil the aforementioned conditions.   
 
 
607 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 97. 
608 Öztürk, 97. 
609 Öztürk uses the phrase “daha güzel” (lit. ‘more beautiful’), which in this context should be 
translated as “better” or “more appropriate”. Öztürk, 97. 
610 Öztürk, 98. 
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Responding to criticism   
 
The previous section has demonstrated that an important element of Öztürk is the 
desire to identify God’s intent behind verses. In other words, to wonder, and 
thereby psychologize, as to what God’s wishes are behind His revelation. Öztürk is 
aware of the potential critique against the psychologisation of the Qur’an, and has 
responded to this issue in a variety of ways.  
 
Öztürk recounts that the issue of psychologisation had already been debated in the 
Turkish context in respect to the question as to whether the hermeneutical models 
proposed by Romantic thinkers such as Dilthey could be helpful in the context of 
understanding the Qur’an611. Critics dismissed the appropriation of Diltheyian 
concepts such as re-experiencing (Nacherleben), on account of the ontological rift 
(ontolojik farklılık) between humans and God612.  In response, Öztürk argues that 
one does not empathise directly with God’s essence (zat) but with the spirit of 
revelation (vahyin ruhuyla)613. In other words, one emphasizes with God’s intention 
(maksat) informed from and directed towards the experiences of a specific 
historical audience. Accordingly, while it is true that God’s essence transcends 
human understanding, we must not ignore the fact that His revelation has become 
relatable by being revealed within a contingent history in a format directed towards 
human understanding (beşeri düzleme)614.  
 
The revelation history of the Qur’an further testifies to this possibility of 
empathising with revelation. Öztürk argues that there are diverse traditional 
accounts documenting how certain opinions voiced by the Prophet’s companions, 
were subsequently reiterated, sometimes verbatim, by the revelation of the 
Qur’an615.  In other words, there is a clear historical precedent of Muslims being 
 
611 Öztürk, Kur’an’ı Kendi Tarihinde Okumak : Tefsirde Anakronizme Ret Yazıları, 37. 
612 Öztürk, 37. 
613 Öztürk, 38. 
614 Öztürk, 38. 
615 Öztürk, 38. 
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able to direct their intentions towards problems that are in accordance with God’s 
will, even in the absence of revelation616. In the case of the latter, Öztürk argues 
that you only need to inspect certain traditions concerning the correspondence 
between the opinion of ʿUmar and the revelation of the Qur’an.  
 
This concept of ʿUmar’s congruence (muvafakat-i Ömer), is based on a recurrent 
historical occurrence wherein ʿUmar had voiced an opinion on a matter that 
subsequently was reiterated, and thereby vindicated, by revelation. Among the 
notable examples related by Öztürk is ʿUmar’s suggestion to establish the Maqām 
Ibrahim (Station of Abraham) as a place of worship, which led to the revelation of 
“and take ye the station of Abraham as a place of prayer”617. Another example is 
ʿUmar’s advice to the Prophet to make his wives speak to strangers from behind a 
veil, since his house is “visited by good people as well as people with ill-intent.”618 
Accordingly, in congruence with ʿUmar’s wishes, the following verse was revealed: 
“And when ye ask (his ladies) for anything ye want, ask them from before a screen: 
that makes for greater purity for your hearts and for theirs.”619 Finally, when some 
of the Prophet’s wives were creating domestic unrest on account of their envy, 
ʿUmar had advised them the same words that were later reiterated in this verse: “It 
may be, if he divorced you (all), that Allah will give him in exchange consorts better 
than you”620.  
 
One of the more pertinent consequences of these historical congruences between 
revelation and human ideas, such as those documented about ʿUmar, lies in the 
prospective of resolving issues in the absence of revelation. According to Öztürk, 
companions were able to think of solutions that were animated by an awareness 
(bilinç) and sensibility (duyarlık) particular to being a Muslim, which were 
subsequently confirmed (teyit) by revelation, to such an extent, that some verses 
 
616 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 265. 
617 Qur’an 2:125; Öztürk, 237. 
618 Öztürk, 237. 
619 Qur’an 33:53 
620 Qur’an 66:5 
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were revealed with a verbatim accordance with what was spoken by a 
companion621. As such, it is quite possible for a Muslim to envision solutions to 
certain problems that are in congruence with God’s will (ilahi irade), even in the 
absence of text (nas)622. However, Öztürk does argue that such solutions will only 
work if they are offered by a Muslim who is rational, scrupulous (vicdan sahibi), 
genuinely faithful, and in full submission (teslimiyet) to God623. 
 
The ethics of interpretative claims 
 
As the last sentence of the previous section demonstrates, Öztürk’s hermeneutics 
has more to offer than mere methodological concerns alone. There are also distinct 
ethical considerations to be discovered in Öztürk’s work. The importance accorded 
by Öztürk towards such ethical considerations, should not be underestimated: 
“before [there is any speak of] theology of Islamic sciences, grace (nezaket), 
delicacy (zarafet), etiquette (görgu), or more succinctly, civilised manners 
(medenilik) must be attained.”624 In the following section, the ethical side of 
Öztürk’s hermeneutics will be further elaborated, because it also has an important 
bearing on the status of subjective understanding in interpretation. For, as we shall 
soon discover, subjectivity in interpretation is affirmed by Öztürk on account of its 
ability to warrant tolerance, authenticity and humility in interpretation.  
 
Given Öztürk’s decades long academic presence in the discipline of tafsīr, it is no 
surprise that one of the sources of Öztürk’s ethical concerns, is the keen awareness 
and understanding of interpretative differences. Such an understanding is but an 
inevitable outcome of a research career that has investigated differing traditional 
and sectarian groups and their Qur’an exegesis, ranging from the Shīʿa, the 
 
621 Öztürk, Kur’an Tefsir ve Usul Üzerine & Problemler Tespitler, 264–65. 
622 Öztürk, 265. 
623 Öztürk, 265. 
624 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tarihsellik Üzerine: Çerçeve Yazılar, Örnek Konular, 93. 
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Muʿtazilīs, the mystics, to the more dominant Sunni schools of the Māturīdīs and 
Ashʿarīs.  
 
Öztürk points towards the Qur’an’s canonization as a key cause for interpretative 
differences between diverse groups. As a canonized text, the Qur’an was no longer 
a recitation that originated from the conversation between man and God; rather, 
the Qur’an had become separated from its original meaning-circumscribing context, 
opening up a variety of different interpretations. Consequently, by becoming open 
to a variety of meanings, the Qur’an also opened up the possibility for meanings 
that ratify sectarian interests, rather than challenge them.  
 
The Prophet had argued that disagreements in his community are a sign of mercy. 
However, while keenly aware of such prophetic wisdom, Öztürk argues that the 
Muʿtazilīs never extended this mercy to the Ashʿarīs, and neither did the Ashʿarīs 
extend this mercy to the Muʿtazilīs625. On the contrary, Ashʿarī dogmatists like Abū 
Manṣūr al-Baghdādī (d. 1037) wrote detailed heresiographies that would use 
denigrating language describing other groups that did not share similar 
interpretations626 The Other would always be thought of as being astray and 
following mere fancy. As such, to merely address the problem of exegetical strife 
from a standpoint of methodology is naïve: “to argue that all these problems [i.e. 
interpretative disagreements] stem from mere divergence in method and scientific 
understanding, is pure naivety. It is my contestation, that the real matter revolves 
around consideration (iz’an), fairness (insaf), and character (ahlak).”627 
 
The solution to such a derogatory attitude towards difference, starts according to 
Öztürk by giving up claims of having an exclusive lease on truth. In this respect 
Öztürk speaks of refraining from a tek hakikatcı dil (a language of being exclusively 
 
625 Öztürk, 90. 
626 Öztürk, 93. 
627 Öztürk, 91. 
 219 
right) and hakikatı temelluk etmek (claiming exclusive ownership of truth)628. 
Rather, as Öztürk argues: “truth is not something humans possess. Humans can only 
pursue truth and perhaps grasp one of its aspects (bir yönüyle kavrayabilir).”629 
Accordingly, it is imperative to be humbler and more modest in one’s interpretative 
claims (haddini bilmek). Which Öztürk decries as being absent in the interpretative 
landscape since many are using an absolutist language similar to God. However, 
according to Öztürk, such a mode of speaking about the Qur’an, is a sign of 
impudence (kustahlık) and arrogance (kibirlik)630, that will in the long run neither 
benefit humans at large, nor Muslims in particular631.  
 
One simply cannot resort to absolutist claims (mutlak nesnelci) without being naive 
according to Öztürk632. Naive, because no interpretation is free of any 
subjectivity633.  Interpretation is influenced by a person’s capacity to understand, 
their ideological inclinations, emotional state, culture, and practical experience; 
which, inevitably, differs from person to person. Even members of the same 
religion, or the same denomination for that matter, will read for this reason a 
religious text differently634.  
 
Öztürk argues that absolutist claims about the Qur’an are further complicated by 
virtue of two problems: historical distance and the manipulation and disinformation 
(dezenformasyon) by the Qur’an’s interpretation tradition. As repeatedly indicated 
by Öztürk, our understanding of the Qur’an has become complicated on account of 
a degree of alienation (yabancılık) developed between the Qur’an’s world of 
language (dil), meaning (anlam), and terminology (kavram) and our present-day 
world635. A complication, that is only further aggravated by a tradition of inherited 
 
628 Öztürk, 93; Öztürk, “Kur’an Vahyinin Anlaşılması ve Yorumlanması,” 35. 
629 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tarihsellik Üzerine: Çerçeve Yazılar, Örnek Konular, 93. 
630 Öztürk, 91. 
631 Öztürk, 93. 
632 Öztürk, 92. 
633 Öztürk, 92. 
634 Öztürk, 92; Öztürk, “Kur’an Vahyinin Anlaşılması ve Yorumlanması,” 39. 
635 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tarihsellik Üzerine: Çerçeve Yazılar, Örnek Konular, 92. 
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explanations full of manipulation and disinformation caused by fifteen centuries of 
political (siyasi), sectarian (mezhebi), and doctrinal (itikadi) strife. 
 
To conclude, in Öztürk’s hermeneutics objective interpretative principles and 
subjective conscientiousness are both part and parcel to the interpretative process. 
Objectivity is something one ought to pursuit but can never absolutely claim. 
Especially present-day readers cannot exercise such a confidence in their truth 
claims as their understanding is from the very onset perturbed by historical distance 
to the text and a distorted interpretative tradition.  Accordingly, an interpreter must 
always exercise a degree of subjective humility concerning their truth claims 
concerning the Qur’an and remain open to the fact that they might be wrong about 
their understanding. As Öztürk states, “When we are able to turn to and criticize 
ourselves, we will learn to be less polarizing in respect to understanding the Qur’an, 
to be more acquainted with an understanding that draws closer, and to be at the 
very least tolerant of those who think differently.”636  
 
Guarding the lines between taḥrīf and taʾwīl  
 
Öztürk’s hermeneutics maintains a constructive view toward the pursuit of 
objectivity and the presence of subjectivity when interpreting the Qur’an. 
Subjectivity and objectivity both have their own important role to play in the 
process of interpreting the Qur’an. However, with subjectivity and objectivity 
having their own particular role, it also means that each in turn has their own 
specific limits. In this final section, these limitations will be further explored as they 
provide concluding insights into the dynamics between subjectivity and objectivity 
in Öztürk’s thought.  
 
The historicity of the Qur’an averts the over-universalizing of its pertinence. For 
starters, because the Qur’an’s message was initially directed towards a specific 
 
636 Öztürk, 93. 
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historical audience. Accordingly, there is by default an objective meaning to the 
Qur’an, which is embedded in God’s original intent specifically catered towards the 
understanding of the Qur’an’s direct audience. However, this historicization 
consequently implies that one level637 of the Qur’an’s significance is off limits to the 
pull and effects of our subjective experiences. Otherwise, we will run the risk of 
having the Qur’an signify what we personally think or wish it does in the present, 
rather than what it signified historically by God’s design638. 
 
In a previous section Öztürk made it clear that tafsīr is the science that unearths the 
historical and objective meaning of the Qur’an, whereas taʾwīl pertains itself to 
renewing the significance of the Qur’an for the present based on the information 
provided by tafsīr.  With this bifurcation in mind, we can by default conclude that in 
Öztürk’s view tafsīr can never become directed by subjective deliberations639. 
However, less straightforward, is Öztürk’s claim that taʾwīl, despite being related to 
the subjective elements of interpretation, has to in fact rely on logical, linguistic, 
and historical deliberations.  In other words, although tafsīr should never be mixed 
with subjectivity, taʾwīl, while considerate of subjectivity, should never be based on 
subjectivity alone.  
 
Öztürk’s primary reason for guarding taʾwīl, comes from a desire to protect taʾwīl 
from becoming taḥrīf (distortion). Taʾwīl without reference to historical, logical, or 
linguistic considerations, will lose scientific dependability. Accordingly, Öztürk 
claims that by having no subject independent references wherewith interpretations 
can be examined, the lines between interpreting (taʾwīl) or twisting (taḥrīf) the 
meaning of the Qur’an become blurred (muğlaklaşmaktadır), or even worse, lost640.  
Since interpretations, especially when they are related to God’s wishes, become 
 
637 To recall, there are two levels of significance in Öztürk’s hermeneutics: historical and 
contemporary. 
638 Öztürk, “Kur’an Vahyinin Anlaşılması ve Yorumlanması,” 33. 
639 Öztürk, 33. 
640 Öztürk, 39. 
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normative, it is important that we are able to warrant their status as a taʾwīl and 
protect them from being a taḥrīf of the text. 
 
Öztürk accords a different status to purely subjective intuitions of the Qur’an’s 
meanings. Accordingly, just because certain interpretations are not tafsīr or taʾwīl in 
the proper sense, it does not mean that they are by default disavowed by Öztürk. As 
Öztürk elaborates, a believer might do his ablution, segregate himself, and read the 
Qur’an with true deliberation.  Subsequently, various new and inspiring meanings 
might dawn in that person’s heart that were hitherto not known. However, as 
Öztürk argues “we have no right to regard canonize (kanonikleştirme) certain 
meanings and associations that appear in our minds and hearts drawn from our 
personal relationship with the Qur’an.”641  In other words, one cannot regard 
intuitive meanings as canonical642 if they are not born from reflections based on 
principles that can be verified scientifically but are merely drawn from pre-
predicative intuition, such as the mystical experience643. Rather, such meanings, 
should be considered as apocryphal (Apokrif). The latter comprises all kinds of 
meaning according to Öztürk that escape the linguistic, historical and logical data 
whereupon tafsīr and taʾwīl relies. Meanings that are ultimately not binding 
(bağlayıcı) nor formally accepted (gayr-i resmi)644 
 
Concluding remarks  
 
Öztürk’s hermeneutics is a strong case in point, as to how the understanding of 
subjectivity in interpretation, simultaneously defines the contours of the surplus of 
meaning.  First of all, binary distinctions such as historical-transhistorical, essence-
form, address-message, whereupon Öztürk’s hermeneutics heavily relies, are 
 
641 Öztürk, Ilahi Hitabın Tefsiri - 1, 1:49. 
642 Canonical means in this context objectively verifiable interpretations that are formally accepted 
(resmi) as legitimate interpretations of God’s will. Moreover, when they have legal content, they can 
become potentially binding (bağlayıcı) on the larger Muslim community.  
643 Öztürk, Ilahi Hitabın Tefsiri - 1, 1:48. 
644 Öztürk, 1:49. 
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inevitably superimposed on the Qur’an’s text, since neither of those terms is 
present in the text itself. Accordingly, a historicizing subject, cannot escape from 
superimposing, and thereby forcing, a surplus of meaning not present in the 
linguistic materiality of the text. For example, rather than straightforwardly reading 
a Qur’anic injunction as “cut off the hands of a thief”, one will inevitably read this 
injunction as follows “cut off the hands, [since you do not have better resources to 
protect property and correct thieves in present-day 7th century Arabia]”,  or  “[I, 
God, command you to] cut off the hands of a thief [tentatively]”. 
 
With these binary distinctions between historical-transhistorical Öztürk also applies 
a strict perimeter around the Qur’an’s appeal. First of all, by arguing that the 
Qur’an’s primary address was reserved to its initial, historical audience. Accordingly, 
even if the Qur’an speaks with generic pronouns (e.g. “you” and “believers”), the 
contemporary reader may not indiscriminately relate this address to their own self. 
Rather, for the modern reader, a proper meaning of the Qur’an is in Öztürk’s 
framework only gained through an interpretative detour. In other words, by (1) 
relinquishing the claim that one is directly addressed by the Qur’an, (2) abstracting 
the universal, transhistorical message of the Qur’an from its historical, contingent 
application, and finally (3) by performing a new mediation between the present and 
the universal message of the Qur’an.  
 
This commitment towards recognizing the dialectics between the historical and 
transhistorical aspects of the Qur’an, reaffirms the innate kinship between the ideas 
of Öztürk and Fazlur Rahman. In some instances, Öztürk is rehashing and 
paraphrasing Rahman in Turkish. For example, Rahman argued:  
 
“We see, then, that the Qur’an and the genesis of the Islamic community occurred 
in the light of history and against a social- historical background. The Qur’an is a 
response to that situation, and for the most part it consists of moral, religious, and 
social pronouncements that respond to specific problems confronted in concrete 
historical situations.”645 
 
645 Rahman, Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition, 5. 
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Whereas Öztürk stated the following: “the transhistorical messages of the Qur’an 
have been presented in forms that express the situation at hand.”646  
 
If similar ideas can be found in the works of Rahman or the Ankara School 
members, it may be wondered what the true novelty of Öztürk’s thinking is? Körner 
has framed Öztürk’s contribution in terms of radicality. In other words, by arguing 
that Öztürk’s works are similar to that of Turkish Qur’an historicist Omer Özsoy but 
more radical647. Unfortunately, Körner does not explain to what degree Öztürk is 
more radical in his claims than Özsoy. I can only suspect that this relates to Öztürk’s 
seemingly more incisive statements, such as that some verses of the Qur’an did not 
even contain a higher ethical message in their own particular context but were only 
meant to give contingent answers to the Prophet’s detractors. Accordingly, Öztürk 
is almost suggesting that some verses were just “stopgap verses”, which inevitably 
raises a few theological controversies648. I have yet to discover such incisive 
statements in the works of Özsoy, or other Ankara School theologians for that 
matter.  
 
Besides its incisive nature, I argue that Öztürk’s contribution to the historicist 
paradigm also lies in the range and creativity of his arguments. There is a great deal 
of overlap in the ideas of Öztürk and Rahman, as both authors argue for a 
hermeneutical method in which the universal values of the Qur’an are distilled and 
mediated anew with the present. However, while Rahman and Öztürk might share a 
similar hermeneutical outlook, they do not necessarily use the same references to 
the Qur’an, the Prophet, or the overall Islamic tradition in order to support this 
outlook. Accordingly, what makes Öztürk’s plea for a historical-critical 
 
646 Öztürk, Kur’an ve Tefsir Kültürümüz, 21. 
647 “Öztürk radikalisiert Özsoys Positionen” (Öztürk radicalizes  the positions of Özsoy). Körner, 
“Modernistische Koranexegese in Der Türkei : Eine Diskussion Mit Mustafa Öztürk,” 13.  
648 For example, does it befit God to put in His last will to humankind disposable information? 
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interpretation of the Qur’an distinctly unique, is his particular creative reading and 
deconstruction of the Islamic tradition.  
 
Öztürk’s deconstruction of tradition and his resistance to regard tradition as 
untouchable and sacrosanct, further imbue his work with a ‘hermeneutics of 
suspicion’ that is best illustrated by Öztürk’s earlier discussed evaluation of intra-
Muslim interpretative differences. All three writers of this dissertation, as it should 
be clear by now, address the status of personal faith in understanding. Cündioğlu 
sees faith in interpretation as a dead-end, while both Alpyağıl and Öztürk affirm its 
constructive value for understanding. While Cündioğlu sees the divergence of 
interpretation among the Muslim sects as an evidence for why faith has little to do 
with guiding understanding, Öztürk, on the other hand, argued for its necessity 
together with other subjective experiences such as conscientiousness. It seems that 
both authors are basing their arguments on another hidden premise, which in the 
case of Cündioğlu must be the conviction that all theological sects, despite their 
differences, have authentic faith involved in their interpretation; while, Öztürk, as 
we must inversely conclude, seems to believe that authentic faith was not involved. 
For, as Öztürk implies, difference in understanding would not have come to be, as 
far as the disingenuous interpretations go, if they stemmed from genuine faith and 
submission to God. 
 
This hermeneutics of suspicion creates both a fundamental interpretative humility 
and openness within Öztürk’s thinking. Truth, as we saw earlier, can only be aspired 
to, and never be claimed by one interpretative party alone. This openness is not 
merely advocated on a theoretical level by Öztürk, but it is also practiced in his 
recently published tafsīr. Öztürk stated in this work that he will seek to mediate the 
secondary, present meaning of the Qur’an not exclusively in reference to the 
Islamic tradition. On the contrary, Öztürk will also venture out and garner insights 
from other traditions of faith and thinking. As Öztürk recounts: “In interpretations 
concerning words and concepts such as faith, the problem of evil, and Satan, the 
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views of Western thinkers have also been given a place. Accordingly, the utilization 
of humankind’s general accumulation [of wisdom] has been considered as 
beneficial, rather than harmful.”649  For, as Öztürk further argues, while humans 
might partake in different religions and civilizations, their fundamental interests 
(meraklar) and big questions (büyük sorular) remain a shared constant (benzer 
mahiyettedir)650.   
 
649 Öztürk, Ilahi Hitabın Tefsiri - 1, 1:65. 
650 Öztürk, 1:65. 
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Truth, Subjectivity, and Method: A Comparative Analysis of The 




In the very first chapter a case was made for a definition of hermeneutics that 
would be better suited to the study of contemporary Turkish discourse on 
hermeneutics. Accordingly, an appeal was made to define hermeneutics not with 
some of its other current descriptions such as the rules of interpretation or 
interpretation of texts. Rather, a definition was proposed that in retrospect can be 
rephrased as Di Cesare eloquently puts it: “Hermeneutics strives for nothing other 
than to understand understanding”651. To put it in the technical terms expounded in 
the first chapter, hermeneutics is a type of contemplation on the operations and 
conditions in which things become intelligible. Hermeneutics is in this sense not 
something that particularly belongs to a specific culture or history as it is often 
imagined. The question as to how understanding is affected or works, is inevitably 
as old as the cross-cultural human capacity to cognize. However, without also 
answering the question as to what the materiality of hermeneutics is, there is still 
no possible way to study hermeneutics. Yet again, a case was made in contrast to 
some popular conceptions to not equate the material aspects of hermeneutics with 
interpretation rules, method, or (theoretical) system. Rather, it was argued that the 
most elementary presence of hermeneutics could be discovered in, and thus, most 
productively studied at its lowest threshold from, a statement.     
 
Qur’an hermeneutics is by extension related to this general sense of hermeneutics 
but only derivatively and more restrictively. The term, as I have come to define it, is 
in one respect a proper noun, since it has its own share of independence and 
 
651 Donatella Di Cesare, Gadamer: A Philosophical Portrait, trans. Niall Keane (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2013), 37–38. 
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unique nature, but the term ‘Qur’an’ in Qur’an hermeneutics simultaneously 
functions as a typical qualifier that further characterizes the earlier mentioned 
understanding of hermeneutics.  As such, Qur’an hermeneutics pertains to 
statements that proceed from reflections on the conditions and operations as to 
how the particular meanings of the Qur’an become intelligible. Qur’an 
hermeneutics is on account of this general definition not by default, as some might 
claim, a mere translation of a traditional concept or literary tradition within the 
Islamic sciences (e.g. tafsīr).   
 
The difference between statements belonging to hermeneutics or Qur’an 
hermeneutics, can be further clarified with these examples. An author might inquire 
into how humans understand at all, and state that all understanding is linguistic. 
Accordingly, while the circumstance and variables wherein understanding might be 
practiced differ, such as in daily conversation or when reading an exciting text (the 
Qur’an included), one could argue that there is still no denying that in each of these 
instances understanding is mediated through and actualised within language. These 
sorts of hermeneutical statements advance our knowledge more broadly and 
generally in respect to the problem of understanding. Thus, we can define these 
kinds of statements as general hermeneutics. However, when an author discusses 
what is theoretically involved in specifically understanding the Qur’an, they are 
usually only advancing our knowledge of understanding the Qur’an, and not so 
much the understanding of other media. These statements, on the other hand, 
should be regarded as a type of regional hermeneutics652. For example, any theory 
that deals with the question of how to understand the enigmatic letters that 
precede certain chapters of the Qur’an, namely ‘the disjointed letters’ (al-ḥurūf al-
muqaṭṭaʿa), is inevitably only solving a problem of understanding that is mainly 
relevant in the case of the Qur’an, and cannot be directly transposed unto a theory 
related to the understanding of other media and objects.  
 
652 Because the scope of the hermeneutical problem is regional, that is restricted to a specific object 
such as the Qur’an. 
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The Turkish authors in the preceding chapters have been shown to practice both 
types of general and regional hermeneutics in their works. Accordingly, we 
discovered that they venture back and forth between the two types of statements, 
having their general accounts on understanding inform their more specific take on 
understanding the Qur’an. For example, Cündioğlu first inquiries into how meaning 
is at all conveyed and what the conditions are for conveying meaning. Cündioğlu 
claimed that in communication one cannot concurrently intend everything, without 
failing to intend anything at all. Thus, the conveyance of meaning assumes a prior 
delimited intention, and therefore, the need to acknowledge that there is always a 
particular intention belonging to an utterance. In other words, the meaning of 
utterances is governed by an objectively discernible intention.  
Since, the Qur’an also conveys meanings through utterances, it means that the 
Qur’an also contains objectively discernible meanings that are uncovered by 
retrieving the authorial intent. 
 
In the preceding chapters, various general and regional hermeneutical statements 
made by contemporary Turkish thinkers were analysed that pertained to the 
problem of subjectivity versus objectivity in interpreting the Qur’an. Each author’s 
statements were introduced, contextualized, and studied in their own right. 
However, a substantial cross-examination is still missing for us to have a better 
understanding of what the central themes and problems are in contemporary 
theories of Qur’an hermeneutics within the Turkish context. Accordingly, in this 
chapter I will undertake the task of comparatively analysing the statements made 
by Cündioğlu, Alpyağıl, and Öztürk concerning the status of subjectivity and 
objectivity within the context of interpreting the Qur’an.  
 
I will conduct this cross-examination in accordance with the following question: 
what are the similarities and differences between the various subjective and 
objective conditions that are requisite for accessing the truth of the Qur’an 
 230 
according to Alpyağıl, Öztürk, and Cündioğlu? The answer to this question will serve 
as the basis for the next chapter. Since, in the next chapter the implications of the 
aforementioned conditions pertaining to subjectivity and objectivity will come to 
their logical end, namely understanding what the status of new and different 
readings of the Qur’an are.  
 
The following example will further illustrate the teleological relationship between 
the discussions in this chapter and the next. In the previous chapters, we discovered 
that Cündioğlu argued that the truth, and hence, the meaning of the Qur’an, is 
God’s original solitary intention. Solitary, since Cündioğlu argued against the 
theoretical impossibilities of concurrent meanings being intended by God. The 
objective condition to access this truth, however, is by reconstructing God’s 
authorial intent within the historical-linguistic horizon of the Qur’an’s initial 
revelation. Accordingly, since there is only one meaning intended by God, this 
implies that new and different readings of the Qur’an are by default qualified in 
reference to how adequately they disclose this meaning vis-à-vis the already 
existent exegetical tradition. Moreover, any present and future exegete that comes 
with a new understanding of the Qur’an, has to disqualify past readings of the 
Qur’an and make a rational case for why their own reading corresponds instead 
with God’s intent.  In other words, new readings can only be meaningful if old 
readings are wrong: they cannot, since concurrency of meaning is excluded, be 
additional or deeper truths disclosed by God.  
 
Nevertheless, to further explore the main question of this chapter as well as 
demonstrate the philosophical stakes involved, I will beforehand rely on various 
insights gathered from Foucault’s historiographical discussion on subjectivity and 
truth. There are a few reasons for this choice. The most important of which, is to 
establish the context and technical terminology that will help us to better organize 
and navigate the desperate ideas discussed in previous chapters.  In other words, it 
is not to present a dedicated study of Foucault but a heuristic frame that provides 
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us a deeper philosophical context and reflection on what is at stake in the ideas of 
the Turkish thinkers. Moreover, it will also demonstrate the philosophical breath of 
the discussions of the Turkish thinkers as they are clearly intersecting with 
discussions held in contemporary philosophy.  
 
In the following sections I will first delineate some key-insights from Foucault 
followed by their pertinence to the discussion held by the Turkish thinkers. 
Afterwards, guided by these insights, I will comparatively examine the ideas by the 
Turkish thinkers in two major sections. The first section will focus on a comparative 
analysis of the ideas pertaining to the subjective conditions and limitations requisite 
to access the truth of the Qur’an, and the second section will focus on objective 
conditions and limitations requisite to access the truth of the Qur’an. 
 
Truth and spirituality 
 
In the latter part of his career, Foucault had given a course on The Hermeneutics of 
the Subject. The main goal of this lecture was to answer the following question: “In 
what historical form do the relations between the ‘subject’ and ‘truth’, elements 
that do not usually fall within the historian’s practice or analysis, take shape in the 
West?”653  Foucault would then approach this question by exploring the historical 
significance of the classical Greek notion of epimeleia heautou, which he translates 
in a variety of manners as care of oneself, attending to oneself, and being 
concerned about oneself. While current in Greek thought, according to Foucault the 
notion of epimeleia heautou had not received any importance in the historiography 
of philosophy654. This was mainly due to the fact that the history of philosophy, 
more broadly the history of Western thought, had argued that “the founding 
expression of the question of the relations between the subject and truth”, is in 
 
653 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 
n.d.), 2. 
654 Foucault, 2. 
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actuality the famous Delphic prescription gnōthi seauton (know yourself) 655. In 
other words, not care of oneself but knowledge of oneself gives us access to truth. 
Hence, what is ultimately at stake between these two precepts in Foucault’s 
forthcoming discussion, are two different paradigms wherewith we can establish 
the relationship between the subject and truth. The first, related to the notion of 
epimeleia heautou, and epitomized by the discipline of spirituality, emphasizes that 
truth is accessed by exercising certain actions on the self that change, purify, 
transform, and transfigure oneself656. The second, related to the gnōthi seauton, 
and epitomized by philosophy, argues that truth is accessed by the subject by virtue 
of knowledge (connaisance) alone657.  Both of these paradigms that decide how 
truth is guaranteed, will eventually also surface in the ideas of the Turkish thinkers. 
However, that aspect of their discussion will be elucidated in a later section.  
 
As irrelevant as it might be to present historiographies of philosophy, from the fifth 
century B.C. to the fifth century A.D., epimeleia heautou was an important precept 
of classical thinking. Its history, as Foucault recounts, extended from “Socrates 
stopping young people to tell them to take care of themselves up to Christian 
ascetism making the ascetic life begin the care of oneself.”658  It was a notion that 
did not only describe one of the fundamental philosophical attitudes of ancient 
Greek culture but also that of the proceeding Hellenistic and Roman cultures659.  
 
During this period of history, the question of “how to have access to the truth” and 
the practice of spirituality (of the necessary transformations in the very being of the 
subject which will allow access to the truth), were never separate660. Rather, the 
epimeleia heautou designated precisely “the set of conditions of spirituality, the set 
of transformations of the self, that are the necessary conditions for having access to 
 
655 Foucault, 3. 
656 Foucault, 11. 
657 Foucault, 15. 
658 Foucault, 10. 
659 Foucault, 8. 
660 Foucault, 16–17. 
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the truth.”661 For example, in classical Greek thinking, there are instances in which 
truth is accessed only by performing purification rites. As Foucault recounts, one 
cannot hear what the oracle had to say without first performing a sacrifice that 
purified the self662. Similarly, the Pythagoreans believed that contact with the divine 
world, and consequently the “world of truth”, could be procured through 
dreams663. However, the condition for this procurement was the purification of the 
soul by applying certain techniques such as listening to music, inhaling perfumes, 
and examining one’s conscious664.  
 
A more elaborate example of the close relationship between self-knowledge and 
self-care, and spirituality and truth for that matter, can be discovered within a 
dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades665. As Foucault retells this dialogue, 
Alcibiades enjoyed a privileged status of wealth, power, and attractiveness in 
Athens. However, Alcibiades was still unsatisfied and set his aims higher, namely 
the transformation of his statutory privilege and pre-eminence into political action, 
and hence, into the effective government of others666.  As expected of Socrates, 
Alcibiades’ ambition was questioned on a variety of fronts. After assessing that a 
city is well governed when harmony reigns amongst its citizens, Alcibiades was 
asked by Socrates what this harmony constitutes of667. Having no ready-made 
answer, Alcibiades crumbled and accepted that he had “lived for a long time in a 
state of shameful ignorance without being aware of it.”668 Socrates’ cross-
examination lead Alcibiades to conclude that “he does not know the object of good 
government, and that is why he must pay attention to himself.”669 He must first 
remedy not only his ignorance of the subject matter but also that he does not know 
 
661 Foucault, 17. 
662 Foucault, 47. 
663 Foucault, 48. 
664 Foucault, 48. 
665 The source of this dialogue is Plato’s Alcibiades.  
666 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 33. 
667 Foucault, 35. 
668 Foucault, 36. 
669 Foucault, 38. 
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that he is ignorant of the subject itself. He must thus take care of himself before 
governing others. Yet, and this is where the spiritual nature of Socrates’ advice 
becomes over evident, to take care of oneself, one must know oneself; to know 
oneself one looks not directly at oneself but at oneself in an element that is the 
most same as the self. In the case of Socrates, this element that resembles humans 
the most, is the divine element that is the source of thought and knowledge670.  
Consequently, by opening unto the knowledge of the divine, the soul will be 
endowed with sōphrosunē (wisdom) and taught to distinguish good from evil and 
truth from falsehood. Moreover, by having become wiser, “the soul will be able to 
conduct itself properly, and being able to conduct itself properly it will [finally] be 
able to govern the city.”671 
 
After Antiquity, however, the reverence and close relationship between the care of 
oneself and the knowledge of oneself becomes slowly disintegrated to the point 
that it becomes irrelevant as a condition to access truth. In the words of Foucault,  
“Now, leaping over several centuries, we can say that we enter the modern age (I 
mean, the history of truth enters its modern period) when it is assumed that what 
gives access to the truth, the condition for the subject's access to the truth, is 
knowledge (connaissance) and knowledge alone.”672 The question as to what 
conditions one must impose on their being as a subject so as to have access to the 
truth, becomes inconsequential. As a result, anyone who satisfies a set of formal, 
methodological conditions is able to reach truth without undergoing any 
fundamental transformation673. 
 
670 We can interpret this also as God given Socrates’ statement: “It is God, then, that we must look 
at: for whoever wishes to judge the quality of the soul, he is the best mirror of human things 
themselves, we can best see and know ourselves in him.” However, Foucault does not want to 
overemphasize this explicit relationship to God, since there is still ambiguity surrounding whether 
Socrates had truly said this or whether this statement was later interjected by the Platonist-Christian 
tradition. Foucault, 70. 
671 Foucault, 71. 
672 Foucault, 17. 
673 Kerem Eksen, “Truth in Practice: Foucault’s Procedural Approach to Spirituality,” in The 
Philosophy of Spirituality: Analytic, Continental and Multicultural Approaches to a New Field of 
Philosophy, ed. Heather Salazar and Roderick Nicholls (Leiden: Brill Rodopi, 2019), 280. 
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An important cause for Foucault that spurred this historical change was the 
“Cartesian moment”. By disqualifying the care of the self and requalifying the 
knowledge of oneself, René Descartes (d. 1650) dissociated a philosophy of 
knowledge from a spirituality of the transformation of the subject's very being674. 
To recall this moment,  Descartes, as documented by the Meditations, ventured on 
a critical reconsideration of his previously held opinions: “And thus I realized that 
once in my life I had to raze everything to the ground and begin again from the 
original foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the 
sciences.”675 By employing methodical doubt, Descartes started to tear down 
everything he previously held to be true. However, in this process, Descartes 
discovered one fact he could not unmake: the self-evident fact that he - as a subject 
- was indeed cognizant, and hence, existing (cogito ergo sum). Having found this 
Archimedean point, Descartes proceeded rebuilding his knowledge of God, 
mathematics, and the physical world676. However, as Foucault argued, the outcome 
of the Cartesian moment also heralded a new twist on the previously discussed 
precept of knowing thyself by disconnecting its knowledge from its classical 
requirement of taking care of oneself. For, what secured indubitable knowledge 
was no longer regarded to be the spiritual transformation of the subject but the 
self-evident nature of existing and being cognizant.   
 
The divorce of epistemology from spirituality, does not necessarily mean that there 
are no longer conditions for accessing truth. On the contrary, a new set of 
conditions come to exist that “only concern the individual in his concrete existence, 
and not the structure of the subject as such.”677  Nonspiritual epistemologies can 
indeed stipulate internal and external conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to 
 
674 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, xxiv. 
675 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress, 
4th ed. (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 59. 
676 Brad Elliott Stone, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in Michel Foucault: Key Concepts, ed. Diana Taylor 
(Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2011), 145. 
677 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 18. 
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access truth678. For example, nonspiritual epistemologies can stipulate that an 
internal condition of procuring truth is by obliging with a formal rule of method. 
Moreover, in regard to an external condition, they can stipulate certain cultural 
conditions such as having an education or the need to operate within a certain 
scientific consensus679. Nevertheless, in each of these instances the conditions 
stipulated are either intrinsic or extrinsic to the act of knowledge. In other words, in 
contrast to requirements such as purification rites or religious conversion, neither 
of these conditions concern the subject “in his being”680. 
 
Epistemologies that concern only the individual in his concrete existence and not 
the structure of the subject as such, have two markedly different significances. 
Spiritual epistemologies have a “rebound effect” according to Foucault. Truth 
procured through such epistemologies will “complete in the subject” and serve as a 
crowning for the work or sacrifice paid in order to receive this truth681.  Nonspiritual 
epistemologies, however, only result in the indefinite development of 
knowledge682. They do not rebound on the subject by transforming, that is by 
enlightening or fulfilling, the subject.  On the contrary, nonspiritual epistemologies 
ensure that “knowledge will simply open out onto the indefinite dimension of 
progress, the end of which is unknown and the advantage of which will only ever be 
realized in the course of history by the institutional accumulation of bodies of 
knowledge”683.  
 
After having researched the Turkish thinkers in the previous chapters, I have come 
to the conclusion that the Foucauldian question of what conditions I must impose 
on my being as a subject so as to have access to the truth, has also been an 
important concern in the works of the Turkish thinkers. The Turkish thinkers have 
 
678 Foucault, 18. 
679 Foucault, 18. 
680 Foucault, 18. 
681 Foucault, 18–19. 
682 Foucault, 18. 
683 Foucault, 19. 
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addressed and answered this question by delineating conditions that “only concern 
the individual in his concrete existence” and those that concern “the structure of 
the subject as such”. In other words, as I will soon discuss further, their reverence 
for method has lead them to stipulate conditions that only pertain to the act of 
knowledge itself, while they have simultaneously also debated, and some of them 
have even stipulated conditions that require an alteration on behalf of the subject 
in order to understand the Qur’an. In respect to the latter, there is on the one end 
Cündioğlu’s emphasis on the self-sufficiency of objective knowledge in order to 
ascertain the meanings of the Qur’an, while on the other end, there is Öztürk and 
Alpyağıl’s additional emphasis on the subject’s transformation through self-
knowledge as a condition for the reception or pursuit of the meanings of the 
Qur’an. As such, Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics can be seen to exhibit the interplay 
of both the Cartesian divorce of spirituality from a philosophy of knowledge as well 
as the Socratic harmony and interplay of both. 
 
With these findings I have in addition discovered both an unanimity and divergence 
amongst the authors concerning the subjective and objective conditions requisite to 
reach the meanings of the Qur’an. In respect to the objective conditions of a Qur’an 
hermeneutics, Alpyağıl, Öztürk and Cündioğlu require that interpreters revere the 
diachrony of the Arabic language. Their views on objective conditions requisite for 
reaching the meanings of the Qur’an are unanimously grounded in the objective 
structures of language itself, such as the formal rules of language and its 
embeddedness in a historical horizon of meanings. However, in respect to 
subjective conditions, there is less unanimity among the authors, resulting in both 
subtle and major divergences. For example, Cündioğlu did not at all consider faith 
(itikad) to be a requirement to better understand the Qur’an while Alpyağıl did 
argue for its necessity. Nevertheless, what the exact similarities and differences are, 




Subjectivity and truth 
 
The least spiritual hermeneutics, and the one that resembles the Cartesian 
paradigm the most, can be found in the works of Cündioğlu. For Cündioğlu 
knowledge alone, as epitomized by proper method, is enough to warrant access to 
truth (the meanings of the Qur’an as intended by God). Accordingly, spiritual 
transformation as exemplified by the requirement of personal conviction is 
irrelevant for Cündioğlu. The ultimate arbiter in matters of interpretation is 
adherence to formal rules of method and the consolidation of solid hermeneutical 
presuppositions (tasavvurat). Not whether someone has, for example, converted to 
Islam or not.  
 
Cündioğlu supports this hermeneutical principle with the reality of divergent 
interpretations in the history of tafsīr. For, as Cündioğlu argues, while we can 
discover the divergence of interpretations motivated by factional presuppositions in 
the tradition of tafsīr, we simultaneously witness the fact that different 
interpretations are maintained by members of the same school. One pertinent 
example concerning the latter, involves the problem of magic, that is whether there 
is any substantiality (gerçeklik) to magic. According to Cündioğlu, general Sunni 
thought exhibits a more accepting relationship towards the reality of magic and its 
subsequent presence in the Qur’an. However, the Muʿtazilīs outright reject the 
substantiality of magic. What is of note, in this regard, is the fact that Abū Ḥanīfa – 
the eponymous founder of one of the great schools of Sunni thinking – sides with 
the Muʿtazilīs on the matter, rather than with the dominantly held position by his 
own school and the other major Sunni schools of theology. This fact demonstrates 
to Cündioğlu that there are other elements that govern understanding above and 
beyond the mere fact of having accepted the faith of Islam (mucerred iman 
kabullenişi)684. For example, the theoretical suppositions held by the interpreter. As 
 
684 Cündioğlu, Anlamin buharlaşması ve Kur’an : Hermeneutik bir deneyim II, 19. 
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such, as Cündioğlu concludes, the ultimate fate of interpretations is decided by 
methodology (metodoloji), not one’s creed (itikad)685. 
 
This hermeneutical principle shares great thematic similarities with the fore-
structures of understanding discussed in the works of Heidegger and Gadamer. This 
concept, which was explored in the second chapter in reference to Heidegger, 
argues that our understanding of something is preceded by an interplay of an 
advanced grasp of potential meanings (fore-having), our expectation of the 
appropriate way in which these meanings can appear (fore-sight), and the related 
conceptions that we have at our predisposal (fore-concept). For example, “I can see 
something as an implement, but not as a violin if I lack the concept of a violin.”686 
Similar to Heidegger and Gadamer, Cündioğlu also makes the point that the 
preconceptions wherewith one enters the hermeneutical circle, will inevitably 
define the meaning one derives from something. Moreover, Cündioğlu’s works 
embody a similar Heideggerian point that “that our first, last, and constant task is 
never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to 
us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme 
secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.”687  
Yet, despite the similarities, in contrast to Heidegger and Gadamer who develop 
their arguments ontologically from the mode of human being (Dasein), Cündioğlu 
explores the theme of the preconceptions of understanding through the familiar 
vocabulary of Arabic logic and dialectics.    
 
In classical Arabic logic, rational judgements (taṣdīqāt) are preceded by conceptions 
(taṣawwurāt). Whether one can assert the fact that a human is a rational animal, is 
inevitably dependent on what is understood by “human”, “rational”, or “animal”. 
Accordingly, there is an intimate relationship between conceptions and judgements 
by virtue of the fact that conceptions direct judgments. However, judgments can 
 
685 Cündioğlu, 19. 
686 Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, 107. 
687 Heidegger, Being and Time, 2001, 195. 
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inversely be tested on account of whether the conceptions they are based on are 
sound. As Cündioğlu puts it, “When our conceptions are inaccurate, our 
propositions that exhibit judgments will inevitably also be inaccurate.”688  Since 
Interpretations also express judgment concerning a state of affairs, namely the 
meaning purported by Qur’an, they are likewise preceded by their own share of 
theoretical pre-conceptions, which can also be tested in accordance with the 
soundness of the presuppositions underlying their claims.   
 
The dichotomy between taṣawwurāt-taṣdīqāt expresses in this sense the 
dichotomy between hermeneutics and exegesis. According to this dichotomy our 
judgments are preceded, grounded, and directed by our conceptions. Likewise, our 
exegesis of the Qur’an is comprised of our judgments concerning the meanings of 
the Qur’an, whereas hermeneutics is comprised of our preconceptions that precede 
and direct such assertions. For Cündioğlu, there was a practical reason for this 
deliberate bifurcation, namely, to gain a more pragmatic footing for dealing with 
rampant misunderstandings of the Qur’an. Rather than criticizing each individual 
interpretation, Cündioğlu wanted to address the issue of existing interpretations on 
a thematic level, that is in respect to their weak subjectivist, theoretical 
foundations. Accordingly, Cündioğlu deliberately directed his critique from the 
exegetical sphere to the hermeneutical sphere by primarily focusing on 
foundational questions preceding any interpretation, rather than the particularities 
of different interpretations689.  
 
Only properly scrutinized conceptions can become the basis for solid, accepted 
postulates (musalammāt) supporting interpretations. In other words, when our 
interpretations are based on conceptions that have weathered the critical test and 
have been publicly accepted, can they truly become sustainable and convincing. 
Interpretations that are based on unquestioned and private falsities, will according 
 
688 Cündioğlu, Anlamin buharlaşması ve Kur’an : Hermeneutik bir deneyim II, 13. 
689 Cündioğlu, xi. 
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to Cündioğlu come under scrutiny by future critics, resulting in the house of 
exegetical cards to collapse.  Moreover, interpretations that have no clear and 
distinct principles that are logically proven, will be impotent (ilzam edici olmaz) and 
unconvincing. Cündioğlu argues that subjectivist interpretations without solid 
theoretical grounds become by their very nature withdrawn and timid, losing their 
critical lustre, since one cannot have the confidence that their claims signify the 
ultimate truth of things. Nevertheless, Islam as Cündioğlu countered, entered the 
public sphere by challenging and criticizing the general praxis and convictions held 
by the 7th century inhabitants of the Arabic Peninsula. Moreover, not only did the 
Qur’an appeal to its audience with its own critique, but it also recorded and 
debated the counterpoints made by its detractors within its own text. Accordingly, 
an approach for Cündioğlu that is truer to the Qur’an would be to make solid, 
intersubjective claims that can fend for themselves in a critical, public debate. 
 
Cündioğlu’s prioritizing of method (metodoloji) over faith (itikad) results in a 
hermeneutical framework that provides access merely on the grounds of 
knowledge alone. Anyone that holds the right theoretical suppositions, will thus be 
able to access the truth of the Qur’an. The type of person690 who holds these 
theoretical suppositions is irrelevant. This is complemented by the fact that there 
are no notable references in Cündioğlu’s work towards classical spiritual practices 
or concepts in Islam that would suggest there are indeed also spiritual requisites for 
understanding the Qur’an. There is no explicit mention of purification rituals, love, 
piety (taqwā), or the effects of sin on the experience of truth to be found in 
Cündioğlu’s works. To give an example of the latter, a recurrent Islamic symbol is 
the “hardening of hearts” by excessive sinning. However, as the Qur’an states, the 
ones whose hearts have hardened do not have the same experience to truth as 
those whose hearts are soft: “Is one whose heart Allah has opened to Islam, so that 
he has received Enlightenment from Allah, (no better than one hard-hearted)? Woe 
 
690 For example, pure or impure, or believer or unbeliever.  
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to those whose hearts are hardened against celebrating the praises of Allah! they 
are manifestly wandering (in error)!”691  
 
Alpyağıl, in contrast to Cündioğlu, does require the subject’s transformation and 
self-knowledge as means to access the Qur’an.  While Alpyağıl does not deny the 
productive role of method, he does deny the fact that method is more fundamental 
for the process of understanding than, for example, lived faith.  On the contrary, 
Alpyağıl is very explicit concerning the latter by arguing that Muslims have a distinct 
privilege in regard to understanding the Qur’an. A privilege that Muslims receive by 
virtue of their special relationship as subjects who properly recognize and practice 
the Qur’an’s message.  
 
To establish an epistemology that prioritizes spirituality over method, Alpyağıl 
explored a variety of hermeneutical questions from two different paradigms. In his 
first work, Alpyağıl reflected on the problem of method through such questions as 
how understanding is affected by the object without any deliberate action on the 
part of the subject, whether the ontological status of both the subject and the 
object characterize the process of understanding, and finally to what extend 
practice by the subject defines understanding. These questions were predominantly 
answered from a Heideggerian perspective on the matter. Whereas in his second 
work, Alpyağıl questioned how the same phenomena was experienced differently 
by various parties, and whether interpretation had any role in the divergency of 
experience. These questions, on the other hand, were predominantly answered 
from a Wittgensteinian perspective on the matter. Nevertheless, despite the 
different questions and paradigms, one theme remained constant in Alpyağıl’s 
thinking, and that was to reflect on the aesthetical and ontological elements of 
understanding. This, in contrast to the focus of pursuing which interpretative 
instruments facilitate understanding or justify the objective status of 
interpretations, which was central to Cündioğlu’s work.     
 
691 Qur’an 39:22 
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Motivated by Heidegger’s theory of ontology, Alpyağıl was able to come to the 
conclusion that understanding needs praxis in order to bring about the right context 
for a certain meaning to appear. Heidegger had argued that a hammer disclosed its 
meaning only through its relevance for the carpenter as expressed by the act of 
hammering. Accordingly, when we abstract away the hammer from the practice of 
hammering, the hammer is no longer able to disclose to us its significance as a 
hammer. In such an instance, it might merely be a piece of wood with a piece of 
steel attached at its tail end. Likewise, one may only come to know the real 
significance of the Qur’anic injunctions of fasting, charity, and so forth, by actually 
engaging in fasting and charity as a believer. Hence, as Alpyağıl argues, a subject 
uninvolved in these tenets of Islam will not fully understand these practices as they 
are conveyed by the Qur’an.   
 
It is clear for Alpyağıl that not all engagements with meaningful objects are realised 
through an incessant and deliberate procedure wherewith the meaning of things 
can be contrived. On the contrary, there are certain experiences, as in the case of 
art, and to a certain degree also the Qur’an, where the subject becomes a passive 
receptor of meaning directed by the object itself. In other words, some meanings 
are received beyond the control of the subject. Nevertheless, what ultimately 
defines for Alpyağıl the degree in which this meaning is received, is still related to 
how well the subject adheres to a set of personal requirements.  
 
These subjective requirements were enumerated by Alpyağıl as follows: adherence 
to a proper politics of recognition (tanıma siyaseti), have awareness of personal 
finitude (fanilik bilinci), harbour good will (iyi istenç), and exercise common sense 
(sağ duyu). Out of these requirements, two are the most reminiscent of previously 
held discussions on spirituality and truth, namely the knowledge of personal 
finitude and adherence to a proper politics of recognition. Alpyağıl stated the 
following in this regard, “The knowledge of finitude, is the awareness of 
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humankinds’s limitations, that there cannot be an absolute subject (mutlak özne), 
and that they [i.e. humans] cannot encompass (kuşatmayacağını) all knowledge.”692  
Accordingly, by acknowledging finitude, the subject has no other option in Alpyağıl’s 
framework but to relinquish the belief in self-sufficiency and become open to 
receive truth from the outside (e.g. other people, art, but also the Qur’an). Truth is 
thus only received through attending to oneself and learning to become aware of 
the self’s finitude. Likewise, continuing the theme of spiritual requisites for 
attaining truth, Alpyağıl has argued that the truth of things only becomes disclosed 
when they are approached with the right politics of recognition. Alpyağıl uses the 
example of a state that has declared independence. Such a state can only signify the 
meaning of its independent statehood if it is actually recognized as a state by other 
nation states. Likewise, in the case of the Qur’an, the Qur’an can transfer its truth 
as God’s revelation only if it is recognized beforehand as God’s final revelation. 
However, as Alpyağıl argued, this recognition is only possible when the subject has 
prepared himself by way of faith.  
 
Only those who possess faith are able to experience the truth of things in an 
exclusive manner. This theme, already established by Alpyağıl’s earlier discussed 
ideas, was further continued and explored in his second work in reference to 
Wittgenstein’s concept of seeing-as. With the concept of seeing-as, a variety of 
phenomenological and hermeneutical facts were communicated by Alpyağıl. Firstly, 
that the same object could be perceived in different ways by the same subject on 
account of an alteration on behalf of the subject.  For example, one could observe 
an initially unfamiliar face, and subsequently realise that it is actually a person they 
recognise from the past. In such a case, the face observed is the same face, yet 
comprehended in two different ways by virtue of an aspect that dawned upon the 
subject. Accordingly, even a previously staunch nihilist, who saw the world devoid 
of higher meaning, could – after a religious experience – come to see the hand of 
God in all of creation. Secondly, there is an immediacy to perception that precedes 
 
692 Alpyağıl, Kimin tarihi, hangi hermenötik? : Kur’an’i anlama yolunda felsefi denemeler 1, 71. 
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deliberation. A rabbit might hop by, resulting in the bystander exclaiming “rabbit!” 
without any planned deliberation preceding such a proclamation. Likewise, a 
believer would be able exclaim “God!” or “miracle!” when reading scripture, 
without having to resort to interpretation.   
 
Understanding, in terms of seeing-as, is hence distinct and more immediate than 
interpretation in Alpyağıl’s thinking. A distinction that is further characterised by 
another set of characteristic differences between understanding and interpretation. 
Firstly, by the fact that understanding is an experience, whereas an interpretation is 
something one does. Secondly, interpretations can be invalidated but someone’s 
experience of something simply cannot. Finally, interpretations are deemed to be 
coercive by Alpyağıl on account of their nature to argue the reality behind 
appearances. The experience of seeing-as, on the other hand, is not dependent on 
evidence or inference. Rather, one sees something as something automatically 
(kendiliğinden) without any required effort.  
 
Since experience precedes deliberation in terms of priority, it is no surprise that in 
Alpyağıl’s framework, logical arguments have no fundamental and imperative sway 
over the subject, as they did in Cündioğlu’s framework. Religious proofs (kanıtlar) 
have only a significance for subjects that have been conditioned through their 
culture to affirm the reality projected by the proof in question. Someone who lacks 
the needed experiences, will not be able to see the truth of the matter as argued. 
Alpyağıl cites in this regard a very relevant verse from the Qur’an that explains that 
if Muhammad had received a divine book which his detractors could touch, they 
would immediately claim that "This is nothing but obvious magic!"693 In other 
words, rather than seeing such an event as a divine miracle, the Meccan polytheists 
would provide an alternate response, which is the fact that they are being hexed.  
 
 
693 Qur’an 6:7 
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Similar to Alpyağıl, Öztürk also qualifies the quest for truth with conditions that 
pertain to the structure of the subject. In his earlier work, Öztürk establishes this 
qualification in reference to the concept of the muvafakât-ı Ömer, namely the 
historical fact that Umar, a companion of Muhammad, was able to offer an opinion 
on a matter that was subsequently vindicated through revelation. For Öztürk, such a 
historical occurrence is proof of the fact that humans are able to project their will in 
ways that are congruent with the Divine Will of God.  Accordingly, there are two 
implications that can be drawn from Umar’s interpretative conduct. First, it is quite 
possible to address new issues in accordance with God’s will in the absence of 
relevant verses. Second, true understanding is in Öztürk’s framework always to 
understand the purpose (maksat) beyond the expression (lafız). Thus, even if there 
are verses that have an apparent and direct solution to a matter, it is still possible to 
argue over and against the literal position of the text by referencing the 
fundamental purpose behind the letter of the law, rather than the letter itself. 
However, before one is able to advance into such this kind of interpretative 
practice, Öztürk requires that he or she must be rational, scrupulous (vicdan sahibi), 
genuinely faithful, and in full submission (teslimiyet) to God.   
 
While Öztürk stipulated the spiritual requirements an interpreter must fulfil, he did 
not provide any philosophical arguments to support or clarify them. Thus, we are 
only told that a believer must be scrupulous and faithful but not explicitly why. 
Alpyağıl’s arguments are for that matter better developed than those of Öztürk’s. 
Nevertheless, it can be logically surmised through the notion of correspondence 
that an interpreter without scruples who is motivated by injustice could not 
possibly project a vision on the world that corresponds with the vision of a just God. 
Hence, only a subject that is thoroughly just at the very core of their being can 
ultimately interpret the world in ways that correspond with the will of a just God.  
 
The problem of subjective requirements was further revisited in a later work of 
Öztürk in explicit relation to the status of method. For Öztürk, the history of 
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sectarian strife in Islam cannot be explained by mere difference in method but has 
to be related to a deeper-rooted problem of amorality in the field of interpretation. 
In other words, for Öztürk interpretative differences, and thus, obstructions to the 
truth of the Qur’an, have more to do with the interpreter’s capacity to show 
consideration (iz’an), fairness (insaf), and character (ahlak) to the interpreting 
other, and less to do with method. Öztürk had become very much aware in his 
career that both classical and modern understandings of the Qur’an are more often 
than not driven by ideological motivations, rather than by a sincere drive for the 
truth of the Qur’an. In respect to the greater tradition of kalam, Öztürk observes 
that authors go through various length in order to read their sectarian 
presuppositions into the Qur’an. Such a reading could be thoroughly methodical. 
However, this does not mean that the reading is sincere. Similarly, modern 
interpreters in Turkey, often resort to simple ideological rhetoric in order to argue 
for a transhistorical reading of the Qur’an. However, by psychologising such 
interpretations, Öztürk demonstrated that these kinds of interpretations are often 
insincere and incoherent. As such, it is no surprise that Öztürk’s ultimate conclusion 
on the status of subjectivity in interpretation, prioritizes personal requirements 
before method, and argues that an interpreter should always read the Qur’an in a 
way that allows for the interpreter to look him or herself in the eye.    
 
The most important question in Öztürk’s thinking is thus not what the arguments 
are that underly interpretations but how sincere an interpreter arrived at such an 
interpretation. Method does not have a role, as one might otherwise expect, to 
guarantee indubitable and scientifically secure interpretations of the Qur’an but 
that interpretations are authentic and not distorted. Öztürk argues that the Qur’an 
should not be the platform for interpreters to project their fanatical or whimsical 
interpretations.  Rather, in order to safeguard the lines between distortion of the 
text (taḥrīf) and genuine interpretation of the text (taʾwīl), it is necessary that 
interpretations are based on principles that can be inspected and tested. However, 
since scientific principles are not a guarantee of absolute knowledge in Öztürk’s 
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framework either, this means that one can at best claim that their interpretations 
are genuine, and not so much that they are incontestable truths. In Öztürk’s 
thinking truth can only be aspired; it is not something that one can claim to have 
reached with absolute certainty and exclusive ownership.  Every interpretation 
embodies a degree of speculation, and therefore, potential cavities that can be 
questioned and revised.  
 
Objectivity and language  
 
In the previous section I focused on the comparison of various subjective 
requirements that a subject must or must not impose on themselves in order to 
reach the truth of the Qur’an. Accordingly, I demonstrated a strong divergence 
between Cündioğlu’s views and those held by Alpyağıl and Öztürk. While the prior 
stipulates no subjective requirements, the latter two authors did. However, the 
latter’s awareness of subjective requirements, does not preclude them to 
additionally also stipulate objective requirements. As we saw earlier, these two 
authors, respectively Öztürk and Alpyağıl, never intended to juxtapose subjective 
requirements and objective requirements in order to abandon the latter in favour 
of the prior, but to argue that subjective requirements are also necessary and, in 
some cases, more fundamental than objective requirements.  Accordingly, while 
subjectivity is embraced by two of the Turkish authors, this acceptance never 
reaches a point that meaning becomes completely relative to what the subject 
understands as the case might be in some esoteric and sophist traditions. A human 
is not by any degree the ultimate measure of all things for the Turkish thinkers, as 
Protagoras once claimed. On the contrary, as all three authors unanimously agree, 
the interpreter must also know and revere the objective structures of language 
itself, such as its rule-based nature and its embeddedness in history (diachrony).  
 
In contrast to the previous section, this part of the discussion on hermeneutical 
conditions will focus on the conditions that do not pertain to the structure of the 
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subject. On the contrary, the focus will be on conditions that are realized by 
fulfilling the internal and external requirements of knowledge. For example, all 
three authors require that the interpreter must know the Arabic language as 
practiced during the times of revelation. However, this condition requires no 
alteration on behalf of the subject itself. To put it in terms that were made familiar 
in the previous section, an interpreter must not first convert or become morally 
conscientious before they can fulfil the condition of knowing the Arabic language. 
 
While not always as direct and explicitly argued, I can confidently argue that one of 
the primary motivations behind the constructive relationship towards the need for 
objective requirements in understanding, stems from the classical Islamic notion 
that the Qur’an is God’s spoken word. This fact was demonstrated through a variety 
of returning concepts in the works of the Turkish thinkers, such as the Qur’an being 
God’s kelam (speech) which exhibited the murad-i ilahi (the divine intent). 
Accordingly, all three authors advocated that the Qur’an “speak for itself”, namely 
as it is intended by God and independent from what the subject wishes for the text 
to say. For example, Cündioğlu observed that contemporary interpreters were 
reading into the Qur’an, rather than from the Qur’an. One of the priorities of his 
first work was to invert this relationship through the emphasis on objectively 
interpreting the Qur’an, thereby allowing the Qur’an to speak for itself, rather than 
made to speak (konuşturmak) in ways that serve the interpreter. The Qur’an had to 
become müfessir (self-explaining) again, rather than müfesser (explained from the 
outside). Alpyağıl, on the other hand, argued that interpretation should be 
grounded in a process that allows for the text to ‘open itself up’ (metnin açılımına) 
to the reader. Interpreters should always serve the text. Hence, the interpreter, as 
crassly as Alpyağıl put it, should never force him or herself unto the text, thereby 
bringing about the ‘rape of the text’. Finally, for Öztürk there is no doubt that in the 
classical and modern interpretative tradition, the Qur’an was made to speak on 
behalf of the interests of the interpreter. Hence, Öztürk plead for sincerity in 
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interpretation in order to objectively read from the Qur’an and not subjectively into 
it.  
 
Besides the character of the Qur’an, the need for objectivity also stems from the 
history of Qur’an studies in Turkey. To recall an observation made in the 
introduction, recent Turkish theories on Qur’an hermeneutics came to exist as a 
critique on arbitrary and disingenuous interpretations of the Qur’an. Hence, it is no 
surprise that the case for objective requirements in interpretation are motivated by 
Alpyağıl, Cündioğlu, and Öztürk’s own perception of what they think are arbitrary or 
distorted interpretations of the Qur’an. Each author, as we saw in previous 
chapters, localizes in their own way what the source of such interpretations is. For 
Cündioğlu one of the current sources of arbitrary and distorted interpretations of 
the Qur’an are the contemporary politically correct readings of the Qur’an. 
Traditionally speaking, men were allowed, based on a reading of verse 4:34, to swat 
their disobedient wives outside the facial area with a small wooden toothbrush. 
However, contemporary readings of the Qur’an, in order to be politically correct, 
distort the Qur’an’s historical meaning by advocating a reading of the verse that 
advises a husband to expulse from himself his disobedient wife. Likewise, Alpyağıl 
disqualifies readings of the Qur’an that wish to read the Qur’an in scientist and 
historicist terms in order to become more relatable. This results in subjective 
readings of the Qur’an that are loaded with anachronistic, scientific jargon. Finally, 
comparable to both Alpyağıl and Cündioğlu, Öztürk also detects excesses in 
interpretations in the contemporary ideological and scientist readings of the 
Qur’an. Especially in those readings that ideologically advocate universalist and 
transhistorical readings of the Qur’an. However, unlike his peers, Öztürk ventures 
one step further by also extending his critique to classical readings of the Qur’an. 
 
Despite the different perspectives on which kinds of interpretations must be 
corrected by a proper hermeneutics, there is still a common motif to the thinking of 
the three Turkish thinkers. Each author cements their commitment towards 
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objectivity with a particular philosophy of language. For each author objectivity in 
understanding is called for and guaranteed by language. All three authors share the 
premise that God’s revelation is expressed through language. Language, is however 
communal, has a historicity to its essence, and functions only when it is 
intersubjective. Since the medium of revelation is also language, it too must have an 
historical and intersubjective aspect to its character whose knowledge must 
become an objective requirement for interpreting the Qur’an.   
 
In respect to Cündioğlu, we can go as far as to say that his entire hermeneutic 
enterprise hinges on the fact that an interpreter can understand the Qur’an 
objectively. Unlike the other authors, who maintain a more multivalent relationship 
to the idea of objectivity in interpretation, Cündioğlu’s hermeneutics only concerns 
itself with establishing the rationale and method behind objectively interpreting the 
Qur’an. Accordingly, Cündioğlu’s work is burdened with proving that objective 
understanding is not only possible but also a requirement.    
 
Cündioğlu attempted to establish the rationale behind his objectivist position in his 
first work through the dialectics of meaning-conveyance and understanding. 
Cündioğlu made it very clear from the beginning of this work that the Qur’an is a 
linguistic phenomenon (dilsel olgu) or linguistic text (nass-ı lugavî). Linguistic 
utterances are not monological in essence: there is always a sender, message, and 
receiver involved in Cündioğlu’s framework. However, the authority on how the 
message is understood, lies in Cündioğlu’s framework not with the receiver but with 
the person that pronounced the message.  
 
The first implication of this shift in authority, is that a message is unilaterally 
defined by the intention of the sender. However, the intention that construes the 
significance of an utterance, must be definite. As Aristotle argued, intending to 
signify everything, ultimately means that nothing is signified. Hence, in Cündioğlu’s 
framework, radical meaning concurrency is highly impossible: the Qur’an cannot 
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intend everything simultaneously. On the other hand, a more modest meaning 
concurrency could technically be possible. Classical authorities such as al-Shāfiʿī 
have even argued that the Qur’an has intended a handful of meanings in some 
verses in a concurrent fashion. However, as Cündioğlu argued, the majority of 
Ḥanafī scholars and even non-Ḥanafī scholars such as al-Ghazālī and al-Shāṭibī have 
expressed their dissent, and argued that meaning concurrency is either not present 
or highly unconventional in the Arabic language. Hence, in contrast to what certain 
relativists would like to propose, the premise of meaning concurrency cannot serve 
as a generic premise of any Qur’an hermeneutics. Not every possible interpretation 
is the same in terms of value, since not all interpretations exemplify what was 
originally intended. There are inescapably wrong and right, and thus, less and more 
valuable interpretations in Cündioğlu’s framework.  
 
While the author of an utterance defines its meaning, there is inevitably a problem 
when the utterance is codified and read in absence of the presence of the original 
author. In a typical dialogical situation, one could easily discern in an objective 
manner what the intent of someone is in respect to a certain statement, simply by 
asking the interlocutor what he or she intended by a statement.  However, in the 
case of a text, such as the Qur’an, there is no such dialogical situation to speak of. 
Accordingly, as a solution, Cündioğlu presents the concept of natural connections 
(söz’ün tabii bağlamı). An utterance is a complex that always carries the following 
material relationships with itself: the what (content), the whom (addressee), the 
why (reason), the when and where (spatial-temporal circumstance), and finally the 
how (mode) of the expression. Accordingly, since the interlocutor is absent, the 
interpreter must ascertain his or her understanding in reference to the adequacy in 
which these aspects are reconstructed. 
 
In Cündioğlu’s second work, however, the relationship between language and the 
problem of objectivity was explored again through the dichotomy between the 
system of language vis-à-vis the performance of language. The Qur’an, as previously 
 253 
stated, is a text expressed in language. Language, however, has two fundamentally 
intersubjective aspects: the systematic rules and conventions that determine 
possible significations, and the ensuing results from the performance of the prior 
mentioned systematic rules and conventions. Accordingly, meaning is not 
determined by the subject, especially not through his or her arbitrary fancy, but 
rather only through a reproduction of the system and intention responsible for the 
actualization of the medium that is being interpreted. The exegetical enterprise is 
for this reason always reconstructive and objective.  
 
The first range of concepts that Cündioğlu used to highlight and explore the 
intersubjective dimensions of language, pertained to the lisan-kelam dichotomy. 
While lisan represented the general system of a language, kelam represented lisan 
in application. For example, the lisan aspect of English would be to argue that the 
nominative case cannot be substituted for the accusative case: you have seen me, 
and not seen I. On the other hand, the kelam aspect of English would be 
represented by many different media, such as sonnets, plays, texts, and so forth, 
since all of these media have been actualised through the practice of lisan. Lisan is 
language in the sense of the system, and thus, anonymous. Whereas kelam is 
always authored, and therefore, always originated by a subject. Accordingly, lisan is 
passive, static without subject, while kelam is active, dynamic, and always realised 
by a subject. Now then, to relate these concepts back to the Qur’an, the Qur’an is 
also a kelam, and the subject that authored this kelam by putting the Arabic lisan to 
use is God.  
 
There is undeniably a complex reciprocal relationship at work between lisan and 
kelam in Cündioğlu’s framework with important hermeneutical consequences. For 
starters, prior performances of language have the capacity to become part of the 
conventional use of signs, i.e. the muvâdaa694. Interlocutors could establish through 
 
694 Dil’in genel bilgisi is an alternative formulation, or Turkish translation that Cündioğlu provides in 
his second book p. 54 
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denotations new relations between signs and objects, which through communal 
agreement can become part of the muvâdaa repository of significations. 
Accordingly, in the absence of the original dialogical situation, the muvâdaa can 
become an important reference to understand what a word could have possibly 
signified during a certain period of a linguistic community’s history. The muvâdaa 
establishes whether words were used metaphorically (mecazi) or literally (zahiri). A 
present-day interpreter may therefore not argue based on their private opinion that 
an expression in the Qur’an should be taken metaphorically instead of literally. 
Rather, they must justify such an interpretation through a reference to the earlier 
mentioned muvâdaa.  
 
On the other hand, Cündioğlu’s framework is not willing to go as far as to argue that 
knowing what words historically signified is enough to understand the Qur’an. 
Rather, and this is where his theory returns again to the problem of the subject and 
the performance of language, the intent of the interlocutor (kasd’ul-mütekellim), 
must also be taken into account. A word can be polysemic, even when it is 
considered only in respect to what it meant a certain time frame. Take for example 
the Arabic word fawq, which could signify elevation in rank or elevation in physical 
space. This same word is related to God in verse 6:61: “He is the irresistible, 
(watching) from above [fawq] over His worshippers”695. Accordingly, an exegetical 
dilemma follows suit: is God above believers in physical space or in rank? Both 
significations are from the perspective of muvâdaa possible.  However, the secure 
way forward for Cündioğlu is by referencing the original intent as the proper means 
wherewith this dilemma can be resolved. God could not have meant that he is 
above his servants in physical space, for that would anthropomorphize God and 
jeopardize his transcendence. Hence, when we try to reconstruct the original 
signification, it is only logical that we consider the verse to mean that God is above 
humans in rank.  
 
 
695 Qur’an 6:61 
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There is no denying that Cündioğlu’s philosophy of language is inspired by 
Saussure’s linguistics. The distinction between lisan and kelam, is no different from 
Saussure’s differentiation between langue and parole. Admittedly, Cündioğlu does 
not hide the fact that his ideas are partly inspired by Saussure, and even announces 
in his preface that he will address the problem of the interpretation of the Qur’an 
through the insights garnered from recent developments in linguistics. Cündioğlu 
merely contextualizes and elaborates on Saussure’s concepts through a vocabulary 
that is familiar to his mostly Muslim audience, and further infers from these 
concepts the necessary hermeneutical implications. In this sense, Cündioğlu follows 
in the footsteps of Ricoeur and Derrida, as both of these authors have also drawn 
the necessary hermeneutical consequences from Saussure’s understanding of 
language.  
 
Alpyağıl, on the other hand, relies more strictly on Wittgenstein to make a similar 
hermeneutical case for objectivity as Cündioğlu did. Two important notions from 
Wittgenstein’s thought were incorporated into Alpyağıl’s Qur’an hermeneutics: 
rule-following and private language use. By exploring Wittgenstein’s reflections on 
these matters, Alpyağıl was able to conclude in a similar vein to Cündioğlu that 
language could only function when it was setup and practiced intersubjectively. 
Only in congruence with pre-established, objective conventions can language users 
express anything meaningful. Inversely, interpreters can only properly understand 
something when they fulfil the objective requirement of referencing the same 
conventions. Accordingly, interpreters that explain the Qur’an in ways that 
circumvent the established conventions of the language community to which the 
Qur’an belongs, are engaging in a practice that would be akin to private language 
use. Primarily, because such interpreters decide on their own accord, rather than 
that of a community, what certain signs refer to. However, as Alpyağıl argued, 
arbitrary denotation is philosophically speaking an incoherent idea.  
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For Alpyağıl, language use and the concept of rule-following are intrinsically related 
to each other. This fact was most clearly argued in reference to Searle’s 
differentiation between constitutive rules and regulative rules. Rules either regulate 
pre-established activities or establish whether an act constitutes an activity. The 
activity of driving exists independently of the rule to not drive through red lights. 
Hence, even if the rule that forbids driving through red lights did not exist, one 
could still partake in the activity that is called driving. However, in checkers, the 
activity of playing checkers is constituted by the rule that pieces may only move 
onto dark squares. Without this rule, one would not be able to play checkers. As 
Searle argued, whereas regulative rules often take the form of imperatives, 
constitutive rules take the form of “x counts as y” or “in the context of c, x counts as 
y”.  Accordingly, when this typology of rules is further related to language, we are 
told by Alpyağıl that language is also comprised of constitutive rules. For example, a 
promise can only be actualized if a certain set of rules are followed. One simply 
cannot randomly use language in order to promise something.  
 
Since language depends on a communal set of rules, there is inevitably an 
intersubjective character to language. Rules serve as a frame of reference 
wherewith an activity can be tested in accordance with its conformity to a rule. 
They do not belong privately to the individual but to a community. Accordingly, one 
can objectively argue whether an individual has conformed to rule or not. It is by 
virtue of such a fact that native English speakers can correct others that have just 
started to speak English in way that is counter to the grammatical conventions of 
English. Likewise, interpreters that apply themselves to the Arabic language of the 
Qur’an in ways that are alien and foreign to the constitutive rules of the Arabic 
language, can also be held accountable by Alpyağıl. As such, arguing that a 7th 
century text such as the Qur’an contains references to the modern theory of 
relativity or quantum theory, is for Alpyağıl akin to claim that it is possible for a 
person to say it is cold but mean that it is actually warm, or that one can substitute 
in a game of chess, chess pieces for checker stones.   
 257 
 
Interpreters that subjectively, and therefore, privately define what the words of the 
Qur’an signify, prompt according to Alpyağıl the debate on private language use. In 
other words, their behaviour relates to the question as to whether it is possible for 
someone to define on their own accord, without resorting to pre-established rules, 
what certain symbols signify. For Alpyağıl, the private language hypothesis is 
internally riddled with inconsistencies. A key inconsistency pertained to the inability 
of a private language user to employ a sign in order to reference the same object 
over and over. There is simply no possibility for the subject to know whether their 
experience of an object corresponds to an earlier made up signifier. The subject 
could not determine that the experience they had on Tuesday and the sign they 
wrote to record this experience, actually conforms to the experience they 
subsequently had on Wednesday.  Accordingly, even the representation of private 
experiences in language, pain included, is depended on a pre-established 
convention through language. Only in the context of a pre-established communal 
language, can an individual always ascertain and express their experiences in a 
persistent way in language.  
 
The objective aspects of rule-following, however, do not entirely discount the role 
of the subject in the process of following rules. Alpyağıl reminds us firstly that 
tradition, and therefore, conventions and rules, are contingent. For example, the 
Qur’an argues in verse 25:67 that the servants of God are neither extravagant nor 
stingy when they perform charity. However, extravagance or stinginess are 
concepts relative to a variety of contingent facts. It could well be that an act is 
considered in one culture or instance to be an expression of extravagance, whereas 
in another culture or instance it might be considered to be an expression of 
frugality. Hence, to apply a rule that demands the avoidance of extravagance and 
stinginess, a subject must interpret the right parameters of what constitutes 
extravagance and stinginess.  
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To apply a rule necessitates the interpretation of a rule, and this in turn necessitates 
practical wisdom. Alpyağıl refers in this regard directly to the Aristotelian concept of 
phronesis (prudence). It is by virtue of prudence, that the individual can judge 
individual situations in accordance with a particular rule. Accordingly, by applying 
practical wisdom, the subject could judge whether an action represents in a given 
situation generosity, miserliness, or extravagance.     
 
The fact that the subject is allowed to interpret a rule, does not mean that the 
subject’s own judgment is the ultimate arbiter in the matter. Rather, the final 
judgment on whether a rule was correctly applied, still rests in the hands of the 
community. Signposts can be read in a multitude of ways. However, whether the 
interpretation of a signpost was correct, is ultimately dependent on how a linguistic 
community has defined the symbols present on a signpost. Consequently, if a 
subject were to interpret the Qur’an, it is ultimately the Islamic community that will 
validate whether the offered interpretation is sound or not.   
 
There is no denying that in Alpyağıl’s framework the relationship between language, 
subjectivity, objectivity, and interpretation, are arranged in a much more complex 
way than Cündioğlu’s straightforward objectivism. Firstly, because Alpyağıl’s 
framework enables a degree of flexibility in interpreting the Qur’an that is 
simultaneously static as well as dynamic. On the one hand, an interpretation is 
relatively independent of the existence of a specific subject, since the reference of 
the interpretation is not the private view of the interpreter but the understanding 
of the community. Which, in the case of a radical subjectivist position, would be the 
opposite, since in such a framework a particular type of understanding cannot exist 
unless it is related to the contingent genius of a specific subject. However, on the 
other hand, Alpyağıl fully acknowledges the contingency of what constitutes the 
right application of certain rules. This allows for new interpretations to be offered 
with the requirement that their value is not defined by the subject but by the 
community to which the text, language, and the subject belong. As such, as I will 
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further thematize in the next chapter, there is a constructive view on the diachrony 
of interpretations to be discovered in Alpyağıl’s framework that is directed by a 
dialectics between subjectivity and objectivity. Not all historically unknown 
interpretations of a verse are therefore by default discarded.   
 
Öztürk’s position, however, is reminiscent in parts to Cündioğlu’s thinking as well as 
that of Alpyağıl. The objective meaning of a verse is the meaning that was 
historically understood by the first audience of the Qur’an. In this sense, Öztürk’s 
position is highly similar to that of Cündioğlu who likewise regarded the objective 
meaning of the Qur’an to be located in the historical horizon of its revelation. 
However, the objective reconstruction of the historical significance is but one 
requirement to the process of understanding, for what the Qur’an signified 
historically, does not necessarily mean what it will signify for the present. Rather, 
based on the requirements of a specific age, the interpreter will have to abstracts 
away the historically contingent aspects of certain verses in order to start a 
mediation between the current context and the transcendent, timeless ideals of the 
Qur’an. Accordingly, similar to Alpyağıl, Öztürk’s work also constitutes an important 
dialectical relationship that always seeks to mediate between the interpreter’s 
objective and subjective understanding of a verse. 
 
The most important premise undergirding this duality between the objective and 
subjective understanding of the Qur’an, comes from the belief that modern 
audiences are not the direct addresses of the Qur’an. On the contrary, for Öztürk 
there is no doubt that the direct addressees of the Qur’an are in fact the Prophet 
and his community. Moreover, the message of the Qur’an has been tailored to the 
experiences and understanding of this community. Partially, because the Qur’an has 
responded to the experiences of its first audience through the various answers 
given to societal issues, but also because the Qur’an related its message through 
the familiar Arabic language of its audience. Hence, the objective meaning of the 
Qur’an always refers to what the Qur’an signified for the first audience of the 
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Qur’an, and not to what present-day interpreters might read in light of their own 
personal experiences of the text and its language. On the other hand, the subjective 
meaning is always the meaning that is understood from the Qur’an post-revelation 
as read anew in light of contingent circumstances.  
 
This bifurcation leads Öztürk to acknowledge historical readings of the Qur’an, even 
if they are not palatable by modern sensibilities. There is indeed an injunction in the 
Qur’an that commands one to cut hands of a thief. This is an objective, historical 
fact in Öztürk’s framework. However, the presence of an injunction within the 
Qur’an, does not necessarily mean that a modern reader needs to apply the 
Qur’anic injunction as it is presented. For, it is not the form in which expressions are 
communicated that represents the timeless message of the Qur’an but the ultimate 
purpose behind the expressions that represents the transcendent message of the 
Qur’an.  
 
By virtue of the form-purpose distinction, Öztürk is able to direct the understanding 
of the Qur’an beyond the mere confines of what has literally been stated by the 
Qur’an. From a language philosophical point of view, Öztürk argued that the form of 
an expression cannot be regarded as the coterminous stand-in for what the author 
wishes to convey. Rather, the linguistic form of an expression should be regarded as 
a contingent vehicle, a particular example wherewith intent (maksat) of the author 
is expressed.  Hence, what an author intended is not necessarily limited by what an 
author said. 
 
The emphasis on purpose rather than form, also means that Öztürk’s hermeneutics 
includes an element of psychologisation. For, one no longer restricts their inquiry to 
what is said but why something is said. Accordingly, in Öztürk’s framework, it is 
quite objectively clear that God announced in Arabic that the hands of a thief must 
be cut. However, the question as to why God announced such an injunction, is 
answered by unearthing the reason raison d'être behind the injunction. Öztürk 
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argued that the injunction of cutting hands was announced in order to protect 
private property and correct the thief. However, with present-day resources it is 
quite possible to implement God’s will in ways that might be better than what was 
historically suggested by the Qur’an.         
 
This binary perspective on subjectivity vis-à-vis objectivity also had further 
implications for the status of the traditional Islamic sciences. In Öztürk’s view, tafsīr 
is the science that pertains to the reconstruction of the earlier mentioned objective 
historical meaning of the Qur’an. On the other hand, fiqh and kalam are the 
sciences that pertain themselves to establishing the significance of the Qur’an for a 
particular age. Fiqh does this certainly in reference to the legal elements of the 





In respect to the different subjective and objective requirements requisite to 
understanding and interpreting the Qur’an, the hermeneutical theories of the three 
Turkish thinkers have both demonstrated important points of divergence as well as 
convergence. 
 
One noteworthy point of recurrent contestation between the different authors, 
concerned the problem of whether faith is a condition one must impose on their 
being as a subject so as to have access to the meanings (truth) of the Qur’an. For 
Cündioğlu, the answer is clear: personal faith does not matter in respect to 
understanding or explaining the Qur’an, since it would otherwise undermine the 
Qur’an’s universal address, and establish interpretations not on rational but fideist 
grounds. The Qur’an appeals to all, non-believers included, and must therefore be 
capable of being heard, understood, and acknowledged by those who do not 
profess faith in Islam. Moreover, the reception history of the Qur’an has clearly 
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demonstrated that believing Muslims belonging to even the same school of 
theology or jurisprudence would differ amongst each other. Hence, faith is neither a 
guarantee nor an impediment to understanding the Qur’an. Alpyağıl and Öztürk, 
however, both argued the opposite and claimed that being a Muslim was a 
subjective requirement for understanding the Qur’an. Of note is the fact that in 
contrast to Cündioğlu, the latter two did oppose the idea that the Qur’an is 
universally intelligible or universally appealing. For Alpyağıl the significance of 
something is determined by how it is recognized. Accordingly, if the Qur’an is not in 
advance believed to come from God, it will never be able to disclose its significance 
as God’s final revelation unto humans. Rational arguments pertaining to religion, 
even those proving God’s existence, are only meaningful to those who have already 
been initiated into religion. Likewise, for Öztürk the Qur’an’s primary appeal and 
significance is only directed to its initial, historical audience. However, to infer the 
Qur’an’s secondary significance, it is necessary that an interpreter fulfils personal 
requirements such as faith and submission towards God. For, only a person that is 
conscientious, scrupulous, and sincere is able to attune himself to God’s will and lift 
the obstructions towards truth that might otherwise have been imposed through 
disingenuous ideological and sectarian biases. The bottom-line of an interpretation 
is less decided by whether one can make a rational case for an interpretation, since 
reason can be instrumentalized, and more so by whether it is motivated by personal 
sincerity or not.   
 
Self-knowledge as a requirement to gain access to the Qur’an’s meanings, was also 
a shared and disagreed upon theme in the arguments of the Turkish thinkers. 
Cündioğlu’s works, conversely, did not contain any references to self-knowledge as 
an important ground for understanding the Qur’an. However, Alpyağıl and Öztürk 
did acknowledge this requirement and shared a similar conclusion in regard to this 
problem: the subject must recognize his or her own contingency in order to prepare 
themselves for the Qur’an. Alpyağıl spoke of fanilik bilinci, knowledge of one’s 
epistemological finitude. In other words, the subject’s knowledge of its inability to 
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self-sufficiently know everything, and thus, of its need to open up towards learning 
from others (including the Qur’an). Likewise, Öztürk spoke of truth’s elusive nature, 
and how it can never become possessed (temelluk) by any subject in particular. 
Otherwise, as Öztürk implies, the subject will fall to an interpretive hubris fuelled by 
sectarian zeal, as some past exegetes had done according to Öztürk. Hence to 
summarize, for Öztürk, insincerity obstructs our ability to truthfully understand the 
Qur’an, since it guides us to read into the Qur’an, rather than from the Qur’an. 
However, sincerity is grounded in humility, which itself is grounded in the self-
knowledge of one’s incapacity to take absolute and sole possession of truth.  
 
Where objective requirements are concerned, less disagreement is discovered 
amongst the authors. Each author is an advocate of objective requirements for 
understanding and interpreting the Qur’an. Their proposal for objectivity is 
supported by two premises. The first premise is that language has a nature that is 
historical, systematic, and inescapably intersubjective.  For example, linguistic 
utterances have material aspects, as Cündioğlu argued, such as their concomitant 
intents. Hence, what defines the meaning of an utterance is not the subjective 
experience of its receptor but what its conveyor intended to objectively transmit.  
Likewise, as Alpyağıl argued, languages also have concrete rules that determine 
which meanings can be constructed under certain circumstances. One simply 
cannot utter “one item” in the English language and refer to two items. However, 
based on the first premise, each author shares a second premise, namely that the 
Qur’an, since it is expressed in language, also has a history, system, and objective 
character that must be revered in order to do justice to its nature. In Öztürk’s case 
this means among other things that utterances in the Qur’an also have clear 
historical addressees and referents. Hence, one should always try to understand the 
Qur’an first in reference to the Qur’an’s historical audience, rather than what one 
might personally experience by relating the Qur’an’s direct address to oneself. 
Likewise, for Alpyağıl this means that interpreters cannot saddle their commentary 
with anachronistic jargon, since that runs counter against the diachronic nature of 
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the Qur’an and its language.  The Qur’an, as Alpyağıl argued, could not have 
possibly referred to modern concepts such as thermodynamics, because 6th and 7th 
century Arabic did not have the means to express such a concept. Nor for similar 
reasons, as Cündioğlu objected, harbour certain ideologically modern concepts such 
as gender equality.  
 
By stipulating objective requirements, the Turkish authors unanimously bar the 
exclusive reliance on subjectivity as a vindicator of one’s interpretation. 
Accordingly, an overtly sceptical or mystical attitude towards meaning is both 
foreign and out-of-place within the frameworks of the authors studied. For 
example, there is clearly no view present in the hermeneutics of the Turkish 
thinkers that argues – based on epistemological arguments – that all meaning is 
relative to the subject’s experience, and thereby equally true or valuable. Nor is 
there, for that matter, a view that one is able to discover the truth of the Qur’an 
exclusively on account of their personal relationship to God696. On the contrary, as it 
was recurrently made clear, the subject must also fulfil requirements that do not 
pertain to the structures of subjectivity but lay outside the subject itself, such as 
knowing how Arabic was practiced and understood during the time of the Qur’an’s 
revelation.  
 
The fact that all three authors advocate some form of objectivity, should however 
not be understood as a plea for a static understanding of the Qur’an, nor that any 
future exegetical activity of the Qur’an is by default stilted by its earlier reception 
history. On the contrary, in all three theories there is still a great deal of dynamism 
involved in how future interpreters can and should relate to the interpretation of 
the Qur’an. For example, as Alpyağıl argued, while it is true that one cannot employ 
the word miserliness in order to intend generosity, it is possible for a linguistic 
community to have a changing idea as to what they regard as miserliness or 
generosity. Accordingly, what objectively, that is according to linguistic convention, 
 
696 For example, by being an elect friend or saint of God.  
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constitutes miserliness, can change over time, thereby allowing for new ways 
wherein the word can be understood. There is thus a great deal still to be said 
about the further implications of the earlier discussed theories and the problem of 
reading the Qur’an in different and new ways. However, this theme will be further 
worked out in the next chapter.  
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Surplus and Futurity of Meaning: The Status of New and 




In the introductory chapter of this thesis, it was argued that the current 
oversaturation of Qur’an interpretations in Turkey through the media of reformist, 
scientist, and relativist discourse in Turkey, was the dominant impetus behind a 
theoretical reinvestigation of the grounds on which the interpretation of the Qur’an 
should proceed. However, the problem of reading the Qur’an differently or in new 
ways is thematically tied to the status of subjectivity and objectivity in 
interpretation. To recall their organic relationship, the more objective 
understanding becomes emphasized, the less variant interpretations become 
appreciated; for the objective is the recurrent, that which gets identified over and 
over in the same way by different parties. On the other hand, the more the 
subject’s private understanding is regarded as valid, the easier it becomes to 
constructively relate to the problem of variant interpretations, since subjectivity by 
default implies particularity, and hence, difference. As such, while we have been 
examining the problem of objectivity and subjectivity, there has without doubt 
been an inescapable practical consequence to these otherwise dull theoretical 
problems, namely what the status of new and different interpretations of the 
Qur’an are. The question as to what these practical consequences are for new 
readings, will be, as assured in the previous chapters, answered in the coming 
sections.   
 
Before I advance further, however, into describing the implications of each author’s 
theory to the problem of reading the Qur’an in new and variant ways, I would first 
like to establish the theoretical framework wherewith the subsequent analyses will 
be conducted. This framework will involve two new concepts: the surplus of 
meaning and the futurity of meaning. Both concepts will be explained in due turn, 
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starting with the concept of the surplus of meaning. These terms have specifically 
been chosen for a variety of reasons. First, the surplus of meaning is a concept that 
has its lexical roots in recent discussions in western philosophical hermeneutics, 
particularly in discussions involving Paul Ricoeur’s work. By referring to an already 
existing concept, we are able to gain a more secure theoretical model for 
understanding the earlier discussed material on the Turkish thinkers. Moreover, 
while it is not the particular focus of this thesis, the appropriation of an already 
existing concept, will inevitably also function as an initiatory reflection on how 
Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics relates to recent discussions in western philosophical 
hermeneutics.  Finally, I also wish to emphasize that the concept of the surplus of 
meaning, while borrowed, will ultimately be further worked out and tailored in its 
definition to suit the present context of Qur’an hermeneutics. Accordingly, I will (a) 
firstly contextualize the term surplus of meaning in regard to Ricoeur’s work, (b) 
follow it by a discussion in which this concept is further worked out together with 
the concept of the futurity of meaning, and (c) relate both concept to the current 
discussion on the status of variant readings and the Qur’an.  
 
The surplus of meaning and the double significance of symbols 
 
The notion of surplus is usually invoked in an economic context, that is to denote 
the amount of money that is left when a vendor sells more than that they actually 
buy. Accordingly, in consideration of its conventional usage, we already know that 
the notion of surplus is related to excess and wealth. It should come as no surprise 
then, that a similar significance can also be found in some of the current 
hermeneutical discussions. Nevertheless, while the specialized usage of the term 
does not wander too far from its conventional usage, it still has its own nuances 
that need to be considered.  
 
One of the more noteworthy usages of this concept is in the works of Paul Ricoeur 
(d. 2005). While Ricoeur has used the term at various turns, I wish to focus on one 
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of his earlier works, namely Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of 
Meaning. This work, which currently exists as a collection of essays, was originally 
based on a range of lectures given by Ricoeur at the Texas Christian University in 
the fall of 1973, titled Discourse and Surplus of Meaning. The reason for choosing 
this work rests on the fact that the concept of the surplus of meaning is explicitly 
related to the problem of interpreting texts, which inevitably involves the subject of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, despite the emphasis on the concept through its titular 
presence, Ricoeur mentions the concept only a few times in a work that spans 
almost a hundred pages. Moreover, when the concept appears, it is a term that is 
explained in context, and not so much by an explicit definition extended to the 
reader by the author. Accordingly, to get a clear view of what the surplus of 
meaning entails, we must refer to the context in which the term is employed. Put 
differently, the significance of the surplus of meaning as employed by Ricoeur will 
only become apparent by retracing the interplay between the term and the 
surrounding text, purpose of the work, and overall arguments. 
 
Ricoeur introduces the term surplus of meaning in his third essay Metaphor and 
Symbol in the context of understanding literary works. Accordingly, his main 
question rings as follows: “The question here is whether the surplus of meaning 
characteristic of literary works is a part of their signification or if it must be 
understood as an external factor, which is noncognitive and simply emotional.”697  
Thus, the notion of surplus is introduced in terms of a characteristic that literary 
works have. However, what this characteristic is, and as well as what the answer to 
this question is, is made more apparent and concrete in the subsequent inquiry into 
how metaphors and symbols function. 
 
In classical rhetoric the metaphor was conceptualized around the notion of the 
word, rather than the sentence. Hence, a metaphor is a word that extends the 
 
697 Paul. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Text: The Texas 
Christian University Press, 1976), 45. 
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meaning of a word through deviation from its literal meaning. A deviation that 
stems from the desire to either “fill a semantic lacuna in the lexical code or to 
ornament discourse and make it more pleasing.”698 As Ricoeur states, we simply 
have more ideas than the words to express them, and hence, need to stretch the 
signification of known words by using metaphors. Moreover, in some cases we rely 
on figurative words, because a figurative expression is more persuasive. Thus, we 
heavily rely on resemblance in order to “ground the substitution of the figurative 
meaning of a word in place of the literal meaning, which could have been used in 
the same place.”699  
 
As the last part of the previous sentence suggests, metaphors are not capable of 
creating new meanings according to this classical understanding. A metaphor is by 
this account always translatable, since the figurative word is understood to be a 
substitute for a literal meaning. No new information is provided about reality when 
a metaphor is put to use. In other words, as Ricoeur puts it in technical terms, a 
metaphor does not represent any form of semantic innovation700.  
 
Conversely, Ricoeur’s own conceptualization of the metaphor does state that 
metaphors are able to confer new information about reality. Rather than arguing 
that the metaphor centres around the word, Ricoeur argues that a metaphor 
operates at the level of the sentence. Put differently, metaphors function on the 
level of predication, not denomination701. In Ricoeur’s view the heart of the 
metaphor lies in the ‘semantic dissonance’ that we experience in the metaphor. In 
other words, in the absurdity that we experience through the tension between 
words in a metaphoric expression. For example, when a poet speaks of a “mantle of 
sorrow”, our prima facie understanding of the expression results by default in an 
interpretative uneasiness, since a literal pertinence between the notion of a 
 
698 Ricoeur, 48. 
699 Ricoeur, 49. 
700 Ricoeur, 49. 
701 Ricoeur, 50. 
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garment of cloth and an abstract feeling of sorrow are irreconcilable. However, it is 
exactly this dissonance that invites us to resolve the ‘semantic impertinence’ with a 
second interpretation that is able to make sense between both notions by still 
looking for other levels of resemblances between both notions702. Moreover, since 
we relate things in new ways to each other, we are thus conferred with new 
information about reality. As Ricoeur eloquently concludes, a metaphor is “a 
calculated error, which brings together things that do not go together and by means 
of this apparent misunderstanding it causes a new, hitherto unnoticed, relation of 
meaning to spring up between the terms that previous systems of classification had 
ignored or not allowed.”703 
 
It is this notion of semantic impertinence that Ricoeur further carries into the 
discussion of symbols, and concretely brings it into relationship with the concept of 
the surplus of meaning. Ricoeur had in a previous work described a symbol as “any 
structure of signification in which a direct, primary, literal meaning designates, in 
addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and which 
can be apprehended only through the first.”704 Accordingly, a symbol is something 
that has a double meaning. However, to get to this meaning, we are, as in the case 
of a metaphor, dependent upon two interpretations that we have to simultaneously 
oppose to each other. Since, it is by recognizing that the literal meaning falls short 
that we see that a symbol still contains more meaning. For example, we intuit in 
poem of Wordsworth that a sunrise signifies more than a simple meteorological 
phenomenon, and that in Babylonian myths the sea in signifies more than the 
expanse of water that can be seen from the shore705.  Hence, this surplus of 
meaning that we intuit “is the residue of the literal interpretation”706.  
 
 
702 Ricoeur, 51. 
703 Ricoeur, 51. 
704 Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde, Illinois (Northwestern University Press, 
1974), 12–13. 
705 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, 55. 
706 Ricoeur, 55. 
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This notion of the surplus of meaning is further explicated by Ricoeur in relation to 
scripture through the example of the Exodus. Prima facie, the Exodus in the Bible 
refers to a well-known event that took place in the history of the Children of Israel. 
However, as Ricoeur argues, the Bible has more to say to us than what happened in 
history. Rather, it discloses on to us also “a certain state of wandering which is lived 
existentially as a movement from captivity to deliverance.”707 Accordingly, the 
double meaning present in the Exodus not only retells a historical event but also 
becomes “the means of detecting a condition of being”708.  
 
To recapitulate, certain expressions have the ability to confer more meaning than 
what is experienced from an initial reading. The excess of meaning present in such 
expressions invites multiple interpretations, so that their secondary meaning can be 
reached. Thus, the surplus of meaning is a phenomenon that from its very nature 
relates to the problem of multiple meanings and variant interpretations.  
 
Excess and futurity 
 
Now that a prefatory understanding of the surplus of meaning has been presented 
through Ricoeur’s works, I wish to further develop this understanding in relation to 
the present thesis. Starting with differentiating between a qualitative and 
quantitative approach to the surplus of meaning, and followed by a further 
discussion on the its relationship to the problem of diachrony and futurity of 
meaning.  
 
In the previous section, Ricoeur presented an understanding of the surplus of 
meaning that I wish to further characterize as a quantitative approach to the 
surplus of meaning. To further clarify this, Ricoeur spoke of double, hence multiple, 
meanings in regard to the nature of symbols. In this sense, there is a quantitative 
 
707 Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, 66. 
708 Ricoeur, 66. 
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approach to the problem of surplus, namely there is an understanding that an 
excess in meaning signifies the possibility of inferring multiple meanings from the 
same object of understanding. Symbols, as the example of the Exodus 
demonstrated, can both be understood literally, that is historically, as well as 
existentially. Alternately it is also possible to understand the surplus of meaning in 
qualitative terms. For example, one could argue that the surplus of meaning in the 
case of the Qur’an pertains to the transformative influence effected by an 
understanding of the Qur’an. In other words, the surplus (overflow) is not in the 
text in terms of multiple leftover meanings but in what the text effects through its 
moral instructions, hence respectively in the fact that the text brings about a better 
person out of the reader, a more wholesome community, and a greater prosperity 
for humankind.   
 
This differentiation is emphasized because of the fact that only a quantitative 
approach to the surplus of meaning is pertinent to problem of variant 
interpretations. The idea of multiple meanings already suggest that each meaning is 
distinct and unique from other meanings. Thus, a claim that a unit in the Qur’an, 
such as a verse or a word, contains a surplus of meanings, would in a quantitative 
framework by default mean that this same unit is able to offer multiple, hence 
distinct, meanings. Since different meanings ultimately lead to different readings, 
the inquiry into the question concerning the status of the surplus of meaning within 
a hermeneutical theory, is without doubt an inquiry into the status of variant 
interpretations of the Qur’an.  
 
Up to this point we have only described the problem of the surplus of meaning in 
respect to multiple contemporaneous meanings. Thus, the idea of multiple 
meanings is still only understood synchronically. However, there is a possibility to 
relate the problem of the surplus of meaning to the more complex problem of 
diachrony, and thus, to the idea of the futurity of meaning.  
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With the futurity of meaning, I simply wish to point towards the fact that a text has 
the ability to disclose new meanings that were hitherto not known by the text’s 
previous reception history. As I argued previously, the surplus of meaning pertains 
to the assumption that an element in the Qur’an is able to offer a variety of distinct 
meanings. However, receiving a different meaning from the text, can 
simultaneously become experienced as receiving a new meaning from the text if 
the experience takes place at a later date under different spatiotemporal 
circumstances.  For example, to stay true to Ricoeur’s examples from religious 
myths, the Fall of Adam might be something one understood literally at Sunday 
school as a child. At this point, one might simply regard it as a 
historical/mythological retelling of what happened to humankind’s ancestor. 
However, there is an excess of meaning that can be existentially pertinent in new 
ways on account of future experiences. For example, as one comes of age, they 
leave the security of their parental home, thus paradise, and realise that they have 
to toil for their own survival: “through painful toil you will eat food from it all the 
days of your life.”709 Or, perhaps someone commits a crime in their adulthood of 
such a magnitude that they feel ‘stained’ by it, having their initial Adamic innocence 
be lost.  As these examples illustrate, Adam’s fall takes different meanings on 
account of future experiences and changing circumstances.  
 
Let me illustrate the relationship between the surplus and futurity of meaning even 
further with certain hypothetical situations related to interpreting the Qur’an. Let 
us imagine a situation in which it is believed that the Qur’an is a dynamic message 
that contains a contingent meaning known by its initial audience as well as an ideal 
meaning only known by its future audience. Thus, the Qur’an has multiple meanings 
(surplus of meaning) that can be discovered diachronically (futurity of meaning). 
Hence, with these assumptions in mind, an interpreter can now address verse 4:3 
wherein polygamy is permitted and argue that the aforementioned verse permits 
polygamy because of contextual constraints but absolves it ultimately by already 
 
709 NIV Genesis 3:17  
 274 
suggesting in between the lines that monogamy is the better option. While the 
latter meaning might have been dormant in the text (surplus of meaning), only a 
future audience that is no longer socioeconomically entrenched in the institution of 
polygamy is capable of intuiting this utopic meaning (futurity of meaning). Similarly, 
if we were to modify this example by starting from a scientist standpoint, an 
interpreter could argue that our enlarged understanding of the world through 
science allows us to read the Qur’an in a way that is informed by modern scientific 
findings. By implication, such an interpreter could argue that God deposited two 
meanings into a verse (surplus of meaning): the one that the first audience of the 
Qur’an could understand, and the meaning that will unveil itself later to a 
community that is more scientifically adept (futurity of meaning).  
 
It is clear now that the surplus of meaning refers to the phenomenon of being able 
to infer a variety of meanings from the same text, same verse, or even the same 
word. Likewise, I have demonstrated that the futurity of meaning pertains to the 
uncovering of new meanings by present and future audiences. However, to relate 
these concepts back to the Turkish authors in a simply descriptive manner is not 
that very interesting. There is nothing inconspicuous about the fact that the Qur’an 
can be read in different ways either by interpreters living in the same age or by 
future audiences of the Qur’an. Any serious hermeneutical scholar is aware of this, 
and so are the Turkish thinkers.  Cündioğlu has repeatedly acknowledged that the 
Qur’an can be read in multiple ways, but only one reading can be authentic to God’s 
intentions. To what degree variant and new interpretations should be 
constructively appreciated from a hermeneutical standpoint or not, is for the 
Turkish thinkers a much more important question. Hence, if we are to inquire into 
the status of the surplus of meaning in the context of the Turkish thinkers, it must 
be done in relation to the problem of authenticity710.  
   
 
710 That is, relative to their understanding of when subjective/objective interpretations are 
authentic/inauthentic. 
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These facts considered, we can already from the outset conclude that in the case of 
anachronism, the appeal to the surplus and futurity of meaning in the Qur’an is by 
default objectionable according to the three previously discussed Turkish thinkers. 
As it was made evident in the previous chapter on language and objectivity, all 
authors believe that the synchronic nature of language constitutes the objective 
limits of how language could have been performed during a specific era. Thus, all 
appeals to the surplus of meaning that is a product of language’s later diachrony, is 
by default suspect and inauthentic to any media expressed during a certain period 
of a language’s history. To reiterate Alpyağıl’s example, Woodsworth reference to 
poets not being gay, can never be interpreted in a way that allows us to claim that 
Woodsworth meant a sexual orientation, since the reference to sexual orientation 
only became part of the word after Woodsworth had passed.  By extension, to 
argue that the Qur’an already informed humankind in the 7th century of quantum 
mechanics, is equally suspect and unconvincing.  
 
Anachronistic readings are by default inauthentic to the text, that much is agreed 
upon by each author. However, in respect to other circumstances, each author 
diverges into their own view on the matter. Accordingly, in the following sections I 
will highlight where these divergences occur and what their further implications 
are.  
 
The surplus and futurity of meaning in Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics 
 
To start the discussion with Cündioğlu, he advocated a very strict objectivist view on 
Qur’an hermeneutics. His specific take on the matter, was marked by a claim that 
utterances are always preceded by a delimited intention. Accordingly, there is only 
one intention that an interpreter could refer to in order to warrant a certain reading 
from the Qur’an. Thus, if two different interpretations are offered, one of them has 
to be wrong in case the other is right, since there can be only one meaning intended 
by the text. Since, there is no intentional concurrency of different meanings 
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according to a single utterance in the Qur’an, there is also no intentional surplus of 
meaning.  
 
This view of meaning concurrency was predominantly based on Cündioğlu’s 
appraisal of polysemy in the Qur’an. As Cündioğlu stated, unlike some outliers such 
as al-Shāfiʿī, the dominant position in classical Islamic hermeneutics either rejected 
or downplayed the significance of meaning concurrency. Saying one thing while 
meaning different things simultaneously, was not a conventional practice known to 
the Arabs, and hence, the Arabic language. Thus, to argue that the Qur’an says one 
thing, while meaning different things simultaneously, is questionable, because God 
would have had to employ the Arabic language in ways that were not familiar, and 
therefore, incomprehensible to the audience of the Qur’an.  
 
Variant interpretations do not occur by God’s design in Cündioğlu’s framework; 
they are merely a side-effect of divergences between interpreters in regard to their 
method and interpretative assumptions, that is their pre-understanding. The more 
a subject secures the right interpretative assumptions and stays true to the 
objective material aspects of the text, the less the subject’s interpretations will 
become volatile and prone to divergence and error. Words are uttered or written 
during a specific period in time, and hence, become actualized in relation to their 
historical horizon, namely the potential of meanings words can signify during a 
specific era.  For example, a personal pronoun such as “you” (plural) is in its form 
very abstract and could refer in potential to any group of addressees. Thus, an 
interpretation that merely regards the form, will inevitably be able to posit an 
approach that a personal pronoun such as “you” carries such a degree of surplus of 
meaning that it could refer concurrently to any possible “you” throughout time and 
space. However, in Cündioğlu’s framework, the question is not of possibility but of 
historical actualization. Thus, the “you” uttered in the Qur’an can only refer to the 
people that were present during the revelation of a verse. What remains for the 
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interpreter, is therefore not to look at what a word can possibly signify but what it 
actually has signified within a historical situation. 
 
Given the reconstructive and objectivist nature of Cündioğlu’s hermeneutics, we 
might be inclined to conclude that there is no futurity to the Qur’an’s meanings. 
However, I would argue that the overall implications Cündioğlu’s work still suggest 
otherwise. It is true that there is no futurity to the Qur’an’s meanings, in the sense 
that God is communicating new messages through the Qur’an, or that the real 
message of the Qur’an is waiting to be actualized at a more opportune time. Mainly 
because the event of meaning is restricted by Cündioğlu’s framework to the date in 
which an utterance was actualized: “I [the interpreter] must seek the (correct) 
meaning not in the future but in the past”711. Nevertheless, there is a futurity 
involved in our relation to the Qur’an in the sense of recovery. To elucidate, for 
Cündioğlu, historical distance is not something that makes the subject’s relationship 
to the Qur’an more productive. On the contrary, as Cündioğlu stated: “Meaning has 
an essence that does not get stronger (güçlenen) or become clearer (belirginleşen) 
over time but even gets lost [over time].”712 Accordingly, to use Cündioğlu’s 
metaphor, what is lost over time, can become recovered again in the future. The 
meanings known to the Prophet and his audience can become lost in the course of 
history and then become known again through an archaeology of meaning as if they 
were new. 
 
Within the reconstructivist paradigm, it is therefore still possible for competing 
parties to argue over what the Qur’an ultimately signifies. Even to the degree that a 
future understanding is considered to be better than one held in the past. However, 
as bold as this implication is, it does have its conditions. First and foremost, given 
Cündioğlu’s recurrent emphasis on historical understanding, it is highly unlikely for 
anyone to claim by a recourse to Cündioğlu’s hermeneutics to understand the 
 
711 C, Book 1, p. 92 
712 C, Book 1, p. 86 
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Qur’an better than the Prophet and his companions did. The latter were the first 
addresses, they were the one’s God directly spoke to. However, it is possible, as 
Cündioğlu’s work implies, that an interpreter could argue that over time some 
exegetes missed the mark with certain interpretations because of the deteriorating 
effects of time on our collective and historical understanding.  
 
Cündioğlu unfortunately does not expand upon the exact technical details of how 
historical distance deteriorates understanding, or how this unfolds into the ongoing 
archaeological task of meaning recovery. Perhaps if Cündioğlu had pursued this 
question with more attention, he would have realised the weaker parts of his own 
theory. To illustrate this further with Cündioğlu’s own principles, meaning can 
become muddled (or vaporize as Cündioğlu calls it) by the sheer existence of 
competing narratives concerning the meaning of something. Hence, the surplus of 
meaning is not something a Muslim should aspire to but try to bar as much as 
possible. To a degree this is a sensible position, for what does Islam specifically 
mean if it can mean everything that any random interpreter imagines it to be? That 
adherents of religions cling to a degree of essentialism by setting boundaries of 
interpretation is only natural in questions concerning identity. Nevertheless, to 
argue that the constants of the Qur’an are guaranteed through a reference to 
historical understanding, is somewhat naïve in light of certain historical facts. For 
example, if multiple competing understandings of the Qur’an are already prevalent 
among the companions of the Prophet, how much certitude can the understanding 
of the companions, that is the surrogates for the historical horizon, provide for 
capturing the ‘the solitary original signification’ of the Qur’an? 
 
The fact that a mere recovery of the historical horizon does not offer 
straightforward answers to what the Qur’an means, can already be witnessed in the 
multiple interpretative narratives that are attributed to the Prophet’s companions 
or their students. A clear example of this pertains to verse 180:1. In this verse, it is 
stated that God will give Muhammad al-kawthar. However, as the famous exegete 
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al-Ṭabarī relates, “Interpreters have disagreed on the meaning of al-kawthar”713. On 
the one hand there is an opinion going back to ʿAisha the wife of the Prophet that 
states that al-kawthar refers to a river (nahr) in paradise714. On the other hand, 
there is an opinion that goes back to Ibn ʿAbbās, the nephew of the Prophet, that 
describes al-kawthar as an abundance of blessing (al-khayr al-kathīr). Finally, there 
is an opinion that goes back to ʿAṭāʾ, a student of a companion, that claims that al-
kawthar is not a river in paradise but a pool (ḥawḍ)715. As excessively scrupulous as 
it might sound, a river is semantically speaking not equal to a pool, and neither are 
both of the prior perfectly equivalent to the idea of an abundance of blessing. The 
latter becomes additionally evident in the fact that some interpreters have argued 
that the seemingly abstract blessing spoken of refers in actuality to the office of 
prophecy716. Thus, we are left with the conclusion that even in the early reception 
history of the Qur’an, variant readings of the Qur’an had come to exist despite 
interpreters having a more immediate access to the language of the Qur’an as well 
as proximity to the Prophet, or in the case of the students, the companions. A 
historical-critical approach is thus no guarantee for the recovery of an objective 
meaning that is free of uncertainty. 
 
This is of course not to say that the historical fact of variant interpretations cannot 
still be mitigated within a reconstructivist approach to the interpretation of the 
Qur’an, but only that it cannot happen in Cündioğlu’s hermeneutics because of its 
various blind spots. For example, in the classical Islamic tradition there is also an 
acknowledgement of the authority which the early generations enjoy for 
understanding the Qur’an. However, there is also an acknowledgement that the 
reports that relate to us that understanding are sometimes conflicting. Hence, to 
resolve this issue certain classical thinkers also integrate a complex source criticism 
and harmonization into their hermeneutics in order to better arrive at the Qur’an’s 
 
713 Ibn Jarīr Al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr Al-Ṭabarī: Jāmʿ Al-Bayān ʿan-Taʾwīl Āy Al-Qurʾān, vol. 24 (Cairo: Markaz 
al-Buḥūth wa-al-Dirasāt al-ʿArabiyya wa-al-Islāmiyya, 2001), 679. 
714 Al-Ṭabarī, 24:680. 
715 Al-Ṭabarī, 24:685. 
716 Al-Ṭabarī, 24:684. 
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vision for humankind. It is not the proper place to expound upon the minutiae of 
how this source criticism works, or how divergent reports are harmonized. 
However, it suffices to say that whereas the classics do take it upon themselves to 
also address the issue of variant readings stemming from accepted authorities, 
Cündioğlu’s hermeneutical oeuvre lacks another section or book that addresses this 
issue. As a result, while Cündioğlu has been able to emphasize the importance of his 
archaeological approach, he has not been able to work out the finer details 
necessary to this approach.   
 
There is no doubt that some of the earlier discussions will also pertain to an 
important part of Öztürk’s hermeneutics, since Öztürk shares certain fundamental 
principles with Cündioğlu. For starters, like Cündioğlu, Öztürk also emphasized that 
any understanding of the Qur’an must first establish the Qur’an’s objective 
historical significance. According to Öztürk it is clear that the Qur’an’s message was 
tailored towards the contingent experiences of a specific historical audience, and 
therefore, contains elements that are contingent in nature. Ignoring this aspect of 
the Qur’an in favour of an overestimated universalization of its message, would 
result according to Öztürk in a variety of unfavourable consequences— 
the most important of which pertained to the dissonance between one’s 
hermeneutics and one’s actual practice. For example, some female interpreters in 
Turkey acknowledge the institute of polygamy as a transhistorical institute 
advocated by the Qur’an, since they believe that everything stated in the Qur’an is 
valid for all ages. Nevertheless, despite this belief, none of these interpreters ever 
hope to involve themselves in the practice of polygamy. Thus, as Öztürk concludes, 
such interpreters only pay lip-service to the universalist paradigm, while in reality 
they already understand that the institute of polygamy has no place in the modern 
Turkey. Accordingly, a much more earnest approach to the Qur’an would be to fully 
acknowledge its historicity.  
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Since the original significance of the Qur’an is located in the past, interpretation is 
characterized by an act of recovery and reconstruction. This was made clear in 
reference to Cündioğlu’s framework. However, it was also made apparent that 
under certain circumstances an archaeological of meaning could unfold in an 
ongoing recovery of new meanings (futurity of meaning). In other words, when the 
interpreter believes that historical distance has resulted in the loss of meaning. 
Thus, the cynicism of meaning loss coupled with an optimism of recovery, results in 
the utopic promise that a new exegesis of the Qur’an could actually uncover some 
of the Qur’an’s significance that Muslims have lost touch with over the course of 
history; paradoxically having the old become new again. Given that Öztürk also 
subscribes to the same principles as described above, including the fact that the 
course of history has resulted in the disappearance of understanding, his work also 
shares a similar perspective concerning the futurity of the Qur’an’s meanings akin 
to that of Cündioğlu. However, unlike Cündioğlu, Öztürk does delve deeper into 
how meaning becomes lost over history.  
 
The Qur’an is a book that comprises on the one hand meanings that are 
straightforwardly understood by modern Muslims, while simultaneously also 
containing elements that are no longer self-evident through historical alienation. 
Öztürk is very confident that the overall Muslim community, despite its internal 
conflicts, has a very firm understanding of the basic ethos and rituals of the Qur’an. 
Accordingly, despite having different political convictions, Sunni and Shia, still agree 
that the Qur’an commands able-bodied Muslims with fasting during the month of 
Ramadan. However, at a more particular and technical level, modern day Muslims 
living in Turkey stand at an undeniable distance from the Qur’an. Neither do Turkish 
Muslims speak the language of the Qur’an, nor are the finer details of 7th century 
Arabic experience in the Qur’an familiar to them. Thus, to a certain degree, the 
Qur’an is both familiar and intelligible, as well as alien and incomprehensible to 
present-day readers.  
 
 282 
In order to mitigate the problem of alienation, a modern Muslims could refer to 
classical sources in order to better understand the historical context to which the 
Qur’an belongs, or uncover its meanings as recorded by authorities that are 
chronologically closest to the Qur’an. However, as Öztürk argues, the biggest 
problem with classical sources, is the fact that they are liable to manipulation and 
disinformation (dezenformasyon) at the hands of various political, sectarian, and 
theological interest known to Islamic history. As such, not only did Muslims lose 
touch with the meaning of the Qur’an on account of the fact that Muslims have 
culturally outgrown ‘the world of the Qur’an’, but also because their current 
understanding of the Qur’an might be based on distorted interpretations that were 
developed in the course of Islamic history to further ideological agendas. 
 
While Öztürk and Cündioğlu’s works agree to this extent, Öztürk’s work does have 
broader implications for the debates concerning the surplus and futurity of meaning 
that are otherwise missing in Cündioğlu’s work. This is predominantly due to the 
fact that Öztürk maintains a two-step hermeneutics that also constructively relates 
to the problem of subjectively understanding the Qur’an, which is not present in 
Cündioğlu’s work. As previously discussed, in Öztürk’s framework one must remain 
as objective as possible where the Qur’an’s historical significance is considered. 
However, in respect to the Qur’an’s secondary and contemporary significance, 
interpreters cannot escape from involving their own subjective backgrounds if they 
are to succeed in properly mediating the Qur’an’s message with present-day 
circumstances. To repeat a recurrent example, the cutting of hands might have 
been the most apt retribution for a thief given the circumstances and resources of 
7th century Arabia. However, in the light of present-day resources and means, a 
better measure would be to correct a thief through various social services.  A better 
measure not because of our modern sensibilities but in respect to how this measure 
better realizes the spirit behind God’s original injunction, which was to correct the 
thief and protect the community. As such, besides the optimism of meaning 
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recovery, in Öztürk’s framework there is also a futurity to the meanings of the 
Qur’an in the possibility of a better application of verses than historically known.     
 
Öztürk based this possibility of new and different implementations of revelation on 
the notion that the form of a linguistic utterance is not fully commensurate with the 
intention that was cause for its communication. Hence, to recount another 
example, God’s promise of paradise is not fully commensurate with its concomitant 
descriptions in the Qur’an. For, as Öztürk argued, these descriptions were tailored 
to the aesthetic sensibilities of 7th century Arabic men and women. Rather, the 
essence of the meaning of paradise resides in the fact that it is the place where all 
subjective dreams become realized. Thus, the significance of paradise is not 
exhausted by its contingent descriptions in the Qur’an but by the imagination of its 
readership in the present and the unknown future. Yet, despite this open-ended 
possibility of reading the Qur’an in new ways, this is not to say that Öztürk 
acknowledges the possibility that God intended different things simultaneously. On 
the contrary, all elements of Öztürk’s work hint towards the fact that God has 
communicated a single transcendent intention that humans subsequently relate to 
their particular situation in new and imaginative ways without straying away from 
the essence of God’s message.  
 
There is nothing in Öztürk’s work that lends credence to the belief that God is 
purporting multiple different things with his Qur’an. In this sense there is an overlap 
between the ideas of Öztürk and Cündioğlu, since both authors do not advocate a 
hermeneutics that assumes that God intended different things simultaneously. 
Variance, as we saw earlier, is in Öztürk’s framework not in the intention behind 
verses but in their implementation. In a sense this is very logical, for if Öztürk had 
argued that variance could be retraced to God’s intention while maintaining that 
God’s intention is the universal constant behind verses,  then Öztürk would have to 
account for the possibility that God’s ultimate wish is for humankind to prosper and 
not prosper, for a thief to be corrected and not to be corrected. This, however, 
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would mean that God would contradict Himself. Accordingly, in Öztürk’s framework 
variant readings can never be justified with the argument that God willed different 
things, only by arguing that new contexts can result in new subjective 
implementations of God’s solitary intention.  
 
Despite acknowledging the universal higher objectives behind God’s contingently 
formulated message, there is also an undercurrent in Öztürk’s work that specifically 
argues that certain verses of the Qur’an do not have any futurity to their meaning. 
Some verses of the Qur’an are simply responding to contingent historical events, 
and only have a meaning for that moment. There is no higher ethical message to be 
inferred from such verses in order to enable them to be pertinent in renewed 
circumstances. A clear example of this were some of the stories within the Qur’an 
that were only narrated to satisfy certain curiosities that Muhammad’s detractors 
had. In other words, these narrations were ad-hoc responses, and are not the kind 
of verses that harbour a transcendent message that can be discovered over and 
over again by new subjectivities. 
 
In Alpyağıl’s framework, on the other hand, there are yet again similar and different 
consequences to be discovered for the surplus and futurity of meaning in the 
Qur’an. There is no doubt that Alpyağıl shares similar ideas to that of Öztürk and 
Cündioğlu. For example, similar to the other authors, Alpyağıl also accorded an 
important hermeneutical place to the intersubjective dimensions of language. In 
Alpyağıl’s framework, private language is impossible. Thus, to claim that one 
interprets certain words by virtue of his or her own private insights, is similar to the 
claim that one can take any given word and ascribe to it a random meaning. Since 
the latter was proven to be impossible and nonsensical within the hypothetical 
discussion of private language use, it means that any interpretation that does not 
respect previously established conventions of language, is likewise nonsensical. 
Thus, comparable to the other authors, we can already argue from Alpyağıl’s 
perspective that any appeal to a surplus of meanings in the Qur’an that was not 
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historically known or possible within the constraints of a language, is already from 
the onset suspect and inadmissible. However, unlike Cündioğlu, Alpyağıl does 
maintain a view of objectivity that is not statically fixed in the past and is able to 
change over time. Likewise, in contrast to Öztürk, Alpyağıl questions whether there 
is not more futurity to the otherwise contingent historical meanings of the Qur’an.  
 
While it is true that rules ought to be followed, it is also true in Alpyağıl’s eyes that 
rules cannot be followed without being interpreted.  Alpyağıl demonstrated this 
with a very straightforward example from the Qur’an. To recall, in verse 25:67 the 
addressees of the Qur’an are told that the servants of God are neither extravagant 
nor stingy. However, what constitutes extravagance or stinginess is ultimately 
something that is relative to a certain context. What might have constituted an 
extravagant spending in one situation, could well be a sign of stinginess in another 
context. Moreover, despite Alpyağıl not having presented this example, it is not 
difficult to envision how the most modest breakfast in Western Europe today could 
be regarded by medieval standards to be lavish, simply on account of the progress 
in food security. Hence, as Alpyağıl demonstrated, renewed contexts can lead to 
renewed explanations of certain verses.  
 
There is thus an immediate contrast to be encountered between Alpyağıl and 
Cündioğlu in regard to variant explanations of the same word in the Qur’an. For 
Cündioğlu, renewed readings cannot measure their validity against present-day 
understanding. However, in Alpyağıl’s view, words such as extravagance, should be 
interpreted according to present-day conventions if we are to properly apply them 
in contemporary situations. Accordingly, there is a double commitment to be 
discovered in Alpyağıl’s thinking that is loyal to both the subjective and objective 
meaning of the Qur’an. Loyal to the subjective meaning, because every context 
demands a different reading if the Qur’an is to be properly interpreted in a certain 
age. Conversely, loyal to the objective meaning, because the subjective 
interpretation should ultimately be approved by the greater community.   
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It is this latter fact, that differentiates Alpyağıl also from Öztürk in respect to the 
problem of variant readings. While Alpyağıl and Öztürk both acknowledge how the 
implementation of verses can change over time, it is only Alpyağıl that explicitly 
argues that this implementation must also be acknowledged by the greater 
community. In Öztürk’s work there is only an explicit emphasis on the fact that the 
reconstruction of the Qur’an’s historical significance must objectively justified. The 
Qur’an’s subsequent significance is not put to the stringent condition that it must 
be acknowledged by the greater community of Muslims. The only real condition 
that can be surmised from Öztürk’s work, is the fact that new implementations of 
certain verses should not contradict what is believed to be the higher objectives of 
these verses. Given that the letter follows the spirit of the law, so should also the 
application of the law.  
 
The difference between Öztürk and Alpyağıl’s ideas becomes further noticeable in 
regard to the problem of higher objectives and the Qur’an. Before I elaborate 
further on this difference, I wish to shed a little light on the notion itself, since 
Alpyağıl and Öztürk already assume their readers to be familiar with the 
background of the concept. Such an assumption is not that surprising, since anyone 
that is familiar with modern Islamic discourse, will inevitably have observed the rise 
and proliferation of the literature on the higher objectives of Islamic Law (maqāṣid 
al-sharīʿa). This traditional concept, as its name suggests, focuses on the essence of 
Islamic Law in terms of its abstract higher objectives, rather than its particulars. Put 
more crudely, it focuses on what the spirit of the law is, rather than its letter.  
 
Given its current prominence, various attempts have been made by reformist and 
non-reformist researchers into uncovering the historicity of the concept in 
traditional Islamic discourse. Partly out of a genealogical interest but also because 
of the weight that traditional concepts carry for a conventional Muslim audience. 
Reform without traditional authority is inevitably a challenging task. Hence, if a 
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recourse to the higher objectives of Islamic Law were to be something practiced 
and approved by traditional authorities, then reformists would inevitably have an 
easier task of convincing their audience of the legitimacy of their own appeal to 
these higher objectives. Accordingly, anyone studying this concept will discover that 
different historicities have been accorded to the concept, retracing it back to 
various important stages of Islamic history, such as the eponymous founders of the 
legal schools in Islam or the companions of the Prophet. However, in order to 
introduce the concept, I will refer only to one interpretation of the concept, that is 
as outlined by the 14th century Andalusian scholar al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388). Mainly 
because of the dominant presence of al-Shāṭibī’s ideas in contemporary discussions 
concerning the subject matter and his influence on different modernist thinkers.  
 
Al-Shāṭibī surely did not advance the idea of higher objectives with modernist 
scruples in mind. Rather, the concept of higher objectives was introduced in 
relation to the problem of whether God’s actions have a rationally definable cause 
(taʿlīl). Unlike his predecessor al-Rāzī (d. 1210), al-Shāṭibī did believe that humans 
are capable of discerning the reasons behind God’s actions717. While we might not 
come to this hermeneutical principle from an explicit mention of the text, according 
to al-Shāṭibī we can infer (istiqrāʾ) this from a holistic reading of a greater body of 
verses. In other words, by recurrently making note of the fact that God Himself 
mentions in verses that there is a specific preponderance involved in His request or 
report. For example, in verse 20:14 it is stated that the prayer should be maintained 
in order to remember God. Another example is verse 4:165, wherein the sending of 
messengers is unequivocally related to a clear rationale: “that humankind, after 
(the coming) of the messengers, should have no plea against Allah.”718 Thus, for al-
Shāṭibī, not only are there clear reasons for why God requests or reports 
something, but He also explicitly mentions these reasons in His Qur’an719. 
 
 
717 Abū Isḥāq Al-Shāṭibī, Al-Muwāfaqāt Fī Uṣūl Al-Sharīʿa, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1997), 322. 
718 Qur’an 4:165 
719 Al-Shāṭibī, Al-Muwāfaqāt Fī Uṣūl Al-Sharīʿa, 2:323. 
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After establishing this hermeneutical fact that God’s law has a rationale behind it 
that is intelligible to human subjects, al-Shāṭibī further ventures forward into 
constructing a comprehensive hierarchical framework wherewith the sharīʿa is 
appreciated. At the very heart of the sharīʿa, as al-Shāṭibī argues, resides the 
ultimate objective of aiding subjects in procuring well-being (maṣlaḥa) in the 
present and the hereafter720. Accordingly, to realize this greater purpose, the 
sharīʿa is structured around a tripartite framework: there are the elements of the 
sharīʿa that pertain to the necessities (ḍarūriyāt), those who pertain to exigencies 
(ḥājiyāt), and those who pertain to enhancements (taḥsīniyāt)721. Thus, any 
injunction that protects life belongs to the necessities, since protecting life is one of 
the absolute aims of the sharīʿa. However, when something is urgent, without being 
absolutely necessary, it belongs to the category of exigencies. An example of this 
pertains to the abatement of fasting when one is ill: “But if any of you is ill, or on a 
journey, the prescribed number (Should be made up) from days later”722. Finally, 
there are the elements of the sharīʿa that only improve quality of life but are 
neither necessary nor urgent within a given situation; Islamic rules on personal 
hygiene are a clear example of this. 
 
It is with the question of which items belong to the category of necessities that the 
theory of higher objectives and the problem of subjectivity start to intersect.  
According to al-Shāṭibī, the most primary aims of the sharīʿa revolve around the 
following five necessities:  protection of life, progeny, religion, intellect, and 
property. One could even discover these aims, argues al-Shāṭibī, in other religions. 
Nevertheless, despite their perennial and obvious nature, other contemporaries of 
al-Shāṭibī, such as al-Ṭūfī (d. 1316) and al-Subkī (d. 1355) have both added a sixth 
item to the list that al-Shāṭibī did not include. The item in question pertains to 
honour, and as al-Qahtani relates, “They [i.e. al-Ṭūfī and al-Subkī] argued that 
sensible people would often be willing to sacrifice their lives and wealth in defense 
 
720 Al-Shāṭibī, 2:322. 
721 Al-Shāṭibī, 2:324. 
722 Qur’an 2:184 
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of their honor.”723 Thus, as this example shows, one could argue that honour is 
more essential than life, because there have been men and women who have given 
up their lives and wealth in defence of their honour and should therefore also 
belong to the list of necessities. However, does this not also hint at the fact that 
what is defined as a necessity is based on subjective circumstances and 
estimations? For, we can easily imagine the inverse of the earlier argument: while it 
might hold true in some parts of the Middle East that honour is more important 
than life, one would be hard-pressed to argue that the average Dutchman, for 
example, would kill or die over honour. Accordingly, can we put questions marks, as 
Alpyağıl does, by wondering whether the so-called objective higher aims of God are 
in reality the interpreter’s own subjective projections on the text? 
 
Some concepts cannot escape from being involved in certain value hierarchies. The 
universal is often regarded in higher esteem than the particular, and the spirit or 
essence of something is usually deemed to be more valuable than its form. 
Accordingly, when Öztürk develops the binaries of the universal transhistorical 
elements of the Qur’an vis-à-vis the contingent particular elements, he inevitably 
also creates a certain hierarchy. This hierarchy, as it was recurrently emphasized, 
favours the purpose behind a verse, i.e. the higher objective, over the specific form 
in which a verse was delivered.  However, Alpyağıl suspects that such hierarchies 
are not derived from the text but are the consequence of a modernist appreciation 
of past cultures.  
 
An optimistic appreciation of modernity inevitably assumes that certain changes in 
the modern world are a sign of progress. Hence, as Alpyağıl argued, any interpreter 
that reads a text that belongs to a past perceived as less developed, will by default 
hold the text accountable to the more elevated standards of the present. 
Bifurcations into contingent injunctions vis-à-vis universal higher objectives, are 
 
723 Musfir bin Ali Al-Qahtani, Understanding Maqasid Al-Shari’ah: A Contemporary Perspective 
(London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2015), 18. 
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according to Alpyağıl a disguised way in which the modernist interpreter deals with 
the dissonance between the values of the present and those espoused by a 
historical text such as the Qur’an. Accordingly, historicists create dualities such as 
ideal-contingent, historical-transhistorical, and universal-particular, in order to still 
acknowledge the Qur’an in some capacity, while ignoring other aspects of its text. 
In other words, while the higher aims of the sharīʿa still have a place in the modern 
world, since they are too abstract to conflict, and are therefore, acknowledged as 
objective and universal; the particular implementation of the sharīʿa is regarded to 
conflict with modern norms and values, and hence, is considered to be historical 
and out of place.  
 
Alpyağıl, as we had discovered in a previous chapter, challenges this notion by 
arguing firstly that we should not value the meaning of verses according to a 
progression bias but according to whether these verses are context appropriate. For 
example, in verse 8:60 it is argued that believers should prepare for combat by 
readying “steeds of war”. It is not hard to see that Qur’an historicist would argue 
that such verses were meaningful only in their own times, since by the standard of 
modern warfare and artillery, war horses are very much an outdated choice when 
one is able to employ tanks or fighter jets. However, as Alpyağıl argued, while this 
advice might feel out of place in present-day United States, it is undoubtedly 
relevant, or maybe even necessary, in some parts of the world, such as Afghanistan. 
Accordingly, verses must be appreciated according to the situation, and not in light 
of the modernist bias and belief in progression.  
 
Besides, rather than arguing for a model in which the present values are leading, 
Alpyağıl would like to advocate an approach that is best described in terms of a 
fusion of horizons. An interpreter should not discard the historical elements of the 
Qur’an because they feel alien or outdated relative to his present-day situation but 
should attempt at drawing parallels with their own context. A modern Turkish 
reader and an ancient Arabic text have different horizons of meaning. For example, 
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the concept of ‘camel’ is realised differently within the cultural horizon of 7th 
century Arabia vis-à-vis present-day Turkey. While in the prior the camel is seen as 
an important part of their cultural and biological ecosystem, in the latter instance a 
camel might be a simple novelty animal observed in a zoo. Accordingly, to still 
understand a camel for what it is in the context of meaning that belongs to the 
Qur’an, a Turkish reader would have to find its analogue in his or her own cultural 
context.  
 
The notion of finding analogues in new contexts, was also argued by Öztürk. 
However, what is of note, is how distinctly similar the hermeneutical premises are 
shared by both authors. For starters, both Alpyağıl and Öztürk argued that the 
Qur’an is not a book that has provided every particular solution to all kinds of 
imaginable human problems. On the contrary, the Qur’an has specifically only 
addressed a limited set of issues with a specific set of solutions. Moreover, when 
the Qur’an offers a solution, the Qur’an does so as an example of how the problem 
should be solved, and not to say that this is the only solution to all kinds of different 
situations. The idea that the Qur’an only provides an example and not the only 
possible way to address an issue was argued by Öztürk in reference to his claim that 
a linguistic form is not commensurate with the intent of an utterance. However, 
Alpyağıl argues this in a less refined manner by stating that the provisional nature of 
solutions should be read between the lines of the Qur’an: “If the expression is not 
out of place, the Qur’an is a book that says “for example” between the lines (söz 
arasında).”724 Hence, when we return to the problem of preparing horses for war in 
the modern world, Alpyağıl’s response would be to not only have an open mind 
about how such a verse could become relevant in other situations but also, when it 
is not relevant, to consider it in didactive terms. In other words, as Alpyağıl’s 
argument suggests, as a starting point to understand that in war one ought to 
prepare the best of military resources, which respectively meant in 7th century 
Arabia a horse and presently a tank.       
 
724 WHWH, p. 158 
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On the other hand, Alpyağıl does acknowledge similar to Öztürk that not all verses 
in the Qur’an are relevant. For example, verse 33:6 argues that the Prophet’s wives 
are the mothers of believers. Indirectly this meant that Muslims could not marry 
the Prophet’s wives. Accordingly, it is only natural that some Muslims might ask to 
what degree such verses have any futurity to them when the Prophet’s wives have 
long deceased?  A similar case could also be made concerning miracles. The verses 
that report on the various miracles of prophets, is hardly something that could be 
transposed through analogical situations or the fusion of horizons into present-day 
experiences. However, in such cases Alpyağıl hopes that these verses are 
appreciated by either considering them as matters of faith or part of the overall 
narrative identity of Muslims. Such verses might not be reenactable in the present, 
but they are part of the historical cultural consciousness of Islam: prophets did 
come with miracles, and Muhammad’s wives were in status considered as mothers 
to the believers.  
 
Despite this substantial hermeneutical claim that the Qur’an provides examples and 
not absolute solutions, neither Öztürk nor Alpyağıl directly address the implications 
that their theories have for the futurity of meaning in the Qur’an. To a degree this 
could be explained by the often-discussed dichotomy between hermeneutics and 
exegesis. Accordingly, it is unfair to expect a fully-fledged exegesis of the Qur’an 
when the question is not about what the Qur’an says but how our human capacity 
to understand relates to the interpretation of the Qur’an. Nevertheless, even in the 
scope of theory, one might expect some of the practical consequences of the theory 
to be part of its exposition. Especially when these practical consequences are so 
immediate to any reader of Alpyağıl and Öztürk’s theories. Hence, it seems highly 
unlikely that the architects of these theories could not think themselves of these 
implications, unless we are willing to ascribe this to a lack of foresight, or the fact 
that some conclusions were left equivocal on account of how delicate their nature 
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is. Regardless, the fact remains that some pertinent questions are still to be 
successfully answered by either of the authors.   
 
To start with the first question, Alpyağıl argued that different contexts could still 
make certain practices in the Qur’an become meaningful, or even necessary for that 
matter. However, as crass and rhetorical as this might sound, does it mean that 
there are actually different, and maybe even, future contexts possible where men 
are allowed to have extramarital intercourse with female slaves? For if we are to 
read the Qur’an, we discover that it states that believing men may only have 
intercourse with “those joined to them in the marriage bond, or (the captives) 
whom their right hands possess.”725  Accordingly, we can wonder if this mean that 
there are still contexts possible wherein men may have slaves, and where - by 
extension - the institute of slavery could become effective? If we are to strictly 
apply the earlier example of how the preparation of horses for war might be 
irrelevant for an American infantry but still relevant for an Afghan infantry, we have 
to assume that a similar scenario might also be possible for the practice of having 
extramarital intercourse with female slaves.   
 
On the other hand, Alpyağıl could argue that in regard to the problem of slavery 
that one must not attempt at understanding the Qur’an in its historical immediacy 
through our modernist biases but through an empathetic attempt at fusing the 
different horizons that the present-day interpreter and the past text belong to. 
However, in such a case we would have to find analogues for 7th century slavery in 
our contemporary experiences in order to better understand the verse in its own 
context as well as how it relates to our situation. Accordingly, we know that the 
Qur’an acknowledges the existence of slaves. However, we also know that the 
manumission of slaves was advocated by the Qur’an, since righteousness is 
described as the spending of one’s substance “for orphans, for the needy, for the 
 
725 Qur’an 23:6 
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wayfarer, for those who ask, and for the ransom of slaves”726. However, given these 
facts, can an interpreter then go as far as to read the Qur’an in such a way that he 
or she firstly draws an analogy between 7th century slaves and present-day 
exploited low-wage workers, followed by regarding the improvement of ill-fated 
working conditions akin to the act of manumission?  Alpyağıl’s work seems to also 
suggest this outcome; however, he is not clear about what the exact parameters or 
limits of his analogical approach is.   
 
A similar critique could also be voiced toward Öztürk. Especially given the fact that 
Öztürk does believe that the aims of the Qur’an can be better implemented in 
future circumstances. Accordingly, with this perspective in mind, we can read the 
Qur’an and discover the following verse: “O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters, 
and the believing women, that they should cast their outer garments over their 
persons (when abroad): that is most convenient, that they should be known (as 
such) and not molested.”727 Now, it is not difficult to infer the ultimate intent 
behind the injunction of the Islamic dress code for women, since the verse clearly 
states “that they should be known (as such) and not molested”. Consequently, is it 
possible – given Öztürk’s belief in the possibility of better implementation – that 
women who have found better ways in which they could protect themselves from 
molestation to actually forego the classical Islamic dress code? Öztürk’s work 
implies such a reading. This can easily be deduced from the example of the cutting 
of hands, as Öztürk argued that a better modern solution to the correction of a thief 
would be through social services. However, while Öztürk’s work suggests such a 




726 Qur’an 2:177 




If we are to sum up the earlier discussions concerning the status of variant readings 
in contemporary Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey, we would have to start with the 
assessment that these theories maintain an outlook that is both insulated and 
paradoxically very porous. Thus, while there is a strong element in these theories 
that seeks to limit the way in which the Qur’an is read differently than its previous 
reception history, there is simultaneously – in some ways an unintended – element 
of opening up avenues for reading the Qur’an in different ways than previously 
known by tradition. However, given the fact that the authors have not addressed 
the preliminary implications of their theories, there is also an element of 
incompleteness to be discovered in their theories.  
 
In regard to the insulated dimension of these theories, it is clear that anachronistic 
readings of the Qur’an are by default rejected by all three authors. To put it 
differently, an interpreter that circumvents the Qur’an’s original reception history in 
order to argue an understanding of the Qur’an that is entrenched in modern frames 
of references, is by default implicating themselves in a hermeneutically illegitimate 
reading of the Qur’an. Thus, for example, one cannot entertain the idea that the 
Qur’an is a revelation that contains in the depths of its texture an exhibition on 
quantum mechanical theory. Likewise, to argue that the Qur’an spoke not of slaves 
as bondsmen but of employees, is similarly out of place.  
 
Yet, despite attempts to limit the ways in which the Qur’an is read by modernist 
ideological frames of references, such as scientific positivism or reformism, there is 
also an explicit and implicit opening up of other ways wherein the Qur’an can be 
read in different and new ways. In Cündioğlu’s framework it is possible to read the 
Qur’an differently as long as one is able to justify that their reading rather than that 
of tradition goes back to God’s sole, objective intention. Likewise, in Alpyağıl’s view 
it is possible to read the Qur’an differently, since the meaning of words such as 
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miserliness can change over time. Moreover, one can read the Qur’an heuristically, 
followed by a need to find contemporary analogues to the examples presented by 
the Qur’an. Finally, in Öztürk’s view one can relate the higher intent behind verses 
in better ways to contemporary situations than how these verses have been 
historically implemented.  
 
There is without doubt a lot of potential to be discovered in contemporary Qur’an 
hermeneutics in Turkey for new ways in which the Qur’an can be read. However, it 
is only a potential whose rough edges have to still be worked out and whose 
implications have to be further drawn out. Cündioğlu emphasized the historical-
critical method but did not address the finer inconsistencies of this method, such as 
the lack of theoretical handles wherewith the disparity in historical data can be 
tackled. Likewise, Alpyağıl argued that meaning can be recovered analogically in the 
present, but what are the limits of these analogies? Can slavery be analogically 
understood, or even more so, implemented in the present? Finally, what are the 
limits of implementing the Qur’an in better ways in the present, as Öztürk argued? 
Does this mean that one can alter the Islamic dress code, or for that matter, other 
rituals of the Qur’an? Despite their urgency, all of these questions, are as far as the 




Final reflections on the state of Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey  
 
In the following sections, I wish to conclude this dissertation with final reflections 
on the state of Qur’an hermeneutics in Turkey as gathered from previous chapters. I 
will present and compare these reflections with the findings and conclusions drawn 
in two other seminal studies in this field. These studies are respectively Körner’s 
Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology: 
Rethinking Islam and Wilkinson’s Dialectical Encounters: Contemporary Turkish 
Muslim Thought in Dialogue.  
 
Among his final remarks, Körner compared Turkish thought to a thriving young 
jungle without much “bio-diversity”. For, as Körner concluded, the Turkish authors 
restricted themselves to only one type of question: ethics. In other words, to the 
question as to how the Qur’an can be made ethically acceptable again. However, 
this focus stifled Qur’an hermeneutics in two ways. First, it made hermeneutics only 
serve a mechanical function, for “we know what is there in the Koran, ethics; and 
we know what must come out, modern ethics. The only question left is, how do we 
get it out? Hermeneutics has [hence] become a tin-opener.”728 Second, since the 
focus of Turkish hermeneutics is to prove that the “Koran can keep up”, it put 
Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics at risk of “producing nothing but apologetics”729.  
 
Having related Körner’s findings to this dissertation, I agree with the fact that 
Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics is indeed a young jungle. However, in respect to the 
discourse studied in this dissertation, I have come to find the works of these Turkish 
thinkers to be more diverse and more compelling than being a simple tin-opener or 
apologetic defence of the Qur’an’s relevance in modernity. Unlike Körner who only 
studied modernist, university theology and the works of the Ankara School, I had 
 
728 Körner, “Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology : 
Rethinking Islam,” 204. 
729 Körner, 204. 
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made a case in the introduction chapter to study also historicist (tarihselci) 
discourse not belonging to the Ankara School (Öztürk), university theology (ilahiyat) 
outside of Ankara (Alpyağıl), and non-university, research (araştırma yazarci) 
discourse (Cündioğlu). This accordingly resulted in discoveries that present a 
different picture of Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics from the one depicted by Körner. 
A picture in which we can see that the authors actively deprioritize or even reject 
the instrumentalization of hermeneutics in order to make the Qur’an more 
palatable for modern sensibilities.   
 
Alpyağıl, Cündioğlu and Öztürk have each made a hermeneutical case for the 
appreciation of the Qur’an with its historical particularity, even if that particularity 
goes against the grain of contemporary sentiments. Their hermeneutics were 
rooted in the motivation to respond to excesses in contemporary Qur’an studies. 
For Öztürk one of these excesses is the over universalizing of the Qur’an’s address. 
As such, Öztürk made an explicit case to argue that some verses were simply 
particular to a historical context, and should not be forced to instil a transcendental, 
universal ethics. Likewise, Cündioğlu explicitly argued against interpretations that 
abused the polysemy of Arabic in order to apologetically advance new, politically 
correct readings of the Qur’an. Finally, Alpyağıl suspected historicist readings of 
being an underhanded attempt at disqualifying the Qur’an’s norms and values in 
favour of those espoused by modernity. Accordingly, Alpyağıl provided a counter 
hermeneutics that did not read the Qur’an in supersessionist and apologetic terms 
but in an intercultural and cyclical way. Preparing horses for war was indeed 
historically relevant, but that does not exclude – even if we now have tanks at our 
disposal – that there are not still cultures for whom this message is pertinent, or 
that we might enter a future wherein it can also become relevant again for 
developed countries. Accordingly, Alpyağıl’s hermeneutics does not even wish to be 
apologetical by either historicizing verses to only be relevant to the past. Neither 
does he wish to read these verses in alternate ways so that they do agree with 
modern norms and values. Our particular present is for Alpyağıl simply not the 
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ultimate reference or sole proprietor of the definition of wisdom and meaning that 
the Qur’an can offer.  
 
Körner was also disappointed by the limited ambitions of the Turkish thinkers. As 
Körner recalls, “But how can one study Koran hermeneutics, and then complain that 
what one has found is only hermeneutics?“730 For Körner the answer to this 
question resides in the ambiguity of the term hermeneutics: “here, one should be 
reminded of the ambiguity of the word 'hermeneutics'.”731 In Körner’s work, 
hermeneutics does not only pertain to the theory of interpretations but also actual 
interpretation. Since the latter is underdeveloped in the works of the Turkish 
thinkers, it follows that Körner is still hopeful that the Turkish “theological 
workshop” will one day produce “an even more theological Islam, which casts new 
light on our questions, visions and lives.”732 
 
In this dissertation I had specifically redirected and tempered such an expectation 
by explicitly divorcing hermeneutics from interpretation. In the second chapter I 
had made a case that hermeneutics is a contemplation on the operations and 
conditions in which the meanings of things become intelligible, expressed at its 
lowest threshold in a statement. I made this separation on account of the genealogy 
of Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics. Turkish Qur’an hermeneutics has been in the last 
few decades a response to a sprawl of perceived arbitrary interpretations of the 
Qur’an. Hence it is by its very nature a meta-level critique and pedagogy on how the 
Qur’an should be read. Its starting point, as I had demonstrated up to the fifth 
chapter, is to insulate the Qur’an from being read freely by stipulating subjective 
and objective requirements. Its ambition is fundamentally philosophical, and less 
exegetical. If there is any exegesis, it is only to drive a theoretical point forward.  
 
 
730 Körner, 205. 
731 Körner, 205. 
732 Körner, 205. 
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Turkish thought remains fundamentally theoretical but also dialectical. This latter 
aspect was extensively assessed by Wilkinson. Wilkinson argued that Turkish 
thought is at its most creative a dialectical enterprise that seeks to navigate at 
certain times western sources with the help of Turkish and Arabic ones, and other 
times Turkish or Arabic discussions with the aid of Western sources733.  In this 
dissertation, I have only come to further vindicate this claim. For example, 
Cündioğlu employed Saussurean and Chomskyan concepts in order to navigate the 
classical discussion on the status of the lafz-i müşterek (polysemic expressions) in 
the Qur’an. Conversely, Öztürk came to the defence of Dilthey by arguing that the 
psychologization of God’s will was possible despite ontological difference. His 
evidence was the muvafakat-i Ömer, that is the recurrent historical occurrence 
wherein the Prophet’s companion ʿUmar had voiced an opinion on a matter that 
subsequently was reiterated, and thereby vindicated, by revelation. With this 
concept Öztürk demonstrated that the argument of ontological difference cannot 
be held as a hermeneutical principle, since history proved that God and humans 
have a shared reason734.   
 
This dialectical engagement is however not always as constructive or deep. In the 
words of Wilkinson, “The [dialectical] responses vary and include negative, positive, 
and constructive elements; they include clichés, generalizations, critical insights, 
and points of active dialogue.”735 Indeed, the cross-cultural dialectics inherent in 
Turkish thinkers can deeply vary from Alpyağıl’s very dense engagement with 
Wittgensteinian thought to Öztürk’s simple citation of Heidegger that language is 
the home of being. However, while Turkish theology is learning a lot from western 
philosophical discourse, the question remains as to whether western philosophical 
 
733 Wilkinson, Dialectical Encounters: Contemporary Turkish Muslim Thought in Dialogue, 227. 
734 ʿUmar’s suggestions were based on rational deliberations. By becoming vindicated in the Qur’an, 
the rationality behind these suggestions becomes also accepted by God. However, by implication, it 
is hard to think that God accepts the rationality of a rule or solution suggested by ʿUmar when God 
Himself has not rationalized the rule itself.  If God has indeed rationalized and come to the same 
conclusion that a rule is appropriate for a given context, that means that man and God – despite 
being ontologically different - share to a certain degree the same type of reason.  
735 Wilkinson, Dialectical Encounters: Contemporary Turkish Muslim Thought in Dialogue, 227. 
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discourse can learn something from Turkish theology’s appropriation of some of its 
ideas? The answer to this seems to be more inclined towards vindication and less 
towards evolution. In other words, the creative appropriation of the Turkish 
thinkers, which itself relies on imaginative arguments, becomes a corpus that 
vindicates and puts certain western ideas into practice. However, because it focuses 
more on using these ideas to drive its own points forward, it does little to evolve 
the western discourse itself from which these ideas are borrowed.  
 
Ultimately it is not so much the purely theoretical nature of Turkish hermeneutics 
or the weaker aspects of its dialectics that I hold the most critically accountable but 
its theoretical open-endedness. As Wilkinson states, “Turkish theologians range in a 
continuum from taking on more prescriptive roles to more explorative roles.”736 
Hence, if I relate this statement to this dissertation, we had similarly discovered the 
prescriptive elements of Turkish thought in the delineation of objective and 
subjective requirements needed to interpret the Qur’an. However, in order to 
delineate these requirements, the Turkish authors were also philosophically 
exploring the problems of objectivity and subjectivity. Whilst exploring these 
problems some authors organically came into certain conclusions that have critical 
consequences for the future of new readings of the Qur’an. However, the full 
philosophical implications, despite some authors intuiting these implications737, was 
only left implied, and the answer often deferred to the future. For example, Öztürk 
extended taʾwīl to jurisprudence and theology. This brought forth the notion that 
renewed subjective mediations could potentially produce new, more contemporary 
metaphors of God and better applications of the injunctions of the Qur’an. 
However, the exact extent and limitations of what could be done better was left 
ambiguous: something the interpreter had to figure out in good conscious. Can we, 
for example, find better means to be chaste and protected from harassment than 
by wearing a head scarf? Can we revitalize the Judeo-Christian metaphor of God as 
 
736 Wilkinson, 235. 
737 The Turkish authors knew that they had drawn conclusions with heavy implications. However, 
they would immediately resort to certain rhetoric that would defer the question.   
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father again within Islam that is wholly compliant with Islam’s strict monotheism? 
None of these questions that truly test the limits of the theories posed, are 
explored by Öztürk himself. Likewise, Alpyağıl argued that historical 
implementations of the Qur’an could become meaningful again in the future. 
However, does this really mean that we can imagine a future wherein slavery 
becomes relevant again? Alpyağıl who was aware of such questions, followed 
Öztürk by also choosing to defer the answer to such controversial questions to the 
prudence of the future interpreter.  
 
I assume that this reticence has only to do with the conservative sensibilities of 
some of the readers in Turkey. In 2020 Öztürk was relieved from his post as 
researcher at the Kur’an Araştırmaları Merkezi (Centre for Qur'an Studies/Research) 
due to certain complaints about the controversial nature of Öztürk’s statements. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that certain answers that were deferred by the 
Turkish authors must still be sought in subsequent works by these thinkers or by 
newer generations. Accordingly, the Turkish authors have laid the foundations and 
created a futurity for Qur’an hermeneutics that is still in wait for the answers they 
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